Vol. 37, no. 2: Full Issue by International Law & Policy, Denver Journal
Denver Journal of International Law & Policy 
Volume 37 
Number 2 Spring Article 8 
April 2020 
Full Issue 
Denver Journal International Law & Policy 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/djilp 
Recommended Citation 
International Law & Policy, Denver Journal (2020) "Full Issue," Denver Journal of International Law & 
Policy: Vol. 37 : No. 2 , Article 8. 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/djilp/vol37/iss2/8 
This Full Issue is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Denver Journal of International Law & Policy by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For 
more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
Denver Journal
of International Law and Policy
VOLUME 37 NUMBER 2 SPRING-2009
TABLE OF CONTENTS
GENERAL ARTICLES
CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC: ECONOMIC
LIBERALIZATION AND RECONCILIATION
IN RWANDA'S COFFEE SECTOR ........ Karol C. Boudreaux 147
and Puja Ahluwalia
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, TRADE, AND
CHINA'S COMPETITION LAWS ........... Mark S. Blodgett, 201
Richard J. Hunter, Jr,
and Robert M. Hayden
COUNTER-TERRORISM AND HumAN RIGHTS:
THE EMERGENCE OF A RULE OF
CUSTOMARY INT'L LAW
FROM U.N. RESOLUTIONS ............. Dr. Joseph Isanga 233
INVISIBLE BORDERS: MAPPING OUT
VIRTUAL LAW? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Kathleen Claussen 257
RIGHTS OF ACTION FOR PRIVATE NON-STATE
ACTORS IN THE WTO DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT SYSTEM ................... Aaron Catbagan 279
2007-2008 LEONARD V.B. SUTTON AWARD
MULTILATERAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS:
FROM MONTREAL To KYOTO - A THEORETICAL
APPROACH TO AN IMPROVED CLIMATE
CHANGE REGIME ....................... Sean Cumberlege 303

CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC:
ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION AND RECONCILIATION
IN RWANDA'S COFFEE SECTOR
KAROL C. BOUDREAUX AND PUJA AHLUWALIA*
I. INTRODUCTION
In some countries, particular industries play especially important roles. In the
United States, for example, the automotive industry has provided hundreds of
thousands of jobs and helped shape the image of America as the land of the
automobile.' More recently, the computer industry has helped create a new image
of the U.S. as a high-tech, well-connected service economy.2 These industries
have contributed to the development of an "American identity."
Coffee has played a unique role in Rwanda's development. For decades,
coffee has been Rwanda's top export and chief source of foreign exchange.3
Thousands of Rwandans have been involved in coffee's cultivation and sale. In
the twenty-first century, the industry continues to provide a livelihood for some
500,000 Rwandan families,4 many of whom work in cooperatives and grow coffee
on small plots on the country's hillsides.5
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1. Kathy E1-Messidi, MSN ENCARTA, Automobile Industry, http://encarta.msn.com (last visited
Feb. 28, 2009) (type "'automobile industry" into the search bar).
2. Andrew Pollack, Japanese Portables Threaten American Lead in Computers, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 24, 1990, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res-9COCE7DB I530F937A157
52C IA966958260&sec=&spon = .
3. Coffee: Rwanda, 43(8) AFRICA RESEARCH BULLETIN: ECONOMIC, FINANCIAL AND
TECHNICAL SERIES 17090B (2006): see also Government of Rwanda, Agricultural Production: Tea and
Coffee. http://www.minagri.gov.rw/article.php3?id-article = 22 (June 10, 2006).
4. Project Rwanda, The Coffee Bike, http://projectrwanda.org/The-Coffee-Bike.php (last visited
Nov. 13, 2008): Green Living Project, SPREAD, Rwanda: Coffee Awakens a National Economy, (Apr.
19, 2008), http://www.greenlivingproject.com/spread-rvanda-coffee-wakes-up-a-national-economy/.
5. RESEARCH INTO USE, RWANDA MIL SCOPING VISIT REPORT 9 (2007), available at
http://www.researchintouse.com/h'downloads/Rwanda_-_MILScoping-Study_- Apr_07.pdf.
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Over the past decade, the coffee sector has been transformed from a highly
controlled, politicized industry to one that is liberalized and quickly developing a
prized niche product: specialty coffee. Rwandans have successfully built a
reputation for quality that buyers in the U.S., Europe, and Asia recognize. These
changes are translating into increased income and greater economic empowerment
for some Rwandan farmers.6
In addition to improving incomes, the liberalized coffee sector increases
opportunities for commercial cooperation among Hutus and Tutsis. Smallholders
are now free to sell their coffee on world markets at prices they negotiate, creating
incentives to form cooperatives in order to benefit from economies of scale
7
Because smallholders retain profits from coffee sales, they also have incentives to
work together to improve the quality of their product. And because coffee in
Rwanda is grown by smallholders, who make up the vast majority of the
population (90%) 8, liberalized coffee policies have the potential to benefit many
Rwandans - Hutus as well as Tutsis.
Rwanda's coffee liberalization, therefore, is likely different from
liberalizations that benefit elites (such as Russian privatizations or Kenya land
titling reforms). 9 It is, to date, an inclusive reform with positive distributional
effects. Because coffee-sector liberalization has raised income, rather than costs,
for the rural poor, this liberalization is less likely to promote conflict than
liberalizations where costs are spread widely (such as the removal of subsidies)
and benefits are narrowly concentrated (such as many privatizations)., 0 We note
that this is an issue that requires further research."'
Journalistic evidence suggests that commercial cooperation exists among
Hutu and Tutsi members of coffee cooperatives and that this cooperation may
contribute to informal reconciliation.12  In June 2008, we sponsored and
participated in exploratory survey work in Rwanda to investigate this issue. Over
ten days, 235 smallholder farmers and employees at coffee washing stations
6. USAID, FrontLines, Mission of the Month: Rwanda (Apr. 2006),
http://www.usaid.gov/press/frontlines/fl-aprO6/dialogue.htm.
7. RUKAZAMBUGA NTIRUSHWA T. DANIEL, DRAFT REPORT ON AGRICULTURAL INNOVATION
AND TECHNOLOGY IN AFRICA: RWANDA ExPERIENCE 14 (2008), available at
http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/243550/RwandaInnovationStudyreport.pdf
8. Id. at 6.
9. See E. Sam Overman, Privatization in China, Mexico, & Russia. A Comparative Study, 19 (1),
PUB. PRODUCTIVITY & MGMT REV. 46, 55 (1995) ("Only two groups appear to have the domestic
capital that could finance privatization. One group is the established political elite and the party
bureaucracy.").
10. Jonathan Morduch et al., Distributional Consequences of the Russian Price Liberalization, 42
(3), ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE 469,469 (1994).
11. See PAUL COLLIER ET AL., BREAKING THE CONFLICT TRAP: CIVIL WAR & DEVELOPMENT
POLICY 53 (Oxford University Press, 2003) (arguing that "the key root cause of conflict is the failure of
economic development. Countries with low, stagnant, and unequally distributed per capita incomes that
have remained dependent on primary commodities for their exports face dangerously high risks of
prolonged conflict.") Rwanda pre-199 4 fits this description and, to a large extent, still does.
12. See infra Part VII.
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completed surveys regarding their attitudes toward reconciliation, among other
issues. 13  Results from these surveys are encouraging, if not dispositive:
membership in a coffee cooperative, as well as longer-term association with a
coffee washing station, and economic and general life satisfaction are significantly
correlated to positive attitudes towards reconciliation. 14  Farmers we surveyed
reported an increased willingness to engage in socially inclusive behavior today in
comparison to the past. Members of cooperatives were less likely to report high
distrust than workers not associated with a cooperative. With respect to material
prosperity, farmers are earning more for their coffee beans today than they were in
the past and are reporting greater economic satisfaction compared to five years
ago.
15
Changes in levels of economic satisfaction stem in part from income earned
through the sale of specialty coffee. Farmers who earn more from the sale of
coffee, and who work together with others in cooperatives (or at private washing
stations), express an improvement in the way they view others. 16  We caution
though, that to the extent that reconciliation is taking place, it is unclear if the
reconciliation is short-term and necessitous or longer-term and sustainable. This is
another question that requires further research.
We believe the Rwandan experience suggests an interesting question: do
government policies that expand commercial interaction among former enemies,
and that spread the benefits of trade to many, prompt commercial cooperation and
perhaps even reconciliation? This suggestion runs counter to some literature on
liberalization and conflict, which suggests that economic liberalization often
contributes to conflict. 
17
13. Interviews were conducted in the local language, Kinyarwanda, at 10 coffee washing stations
in the southern part of the country. Interviews were conducted by a team of students from the National
University of Rwanda in Butare. Five of the ten survey sites were coffee cooperatives; the remaining
five were privately owned coffee washing stations. In the case of interviewees at cooperatives they
included both employees and farmers (in some cases a farmer might also be an employee). Similarly, at
the privately owned coffee washing stations (i.e., non-cooperatives) interviewees were a mix of
employees of the stations and smallholder farmers selling their beans to the station. The methodology
and survey procedure is described in Jutta Tobias, Intergroup Contact Caused by Institutional Change:
An Exploration of the Link Between Deregulation and in Rwanda's Coffee Sector and Attitudes
Towards Reconciliation (2008) (unpublished PhD dissertation, Washington State University) (on file
with author), 25-31. [hereinafter Intergroup Contact]. Surveys on-file with author [hereinafter Coffee
Survey].
14. See Coffee Survey, supra note 13.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER CRAMER, VIOLENCE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: WAR, MEMORY,
PROGRESS (Indiana University Press, 2006); ROLAND PARIS, AT WAR'S END: BUILDING PEACE AFTER
CIVIL CONFLICT 45, 71, 161 (Cambridge University Press, 2004); Andy Storey, Economics and Ethnic
Conflict: Structural Adjustment in Rwanda, 17 (1) DEV. POL'Y REV. 43, 43-44 (1999); David Keen,
Liberalization & Conflict, 26 INT'L POL. SCI. REV. 73 (2005); Han Dorussen, Heterogeneous Trade
Interests & Conflict: What You Trade Matters, 50 (1) J. OF CONFLICT RESOL. 87, 89-92 (2006); Dennis
Galvin, Market Liberalization as a Catalyst for Ethnic Conflict in Senegal & Central Java, Indonesia
13-18 (paper presented at the 97"h meeting of the American Political Science Association, 2001).
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The Rwandan reforms may be distinctive in that they have the potential to
benefit all farmers, Hutus as well as Tutsis. And, as a vast majority of Rwandans
are still engaged in agricultural production, this liberalization creates opportunities
for a broad swathe of people to increase their income.' 8 Such policies provide for
commercial cooperation and may create a climate in which informal reconciliation
takes place. If so, then in post-conflict environments, similar broad-based
liberalization policies may present an important complement to more formal
reconciliation efforts such as international tribunals and local court proceedings.
19
II. COFFEE AND POWER IN RWANDA
The history of the coffee industry in Rwanda, until recently, is that of
unfortunate politicization.2 ° Successive governments used control of the coffee
trade for their political and financial gain. Through compulsory production, export
taxes, and a government-controlled export agency, successive regimes captured the
profits of coffee farmers and used these funds to maintain power. 1 So long as
international coffee prices remained high, the system was stable; however, once
prices dropped in the late 1980s and early 1990s, a key government source of
revenue shrank.22 By the early 1990s, the government lost its ability to pay
farmers a subsidized price for coffee, putting at risk its base of rural support.2 3
Missionaries may have first introduced coffee into Rwanda in the early part of
the twentieth century, but official government involvement began in the 1930s
with the Belgian colonial government's "coffee campaigns. 24  Under these
policies, government authorities built nurseries and supplied seeds, but they also
required Rwandan farmers to plant coffee trees. 25  The colonial government
introduced a mandated minimum price for coffee, created mandatory quality
guidelines, and issued special licenses that allowed only some firms to purchase
18. See The World Bank, Rwanda - Country Brief, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTE
RNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/RWANDAEXTN/0,,menuPK:368714-pagePK: 141132-piPK: 141
107-theSitePK:368651,00.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2008) (noting that "[a]griculture currently accounts
for just fewer than 40 percent of GDP and provides jobs to 90 percent of the population. Most
Rwandans rely on subsistence agriculture with limited participation in the market economy"); see also
AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, AFRICAN ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 2004/2005 382 (2004).
19. See infra Part IIl.
20. Philip Verwimp, The Political Economy of Coffee, Dictatorship, & Genocide, 19(2) EUR. J.
POL. ECON. 161, 161 (2003); see generally Lode Berlage et al., Dictatorship in a Single Export Crop
Economy, (Oct. 2004), available at http://www.hicn.org/papers/dicta.pdf. See Learthen Dorsey, The
Rwandan Colonial Economy: 1916-41, (1983) (unpublished PhD dissertation, Michigan State
University) (on file with author).
21. For a discussion of a variety of African experiences with export agencies, see ROBERT H.
BATES, MARKETS & STATES IN TROPICAL AFRICA: THE POLITICAL BASIS OF AGRICULTURAL POLICIES,
11-29 (University of California Press, 1981); see also TAKAMASA AKIYAMA ET AL., COMMODITY
MARKET REFORMS: LESSONS OF Two DECADES 84-85 (The World Bank, 2001).
22. Verwimp, supra note 20, at 171-75.
23. Id. at 175; see also Andy Storey, Structural Adjustment, State Power & Genocide: The World
Bank and Rwanda, 28 REV. AFR. POL. ECON. 365, 371, 375 (2001) [hereinafter Storey, Structural
Adjustment].
24. Dorsey, supra note 19, at 169.
25. Id. at 166-68.
VOL. 37:2
CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC
coffee. 2 6 They imposed export taxes on coffee sales and individual income taxes
on the local producers, most of whom were Hutu farmers. Tutsi chiefs collected
these taxes, which supported the colonial government and their Tutsi allies.27
The post-independence Kayibanda government (1962-1973) maintained a
tight grip on the coffee sector.28 Under this regime, a government agency (OCIR),
together with a monopsony export company (Rwandex), purchased and then sold
on world markets all coffee grown in Rwanda.29 The farm gate price paid to coffee
farmers was set by the government (by OCIR-Caf6 after it was created in 1978). 3o
Middlemen bought beans from farmers and sold them to a monopsony exporter,
Rwandex. The markets where smallholders brought their beans for purchase acted
as "the economic arm of the Gitarama (i.e. Kayibanda) regime." 31
Heavy government involvement in the coffee sector continued under the
Habyarimana regime (1973-1994).32 During the 1970s and 1980s, as world coffee
prices increased, coffee exports provided between 60 and 80 percent of Rwanda's
export revenue.33 Habyarimana ensured control of these important rents by
appointing relatives and supporters to positions of authority at the powerful and
lucrative state-run coffee agency, OCIR-Caf. 34
26. Id. at 181.
27. Id. at 55-56.
28. David Norman Smith, Globalization and Genocide: Inequality and Mass Death in Rwanda, in
ON THE EDGE OF SCARCITY 149, 158 (Michael N. Dobkoski et al. eds., 2002).
29. Interview by World Investment News with Mr. Anastase Nzirasanaho, Director, Office des
Cafes du Rwanda, available at http://www.winne.com/rwanda/tol3interview.html (last visited Sept. 4,
2008) (noting that before 1978 the Offices des Cultures Industrielles du Rwanda (OCIR) was
responsible for both the coffee and tea sectors. In 1978, OCIR-Caf6 was created to 'promote the sector
on local and international markets.' Before the liberalization of the sector in the 1990s, OCIR-Caf6
managed approximately 30 percent of the country's export volume. The remainder of the exports
flowed through RWANDEX, S.A., a company partially government-owned and created in 1964.).
30. Paul DeLucco, Raising the Bar: Producing Quality Coffee in Rwanda, in ADCIIVOCA
WORLD REPORT 13, 14 (Spring 2006), available at http://www.acdivoca.org/852571DC00681414/
Lookup/WRSpring06-Page 13-14-RaisingtheBar/$file/WRSpringO6-Pagel 3-14-RaisingtheBar.pdf.
31. Verwimp supra note 20, at 163 (stating that monopsony export agencies were common in
Africa before the 1990s. Typically, they bought low and sold high: purchasing commodities at a
mandatory price which was lower than the world market price, but selling at higher, market rates. The
agency kept the difference and, in this way, imposed a tax on producers, most of whom were poor.); see
also P.T. BAUER, DISSENT ON DEVELOPMENT: STUDIES & DEBATES IN DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
387-388 (Harvard University Press, 1972).
32. See Berlage et al., supra note 20, at 22 (noting the policy was contained in a 1978 coffee
cultivation law that made the neglect of coffee trees "punishable" and that created commune-level
coffee monitors who both advised and controlled smallholder farmers. While there was, the authors
note, little pressure to enforce these laws in the early 1980s - because coffee prices were high and
farmers were content to grow coffee- pressures to enforce would have changed in the mid-1980s as
worldwide coffee prices began to tumble.).
33. Berlage et al., supra note 20, at 14. See also David Tardiff-Douglin et al., Find the Balance
Between Agricultural & Trade Policy, Rwanda Coffee Policy in Flux 1 (MSU International
Development Working Papers, No. 59, 1996).
34. Berlage et. al, supra note 20, at 14.
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A rise in coffee prices allowed the government to modestly increase the price
it paid to farmers, although the government continued to retain much of the
difference between the gate price paid to smallholders and the world market price.
Verwimp states: "The very high world market coffee prices allowed the
[Habyarimana] regime's elite to increase both its personal consumption and its
power over the population., 35 The government used its additional revenue to buy
loyalty in rural areas (through higher prices paid for coffee and through subsidized
agricultural inputs) and to spend more on monitoring the population.
36
A crisis began when worldwide coffee prices tumbled in the late 1980s and
the government rapidly lost revenue. 37  For a few years it attempted to keep
payments for coffee stable, but this was an unsustainable policy-especially as,
from 1990 onwards, the government needed resources to fight the invading
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) forces. By the early 1990s, the government
lowered the price it paid to smallholders; price supports to coffee farmers ended in
1992. 38 Storey writes: "[fjor the great mass of ordinary people, the benefits
accruing from the fact that they were ruled by Hutu rather than Tutsi were wearing
thin, with the result that a rupture between rulers and ruled was deepening. 39
With their income falling, farmers wanted to shift into production of another
cash crop, bananas, but this was forbidden by law (the government may have
refused to modify the law because of coffee's role as the major source of export
revenue and a lack of readily available, viable substitutes).40  With an extensive
system of local monitors in place, it was difficult for farmers to ignore the law.4
However, in the face of falling income and hunger, farmers uprooted as many as
300,000 coffee trees42 and planted food and other more attractive cash crops.
43
The fall in coffee prices, coupled with growing military expenditures in
response to the 1990 RPF invasion, meant that Habyarimana faced a political and
35. Verwimp, supra note 20, at 172.
36. Id. at 171-73. Under the Habyarimana regime, the powerful OCIR-Caf6 agency was run by
relatives of the dictator's wife, members of the clan de Madame also know as the "akazu." Id.
37. Id. at 173-75. See also Berlage et. al., supra note 20, at 22-24.
38. See Storey, supra note 17, at 47.
39. Storey, Structural Adjustment, supra note 23, at 369.
40. Verwimp, supra note 20, at 173-74.
41. Id. at 162. Peter Uvin writes of the reach of the post-colonial Rwandan state: "the Rwandese
state has been able to expand its presence to the most remote corners of the territory and of social life.
Representatives of the state and of the single party were present at even the lowest level of social
organization: each "colline" (hill-the basic geographical reference in Rwanda), each extended family
was in permanence surrounded by centrally-appointed administrators, teachers, agricultural monitors,
internal security agents or police agents, as well as by local party cadres of all kinds." Peter Uvin,
Prejudice, Crisis and Genocide in Rwanda, 40 (2) AFR. STUD. REV. 91, 97 (1997). In a similar vein,
Hintjens writes: "[p]ost-independence Rwanda inherited a legacy of close public scrutiny of all spheres
of life, continuing the former colonial and monarchical state's ability to control each individual through
a network of controls, extending from the apex of the regime to its base at household level." Helen M.
Hintjens, Explaining the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, 37(2) J. MOD. AFR. STUD., 241, at 245 (1999).
42. Storey, Structural Adjustment, supra note 23, at 369.
43. Verwimp, supra note 20, at 173-74.
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fiscal crisis.44 One option to deal with the fiscal crisis was to find other sources of
revenue. To this end, the government confiscated property and raised taxes to
supplement the budget and there was some reduction of consumption by elites.45
At the same time, foreign aid became an increasingly important part of the
46budget. Prunier argues that in the 1980s, Rwanda's elite relied on three sources
of "enrichment:" coffee and tea exports, tin exports for a brief time, and foreign
aid.47 As the commodity revenues shrank, "there was an increase in competition
for access to that very specialized resource (foreign aid), which could only be
appropriated through direct control of the government at high levels."
48
However, the reliance upon, and competition for, foreign aid created serious
problems within the elite akazu group: 49 "the various gentlemen's agreements
which had existed between the competing political clans since the end of the
Kayibanda regime started to fracture as the resources shrank and internal power
struggles intensified." o With its growing dependence on foreign aid, and in a bid
to remain in power, the government agreed to an International Monetary Fund
(IMF) structural adjustment program in 1990 that led to further hardships for
farmers.5 i
Verwimp argues that in the early 1990s the regime was no longer able to raise
the revenue it needed to buy rural support.5 2 Faced with rural discontent,
Habyarimana used repression and violence as alternatives to the purchase of rural
44. Patrick Cannon, Elusive Quest? The Political Economy of Reconciliation in Post Genocide
Rwanda, Address at the Sacramento State Center for African Peace & Conflict Resolution 141h Annual
Africa/Diaspora Conference (2005), http://www.csus.edu/org/capcr/documents/archives/2005/Confe
renceProceedings/Cannon- I .pdf.
45. Verwimp, supra note 20, at 174-76.
46. Storey, Structural Adjustment, supra note 23, at 371-72.
47. GERARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDA CRISIS: HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE 84 (Columbia University
Press 1995).
48. Id.
49. "Akazu" can be translated as "'small house" and in the Habyarimana regime it referred to a
group of senior-level military and civilian advisors who were connected to Agathe Habyarimana, the
President's wife. See Hintjens, supra note 41, at 259.
50. See id.; PRUNIER, supra note 47.
51. PETER UVIN, AIDING VIOLENCE: THE DEVELOPMENT ENTERPRISE IN RWANDA 57-59
(Kumarian Press 1998). Uvin writes that in 1991 Rwanda entered into a $90 million structural
adjustment program with the World Bank. In 1992 and 1993 additional "loans were negotiated but
only partially implemented." Key policy goals of the program included improving fiscal and monetary
discipline, expanding the private sector and limiting government involvement in this sector, liberalizing
trade, increasing export production and allowing for increased internal migration of workers. These
loans also required a currency devaluation, which sparked inflation. Uvin notes most of these policy
changes were not implemented so aid disbursements for structural readjustment were suspended. Id.
52. Verwimp, supra note 20, at 177-78.
2009
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
loyalty.53 Evidence shows rising numbers of arbitrary arrests, massacres of Tutsis,
confiscations of property, and rapes during these years.54
To rebuild its popularity, the regime diverted attention from its own economic
policies to the Tutsi/RPF threat, using this as an excuse for the increased level of
repression within Rwandan society. 55 The government demonized the invaders,
argued that allowing Tutsis into the country would mean Hums would have less of
the extremely scarce resource of land, 56 and used the media to foment ethnic
hatred.57 Mostly, the repression was directed at the Tutsi minority, though some
spilled over to Hutus.5 8 The ultimate results were disastrous. In the three months
between April and June of 1994, approximately 800,000 people5 9 were murdered
and up to 250,000 raped 60 in a country with a population between seven and eight
million,61 roughly the size of Connecticut.62  Three quarters of Rwanda's Tutsi
population 63 and many moderate Hums and Hum opponents of the Habyarimana
government died.64 The Rwandan genocide was stopped not by international
53. Verwimp, supra note 20, at 175, 177. Storey points out that in 1992 Habyarimana did agree to
the creation of a coalition government. With rival Hutus in office, the older guard may have felt their
positions in danger, especially as the economic outlook was dire, so Storey argues they used a variety of
strategies to stave off the possible loss of power: electoral manipulation, use of propaganda blaming the
Tutsi for the economic crisis, violence against opponents, and finally, genocide. Storey, Structural
Adjustment, supra note 23, at 369-70, 375.
54. Berlage et. al., supra note 20, at 23.
55. Verwimp, supra note 20, at 178.
56. For a discussion of land scarcity in pre-genocide Rwanda see Catherine Andr& & Jean-
Philippe Platteau, Land Relations Under Unbearable Stress: Rwanda Caught in the Malthusian Trap,
34 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG., 1 (1998).
57. Uvin, supra note 41, at 100.
58. See Storey, supra note 17, at 47.
59. The United Nations reports 800,000 deaths. See, e.g., Letter from Kofi A. Annan, Under-
Sec'y-Gen. for Peacekeeping Operations, U.N. Sec. Council, to President of the U.N. Sec. Council
(Dec. 15, 1999), http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/395/47/IMG/N9939547.pdfOpen
Element; Alison Des Forges, who triangulates data from three sources, estimates that at least 500,000
were killed. ALISON DES FORGES, LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY: GENOCIDE IN RWANDA 15-16
(Human Rights Watch 1999).
60. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SHATTERED LIVES: SEXUAL VIOLENCE DURING THE RWANDAN
GENOCIDE & ITS AFTERMATH (1996), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/l1996/Rwanda.htm#P32
4_67660.
61. Mark A. Drumbl, Punishment, Postgenocide: From Guilt to Shame to Civis in Rwanda, 75
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1221, 1243. For a discussion on regional patterns in violence and how it rapidly spread,
see SCOTT STRAUS, THE ORDER OF GENOCIDE: RACE, POWER, AND WAR IN RWANDA 53-64 (Cornell
University Press 2006).
62. Drumbl, supra note 61, at 1250.
63. Alan J. Kuperman, Provoking Genocide: A Revised Histoiy of the Rwandan Patriotic Front,
6(1) J. GENOCIDE RES. 61 (Mar. 2004).
64. See PRUNIER, supra note 47, at 265; see also Drumbl, supra note 61, at 1248 ("Many of the
10,000 to 30,000 Hum who were massacred during the genocide were killed not because they opposed
the genocide per se, but because they were political opponents of the genocidal regime who challenged
the grip of that regime on power without necessarily contesting its anti-Tutsi fanaticism."); Mark A.
Drumbl, Rule of Law Amid Lawlessness: Counseling the Accused in Rwanda's Domestic Genocide
Trials, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 545, 579 (1998).
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action, but by the RPF who killed between 25,000 and 60,000 Hutus during the
genocide and in reprisal attacks. 65
Verwimp sums up the Habyarimana regime's descent into genocide as the
result of a failed strategy to maintain political power.66 The government lost the
loyalty of the majority rural population and needed to do something to win back
that loyalty or face expulsion (or worse).6 7 Rural support was shattered by the
government's inability to maintain high coffee prices and by unpopular policies
that forced farmers to grow coffee rather than food or other cash crops.68  In
addition, the economic structural adjustment program imposed real hardships on
most Rwandans: inflation rose, taxes increased, price controls were removed, fees
for health and education were introduced, and price supports for coffee were
eliminated.69 These policy changes imposed substantial costs on Rwandans at a
time when the government was forced to defend itself (and hence, expend scarce
resources) against the invading RPF. 70 To maintain power, the government tried to
legitimize its reign by resorting to ethnic ideology. 71 Frightening farmers with the
specter of Tutsi violence was a means to regain rural support.
72
65. Ariel Meyerstein, Between Law & Culture. Rwanda's Gacaca & Postcolonial Legality, 32 L.
& SOC. INQUIRY 467, 472 (2007). RPF soldiers also killed thousands of Hutu civilians after 1994 in
wars in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, the anti-insurgency campaign in northwest Rwanda
in 1997 and 1998 and during the closing of the refugee camps in 1995. Lars Waldorf, Massjusticefor
Massatrocity: Rethinking Local Justice as Transitional Justice, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 1, n. 338 (2006).
Compare DES FORGES, supra note 59, at 705 (describing widespread and systematic human rights
abuses by the RPF before and during the genocide and noting how the RPF massacred groups of
unarmed civilians in public meetings after combat was finished, in places where there had been little or
no slaughter of Tutsi and where militia did not appear to threaten their advance.), with PHILIP
GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM You THAT TOMORROW WE WILL BE KILLED WITH OUR FAMILIES:
STORIES FROM RWANDA 219 (Farrar, Straus & Giroux 1998) ("What most vividly impressed observers
in the waning days of the genocide was the overall restraint of this rebel army, even as its soldiers were
finding their ancestral villages, and their own families, annihilated.").
66. Verwimp, supra note 20, at 161.
67. Id. at 173-74.
68. Id.
69. Storey, supra note 17, at 47-48.
70. Uvin, supra note 41, at 108.
71. Many historians and ethnographers do not consider Hutus and Tutsis to be distinct ethnic
groups. GOUREVITCH, supra note 65, at 47-48 (1998); UVIN, supra note 41, at 92-93. Both groups
speak the same language (Kinyarwanda), belong to the same clans (ubwoko), practice the same
religions, live side-by-side, intermarry and share art, music, and culture. Drumbl, supra note 61, at
1242-44; DES FORGES, supra note 59, at 4; PRUNIER, supra note 47, at 15. In pre-colonial Rwanda, the
terms "Hutu" and "Tutsi" referred to farmers and cattle-herders, respectively. Animal husbandry
brought greater status and power, and therefore Tutsis generally enjoyed higher social status and wealth
than Hutus. However, the categories were fluid, and a Hutu could become a Tutsi by acquiring more
cattle. Colonialism, however, changed the significance of the meaning of "Hutu" and "Tutsi." When
Europeans explored Rwanda in the early nineteenth century, they identified Rwandan Tutsis as the
superior race, being generally taller, lighter and in control of Rwanda's pre-colonial monarchy (one of
the most sophisticated in Eastern Africa at the time). Under Belgian colonialism, identity cards
hardened and institutionalized the categories "Hutus" and "Tutsis" and in a system of indirect rule,
privileges reinforced Tutsi's political dominance. The terms no longer referred exclusively to status and
economic activity, but referred to two "races," one of which enjoyed greater political power. DES
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This is certainly not to say that government control of the coffee sector was a
direct cause of the genocide. 73 It is to say that the politicization of the coffee sector
by the Habyarimana regime empowered some elites to use a portion of the coffee
revenue to perpetrate violence. The consequences of extensive government
involvement in this key sector were not simply economic; they were deeply
74political and, ultimately, catastrophic for many.
However, other factors-such as prejudice, strong resentment over land
shortages, a severe refugee problem, resentment over rising prices that resulted
from the IMF-directed economic restructuring, and fear generated by the RPF
incursions-also played important roles in sparking the genocide.75
III. REBUILDING RWANDA
The broad participation in Rwanda's genocide has posed significant
challenges to meting out justice, restoring peace, and rebuilding Rwanda's
76
economy. Before the genocide, Hums and Tutsis farmed the same hills,
"attended the same schools and churches, worked in the same offices, and drank in
the same bars. 77  Some intermarried and by one estimate, one quarter of
Rwandans have both Hutu and Tutsi among their eight great-grandparents7 8
Despite sharing so much, violence among Rwandans was widespread.
Killings were public and neighbors often perpetrated the violence with machetes,
sticks, and tools. 79 "Perpetrators" numbered in the hundreds of thousands,8° while
FORGES, supra note 58, at 31-38; STRAUS, supra note 61, at 18-23 (debunking the "ancient tribal
hatred" as an explanation of the genocide); PRUNIER, supra note 47, at 5-23 (describing the colonial
impact on Rwandese society.).
72. Verwimp, supra note 20, at 178.
73. See id. at 180 ("It is not the fall of the coffee price that caused the genocide, but the desire of
the ruling elite to stay in power at all cost.").
74. Id. at 172.
75. Uvin, supra note 41, at 96-105. For an analysis of the participation and spread in violence, see
Straus, supra note 61, at 35-40 (analyzing the hypotheses of nationalism, racial ideology,
dehumanization, deprivation, group conformity, deviant behavior, material incentives, and the security
dilemma hypothesis.).
76. Wole Soyinka, Hearts of Darkness, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1998, § 7, at 11 (reviewing PHILIP
GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU THAT TOMORROW WE WILL BE KILLED WITH OUR
FAMILIES), ("To capture the uniqueness of the Rwandan crime, one must imagine that nearly the
entirety of the German population participated in the liquidation of the Jews, or that the Russian masses
responded to Stalin's war against the kulaks, armed themselves with picks and shovels and massacred
the kulaks in village after village, instead of merely watching them being herded off to their eventual
extermination.") Under one estimate, "[tihe dead of Rwanda accumulated at nearly three times the rate
of the Jewish dead during the Holocaust. It was the most efficient killing since the atomic bombs of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki." GOUREVITCH, supra note 64, at 4.
77. DES FORGES, supra note 59, at 4.
78. ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY, RWANDA: THE PREVENTABLE GENOCIDE para. 2.4
(2000), available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/ 5629/rwanda.html.
79. Id. at para. 16.58.
80. Scott Straus, How Many Perpetrators Were There in the Rwandan Genocide? An Estimate, 6
J. GENOCIDE RES. 85, 85-95 (2004). Straus defines "perpetrators" as "any person who participated in an
attack against a civilian in order to kill or to inflict a serious injury on that civilian" and estimates
VOL. 37:2
2009 CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC
others facilitated killings or looted. As Mark Drumbl noted, "[m]any Rwandans
provided lists of Tutsi in their region to their killers. Teachers identified students,
physicians identified patients, and pastors identified the faithful.... Many of these
individuals stood silent as murder plagued their streets, but then promptly moved
into a suddenly vacant home." 81
After the genocide, the RPF government began controversial mass arrests and
detentions, often relying on accusations by opportunistic neighbors.82 Many of the
detainees had incomplete case files without specified charges or investigations.
83
By October 1994, approximately 58,000 people were detained in a facilities
designed for 12,000.84 Within three years, this number doubled to 125,000.85
With Rwanda's judicial infrastructure in ruins, these dententions posed a
significant due process challenge. 6 Over 80% of Rwanda's legal personnel had
been killed or fled the country.87 Many courts had been damaged or looted.88 Of
the personnel that remained, few had formal legal training.
89
approximately 200,000. A low-end estimate would be tens of thousands perpetrators. BRUCE D. JONES
PEACEMAKING IN RWANDA: THE DYNAMICS OF FAILURE 41 (2001). A high-end estimate would be
hundreds of thousands. DES FORGES, supra note 59, at 2; MAHMOOD MAMDANI, WHEN VICTIMS
BECOME KILLERS: COLONIALISM, NATIVISM, AND THE GENOCIDE IN RWANDA 7 (2002); CHRISTIAN P.
SCHERRER, GENOCIDE AND CRISIS IN CENTRAL AFRICA: CONFLICT, ROOTS, MASS VIOLENCE, &
REGIONAL WAR 126 (2001) (estimating that "every fourth person in Rwanda's Hutu population
including men, women, and children - was probably directly involved in the genocide, and millions
rendered themselves indirectly responsible.").
81. MARK A. DRUMBL, ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 98 (Cambridge
Univ. Press 2007).
82. Waldorf, supra note 65, at 41-42. See also DES FORGES, supra note 59, at 754 ("Because the
overburdened judicial system has failed to discover and punish false accusations increasing numbers of
people have brought false charges for their own interests. In some cases ... persons have been obliged
to pay others in order to avoid being false accused and imprisoned or they have been asked to provide a
substantial sum of money to officials in order to arrange for the release of a family member.");
ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY, supra note 77, at § 18.39. ("In too many cases, false accusations
were made against those whose only 'crime' was inhabiting land or property or working in a post that
returning Tutsi refugees coveted. In other instances, accusers were known to be seeking retribution for
some current or past wrong, real or imagined, but unconnected to the genocide.").
83. U. S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES: RWANDA 2001§
l(d) (2002) (reporting that, in 2001, ninety-five percent of approximately 112,000 individuals
incarcerated were awaiting trial on genocide-related charges, the majority of whom had incomplete
files). Many pre-trial detentions were retroactively legalized. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LAW &
REALITY: PROGRESS IN JUDICIAL REFORM IN RWANDA 13 (2008), available at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2008/rwandaOO8/.HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LAW & REALITY, supra note
82, at 14.
84. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LAW & REALITY, supra note 83, at 14.
85. GOUREVITCH, supra note 65, at 242. See also infra note 110 for more discussion of prison
conditions.
86. Maya Goldstein-Bolocan, Rwandan Gacaca: An Experiment in Transitional Justice, 2004 J.
DIsP. RESOL. 355, 371 (2005).
87. Id. at 371-72. Estimates vary as to the number of legal personnel in Rwanda after the
Genocide. National Service of Gacaca Jurisdictions, Gacaca Overview, http://www.inkiko-
gacaca.gov.rw/En/Generaties.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 2008) (reporting 758 judges and 70 prosecutors
before the genocide and 244 judges and 12 prosecutors after); UNITED STATES INSTITUTE FOR PEACE,
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The government periodically began granting provisional releases of genocide
suspects in 1994-first the elderly, sick, young, those accused without case files,
and later those who had served their sentences in pretrial detention or had
confessed. 90 By 2006, the number of genocide suspects in pre-trial detention
shrank to roughly 66,000.91 While some releases benefited the wrongly accused,
they have predictably also heightened tensions within Rwanda. As Drumbl notes:
"in the aftermath of the genocide both victim and aggressors must live unavoidably
side-by-side... and share common public spaces.92
To heal wounds, the RPF-led government has adopted a variety of strategies.
The government has participated in international court proceedings, created and
strengthened national and local-level dispute resolution institutions while also
pursuing a program of economic liberalization that seems to provide an alternate
channel for informal reconciliation.93 By most accounts, these institutional and
policy changes in Rwanda have varying records in terms of promoting
reconciliation and providing justice to aggrieved parties and to defendants. We
discuss some of these formal efforts below.
A. Creating the ICTR
With the reluctant support of Rwanda,94 the United Nations Security Council
established the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) to prosecute
crimes of genocide and violations of international humanitarian law.95 Despite its
RWANDA: ACCOUNTABILITY FOR WAR CRIMES & GENOCIDE (Special Report No. 13, 1995), available
at http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/early/rwandal.html (reporting that 40 out of 800 judges and
lawyers were alive and in the country after July 1994).
88. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LAW & REALITY supra note 83, at 12. Damage to the ministry
building was so severe that the Minister of Justice had to work from his hotel room and file documents
in boxes under his bed. Id.
89. William A. Schabas, Genocide Trials & Gacaca Courts, 3 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 879, 883
(2005) ("There were only about 20 lawyers with genuine legal education in the country when I visited
Rwanda in November 1994.").
90. Waldorf, supra note 65, at 42-43.
91. U. S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES: RWANDA 2006 §
1 (c) (2007).
92. Drumbl, supra note 60, at 1238.
93. See supra Parts III.A-B, IV.
94. The U.S. government sent Assistant Secretary John Shattuck to solicit the necessary request
from Rwanda for the Tribunal. Before Rwanda consented, Paul Kagame-who at the time served as
Vice-President and Minister of Defense-expressed concerns that crimes of genocide would not be
punished with the death penalty; the international court would be removed from Kigali and therefore
justice would not be palpable to Rwandans; and Rwanda would not have jurisdiction over criminals
who fled outside Rwanda. David P. Rawson, Prosecuting Genocide: Founding the International
Tribunal for Rwanda, 33 OHIO N.U.L. REv 641, 648-49 (2007) (citation omitted). Consequently, these
reservations hardened into opposition, particularly when it was clear that Tribunal would not sentence
genocide leaders to death, and Rwanda ultimately voted against the Resolution establishing the
Tribunal. Id. at 654-55.
95. See Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, Annex, art.
1-4, 7 U.N. Doe. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) [hereinafter ICTR statute] (giving the ICTR substantive
jurisdiction over crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, and violations of Article 3 common to
the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II. Temporal jurisdiction was between January 1,
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location in Arusha, Tanzania, the ICTR has concurrent jurisdiction with Rwandan
national courts, though it theoretically has primacy and can ask national courts to
defer to it in any case.9 6 The ICTR was modeled after the International Criminal
Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) and-for the sake of economy and consistency in
law-it shares institutional links;97 its rules of evidence and procedure mimic the
ICTY's with some modification,9 and it consists of three trial chambers, a registry,
a head prosecutor, 99 and an appeal chamber similar to the ICTY. °0 0
There were several motivations behind creating the ICTR. Because the
Rwandan court system was in shambles after the genocide,10' there were concerns
that vengeance would compromise fair trials and due process.1"2 The ICTR,
empanelled with judges selected by the General Assembly,' 0 3 would presumably
be in a better position to mete out justice impartially. Some also believed that an
international tribunal would expedite extradition and deter genocide in other
countries. 10
4
As of April 2007, the Tribunal has handed down twenty-seven judgments
upon individuals holding leadership positions during the genocide, including the
1994 and 31 December 31, 1994 to allow prosecution of genocide planners.).
96. See id. at art. 8; S.C. Res. 977, 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/977 (Feb. 22, 1995). For a further
discussion of the difficult relationship between the Tribunal and Rwanda, see Eric Husketh, Pole Pole:
Hastening Justice at the UNICTR, 3 Nw. U. J. INT'L HUM. RTs 8, 11, 50-65 (describing how after
ICTR's decision to release Barayagwiza-considered one of the top criminals in Rwanda-the
Rwandan government suspended cooperation with the Tribunal, preventing the travel of witnesses to
Arusha and refusing to issue the Chief Prosecutor a visa to enter the country, although her office and
investigating staff were in Kigali.). See also INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA: TIME FOR PRAGMATISM (2003), available at
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?I=I&id=2303 [hereinafter TIME FOR PRAGMATISM]
(describing how the Rwandan government prevented the travel of witnesses because it objected to the
prosecutor's inquiries into war crimes presumed to have been committed by the RPA in 1994).
97. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 5 of Security
Council Resolution 955, 9, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/1995/134 (Feb. 13, 1995).
98. ICTR statute, supra note 95, at art. 14.
99. In 2003, the Security Council split the prosecutorial duties for the criminal tribunals for
Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. S.C. Res. 1503, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1503 (Aug. 28, 2003).
100. ICTR statute, supra note 95, at arts. 10, 11, 13, 15, 16.
101. See supra text accompanying notes 84-87.
102. According to Human Rights Watch, "[m]ore than one hundred persons were condemned to
death for genocide [and] [m]any international leaders and organizations opposed the executions,
both on general principle and because some of the trials had failed to meet international standards of
due process. In several, the accused had no access to counsel and presented no witnesses in their
defense. In the case of former prosecutor Silas Munyagishari, political considerations may have
influenced the verdict. The executions were carried out in several towns before large and often festive
crowds." HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 1999, Rwanda: Human Rights Developments,
available at http://www.hrw.org/worldreport99/africa/rwanda.html; see also David Wippman,
Atrocities, Deterrence, and the Limits of International Justice, 23 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 473, 483 (1999)
(discussing the possible perception of national trials as illegitimate and "a case of 'victor's justice."').
103. ICTR statute, supra note 95, at art. 12.
104. The Secretary-General, Letter Dated 1 October 1994from the Secretary-General Addressed to
the President of the Security Council, 138, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/1994/1125
(Oct. 4, 1994).
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former Prime Minister, six Ministers, one Prefect, and seven Bourgmestres. 105  It
has convicted the first head of government for committing genocide and, since the
Nuremberg Trials, the first media leaders for inciting genocide. 10 6  By some
accounts, it also advanced the definitions of "ethnicity" and "rape" for the
purposes of proving genocide. 10 7 By the end of 2008, eighty-six accused persons
will have been brought before the ICTR.'0 8
Scholars have suggested that the Tribunal creates other indirect benefits. It
has been argued that internationalizing the justice process has motivated countries
to apprehend extremist Hutu leaders, which has thereby thwarted military
reorganization of a defunct Interahamwe (the Hutu paramilitary force that was
responsible for much of the genocide violence) that continued to launch attacks
against the RPF until 1999.109 Some have also suggested that the ICTR has made
the Tutsi government more cautious about violent reprisals against Hutus, as the
Tutsi government benefits from distinguishing itself morally from the previous
leadership and maintaining international legitimacy. 10
The ICTR's accomplishments, however, have not been without costs or
criticism."1 In its early years, the Tribunal was mired in charges of financial
105. International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, The Tribunal at a Glance, paras. 1, 8,
http://69.94.11.53/default.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2008).
106. Id. at paras. 5, 8. See also Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza, & Ngeze, Case No. ICTR
99-52-T, Sentence, paras. 1095-1101 (Dec. 3, 2003).
107. International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Achievements of the Tribunal,
http://69.94.11.53/default.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2008); Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-
T, Decision by Appeals Chamber (June 1, 2001) (affirming prior judgment of ICTR Trial Chamber, as
well as convicting defendants for complicity in genocide and crimes against humanity); Prosecutor v.
Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-T, Judgment and Sentence (May 15, 2003) (advancing the definition of
"conspiracy") Prosecutor v. Niyitegeka, Case No. ICTR-96-14-T (May 16, 2003); see also Payam
Akhavan, Focusing on ICTR Case Law- The Crime of Genocide in the ICTR Jurisprudence, 3.4, J. INT'L
CRIM. JUST. 989 (2005) (discussing how the Trial Chambers went to great lengths to characterize Tutsis
as an 'ethnic' group in order to justify the label of genocide).
108. ICTR Newsletter (Int'l Crim. Tribunal for Rwanda), June 2008, at 1, available at
http://69.94.11.53:80/ENGLISH/newsletter/june08/juneO8.pdf.
109. Payam Akhavan, Beyond Impunity Can International Criminal Justice Prevent Future
Atrocities?, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 7, 23 (2001).
110. Id. at 24 (noting also the "occasional punishment of crimes perpetrated by government forces
against Hutu civilians"). See also Rwanda: Human Rights Developments, supra note 102 ("An
increasingly active military justice system [has] tried soldiers for indiscipline and common crimes,
sentencing several to prison and even to death after conviction for charges such as theft and murder.").
But see Alison Des Forges & Timothy Longman, Legal Responses to Genocide in Rwanda, in MY
NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY: JUSTICE AND COMMUNITY IN THE AFTERMATH OF MASS ATROCITY 49, 61
(Eric Stover & Harvey M. Weinstein eds., 2004) (noting that "[tirials of genocide suspects - and a
pointed avoidance of substantial legal cases against RPA soldiers have sought to shape public
perception to recognize the moral failings of many Hutu leaders while raising the moral standing of the
current national leadership."). See also supra note 65 for more information on RPF war crimes.
11. For a general criticism of international criminal trials see Eric A. Posner, Political Trials in
Domestic and International Law, 55 DUKE L. J. 75, 147 (2005) ("If only the strongest states have the
power to establish international tribunals, determine their memberships, set their agendas, and thus
influence the development of international criminal law, predictably the resulting norms of international
criminal law will reflect the interests of the strong states, not the weak ones.").
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corruption and mismanagement.' 12 For example, some genocide suspects were on
the payroll as defense-team investigators."' The proceedings continue to be
criticized as slow and expensive, 1 4 and some argue that the ICTR diverts resources
away from rebuilding a rule of law in Rwanda." 5 For 2008 and 2009, the ICTR
will have a budget of $247,466,600116 to complete six trials and commence two.117
Despite the ICTR's mandate to complete all trials by the end of 2008 and all work
by 2010,118 twenty-nine detainees are currently on trial while seven await trial. 1 9
Already, the ICTR has applied for a one-year extension.
120
112. In 1997 the United Nations Office of Internal Oversight Services reported that in the
Tribunal's Registry not a single administrative area functioned effectively ("Finance had no accounting
system and could not produce allotment reports, so that neither the Registry nor United Nations
Headquarters had budget expenditure information; lines of authority were not clearly defined; internal
controls were weak in all sections; personnel in key positions did not have the required qualifications..
. ."). The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Activities of the Office ofInternal
Oversight Services, Annex, 9, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/51/789 (Feb. 6, 1997).
The report also noted that the "Chief of Finance did not have the required degree in administration,
finance or accounting nor... [the] relevant United Nations experience in those fields." Id. at 20.
113. Victor Peskin, Rwandan Ghosts, LEGAL AFFAIRS, Sept./Oct. 2002, available at
http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/September-October-2002/feature-peskin-sepoct2002.msp.
114. See Yacob Haile-Mariam, The Quest for Justice and Reconciliation: The International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the Ethiopian High Court, 22 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REV.
667, 736 (1999) (asserting that the Rwandan courts began prosecuting defendants a year after the ICTR
and closed four hundred cases by the middle of July 1998, whereas the ICTR had not completed one
trial by the middle of August 1998). But see Husketh, supra note 96, at 6 (pointing to the increased
efficiency of the ICTR as the rate of completion nearly doubled between the first and second mandate
and attributing the delays to a lack of technical and translation services, infrastructure, security of
lawyers, transportation costs between the two offices, perverse financial incentives for defense lawyers,
failure to utilize plea bargaining, and fee-splitting).
115. Jose E. Alvarez, Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda, 24 YALE J. INT'L L.
365, 466 (1999) ("[E]ach dollar spent by the international community on the ICTR is one less dollar
available for assistance to Rwandan courts..."). Compare Akhavan, supra note 109, at 25-26 (arguing
against Alvarez by pointing to violence against judicial personnel, emotionally charged prosecutions
and politicization of the Rwandan judiciary), and Des Forges & Longman, supra note 110, at 62
("Given [Rwanda's] politicization of the judiciary, it is not at all clear that investing more in the
Rwandan justice system would have promoted the rule of law and encouraged reconciliation in the
country.").
116. International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, General Information,
http://69.94.11.53/default.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2008).
117. According to the most recent completion strategy report, "[flour cases concerning seven
accused are in judgement [sic] drafting phase and two-single accused cases are completed, with the
closing arguments yet to be heard. There are six trials involving 19 accused currently ongoing. Two
single-accused trials are scheduled to commence shortly. There are four new cases which are to be
prepared for trial and four single-accused cases for which request for referral to Rwanda are pending."
President of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Report on the Completion Strategy of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 4, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc.
S/2008/322 (May 13, 2008).
118. S.C. Res. 1503, supra note 99.
119. International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Detainees-Status on 10 October 2008,
http://69.94.11.53/default.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2008).
120. ICTR Newsletter, supra note 108, at 2.
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It is also uncertain how much the ICTR has healed wounds amongst
Rwandans. Despite ICTR's outreach program (established in 2000), 121 many
Rwandans are unaware of the Tribunal's far-removed work in Tanzania. 122 Of the
Rwandans are aware, many are skeptical. High-ranking suspects at the ICTR
enjoy better defense lawyers and judges than low-ranking suspects who are tried in
Rwanda, often without representation, 23 before judges with minimal experience. 124
They also receive a higher quality of health care than victims and at maximum can
be sentenced to life imprisonment (sometimes in a Scandinavian jail). 125  Until
recently, 126 lesser offenders in Rwanda could receive death sentences if convicted
and otherwise face harsh, over-crowded prison conditions.1 27 These differences in
treatment between Rwandan courts and the ICTR have led to accusations of class
justice, 128 and many Rwandans believe that the ICTR places too much emphasis on
responding to the rights of the accused and not enough to victims and survivors,
129
including those who serve as witnesses.1 30  Hutus have other reasons to be
121. The Outreach Program primary locale is the Information Centre Umusanzu mu Bwiyunge in
Kigali. The Centre provides briefings, lectures, workshops and films about the Tribunal's work. The
Tribunal also established an internship program in 2000 to allow Rwandan law students to work at the
court each year and began translating court documents into Kinyarwanda. International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda, supra note 106. See also Victor Peskin, Courting Rwanda-The Promises and
Pitfalls of the ICTR Outreach Programme, 3.4 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 950 (describing the Programme as
ineffective). According to Alison Des Forges and Timothy Longman, the outreach centre is
"[alttractive to a tiny part of the urban elite ... [but] offers little to the majority of Rwandans, who are
illiterate and live in rural areas." Des Forges & Longman, supra note 110, at 56.
122. A survey conducted in 2002 of 2,091 Rwandans found that 87% either were "not well
informed" or "not informed at all" about the Tribunal. Eric Stover & Harvey M. Weinstein,
Conclusion: A Common Objective, A Universe of Alternatives, in MY NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY: JUSTICE
AND COMMUNITY IN THE AFTERMATH OF MASS ATROCITY 323, 334 (Eric Stover & Harvey Weinstein
eds., 2004).
123. See infra note 139.
124. Haile-Mariam, supra note 114, at 736.
125. See id.
126. Organic Law No. 31/2007, July 25, 2007,
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/type,LEGISLATION,,RWA,46badalc2,0.html, art. 4-5; see also U.N.
Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm'n on Human Rights, Report on the Situation of Human
Rights in Rwanda, 136, U.N. Doe. E/CN.4/2000/41 (Feb. 25, 2000) (prepared by Michel Moussalli)
(finding that of the some 2,406 persons tried by the special genocide courts, 14.4% were sentenced to
death, 30.3% to life imprisonment, 34% to jail terms of between 20 years and one year, and 19%
acquitted).
127. Rwanda: Gacaca: A Question of Justice, AMNESTY INT'L, Dec. 17, 2002, at 8, available at
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AFR47/007/2002 ("Preventable diseases, malnutrition and the
debilitating effects of overcrowding resulted in a reported 11,000 deaths between the end of 1994 and
end of 2001."); see also Yassin Yusingwire, Harsh Prison Conditions Propagating HIV/Aids - Study
Reveals, RWANDA NEWS AGENCY, July, 2 2008, available at
http://www.rnanews.com/index.phpoption=com content&task=view&id-39&Itemid=31.
128. Haile-Mariam, supra note 114, at 736.
129. Kingsley Chiedu Moghalu, Image and Reality of War Crimes Justice. External Perceptions of
the International Criminal Tribunalfor Rwanda, 26:2 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 21, 29 (2002).
130. Stephen Buckley, Witnesses of Genocide Targeted; Protection Efforts Fail Rwandans Waiting
to Testify in Tribunals, THE WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 1997, at A24 (reporting that assailants opened fire on
a shop owner and eleven others; also reporting assaults on U.N. officials by Hutu former-exiles);
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skeptical of the ICTR. For Hutus who did not perpetrate violence, but suffered
violations of international humanitarian law in attacks by the RPF, the ICTR's
exclusive focus on prosecuting Hutus has left them without a remedy.13 1 Zorbas
argues that: [i]t is nearly impossible to overstate the bitter disappointment and ill
will the ICTR's alleged rampant corruption, bureaucracy, incompetence, and above
all its meager results.., has generated with the RPF government, the Rwandan
people and internationally."'1 32
B. Rebuilding National Courts
Rwanda's courts reopened in 1996 understaffed, with 324 magistrates, 100
deputy prosecutors and 298 judicial police officers. 133 To try genocide crimes, 134
the government established specialized chambers in civil and military courts and
carved out four categories of culpability for acts related to the genocide: Category
1 for planners, notorious murderers, and rapists; Category 2 for perpetrators,
conspirators, and accomplices of homicide; Category 3 for persons accused of
serious but non-lethal assaults; and Category 4 for perpetrators of property
offenses. I35  Penalties initially ranged from death and life imprisonment for
Hirondelle News Agency, Rwanda and UN Court Vow to End Witness Deadlock, ARUSHA TIMES, Feb.
5-11, 2005 (reporting the murder of a confessed genocide killer upon return from the ICTR); Husketh,
supra note 96, at 58 ("In December 1996, a witness was killed with his daughter, brother, nephew and
seven others. The witness had asked investigators for protection, but the nearest telephone was more
than 20 miles away. The next month, January of 1997, another witness and her entire family of eight
were killed after returning from testifying in Arusha.").
131. See The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: Justice Delayed, INT'L CRISIS GROUP,
June 1, 2001, at iii; see Husketh, supra note 96, at 2 (suggesting that the Security Council's decision to
not renew Prosecutor Cara del Ponte's mandate was partially motivated by the Rwandan's government
animus against her as well as its desire to preempt her continued investigation into war crimes by the
RPF/RPA); TIME FOR PRAGMATISM, supra note 75 (describing pressure from the Rwandan government
to not prosecute members of the Rwandan patriotic army (RPA)). Letter from Sidiki Kaba, President,
International Federation of Human Rights & Kenneth Roth, Executive Director, Human Rights Watch
to Council Members (June 2, 2006), available at
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/06/02/rwandal3504.htm (urging the Security Council to assure the
Prosecutor will be afforded the necessary time to prosecute RPA cases even if those proceedings
continue beyond 2008).
132. Eugenia Zorbas, Reconciliation in Post-Genocide Rwanda, I AFR. J. OF LEGAL STUD. 29, 34
(2004); see also De Forges & Longman, supra note 110, at 56-57 (noting that "although the majority of
the population is not hostile to the ICTR, people tend to see it as an activity of the international
community conducted primarily for its own benefit, with little relevant to the process of reconciliation
in Rwanda.").
133. See Gacaca: A Question of Justice, supra note 127, at 12.
134. Rwanda had no provision for prosecuting and punishing genocide crimes in its domestic penal
code, though it had ratified the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, the Geneva Conventions and other conventions of international humanitarian law in 1975.
See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 83, at 14-16 (discussing and criticizing how Rwanda
established the legal basis for prosecution).
135. Organic Law No. 08/96, Aug. 30, 1996, art. 2,
http://www.preventgenocide.org/law/domestic/rwanda.htm [hereinafter 1996 Genocide Law]; see also
Zorbas, supra note 130, at 35.
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Category 1 offenders to civil damages for Category 4 offenders, though sentences
could be reduced through plea-bargaining.
136
By December 2003, the twelve national specialized courts had tried 9,700
accused.137  These trials have been criticized for a number of shortcomings,
including, but not limited to: a lack of due process, 138 unqualified judges, 139
inadequate defense representation, 140 executive influence,' 4 1 "Tutsification,"'
' 42
impunity for RPF war crimes, 143 and creating a sense of collective guilt against
Hutus. 144 To victims, the court proceedings were often inaccessible and provided
little reparation. 145 To the accused, Tutsi-dominated juries led some to view
136. 1996 Genocide Law, supra note 135, at art. 14-15.
137. Waldorf, supra note 65, at 44.
138. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, RWANDA: COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES 2007
(Mar. 11, 2008), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrptI2007/100499.htm (reporting that
judiciary is subject to executive influence and does not always ensure due process or expeditious trials).
139. Gacaca: A Question of Justice, supra note 127, at 12 (observing that "[flew of the magistrates
were jurists and less than a quarter had adequate legal training").
140. 1996 Genocide Law, supra note 135, at art. 36 (stating that the Rwandan government is not
obliged to pay for defense counsel); THE DANISH INST. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, LEGAL AID IN RWANDA: A
REPORT ON THE LEGAL ASSISTANCE AVAILABLE IN RWANDA annex at 83 (2004) (estimating that only
half of the defendants have benefitted from representation).
141. See HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, PROSECUTING GENOCIDE IN RWANDA: A HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST
REPORT ON THE ICTR AND NATIONAL TRIALS (Jul. 1997), available at
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/pubs/descriptions/rwanda.htm (finding that Hutu prosecutors and
judges who did not arrest or convict suspects because a lack of evidence were sometimes charged with
genocide or corruption); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, RWANDA: HUMAN RIGHTS DEVELOPMENTS (1999),
available at http://www.hrw.org/wr2k/Africa-08.htm (in 1999, the Supreme Court disbanded); HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2003: RWANDA: HUMAN RIGHTS DEVELOPMENTS (2003), available
at http://www.hrw.org/wr2k3/africa9.html (finding that in 2002 six Supreme Court judges were forced
to resign after the Prosecutor General threatened to jail them on corruption charges).
142. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 102 (concluding that the "judiciary [was] largely in the
hands of Tutsi, many of whom were recent returnees."); ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY, supra note
78, at § 18.38 ("as in virtually all other sectors of Rwandan public life, the justice system was dominated
by Tutsi").
143. When the ICTR prosecutors attempted to investigate crimes by RPA soldiers, Rwandan
officials forced the suspension of the trials by not allowing the witnesses to travel. When other
countries, such as France and Spain, have issued arrest warrants for RPA soldiers and officers, Rwanda
has broken diplomatic relations and ignored the warrants. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 83, at 4
("only 32 soldiers have been brought to trial for crimes committed against civilians in 1994, with 14
found guilty and punished with light sentences"); Waldorf, supra note 65, at n. 338 (citation omitted)
(Lieutenant Colonel Fred Ibingira, for example, who commanded the troops that massacred an
estimated 2000-4000 Hutu refugees at the Kibeho refugee camp in April 1995 was sentenced to
eighteen months in prison for "failing to give assistance to a person in danger."); see also Des Forges &
Longman, supra note 110, at 61 (noting that the courts have been used extensively to intimidate
potential critics and opponents of the regime).
144. Waldorf, supra note 65, at 40 ("Early on, the RPF seemed more interested in using the judicial
system to impose collective guilt and social control on the Hutu majority than in establishing
individualized accountability for the genocide.").
145. Goldstein-Bolocan, supra note 86, at n. 375 ("although compensation for victims has been
awarded in 50 percent of civil verdicts, in none of these cases were the verdicts awarded against the
state or against those found criminally guilty") (citation omitted).
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themselves as prisoners of war on the losing side, rather than as defendants in a
criminal trial. 146  Given the enormous caseload and the judiciary's limited
resources, it would have taken over eighty years to try all of the accused. 147
The Rwandan government undertook two dramatic initiatives to improve the
delivery of justice. First, it sought to reform the judiciary 148 by introducing greater
autonomy, 149 raising the educational criteria for judicial posts, 150 and increasing the
pace of justice.15 1 Second, it launched gacaca, a form of popular justice modeled
on past customary conflict-resolution practices, to judge most genocide cases. 152
Although gacaca and the conventional courts differ in law, procedure, and
personnel, the two now constitute a single judicial system. 1 53
C. Institutionalizing Gacaca
"Gacaca" translates to "lawn" or "small grass," the setting of traditional,
informal gatherings where community1 54 elders resolved minor conflicts over
146. Drumbl, supra note 61, at 1290; Des Forges & Longman, supra note 110, at 62-63 ("domestic
trials have been politicized and many Rwandans view them as one-sided .... "); Straus, supra note 80,
at 151 (finding that many interviewed perpetrators equated killing Tutsis with fighting the enemy and
that the most powerful predictor of why one perpetrator committed more violence than the other was
whether a respondent described himself as motivated by war-related fear or anger).
147. Schabas supra note 89, at 888; ORG. OF AFR. UNITY, supra note 78, at § 18.37 (estimating
between two to four centuries to try all those in detention).
148. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 83, at 23 (stating that a commission consisting of
members of the supreme court, prosecutor's office, bar association, ministry of justice, and law faculty
drafted 13 laws, which were mostly introduced in 2004 to reform the judiciary).
149. See generally Organic Law No. 07/2004, Jan. 1, 2004,
http://www.amategeko.net/display-rubrique.php?ActDo=all&lnformation-ID=2&Parent-ID=9&type=
public&LangueID=An&rublD=30692036#30692036, [hereinafter 2004 Organisation of Courts Law]
(determining the Organisation, Functioning, & Jurisdiction of Courts). The president of the Supreme
Court now has hiring and removal powers with the approval of the Superior Council of the Judiciary, a
group consisting of judged elected by peers, the President of the National Commission of Human
Rights, two representatives of law faculties, and the ombudsman. Id. at art. 6. The office of the public
prosecutor was guaranteed financial and administrative autonomy from the Ministry of Justice. Organic
Law No. 03/2004, Mar. 20, 2004, art. 2, http://www.kituochakatiba.co.ug/prosecutionservice.pdf. To
discourage corruption, judges' salaries increased between two and five-fold. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
supra note 83, at 26.
150. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 83, at 27 (finding that before the reforms, approximately
10% held law degrees and some lower court judges had only finished primary school. In 2004, a law
was passed requiring law degrees and six years of experience for High Court judges and eight years for
Supreme Court judges).
151. To streamline the judicial system, the government cut the number of courts and judges. See
generally 2004 Organisation of Courts Law, supra note 149, at title I. Judges are also now required to
deliver an official judgment, including reasons for the decision, within 30 days of the closure of trial
proceedings. Id. at art. 168.
152. Between 2005 and 2008, the conventional courts tried only 222 genocide cases. As of 2008,
all remaining cases will be sent to gacaca with the exception of national or provincial leaders and those
accused sent back to Rwanda from other national or international jurisdictions. HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, supra note 83, at 17.
153. Id. at2.
154. Rwandan communities traditionally were separate homesteads spread out on hillsides rather
than villages. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, UPROOTING THE RURAL POOR IN RWANDA § III (2001),
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property, inheritance, personal injury, and marital relations. 155  Historically,
gacaca's goal was to restore tranquility to the community. 156  All community
members participated and, apart from women, anyone could voice their opinion. 57
Both parties were expected to accept the sentences imposed, and after the conflict
was resolved, to maintain a social relationship. 158  In addition to collectively
meting out punishments, communities performed welcoming rites for persons who
had completed their punishments to recreate a sense of belonging.' 59
Throughout the colonial period, gacaca continued to play a role in resolving
local disputes even as parts of the legal system formalized. Colonial courts often
accepted gacaca judgments, and in some cases, the courts reviewed rather than re-
litigated appeals.16 By the 1980s, local authorities (or sector officials) used
gacaca as a "semi-official" institution to adjudicate disputes outside state courts. 61
Though gacaca ceased in most communities during the genocide, some
reorganized it afterwards to arrest genocide suspects and deal with property
disputes arising from returnees. 162 In 1998, some detainees, encouraged by prison
officials, began their own gacaca to hear confessions of inmates.
163
In 2001, the Rwandan government passed legislation to revive and adapt
gacaca to try all genocide-related cases, except Category 1 cases which would be
heard by national courts.1 64 Local communities elected over 250,000 judges1 65 and
available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/rwanda/. See also Zorbas, supra note 132, at 36-7.
155. For more serious crimes such as murder and cattle theft, the king's representatives or chiefs
generally had jurisdiction. Waldorf, supra note 65, at 48.
156. Christopher J. Le Mon, Rwanda's Troubled Gacaca Courts, 14 (2) HUM. RTS. BRIEF 16, 16
(2007).
157. Waldorf, supra note 65, at 48.
158. Jessica Raper, The Gacaca Experiment: Rwanda's Restorative Dispute Resolution Response to
the 1994 Genocide, 5 PEPP. DIsP. RESOL. L. J. 1, 30 (2005). In recent times, the losing party had to
provide beer to the community as a form of reconciliation. Waldorf, supra note 65, at 49.
159. Paul E. Nantulya, The Gacaca System in Rwanda, 4 CONFLICT TRENDS, at 53-54 (2001),
available at http://www.accord.org.za/downloads/ct/ct_2001_4.pdf.
160. Id.
161. Waldorf, supra note 65, at 49.
162. Jennifer Widner, Courts & Democracy in Postconflict Transitions: A Social Scientist's
Perspective on the African Case, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 64, 65-66 (2001) (noting how the voluntary
character of resettlement after the genocide-with families and friends banding together to form new
villages-meant that members of these new communities trusted each other enough to make election an
acceptable means of selecting gacaca members, and the number of gacaca rapidly increased).
163. PENAL REFORM INTERNATIONAL, GACACA JURISDICTIONS AND ITS PREPARATIONS 29 (2002),
available at http://www.penalreform.org/resources/rep-gal-2002-preparations-en.pdf (noting that in
Kigali Central Prison, the gacaca committee heard 1127 confessions from approximately 8000 inmates
from late 1998 to late 2001).
164. Organic Law No. 40/2000 of 26/01/2001, art. 2. After the accusation phase ended,
approximately 818,000 persons had been accused, 77,000 of which were in category I. In March 2007,
the government redefined the categories to move some accused from category I to 2. HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, supra note 83, at 21-22.
165. Judges are not required to have legal qualifications. Rwandans of "integrity" who are at least
twenty-one years of age can be elected as Gacaca judges so long as they have not participated in the
genocide; are free from the spirit of "sectarianism"; have not been sentenced to a penalty of at least six
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after an 18-month pilot phase in approximately 10% of the cells in Rwanda,'66
gacaca was launched with some modification nationwide in January 2005.167
The modernized gacaca system departs from traditional gacaca in
fundamental ways."' First, gacaca judges are not community elders, but elected,
relatively young citizens, including women."' Second, gacaca courts judge
serious crimes, such as homicide, whereas traditional gacaca resolved only minor
civil disputes. 170 Third, modem gacaca is an official state institution that applies
codified, rather than "customary" law, with powers to summon persons, issue
warrants, conduct searches, confiscate property, and impose sentences up to 30
years in prison.17 1 In traditional gacaca, family and clan members, rather than
individuals, paid assessed judgments, as all members were "parties to the
conflict."' 172  Finally, modem gacaca's goals are a mix of retributive and
restorative justice,17 3 rather than a restoration of communal tranquility. 7 4
months of imprisonment; are of high morals and conduct, truthful and honest; and are characterized by
a spirit of speech sharing. Jacques Fierens, Gacaca Courts: Between Fantasy and Reality, 3 J. INT'L
CRIM. JUST. 896, 914 (2005); Organic Law No. 16/2004, June 19, 2004, art. 14 (hereinafter Gacaca
Law] (establishing the organization, competence and functioning of gacaca courts charged with
prosecuting and trying the perpetrators of the crime of genocide and other crimes against humanity,
committed between October 1, 1990 and December 31, 1994).
166. 762 gacaca courts were established. Meyerstein, supra note 65, at 474. In the first nine
months of trials, 2000 defendants pled guilty and almost 6000 were convicted. But more than 10,000
fled Rwanda fearing "false accusations and unfair trials." Le Mon, supra note 156, at 17.
167. In June 2004, the government amended the law to combine Categories 2 and 3 into a single
category, slightly modified the definitions of crimes, reduced the number of courts and judges, lowered
the quorum from fifteen to seven, reduced some penalties to encourage more guilty pleas, capped the
maximum sentence to thirty years (instead of life), and provided for mitigating circumstances. Waldorf,
supra note 65, at 53-54; Gacaca Law, supra note 165, at arts. 18, 23, 51, 55, 56, 81.
168. Waldorf, supra note 65, at 52. For a description of the Gacaca's proceedings and their
differences from American trials see Linda E. Carter, Justice and Reconciliation on Trial: Gacaca
Proceedings in Rwanda, 14 NEw ENG. INT'L & COMP. L. 41,45-47 (2007).
169. Waldorf, supra note 65, at 52 (citing NAT'L SERVICE OF GACACA COURTS, REPORT ON
IMPROVING THE LIVING CONDITIONS FOR THE INYANGAMUGAYO 2 (2005)) (finding on the basis of
surveys that thirty-four percent of gacaca judges are women)). We attended a gacaca proceeding in
Butare on May 28, 2008. The panel ofjudges hearing cases that day was composed of two women (one
older, one younger) and four men. The lead judge was an older man.
170. Waldorf, supra note 65, at 52.
171. Meyerstein, supra note 65, at 475-76. The Gacaca jurisdictions can impose sentences as
severe as thirty years of imprisonment for Category 2 defendants who have killed or attempted to kill
their victims and refuse to confess, whereas Category 3 defendants can only be ordered to pay civil
compensation for damages to victims' property. Gacaca Law, supra note 165, at arts. 73-75.
172. Leah Werchick, Prospects for Justice in Rwanda's Citizen Tribunals, 8 (3) HUM. RTS. BRIEF
15, 17 (2001); Goldstein-Bolocan, supra note 86, at 376; Waldorf, supra note 65, at 48.
173. Waldorf, supra note 65, at 14 ("Under retributive justice, offenders are punished generally
with incarceration. Under restorative justice, offenders offer atonement and victims forgive though a
process of face-to-face mediation. Apologies, community service, and other forms of restitution replace
incarceration."); see also John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice: Assessing Optimistic & Pessimistic
Accounts, 25 CRIME & JUST. 1 (1999) (providing a general overview of restorative and retributive
justice). For a criticism of how restorative justice can sacrifice due process, reinforce pre-existing
power relations, fail to deter, and short-change victims, see Richard Delgado, Prosecuting Violence: A
Colloquy on Race, Community, & Justice, 52 STAN. L. REV. 751 (2000).
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Gacaca begins at the cell level 175 where every Rwandan is legally obligated
176
to participate as a member of the general assembly, in a public enterprise of
evidence gathering. 177 Initially, Rwandans accused alleged perpetrators in front of
the general assembly. 178  But due to lackluster participation, in 2004, the
government mandated local administrative officials and nyumbakumi (persons in
charge of ten households) to gather information from small groups and
individuals. 79 The information gathered during this accusation process (which the
accused cannot contest180 ), coupled with prisoner confessions and state prosecutor
files, constitute the basis for categorization by the court-nine adults of "integrity"
elected by the general assembly.1 8' The court then tries suspects accused of lower-
level crimes and passes the more serious Category 2 offenders up to secteur (or
"sector") level tribunals and Category 1 offenders to the Public Prosecution
Office.
82
To encourage confessions, persons who plead guilty to Category 2 or 3 crimes
are eligible to serve only half of their sentences, half of which would be in
community service.'8 3  Although the court can reject a confession deemed
incomplete or insincere,' 84 anecdotal evidence suggests that the benefit of
expedited trials, provisional release, and reduced sentences has encouraged false,
insincere, and formulaic confessions.1
8 5
174. The official goals of the gacaca are: (1) to reveal the truth about what has happened, (2) to
accelerate the genocide trials, (3) to eradicate the culture of impunity, (4) to reconcile the Rwandans
and reinforce their unity, and (5) to prove that Rwandan society has the capacity to settle its own
problems through a system of justice based on Rwandan custom. National Service of Gacaca
Jurisdictions, The Objectives of the Gacaca Courts, http://www.inkiko-
gacaca.gov.rw/En/EnObjectives.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2008).
175. Gacaca has three courts: a cell gacaca court, a sector gacaca court, and a sector's gacaca court
of appeals. Gacaca Law, supra note 165, at arts. 33-38.
176. Persons who refuse to testify can be prosecuted by Gacaca courts and sentenced to up to one
year imprisonment. Id. at art. 29.
177. Gacaca hearings are public, except for rape related proceedings and other exceptional cases in
which hearings are conducted in camera. Id. at arts. 21, 38.
178. Id. at art. 32.
179. Meyerstein, supra note 65, at 488.
180. The nyumbakumi present the accusations to the assembly to confirm the accuracy of the
information recorded, not to test its truth. Gacaca Law, supra note 165, at arts. 33, 35-37. See HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 83, at 21 for a discussion of how the nyumbakumi had disproportionate
power to influence the nature and amount of information that would form the basis of judicial files of
accused persons and how the method undermined the intended openness of the process; in some cases,
when Category 1 suspects were brought to trial in conventional courts, judges used information
gathered in gacaca to justify its conviction without independently assessing the information's validity.
181. Gacaca Law, supra note 165, at arts. 33-34.
182. Id. at art. 34.
183. Id. at art. 73.
184. Waldorf, supra note 65, at 73 ("Gacaca courts do not have to accept confessions, even if the
prosecutor has certified them as truthful.").
185. Id. at 72-74; see also Madeline H. Morris, The Trials o]'Concurrent Jurisdiction: The Case of
Rwanda, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 349, 361 (1997).
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Gacaca has been criticized by some and celebrated by others. Some have
praised it as an innovation in transitional justice that combines traditional, local
institutions with modem judicial practices leading to transformative, democratic
effects. I1 6  Others, however, criticize gacaca for failing to meet international
human-rights standards with respect to due process,187 impartial and qualified
judges, lss a right to appeal,' 89 a right to defense, 190 and separating prosecutorial and
judicial roles. 191 Some also criticize gacaca for failing to advance justice or
reconciliation, and instead delivering participatory popular punishment and
collectivizing guilt against Hutus.' 92 Acknowledging its shortcomings, however,
186. Le Mon, supra note 156, at 16. See Rosa E. Brooks, The New Imperialism: Violence, Norms
& the Rule of Law, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2275, 2336 (2003) ("[G]acaca. . may hold out Rwanda's best
hope of coming to terms with the genocide in a way that rebuilds confidence in the government and the
rule of law."). See also Erin Daly, Between Punitive and Reconstructive Justice: The Gacaca Courts in
Rwanda, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 355, 376-77 (discussing how gacaca may help to promote
democracy and the rule of law and that the sheer number of tribunals should protect the process as a
while from undue influence by the central government). See also Christine M. Venter, Eliminating
Fear Through Recreating Community in Rwanda: The Role of Gacaca Courts, 13 TEX. WESLEYAN L.
REV. 577, 581 (2007) (arguing that if gacaca courts were properly funded and organized it could
provide a link between the past of the genocide and the participatory democracy Rwanda hopes to be).
See Aneta Wierzynska, Consolidating Democracy Through Transitional Justice: Rwanda's Gacaca
Courts, 79 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1934, 1958 (2004) (stating that gacaca creates "a critical communication
bridge between the people and the State that did not exist before."). But see Waldorf, supra note 65, at
77 (noting that these arguments assume incorrectly that the RPF-dominated government is moving
toward greater democracy and that gacaca is truly participatory).
187. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 83, at 2. See also Daly, supra note 186, at 383.
188. See Gacaca: A Question of Justice, supra note 127 at 38. See also Meyerstein, supra note 65,
at 479 (discussion of how the training of gacaca judges is inadequate).
189. See Gacaca Law, supra note 165, arts. 89-92. See also Goldstein-Bolocan, supra note 86 at
389. But see Daly, supra note 186 at 383 (noting that the appellate process may undue some benefits of
gacaca because they take time, do not strengthen the community and depend on the commitment of the
authorities to the rule of law).
190. See Gacaca Law, supra note 165, at art. 32 (noting Gacaca law does not entitle defendants to
be represented by a lawyer, but allows the defendant to speak for himself, and for individuals at the
hearings to speak for or against the defendant). See also Goldstein-Bolocan, supra note 86, at 388-89
(noting defendant's position may be further compromised because most cases will be judged on the
basis of the files prepared and handed over to the Gacaca judges by the public prosecutor's offices,
making it difficult for lay judges and defendants to challenge the information). See also HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 83, at 20-21.
191. See Gacaca Law, supra note 165, at art. 33 (nothing that individuals responsible for gathering
evidence and categorizing cases may also called as witnesses). See also Meyerstein, supra note 65, at
488-90 (discussing how local authorities and nyumbakumi abused their positions to protect themselves
and their families during the information gathering and accusation stage and ultimately played the role
of gacaca judges, who were relegated to recording and confirming the accuracy of the transcriptions
without confirming its validity). See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 83, at 43-45.
192. The Gacaca Courts Prepare to Finish Their Mandate, HIRONDELLE NEWS AGENCY, Apr. 24,
2007, http://www.hirondellenews.com/content/view/402/135/ (reporting as of 2007, 818,564 cases
accusing crimes of genocide had been prepared, including 77,269 in the first category of politicians and
planners, 432,557 in the 2nd category of executors and 308,738 cases of looting. 71,405 cases had been
heard, verdicts had been rendered in 64,800 and remain for 6,605. There had been intended acquittals
for 15,219 while 7,200 verdicts had been appealed.). See also Waldorf, supra note 65, at 80-81
(arguing that gacaca will likely criminalize a vast swathe of the Hums population, given that naming
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others conclude that it was the best alternative for delivering justice in post-
genocide Rwanda.
193
Given the range of criticism directed towards Gacaca, it is unclear the extent
to which it has healed wounds. Rather, the process may have inflamed animosities
amongst Hutus and Tutsis. According to Lars Waldorf, "Hutu[s] generally view
[gacaca] as a way to release family members wrongly imprisoned, while Tutsi
survivors often see it as a disguised amnesty for those who killed their family
members." 194  Initially, the majority of Rwandans supported gacaca. 195  Yet,
despite mandated attendance at gacaca court, 196 participation has declined
significantly, suggesting a shift in attitudes.1 97
accomplices provides sentence reductions; opportunistic looters are technically genocidaires;
accomplice liability is broadly defined; accomplices are treated as perpetrators; there is no provision for
defenses and justifications, even though there might be colorable claims of duress; and bystanders will
be prosecuted for failing to render assistance). See also Daly, supra note 186, at 385 (noting that
gacaca has only a limited ability to promote reconciliation since its rebuilds communities under a cloud
of punishment and retribution). See also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THERE WILL BE No TRIAL: POLICE
KILLINGS OF DETAINEES AND THE IMPOSITION OF COLLECTIVE GUILT 27-30 (2007), available at
http:/Ihrw.org/reports/2007/rwandaO7O7/ (observing that since the end of 2006, officials have been
imposing collective punishments on residents, including fines, obligatory labor, and beatings when
survivors suffer property damage.). But see Meyerstein, supra note 65, at 491 (arguing that the abuses
of power by local officials actually serve to protect the Hutu population and thus work against a
collectivized guilt against the Hutu majority).
193. See Meyerstein, supra note 65, at 467 (arguing that Amnesty International's legalist approach
to the gacaca prevents it from appreciating its unique postcolonial hybrid form that is perhaps uniquely
capable of responding to the genocide). See also Carter, supra note 168, at 49-50 (acknowledging that
gacaca is an ingenious solution since it spreads out the work among a large number of people with the
possibility of justice on a large scale); Widner, supra note 162, at 66 (arguing that gacaca is integral to
reconstructing the rule of law because an ineffective, overused judicial system risks undermining
judicial legitimacy and leads people to turn away from law altogether).
194. Waldorf, supra note 65, at 74 (citation omitted). See also Goldstein-Bolocan, supra note 86,
at n.249 (citing Jeremy Sarkin, The Tension Between Justice and Reconciliation in Rwanda: Politics,
Human Rights. Due Process and the Role of the Gacaca Courts in Dealing with the Genocide, 45 J.
AFR. L. 143, 288-89 (2001), quoting Alison Des Forges who suggests that that "the fairness of the
proceedings will vary enormously ... (and) the result in any one community will be determined by the
local balance of power.") (citation omitted in original).
195. TIMOTHY LONGMAN ET AL., Connecting Justice to Human Experience: Attitudes Toward
Accountability and Reconciliation in Rwanda, in MY NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY, 222 (Eric Stover &
Harvey Weinstein, eds., Cambridge University Press, 2004) (stating gacaca was the most popular
alternative. In 2002, when polled on how much contribution the judicial alternatives would make in
advancing reconciliation, 33.8% believed the ICTR would make a significant or very significant
contribution, whereas 69.2% thought the genocide trials would, and 84.2% believed that gacaca
would.). See also PETER UVIN, THE INTRODUCTION OF MODERNIZED GACACA FOR JUDGING SUSPECTS
OF PARTICIPATION IN THE GENOCIDE AND MASSACRES OF 1994 IN RWANDA 8, available at
http://fletcher.tufts.edu/humansecurity/pdf/Boutmans.pdf (citing over 70% support for gacaca). But see
Waldorf, supra note 65, at n.366 (suggesting that attitudinal surveys may have measured respondents'
ability to parrot widespread government propaganda, rather than actual support for gacaca).
196. Waldorf, supra note 65, at 66, n.370 & n.378 (noting that in the pilot phase, absenteeism was a
problem in eight out of the twelve jurisdictions, partially because of the harsh economic realities.
Ninety percent of the Rwandan labor force are subsistence farmers. Many are already required to
participate in government sensitization campaigns and community labor typically (umuganda) five
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Some attribute this decline in supportto the public perception that gacaca
court judges are corrupt. Judges serve without pay and lack legal qualifications,1 98
which make them susceptible to corruption. Some defendants have successfully
bribed judges, 99 for example, to avoid, for example, a Category I classification,2 0
and tens of thousands of judges have been accused of participating in the
genocide. 2 1  Judgments also aren't always enforced against indigent
genocidaires.2 °2 Without a guarantee of compensation, Tutsi survivors are
reluctant to participate as witnesses, particularly when they fear retaliation and
violence by their Hutu neighbors20 3 and by genocidaires who have confessed but
have been provisionally released. 04
Hutus too have little incentive to participate in gacaca when they have no
opportunity to discuss the suffering inflicted on them by the RPF, or when they
fear accusation.0 5 False denunciations, though punishable by law, are a simple
times a month.). See also 2004 Gacaca Law, supra note 165, at art. 29 (noting that the Rwandan
government now mandates participation, penalizes absenteeism with 3 to 6 months in prison and for
repeated absentees, 6 months to 1 year). But see Goldstein-Bolocan, supra note 86, at 392, for a
criticism of the state-mandated use of Gacaca to deal with genocide cases may undermine its original
value as an informal, spontaneous dispute resolution mechanism.
197. AVOCATS SAN FRONTIERES, MONITORING OF THE GACACA COURTS JUDGMENT PHASE,
ANALYTICAL REP. 10, 25 (Mar.-Sept. 2005) (reporting that "although the local population may have
been present in large numbers, they were reluctant to become involved" and hypothesizing the mains
reasons to be fear of reprisals, refusal to denounce friends and families, and fear of being convicted for
false testimony). See also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, OVERVIEW OF HUMAN RGHTS ISSUES IN RWANDA
1 (Jan. 2006), available at http://hrw.org/wr2k6/pdf/rwanda.pdf (noting that many Rwandans did not
trust gacaca courts and boycotted sessions).
198. See Waldorf, supra note 65, at 67.
199. See Le Mon, supra note 156, at 17. See generally Seven Gacaca Judges of a Same Court
Arrested, HIRONDELLE NEWS AGENCY (Dec. 7, 2007),
http://www.hirondellenews.com/content/view/1325/461/.
200. See Le Mon, supra note 156, at 17 (referencing articles that reported bribery ofjudges).
201. Id. at 18 (citing report by Rwandan government office in charge of gacaca courts indicating
that authorities suspect 45,396 gacaca court judges of having committed crimes during the genocide).
See also Waldorf, supra note 65, at 67, n.386 (estimating 1319 judges had been replaced as of January
2004, with 656 having been accused of genocide. In the Murama Sector, the gacaca president stated
that the removal of all judges who had pillaged in 1994 would leave gacaca without any judges.)
(citations omitted).
202. Waldorf, supra note 65, at 57 & n.317 (noting that "in a sample of 192 judgments from 1997
to 1999, civil parties obtained the right to compensation only half the time). Compensation through
community service could exacerbate ethnic tensions if seen as a return to the colonial-era forced labor
system where Hutu clients worked for Tutsi patrons. Id.
203. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES (2007) (reporting
between 11 and 25 genocide witnesses were killed in 2007, while another 22 reportedly committed
suicide). See also Le Mon, supra note 156, at 17-18, nn.10, 13, & 14 (citing reports of multiple cases of
retaliation against witnesses).
204. Arthur Asiimwe, 36,000 Genocide Suspects Freed from Rwandan Jails, THE INDEPENDENT
(London), July 30, 2005 (reporting that a genocide survivor told a journalist, "It will now be useless to
attend these gacaca courts. These [released detainees] will stick together and hide the truth."). See
Meyerstein, supra note 65, at 487-91, for a discussion of how prisoner releases has contributed to the
atmosphere of anxiety and distrust.
205. See Le Mon, supra note 156, at 18-19. See also Timothy Longman & Theoneste Rutagengwa,
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route to get rid of a neighbor whose property one covets or to resolve a property
dispute that the gacaca courts do not hear.20 6 Indeed, when the national phase
began, ten thousand Hums fled to Burundi, °7 causing an international refugee
crisis. Many feared they would be accused as perpetrators or bystanders, killed in
revenge after being named, or, in the case of provisional releases, be sent back to
208prison. Some Hum extremists and families of prisoners propagated rumors that
gacaca was a harbinger of a counter-genocide, designed to round up Hums and kill
them en masse.20 9 The tactics adopted at the local level to coerce participation (i.e.
fines and public admonishments) have reinforced these fears and help perpetuate a
culture of secrecy, 210 where silence is perceived as loyalty to kin and patrons rather
than as deception.21'
The Rwandan government has further frustrated gacaca's potential to
advance reconciliation by criminalizing certain challenges to gacaca courts. At
times, the government has accused citizens and international organizations 212 who
Memory, Identity and Community in Rwanda, in MY NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY, 176 (Eric Stover &
Harvey Weinstein, eds., Cambridge University Press, 2004) (finding in attitudinal surveys that "[m]any
Hutu resent the fact that their experience of suffering is excluded from official discourse.").
206. Waldorf, supra note 65, at 72, n.420 (noting that Gacaca courts do not hear property disputes
stemming from the ethnic violence before the genocide, the RPF's displacement of hundreds of
thousands of Hutu in northern Rwanda during the civil war of 1990 to 1993, the return of several
hundred thousand Tutsi exiles who had fled before 1994, some of their families having left Rwandan in
1959, and the return of about two million Hutu refugees who had fled after the RPF victory in 1994).
See also ORG. OF AFR. UNITY, supra note 78, at §17.9 (reporting that according to the OAU, the return
migration totaled 750,000 just four months after the genocide. "In a literal sense, it was almost an
entire new Tutsi population that emerged after the war," many of whom had no connection to villages
or communities in Rwanda.).
207. Meyerstein, supra note 65, at 490.
208. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS 2005, HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES (Mar. 8, 2006),
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rlsihrrpt/2005/61 587.htm (reporting that in late April 2005, more than 6500
Hutu fled Rwanda). See also Mary Kimani, 600 Tried, Thousands Flee, INT'L JUST. TRIB. (May 22,
2005) (quoting one fleeing Hutu, "We fled because of one-sided justice. It is one community judging
the other.").
209. See Waldorf, supra note 65, at 67-68.
210. See GOUREVITCH, supra note 65, at 22 ("Rwandan culture is a culture of fear..."). See also
DANIELLE DE LAME, A HILL AMONG A THOUSAND: TRANSFORMATIONS AND RUPTURES IN RURAL
RWANDA 14-15 (University of Wisconsin Press, 2005) ("Secrets are a preferred tool for forging an
identity, both individual and collective . . Shared secrets develop internal solidarity rooted in trust in
each other's ability not to reveal them ... Secrecy persisted as a cultural habit well beyond pre-colonial
and colonial Rwanda, where people, subjected to a climate of constant insecurity, were at the mercy of
capricious chiefs whose intrigues affected their lives The habit of secrecy continues in the most
ordinary circumstances: one's dwelling place is mentioned evasively, and the rooms of a house are set
up so as to conceal the state of one's provisions.").
211. Waldorf, supra note 65, at 70.
212. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 83, at 39, n.104 ("Among the international organizations
accused of supporting divisionist and genocidal ideas by one or both of the parliamentary commissions
were CARE International, Trocaire, Norwegian People's Aid, 11-Il-Il, Kolping Family, Pax Christi,
Voice of America (VOA), British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and Human Rights Watch as well as
the Catholic Church, the Association of Pentecostal Churches in Rwanda, Jehovah's Witnesses, Seventh
Day Adventists, the International United Methodist Church, and the Mennonites.").
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have spoken out against or not participated in gacaca as harboring "divisionism ''213
or "genocidal ideology, '214 which is punishable by a maximum of five years in
prison."' In one case, a local government official accused citizens of having
"genocide and ethnic ideologies" for boycotting a gacaca, though the boycott was
based on allegations that judges were soliciting bribes.21 6
The Kagame government's increasingly authoritarian tendencies have not
passed unnoticed by international watchdog organizations. Amnesty International
reports that Rwandan journalists continue to face violence, intimidation, and
harassment."' Human Rights Watch has condemned the recent killings of
genocide survivors and extrajudicial executions, calling for "prompt, effective, and
impartial investigations and prosecutions in all situations, including in the killing
of genocide survivors. 2 18  Such killings clearly raise tensions between ethnic
groups in the country. In the past two years, Human Rights Watch has also
denounced illegal detentions, police killings, and the disappearance of prominent
29business people within the country. 19 In its 2008 Country Report on Human
Rights in Rwanda, the U.S. State Department says:
213. Id. at 35. "In 2002 'divisionism' (then called 'sectarianism') was made a crime .... Id. The
crime of sectarianism occurs when the author makes use of any speech, written statement or action that
causes conflict that causes an uprising that may degenerate into strife among people. Id. "When asked
to define 'divisionism,' not one judge interviewed by Human Rights Watch researchers was able to do
so, despite having convicted defendants on divisionism charges." Id. (internal citations omitted).
214. Id. ("Under the 2003 law punishing genocide, persons condemned for denying or grossly
minimizing genocide, attempting to justify genocide or destroy evidence related to it were liable to a
minimum of ten years and a maximum of twenty years in prison.") (internal citations omitted); see also
CONST. OF THE REPUBLIC OF RWANDA, pmbl, arts. 9, 13, 33 (June 4, 2003) (stating that that
revisionism, negationism, the minimization of genocide and all ethnic, regionalist, and racial
propaganda based on an form of division is punishable by law); see also Human Rights Watch,
Preparing for Elections: Tightening Control in the Name of Unity, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
BACKGROUNDER, May 8, 2003, http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/africa/rwanda0503bck.htm (noting
that in 2003, the government accused forty-six MDR politicians and their alleged supporters of
divisionist ideology.); see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 83, at 40-41 (offering further
discussion of problematic prosecutions that have led to marginalization of political opposition, chilled
dissent against government policies such as land reform, social isolation of individuals charged and
approximately 1,300 prosecutions in 2007-2008 alone).
215. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 83, at 38.
216. Le Mon, supra note 156, at 19; Kamembe Residents Boycott Gacaca, THE NEW TIMES
(KIGALI), (Sept. 29, 2006); see also Genocide Survivor Boycotts Gacaca, Cites Harassment, THE NEW
TIMES (KIGALI), Nov. 16, 2006.
217. See AMNESTY INT'L REPORT 2008: STATE OF THE WORLD'S HUMAN RIGHTS, RWANDA
(2008), http://thereport.amnesty.org/eng/regions/africa/rwanda.
218. Human Rights Watch, Killings in Eastern Rwanda, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH BACKGROUNDER,
(JAN. 2007), http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/africa/rwanda0 I 07/rwanda0 I 07web.pdf.
219. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 2007, RWANDA - EVENTS
OF 2006 (2007), http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/publisher,HRW,,RWA,45aca2a5b,0.html ("Police and
members of Local Defense Forces illegally detained and abused hundreds of persons, many of them
street children and members of other vulnerable groups in Kigali, the capital, during the first months of
2006.").
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Significant human rights abuses occurred, although there were
important improvements in some areas. Citizens' right to change their
government was restricted, and extrajudicial killings by security forces
increased. There were reports of torture and abuse of suspects, although
significantly fewer than in previous years. Police sometimes imposed
collective punishments, including beatings, on residents of communities
in which the property of genocide survivors had been damaged or
destroyed.... Security forces arbitrarily arrested and detained persons....
There continued to be limits on freedom of speech and association, and
restrictions on the press increased.220
Filip Reyntjens goes so far as to say that "[t]en years after the 1994 genocide,
Rwanda is experiencing not democracy and reconciliation but dictatorship and
exclusion., 221 Reyntjens discusses the conflicts and disagreements that have
wracked the RPF over the past decade. These include allegations of abuse of
power, human rights violations, discrimination, and intimidation of opponents and
critics. 2 22 He concludes that the RPF is continuing the authoritarian tendencies of
the Habyarimana regime and warns that the international community should not be
blinded by the competent, technocratic rule of the RPF. 3  Reyntjens sees
ominous" signs that the situation in Rwanda might further deteriorate and that the
seeds for "massive new violence in the medium to long run" may already be
sown. 2 24 An echo of this concern is found in the U.S. Millennium Challenge
Corporations' 2007 country scorecard for Rwanda which gives the country low
marks in the category of "Ruling Justly.
225
Given the scope of the 1994 genocide, and the enormous number of people
involved as perpetrators or accomplices, it is unsurprising that both the ICTR and
the national legal system have experienced real difficulties in effectively and
efficiently prosecuting cases. Empowering local communities to draw on their
local knowledge and resolve genocide-related disputes relieves stress on the formal
legal system and may speed justice for some. Gacaca holds the potential to
promote inter-ethnic reconciliation, but it is unclear if the process is living up to
this potential.
Strategies for promoting reconciliation do not rely solely on legal process;
however, in addition to the courts and gacaca, the government has undertaken a
variety of other efforts to promote reconciliation. These include creating the
220. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -RWANDA, (March
11,2008), http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/100499.htm.
221. Filip Reyntjens, Rwanda, Ten Years On: From Genocide to Dictatorship, 103 AFR. AFF. 177,
177 (2004).
222. Id. at 180.
223. Id. at 209.
224. Id. at 209-10.
225. Millennium Challenge Corp., Rwanda Candidate Country Scorecard FY08, (2007),
http://www.mcc.gov/documents/score-fy08-rwanda.pdf (demonstrating that although Rwanda scores
well in terms of controlling corruption, it scores poorly in terms of the protection of civil and political
rights and in terms of voice and accountability).
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National Unity and Reconciliation Commission, which organizes meetings,
conferences, and workshops to discuss unity and reconciliation; 226 building
genocide memorials and museums; 22 7 and sponsoring remembrance events, such as
the national day of mouring and the annual mourning period in April. 228 In
addition to these programs, informal reconciliation in Rwanda may be encouraged
by the government's policy of economic liberalization. We discuss the
government's effort to liberalize the economy generally and the important coffee
sector particularly below.
IV. LIBERALIZATION IN RWANDA
Over the past decade, the Rwandan government has liberalized much of the
economy, albeit slowly and with some difficulty. There are currently no
restrictions on investments in Rwanda,229 which is also a member of several
regional trade groups, including the East African Community . 0 Tariffs have been
eliminated on goods entering from COMESA countries but they remain a weighted
9.7% in 2005 for other goods from other nations. 23 1  The government has
privatized a large number (70 of 104) of industries.2 32 While Rwanda scores
reasonably well on a recent economic freedom index in terms of fiscal, trade, and
monetary freedom, it scores poorly in terms of property-rights protection and
233
corruption. Overall, the trend in Rwanda over the past 10 years is towards
increased economic freedom and in November 2006, Rwanda was designated as a
"Threshold" country by the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) in the U.S.,
and cited for having "demonstrated an impressive track record on economic
reform. 234
VISION 2020 creates a strategic plan for economic change in Rwanda.2 35
This plan "has served as the platform for sector policy-setting in each ministry
since late 2003. "236 The goals created by VISION 2020 and Rwanda's Poverty
226. Zorbas, supra note 132, at 38. The NURC was created in 1999. It participated in "civic
reeducation" aimed at former Interhamwe members or other demobilized soldiers by providing courses.
Id.
227. Id. at 39.
228. Id. at 40.
229. THE HERITAGE FOUND., 2008 INDEX OF ECONOMIC FREEDOM, RWANDA (2008),
http://www.heritage.org/Index/country.cfm?id=Rwanda.
230. John Gahamanyi, Finanical Institutions: Rwanda Joins EADB Board, THE NEW TIMES
(Kilgali), Nov. 6, 2008, available at http://newtimes.co.rw/index.php?issue=13706&article=10550.
231. THE HERITAGE FOUND., supra note 229.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Press Release, Millennium Challenge Corp., Millennium Challenge Corporation Board of
Directors Announces 2007 Threshold Program Countries Niger; Peru; and Rwanda (Nov. 8, 2006),
available at http://www.mcc.gov/press/releases/2006/release- 1 10806-thresholdcountryselection.php;
see also MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP., supra note 225.
235. REPUBLIC OF RWANDA MINISTRY OF FIN. AND ECON. PLANNING, VISION 2020 (July 2000),
available at http://www.moh.gov.rw/docs/VISION2020.doc.
236. Int'l Fund for Agric. Dev., Enabling the Rural Poor to Overcome Poverty in Rwanda,
www.IFAD.org, Nov. 2006, http://www.ifad.org/operations/projects/regions/Pf/factsheets/rwanda-e.pdf
2009
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) include improving the institutional environment
to allow for private-sector development and infrastructure improvements; focusing
on good governance (including democratization, national reconciliation, political
stability, and security); improving productivity (especially of land); improving
human capital through investments in health and education, creating a service-
based economy with a focus on ICT (information communications and
technology); 237 reducing external support; relying more on exports; and promoting
regional integration.
238
Progress towards the VISION 2020 goals has been mixed. As a result of
these policy changes, the annual economic growth rate was above 10% between
1994 and 2004; this was the second highest growth rate in Africa during that
period.239 Per capita GDP rose at a rate of 5.3% during this same time period and
this was the third highest growth rate in Africa. 240  The British overseas
development agency, DFID, reports that poverty levels dropped from 70% of the
population in 1994 to under 57% in 2006.241 The government has improved tax
collections. The amount collected by the Rwandan Revenue Authority has
increased three-fold from the equivalent of 60 million pounds in 1998 to the
equivalent of 240 million pounds in 2006.242 The government has also devoted
much time and attention to diversifying the economy. Results have been good
enough that in 2006 the British government and the Rwandan government signed a
Memorandum of Understanding that commits the bilateral partners to continuing
reforms and financial support.243
Despite this progress the per capita GDP is depressingly low at $260.244
Most Rwandans still work in agriculture.24 5 The World Bank reports that only 6%
237. Xan Rice, Poverty-stricken Rwanda puts its faith and future into the wide wired world, THE
GUARDIAN (London), Aug. 1, 2006, at 20, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/rwanda/story/0,,1
834621,00.html.
238. RWANDAN AUTHORITIES, AN APPROACH TO THE POVERTY REDUCTION ACTION PLAN FOR
RWANDA: THE INTERIM PRSP 12 Int'l Monetary Fund (2000), available at
http://www.imf.org/extemal/NP/prsp/2000/rwa/01/110100.pdf.
239. Press Release, Dep't for Int'l Dev., Rwanda's remarkable recovery leads UK to commit funds
for next 10 years, (March 1, 2006), available at http://www.dfid.gov.uk/news/files/pressreleases/rwan
da-commitment.asp.
240. Dep't for Int'l Dev., Organization Record (Jan. 6, 2007),
http://www.afdevinfo.com/htmlreports/org/org-35681.html.
241. Dep't for Int'l Dev., A Way to Help Governments Reduce Poverty, WWW.DFID.GOV.UK, Jan.
7, 2008, http://www.dfid.gov.uk/news/files/prbs-hovs-reduce-poverty-examples.asp#Rwanda. If these
figures are accurate, then such changes go some way towards addressing two prongs of Collier's
conflict trap: economic growth and low incomes. COLLIER ET AL., supra note 11, at 53. However,
past experience may not be replicated in the future. Id.
242. Dep't for Int'l Dev., Good Taxes Reduce Poverty in Rwanda, WWW.DFID.GOv.UK, Jan. 10,
2008, http://www.dfid.gov.uk/casestudies/files/africa/rwanda-tax.asp.
243. Dep't of Int'l Dev., supra note 239.
244. U.S. Dep't of State, Background Note: Rwanda, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/286l .htm.
245. Id.
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of Rwandans have access to clean water and electricity. 246 And, Rwanda scores a
low 150 out of 178 in the World Bank's latest (2008) Doing Business report. 247
V. MODEST GAINS AND ENCOURAGING SIGNS IN THE COFFEE SECTOR
One area where the government's liberalization policies have created benefits
for many poor Rwandans is in the coffee sector. Economic liberalization in this
important sector has benefited thousands of Rwanda's smallholders. 248 Reforms
have freed farmers from mulching requirements and the legal obligation to grow
coffee. Farmers can now interplant coffee with other crops,24 9 freely contract with
buyers, 250 and join together in cooperatives to take advantage of economies of
scale.2 51
Rwandex S.A., the old monopsony purchaser/exporter, was sold to a private
owner in 2007.252 Recent reports suggest the company may face liquidation as a
result of excessive debt. 253 If this were to happen, Rwanda would still have four
246. World Bank Group Dev. Outreach, Poverty Alleviation and Economic Growth in Rwanda
through S&T, http://wwwl .worldbank.org/devoutreach/january07/article.asp?id=397.
247. Doing Business 2008: Comparing Regulations in 178 Economies 6 (World Bank, Working
Paper No. 41938, 2008), available at http://go.worldbank.org/DXNFXDD490.
248. AKIYAMA ET. AL., supra note 21, at 88 (noting that after Uganda liberalized its coffee sector
"Rwandan policy makers became keenly aware of the sound performance of Uganda's subsector
following liberalization and were eager to apply similar policies.").
249. Scott Loveridge, Edson Mpyisi & Michael T. Weber, Farm-Level Perspectives in Rwanda's
Coffee Supply Chain Coordination Challenge, 4 Agricultural Policy Synthesis: Rwanda Food Sec.
Project/MINAGRI, No. 2E (2002), available at http://www.aec.msu.edu/agecon/fs2/rwanda/ps-2e.pdf.
250. DeLucco, supra note 30, at 13.
251. A cooperative is defined as: "a private business organization that is owned and controlled by
the people who use its products, supplies or services." Univ. of Cal., Davis Dep't. of Agric. and Res.
Econ., Rural Coop. Ctr., What is a Co-op?, http://www.cooperatives.ucdavis.edu/whatis/index.htm (last
visited Nov. 13, 2008). Agricultural cooperatives form when farmers voluntarily choose to associate in
a larger group to pursue some common goal(s) or benefits. These benefits might include access to
processing equipment, economies of scale, risk spreading, socializing opportunities, microloans, or
improved health or education facilities. Cooperative members may also work at the cooperative as
employees. Cooperatives operate under bylaws that specify roles and responsibilities of members,
management, and the board of directors. Members elect the cooperative's management and board of
directors. In addition, members meet regularly to debate the cooperative's direction. In the field study,
when asked what the benefits of being a coffee cooperative member was, roughly 27% responded
-earning money and improving living conditions," 20% responded "getting loans," 20% responded
"getting inputs" (e.g., fertilizer, pesticide), 15% responded "training and quality improvement" and 15%
responded to "join others and socialize." Jutta M. Tobbias, Data Analysis from Field Study [hereinafter
Field Study 2008] (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
252. African Agriculture, Rwanda Coffee Company Privatized, Value-Addition Estimates
Expected, http://africanagriculture.blogspot.com/2007/03/rwanda-coffee-company-privatized-
value.html.
253. Before the sale of the company, the government of Rwanda owned a 51% share in the
company. Id. On the recent liquidation of Rwandex, see Gertrude Majyambere, Coffee Sector: Why
Rwandex Was shut Down, THE NEW TiMES, (Kigali, Rwanda) May 18, 2008, available at
http://www.newtimes.co.rw/index.php?issue= 13630&article=647&week= 15.
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coffee exporters operating in the country, an increase in competition that may
improve marketing efficiency. 4
Important improvements in this sector have come from bilateral and
multilateral development assistance. NGOs have helped farmers establish
cooperatives and have trained cooperative members in quality control, processing,
and marketing efforts.2 5 Removing a coffee bean from its cherry (depulping) is a
lengthy process, 256 and the government, donors, NGOs, and the private sector have
worked with smallholders to improve the process, in part by helping to build scores
of washing stations257 around the country to improve quality. 258  The result is
254. AKIYAMA ET. AL, supra note 21, at 109 (discussing coffee sector liberalization in India,
Uganda, and Togo write: "the disappearance of inefficient marketing parastatals, and increased
competition (the result of private traders entering the coffee market) marketing efficiency has improved
substantially in Togo and Uganda." Rwanda's liberalized export sector should result in a similar
improvement in marketing efficiency).
255. Samuel Goff, Tex. A&M Univ., International Partnerships for the Development of the
Specialty Coffee Sector in Rwanda, Address Before the AIAEE 2 2nd Annual Conference (May 16,
2006), in International Teamwork in Agriculture and Extension Education, May 2006, at 244, available
at http://www.aiaee.org/2006/Accepted/244.pdf.
256. The coffee season in Rwanda runs from March through July. As coffee cherries ripen, farmers
go to their fields every few days to pick the fruit. The coffee bean is the seed of this fruit. To get the
bean, the fruit must be removed by either a dry or wet process. Dry processing is a low-technology
approach that uses the sun to dry the fruit which is subsequently milled. In a wet process, used at coffee
washing stations in Rwanda, growers bring their cherries to a washing station to be weighed and de-
pulped. The cherries are pre-sorted, by floating them in water to separate the heavier cherries from the
lighter ones. The cherries are run through pulping machines that remove much of the fruit from the
bean. The fruit from the pulping may be retained to use as fertilize, but the beans ferment in holding
tanks, as fermentation makes it easier to remove the remaining mucilage. After the fermentation process
is complete, the beans are washed four to five times. The beans are sorted again and left to float for 24
hours. After this 24-hour period, the beans are laid out on sorting tables, and workers pick out damaged
or irregular beans. The beans are dried in the sun until they reach a desired moisture level, which may
take between ten days to two weeks depending upon the weather. This "'parchment" coffee is then
packed in burlap bags and stored for shipment to a miller who will remove the parchment and produce
green coffee beans. Beans are typically exported after this and roasted by the importer. For more
discussion of this process and supply chain concerns as they relate to coffee production see Raphael
Kaplinksy, Competitions Policy and the Global Coffee and Cocoa Value Chains 8-9 (paper prepared for
United National Conference for Trade and Development 2004), available at http://www.acp-eu-
trade.org/library/files/Kaplinsky-Raphael-EN-052005-IDS-Competition-policy-and-the-global-coffee-
and-cocoa-value-chains.pdf
257. Coffee washing stations are generally located in the rural, Rwandan hills where there is little
infrastructure. US AID was instrumental in building the first washing station in Rwanda. By 2005, 46
washing stations had been built, 38 with the financial assistance from US AID. By 2007, the number of
washing stations in operation more than doubled to 120. SPREAD, a US AID Project currently
provides NGO support to 95 washing stations. See infra note 259. Still in 2007, less than 10% of all
Rwandan coffee was sold fully washed, indicating more growth opportunities. OTF Group, Coffee
Strategy Update, Continuing Achievements Made in the High Quality Arabica Coffee Market, 2007-10
(on file with author).
258. Peter Hulm, Rwandan Coffee Goes from Ordinary Coffee to Star(bucks), International Trade
Forum (Jan. 2007), http://www.tradeforum.org/news/fullstory.php/aid/1 134 (last visited Sept. 5, 2008).
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increasing demand for Rwandan fully washed coffee, some of which is considered
"specialty coffee. 259
One of the major effects of the liberalizing Rwanda's coffee industry is that
smallholders who produce higher valued specialty coffee have higher incomes.
The price that cooperatives and private buyers are paying farmers for unwashed
coffee cherries has risen from 60 to 80 Rwandan francs in 2004 to 120-150 francs
in 2007.26 o Once the cherries are washed they can be sold to buyers for an even
higher price. In 2004, the Maraba cooperative sold washed coffee for $3.26 per
kilo; in 2007, the cooperative was able to charge $4.08 per kilo.261 In 2007, the
COOPAC cooperative was selling its cherries for $4.00 per kilo, 262 and the
Rusenyi cooperative was selling in a range between $4.40 and $5.50 per kilo.263 In
a truly remarkable achievement, in September 2007, importers paid as much as
$55.00 per kilo for the best Rwandan coffee.264 In 2008, the Rwandan government
projects that 25% of the beans sold for export will qualify as high-value, defect-
free specialty coffee.265 Cooperatives use the income these sales generate to pay
farmers for cherries, to pay salaries for washing-station staff, and they may provide
other benefits to members-short-term loans and improvements to local schools
would be just two examples.266
A 2006 report to US AID details that "[a]pproximately 50,000 households
have seen their incomes from coffee production double, and some 2,000 jobs have
259. "Specialty" coffee is defined by the Specialty Coffee Association of America as: "coffee that
has no defects and has a distinctive flavor in the cup." Specialty Coffee Ass'n of America, Coffee Term
Definitions, http://www.scaa.org/pdfs/glossary.pdf (last visited Sept. 4, 2008). Coffee is ranked into
five classes. Class 1 is "specialty" coffee and may have between 0 and 5 defects. The next class,
"premium grade" has between 6 and 8 defects. Coffeesearch.org, Coffee Trade: New York Coffee
Exchange, http://www.coffeeresearch.org/market/coffeemarket.htm (last visited Sept. 4, 2008).
Washing coffee may increase the quality of the coffee, which, in turn, might improve the chances of a
particular lot of coffee being considered "specialty. See Loveridge et al supra note 249, at 3.
260. Richard Swanson & Tom Bagaza, Sustaining Partnerships to enhance Rural Enterprises and
Agribusiness Development (SPREAD Project), SPREAD-Growers First Coffee Cooperative Assessment
& 2008 Cooperative Development Work Plan, 22-24, (report prepared for the Tex. A&M Univ. Sys.
Borlaug Inst. of Int'l Agric. and Growers First, 2008), available at
http://www.spreadproject.org/documents/SPREAD%20Coffee%2Cooperative%2OAssessment%20and
%20Workplan.pdf.
261. Id. at 22.
262. Id. at 24.
263. Id. at 23.
264. At the Golden Cup coffee auction and competition in Kigali, in September of 2007, Rwandan
coffee was bought by U.S. coffee importers for as much as $55 per kilo (approximately $25 per pound),
a Rwandan record price comparable to the world's most expensive coffees. Rwanda Dev. Gateway,
Coffee Sells at Record Prices (Sept. 10, 2007),
http://www.rwandagateway.org/article.php3?id-article=6848.
265. Coffee Revenues Double Before Year End, RWANDA NEWS AGENCY, July 24, 2008, available
at http://allafrica.com/stories/200807240894.html.
266. See infra text accompanying note 393 for further discussion of cooperatives and potential
benefits. In Field Study 2008, 83% of respondents who were members of cooperatives believed that
they could not have received the economic and social benefits without being a member of the
cooperative. Field Study 2008, supra note 251, at question 14.
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been created at coffee washing stations. 267 An NGO involved in the US AID
project reports: "incomes (in the specialty coffee sector) have doubled or tripled,
and business skills, labour conditions and community spirit have been
enhanced." 268 In US AID-supported coffee zones, earnings increased by 50-100%
between 2004 and 2007.269 With more income, farmers can repair their homes,
buy clothes and livestock, pay school fees for their children, and get through the
long months between harvests more easily than before.27°
The results from our exploratory field survey271 conducted in the June 2008
among rural Rwandan coffee farmers confirm that smallholder farmers are
benefiting from changes in the coffee sector. Sixty-four percent of those polled
said that their workload had been reduced in the past five years or, alternatively,
since joining a cooperative. 272 Farmers reported using this extra time to pursue
other income generating activities, helping care for family and friends, and to meet
socially.273  When asked to compare the level of happiness with their economic
situation now versus in the past (i.e. five years ago, or alternatively before they
joined the co-op), only 3% polled said they were very happy before, whereas 40%
said they were very happy now.274  Seventy-two percent reported feeling very
confident that there are now good opportunities to make a better life for themselves
and their families.275 While these results are not dispositive, they further
corroborate the thesis that farmers are experiencing important economic gains that
may, in turn, help promote more positive feelings towards others, a step towards
reconciliation.
267. Chemonics Int'l, Assessing US AID's Investments in Rwanda's Coffee Sector - Best Practices
& Lessons Learned To Consolidate Results & Expand Impact 4 (2006), available at
http://www.minagri.gov.rw/IMG/pdf/USAID-RwandaCoffeeAssessment.pdf.
268. ACDI/VOCA, Specialty Coffee: Increased Quality & Profits for Smallholders, available at
http://www.acdivoca.org/852571 DC00681414/Lookup/coffeebroweblayout/$file/coffeebroweblayout.p
df (last visited Sept. 4, 2008).
269. Swanson & Bagaza, supra note 260, at 22-24.
270. Interviews with members of the COOPAC cooperative, Gisenyi, Rwanda, ( Mar. 16 2006);
Field Study 2008, supra note 251, at question 20.
271. The proportion of Hutu to Tutsi ranged from 54% Hutu (to 38% Tutsi) to 83% Hutu (to 13%
Tutsi) across the locations. Intergroup Contact, supra note 13, at 38. Although the study's sample
represents a minority of coffee farmers in Rwanda, i.e. those benefiting from the results of privatization
in Rwanda's coffee sector, and the survey design prohibits generalizations beyond the group examined,
the observed correlations match current theories of reconciliation and are corroborated by journalistic
evidence. Moreover, while correlation is not the same as causation, the absence of a correlation
suggests the absence of a causal relationship. Here, there are strong correlations. Id.
272. Field Study 2008, supra note 251, at question 18. Because not all farmers were members of
cooperatives but sold their cherries to private washing stations, we used a 5 year time horizon as a
reference point for these participants as opposed to membership in a cooperative. Id. Part VII offers a
more in-depth discussion of private washing stations.
273. Field Study 2008, supra note 251, at question 19.
274. Id. at question 21.
275. Id. at question 38.
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There are a number of reasons to believe these benefits will continue. 276
While growth worldwide in ordinary-grade coffee consumption remains modest,
the consumption of high-quality specialty coffee (currently 7% of the coffee
volume in the international market) is rising by 20% annually.277 Even with
increased competition and somewhat lower prices, Rwanda's specialty coffees
should continue to command a good price. 278 In 2006, coffee exports were
expected to grow from 17,000 to 21,000 metric tons-a 23.5% increase-and
generate $46 billion in revenue-which would mark a 21% increase from 2005
figures.279 Coffee, along with tea, still earns more than 50% of Rwanda's trade
revenue, 280 and the amount of fully washed coffee is also rising as the number of
washing stations increases.
281
In an interview in 2006, Rwanda's then-Minister of Agriculture, Anastase
Murekezi, said that the specialty coffee industry's most successful story to date (in
terms of wealth being created for Rwandans) was with American companies. 282
Importers such as Starbucks and Green Mountain buy Rwandan coffee, bringing
much needed income to smallholders,283 but so too are less well-known but highly
discriminating American importers such as Intelligensia, Thanksgiving, and
Counter Culture Coffee.284
As noted above, several NGOs have helped Rwandans take advantage of this
liberalized environment, providing training and technical assistance and helping
farmers develop relationships with foreign buyers. For example, US AID has used
part of its relatively small budget in Rwanda to support rural economic growth
through three coffee-related projects: the Partnership for Enhancing Agriculture
276. RWANDA NEWS AGENCY, supra note 265 (noting that through July, 2008 export revenue for
Rwandan coffee was reported to be $15 million, up from $6.8 million for the whole of 2007).
277. Specialty Coffee Statistics & Coffee Facts, http://www.e-
importz.com/Support/specialty-coffee.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2008).
278. ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, COUNTRY REPORT: RWANDA (2007), (observing that in its
2007 Country Report on Rwanda, the Economist Intelligence Unit notes: "Stagnation in many of the
traditional coffee-drinking markets of North America and Western Europe will restrict growth in
demand, although demand for high-quality specialty coffees, including Rwanda's finest fully washed
Arabica, will remain more buoyant.").
279. Reuters, Rwanda 2006 Coffee Output Seen at 21,000 T, FLEXNEWS, Oct. 19, 2006,
http://www.flexnews.com/pages/5321/Africa/Coffee/rwanda_2006_coffee-output-seen_21000_t.html.
280. TRADE POLICY REVIEW BODY REPORT, RWANDA-REPORT BY THE GOVERNMENT,
WT/TPR/G/129 (Aug. 31, 2004), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/tpr e/g129_e.doc
(noting that "The chief cash crops are tea and coffee, which provide more than half of Rwanda's export
revenue.").
281. Swanson & Bagaza, supra note 260.
282. Interview with Anastase Murekezi, Minister of Agriculture, Rwanda, in Kigali, Rwanda, (Mar.
14, 2006) (on file with author).
283. See Laura Fraser, Coffee, and Hope, Grow in Rwanda, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2006, § 3, at 31.
284. Description of Rwandan Intelligentsia Coffee,
http://www.intelligentsiacoffee.com/origin/offerings/02-15-2008; Description of Thanksgiving Coffee's
use of Cooperatives in Rwanda, http://www.thanksgivingcoffee.com/cooperatives; description of
Counter Culture Coffee's use of Rwandan Coffee,
http://www.counterculturecoffee.com/index.php?option=com-content&task=view&id=606&Itemid=49.
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through Linkages (PEARL), the Agricultural Cooperative Development
International/Volunteers Overseas Cooperative Assistance (ACDI-VOCA), and the
Agribusiness Development Assistance Project in Rwanda (ADAR).285
Each group has made important contributions to strengthening the coffee
sector. For example, the PEARL project, working closely with the National
University of Rwanda in Butare focused on helping farmers form cooperatives to
produce high-quality specialty coffee.286 PEARL team members taught local
growers how to improve their quality-control measures, develop effective
marketing strategies, and create beneficial relationships with specialty coffee
importers.287 PEARL has helped thirteen cooperatives win government approval,
and also assisted coffee washing stations by helping to improve quality-control
capabilities, improving market access, and improving management skills.
288
Whether these cooperatives can develop effective management structures remains
an open question, one the new SPREAD project (an outgrowth of PEARL) is
attempting to address.
289
Trainers and buyers from Europe, China, and Japan are also routinely visiting
the country, bringing expertise that helps improve the local industry, as well as
income to farmers. Minister Murekezi said: "You see richness growing and
poverty decreasing. You see people happier, more children at school, more homes
being improved, more people in savings schemes for health. And people say they
want to continue to improve their lives through coffee.,
2 90
In the 2006 interview, the Minister also noted that in the areas around
washing stations, employment and revenues are both rising. Besides increased
incomes for farmers, the benefits from specialty coffee extend beyond the
cooperative. Goff notes: "[A]s income levels of the cooperative members have
increased so has the flow of money in the community.... The positive feelings
among community members are a reflection of increased incomes in the area (of
the cooperatives). 29' Coffee production cannot, by itself, solve the many
285. Chemonics Int'l, supra note 267, at 15-16 (noting that budgets for these projects have been
relatively small: ACDI-VOCA's budget was approximately $600,000 from 2001 to 2003; ADAR and
PEARL had annual budgets of approximately $1.5 million. ADAR and PEARL were six-year projects).
286. Id. at 16.
287. Id. at 32, 33, 39.
288. See generally Partnership to Enhance Agriculture in Rwanda through Linkages,
http://www.iia.msu.edu/pearl/index.htm (discussing PEARL's functions); see also Swanson & Bagaza,
supra note 260, and Intergroup Contact, supra note 13, at 26 (explaining that the PEARL project was
succeed by a new project know as SPREAD (Sustaining Partnership to enhance Rural Enterprise and
Agribusiness Development). SPREAD currently assists 15 coffee cooperative and 5 privately owned
coffee ventures. SPREADS also assists with technical support and health care services. 95 coffee
washing stations, 9 of which are privately owned. 20,000 farmers are associated with the cooperatives
that receive assistance from SPREAD, and 5000 farmers sell to private washing stations that have also
benefited from SPREAD.).
289. Swanson & Bagaza, supra note 260, at 26-36.
290. Murekezi interview, supra note 282.
291. Samuel Neal Goff, A Case Study of the Management of Cooperatives in Rwanda, 70 (2006)
(unpublished Master's thesis, Texas A&M University) (on file with Texas A&M University Libraries).
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problems these farmers face. Indeed, it remains to be seen if the benefits of coffee-
sector liberalization will continue to flow to the rural poor. Taken together,
concerns over the quality of cooperative management, the government's coffee
agency, and a problematic land law292 may bode ill for farmers.293 However, if
capacity issues can be addressed and harmful government interference avoided,
then the positive gains of the past several years might translate into continued
economic and social benefits for Rwanda's poor farmers.
VI. ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION AND CONFLICT
Economic liberalization entails reforms that "extend the scope of the market,
and in particular of international markets. 29 4  Political liberalization seeks to
expand democracy, strengthen and broaden participation in the political arena,
increase voice for all members of society.295 While both sets of reforms may be
jointly pursued one often precedes the other (as in South Korea and China).
The goal of economic liberalization is a more open economy. Typical
strategies for accomplishing the goal are privatization, deregulation, reductions in
tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade, elimination of price controls and subsidies,
and the removal of barriers to investment.296 Structural adjustment programs
(SAPs) were one manifestation of economic liberalization and a common feature
of IMF lending in the 1980s and 90S. 2 97 SAPs typically required developing world
governments to change their monetary policies to reduce inflation, to reduce tariff
rates, to shrink government budgets and to privatize state-owned industries.298
292. Organic Law Determining the Use and Management of Land in Rwanda § 20 No. 8/2005
Gazeti ya leta ya Rebublika Rwandaise, Sept. 15, 2005.
293. See Goff, supra note 291 (discussing management concerns at coffee cooperatives in
Rwanda); see Swanson & Bagaza, supra note 260, at 9 (discussing current concerns with cooperative
management and capacity). For a discussion of the problematic role played by OCIR-Caf6 see Karol
Boudreaux, State Power, Entrepreneurship and Coffee: the Rwandan Experience, 15 MERCATUS POL'Y
SERIES 1, 22-23, (2007). Boudreaux also discusses the troubling 2005 Land Law. Id. On the concerns
raised by the Land Law see also, Johan Pottier, Land Reform for Peace? Rwanda's 2005 Land Law in
Context, 6 J. AGRARIAN CHANGE 509 (2005), and Herman Musahara, Improving Tenure Security for
the Rural Poor: Rwanda-Country Case Study (LEP/FAO Working Paper No.7, 2006), and Int'l
Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Dev., A Case Study On the Implications of the Ongoing
Land Reform on Sustainable and Rural Development and Poverty Reduction in Rwanda And The
Outcome Report of the Thematic Dialogue (Jan. 20, 2006) [hereinafter Implications Case Study], and
Saskia Van Hoyweghen, The Urgency of Land and Agrarian Reform in Rwanda, 98 AFR. AFF. 353
(1999).
294. Francesco Giavazzi & Guido Tabellini, Economic and Political Liberalizations, 52 J.
MONETARY ECON. 1297, 1298 (2005).
295. See, e.g., POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION & DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE ARAB WORLD 3-4 (Rex
Brynen et al. eds., 1995).
296. Global Trade Negotiations Home Page,
http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidtrade/issues/washington.html.
297. See Paul Collier and Jan Willem Gunning, The IMF's Role in StructuralAdjustment, 109 The
Econ. J. 634, 634 (1999). See also J. Barry Riddell, Things Fall Apart Again: Structural Adjustment
Programmes in Sub-Saharan Africa, 30 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 53(1992).
298. Morris Goldstein, IMF Structural Conditionality: How Much is Too Much? (Institute of
International Economics Working Paper No. 4, 2000).
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This conditional lending has been widely criticized for imposing the costs of
"austerity" measures on the people least able to bear them: the developing world's
299poor.
An extensive literature explores the role that economic and political
liberalization play in promoting peaceful relations among nations and in intrastate
conflicts. 30 0 The key insight of this work-which is also known as the "liberal
peace thesis"-is that market-oriented democracies rarely go to war against each
other.30' Polacheck and Seiglie, for example, write that "countries with the most
trade (and the greatest gains from trade) have the most to lose from conflict.
Ceteris paribus, these countries have lesser amounts of conflict. 30 2 They go on to
argue that, "nation pairs with more trade exhibit less conflict and democracy-pairs
exhibit more trade." 303 The liberal peace thesis also applies to intrastate conflict,
as market democracies experience lower levels of internal conflict, rebellion,
assassination, and other disturbances than do authoritarian regimes or closed
304
economies.
Extending this insight, commercial activities within a country, which typically
require collaborative efforts to bring goods or services to the market, may also act
as a catalyst for generating trust.30 5  Such collaboration can contribute to the
299. See generally, Storey, supra note 17.
300. Michael Doyle, Liberalism and World Politics, 80 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 1151 (1989); Cramer,
supra note 17, at 202-05; R.J. RUMMEL, UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT AND WAR, VOL. 4: WAR, POWER,
PEACE (1979).
301. See generally John R. Oneal and Bruce Russett, Assessing the Liberal Peace with Alternative
Specifications: Trade Still Reduces Conflict, 36 J. PEACE RES. 423, 433, 439 (1999) (noting that "there
is statistically significant evidence for the pacific benefits of economi- cally important trade" as well as
joint democracy); see generally Hivard Hegre, Development and the Liberal Peace: What Does it Take
to be a Trading State? 37 J. PEACE RES. 5, 17 (2000) (concluding that the pacifying effect of trade
increases with increased development but that in cases where a trading pair includes one country that is
very poor, GDP per capita of less than $300, increased interdependence may increase the incidence of
fatal disputes); see generally Cullen F. Goenner, Uncertainty of the Liberal Peace, 41 J. OF PEACE RES.
589, 600 (2004) (discussing the three main theoretical approaches to liberal peace and finding that while
trade interdependence is not a strong predictor of military conflict democracy is.); see generally Dale C.
Copeland, Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade Expectations, 20 INT'L SECURITY 5
(1996) (arguing that interdependence can foster peace only when states expect that trade will be high
into the foreseeable future and that when expectations for future trade are low, the most highly
dependent states will be the ones most likely to initiate war for fear of losing economic wealth that
supports long-term security).
302. Solomon Polachek & Carlos Seiglie, Trade, Peace and Democracy: An Analysis of Dyadic
Dispute 14 (IZA Discussion Paper No. 2170, 2006).
303. Id. at 48.
304. See Mirjam E. Sorli, The Liberal Peace Argument in the Middle East: Ali in Wonderland or
Crude (Oil) Reality? (Sept. 8, 2001) (unpublished Master's Thesis, University of Oslo), available at
http://www.prio.no/sptrans/-68957771/file38409-canterbury-mirjam.pdf (analyzing the liberal peace
theory on an interstate and an intrastate level. Regarding the liberal peace theory, the author states,
"Democracy and economic growth are today seen as the main ingredients in a recipe for a
peaceful world.").
305. See, e.g., T. Saguy & A. Nadler, Social psychology and the process of trust building:
Interviews with Israelis and Palestinians involved in joint projects, 44 MEGAMOT, 2006, at 354. Our
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development of a new, shared identity among members of different groups,
30 6
thereby reducing prejudice among previously hostile groups.30 7
The idea that a "liberal peace" exists is not new, but renewed interest in the
subject over the past twenty years has generated a large body of theoretical and
empirical work.30 8 In addition, the claim that liberal market democracies are more
peaceful than other societies provided support for efforts to export both democracy
and free-market economic policies to countries lacking these institutions. 9
However, the liberal peace thesis has its critics. 310 As Paris notes, it might be
the case that existing liberal democracies are peaceful, but the shift from
authoritarianism and/or a closed economy to market liberalism can be fraught with
conflict.311 Some liberalization policies, such as those adopted in Rwanda in the
early 1990s, impoverish, rather than enrich or empower, the poor. 312  Some
privatization efforts benefit political insiders at the expense of the broader
fieldwork supports this hypothesis. When polled on levels of trust towards buyers, 32% of farmers
indicated intermediate and high levels of trust previously (i.e. 5 years ago or alternatively before joining
the cooperative), whereas 89% indicated intermediate and high levels of trust now. Field Study 2008,
supra note 251, at question 17.
306. For a discussion of social identity theory see generally Matthew J. Hornsey, Social Identity
Theory and Self-categorization Theory: A Historical Review, 2/1 SOC. AND PERSONALITY PSYCHOL.
COMPASS 204, 204-06 (2008), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.111 1/j.1751-9004.2007.00066.x.
307. Samuel L. Gaertner et al., How does Cooperation Reduce Intergroup Bias? 59, No. 4 J.
PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL., 692 (Oct. 1990) (showing how intergroup cooperation may
contribute to the development of a new, shared identity among previously hostile groups); MUZAFER
SHERIF, IN COMMON PREDICAMENT: SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERGROUP CONFLICT & COOPERATION
(Houghton-Mifflin 1966) (suggesting that when two parties who have experienced conflict over limited
resources are faced with a superordinate goal- task or challenge that both groups want to have resolved,
and that requires joint effort- hostile behavior subsides); see also GORDON ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF
PREJUDICE (Oxford, 1954): Thomas F. Pettigrew, Intergroup Contact: Theory, Research and New
Perspectives, 49 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 65, 65-71 (1998) (providing evidence how positive interaction
between antagonistic groups can lead to reductions in prejudice and hostility).
308. For a sense of the literature, see, e.g., John R. O'Neal, Frances H. O'Neal, Zeev Maoz &
Bruce Russett, The Liberal Peace: Interdependence, Democracy and International Conflict, 1950-85,
33 (1) J. PEACE RES. 11, 11 (1996); see also John O'Neal & Bruce Russett, Clear and Clean: The
Fixed Effects of the Liberal Peace, 55 (2) INT'L ORG. 469, 469-71 (2001); see also Michael Mosseau,
Hivard Hegre & John R. O'Neal, How the Wealth of Nations Conditions the Liberal Peace, 9 (2) EUR.
J. INT'L REL. 277,278 (2003).
309. Paris, supra note 17, at 44.
310. Katherine Barbieri & Gerald Schneider, Globalization and Peace: Assessing New Directions
in the Study of Trade and Conflict, 36 (4) J. OF PEACE REs., 387 (1999); Cullen Goenner, Uncertainty
of the Liberal Peace, 41 (5) J. PEACE RES., 589, 589-90 (2004); Erik Gartzke, Quan Li &
Charles Boehmer, Investing in the Peace: Economic Interdependence and International Conflict, 55
INT'L ORG., 391 (2001).
311. Paris, supra note 17, at 44; CRAMER, supra note 17, at 204-205 (arguing that "[t]he liberal free
trade vision of capitalism . prettifies reality in two main ways. First, it glosses over the reality of
how capitalism takes root in a society and how societies have developed into advanced capitalist
societies. The beginnings and the effective and progressive development of capitalism are always
painful.").
312. Storey, Structural Adjustment, supra note 23, at 375-77.
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society.3 13 When liberalization policies benefit the few and the favored at the
expense of the majority of a citizenry, creating or exacerbating economic
cleavages, they may prompt conflict.314 Therefore, how liberalization policies are
crafted may help determine if they are conflict-generating or conflict-reducing.
In Rwanda, liberalization policies in the coffee sector have imposed some
costs on farmers (the costs associated with developing and marketing a high-
quality product) but, foreign aid projects implemented by NGOs have both off-set
these costs and have helped farmers develop valuable market linkages needed to
compete globally. 315 These projects have also helped farmers form cooperatives,
improve their product, raise capital, identify buyers, and learn how to negotiate
contracts.3 16 Providing farmers with the skills needed to transition from producing
low-quality commercial grade coffee to high-quality specialty coffee has been an
important part of transformation in Rwanda's coffee sector.317 Government
policies creating greater scope for local decision making and for entrepreneurship,
coupled with support from the development community, have energized this
sector. Unlike other liberalizations, the benefits of the coffee-sector liberalization
are spread broadly. 318 Any farmer can choose to grow coffee.3 19 No one ethnic
group seems to be benefiting at the expense of another. To date, the reforms seem
to be conflict-reducing rather than conflict-enhancing.32 °
VII. COOPERATION AND RECONCILIATION
The economic imperatives discussed above mean that for many smallholders
there are potential benefits from joining together in cooperatives to produce and
process coffee. Most Rwandan coffee farmers are smallholders, and they face
serious obstacles identifying possible foreign buyers, marketing their product, and
negotiating sales contracts.32' Sharing costs and spreading risks is a sensible
strategy for many of these farmers, so they join together in cooperatives. 322
313. KATHERINE VERDERY, THE VANISHING HECTARE: PROPERTY AND VALUE IN POSTSOCIALIST
TRANSYLVANIA 113-14 (Cornell University, 2003).
314. Cannon, supra note 44, at 42.
315. See supra Part V.
316. Karol Boudreaux, Comment, State Power, Entrepreneurship, and Coffee: The Rwandan
Experience, MERCATUS POL'Y SERIES, Policy Comment No. 15, at 5, 8, 17, 27, Oct. 2007.
317. Id. at 15.
318. Id. at 12, 18.
319. Id. at 8.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 29.
322. Id. Discussing work done over the course of a number of years, Fort and Schipiani identify
four possible contributions that business can make towards the creation of more peaceful societies.
These contributions include: fostering economic development and creating jobs, adopting external
evaluation principles, "creating a sense of connectedness among members of an organization" and in
mediating power contests. For our purposes, the role that local businesses (cooperatives and/or private
washing stations) play in terms of economic development, job creation, and encouraging connectedness
among members are of key importance. See Timothy L. Fort and Cindy A. Schipani, An Action Plan
for the Role of Businesses in Fostering Peace, 44 AM. BUS. L.J. 359, 364-67 (2007); see also, Thomas
W. Dunfee & Timothy L. Fort, Corporate Hypergoals, Sustainable Peace, & the Adapted Firm, 36
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Compared to individual production, well-run cooperatives can give smallholders a
leg up in a competitive marketplace and provide other benefits that are sorely
lacking, such as small loans, agricultural inputs, training, and a social forum.
323
Cooperatives are not new in Rwanda.324 Uvin writes that hundreds of
cooperatives were created in the 1980s and thousands of less formal farmers'
organizations were also started during this time.325 A US AID report says that the
Habyarimana government had an "associez-vous, on vas vous aider" policy "but
without there necessarily being a real reason for associating., 326  Today, the
Rwandan government encourages the formation of cooperatives, but is not directly
327involved in running cooperatives. Farmers who choose not to be members of
cooperatives have alternatives of selling their cherries to private buyers or to
private coffee washing stations. 328  These "middlemen" will sell the cherries to
millers and/or exporters.
329
Because bringing coffee to the market requires significant coordination
amongst workers at cooperatives and private washing stations,330 both
organizations may facilitate cooperation. 331  An International Alert study from
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 563, 594 (2003).
323. See Swanson & Bagaza, supra note 260, at 14 (describing the cooperative management
structure and polled benefits).
324. Chemonics Int'l, supra note 267, at. 8. In a summary report, US AID notes: "[p]rior to the
establishment of the COOPACABI coffee cooperative in Bicumbi in 1996, no coffee cooperatives
existed in Rwanda. Farmers sold semi-washed coffee directly to RWANDEX agents, at prices pre-
determined by the GOR (Government of Rwanda). However, coffee producer associations did exist, but
served the limited function of input distribution (and eventual reimbursement) of products supplied by
OCIR-Caf&." USAID, Assessing USAID'S Investments In Rwanda's Coffee Sector: Best Practices and
Lessons Learned to Consolidate Results and Expand Impact, April 2006,
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf docs/PNADG793.pdf.
325. UvIN, supra note 50, at 164-65.
326. Translates roughly: "if you join together we will help you." See Interview with Tom Bagaza,
Producer Relations Coordinator, SPREAD, Kigali, Rwanda (Feb. 19, 2008) (explaining that before
1994, OCIR-Cafe encouraged farmers to form associations so that it could deliver agricultural inputs to
centralized locations rather than to individual farmers - so coffee associations made the government's
job of supporting farmers easier, they did not have a strong business focus.).
327. Chemonics Int'l, supra note 323, at 12-13.
328. See, e.g., USAID, The Ties That Bind: Case Studies in Making Buyer-Supplier Relationships
Last, Research Report, July 2007, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf docs/PNADL009.pdf.
329. Id. Interestingly, our field study found that 23% of coffee cooperative members reported
selling to their cooperative instead of private washing stations out of loyalty. Field Study 2008, supra
note 251, at question 17; see also supra text accompanying notes 260-61 for a description of the coffee
washing process and private washing stations. Of course, cooperatives are also a kind of a
"middleman." See id.
330. See infra text accompanying notes 400-404; see also note 305 for data regarding trust towards
buyers.
331. Discussing the role that multinational corporations can play in promoting peace, Fort argues:
"[clonceptually, businesses do possess the capability to reach across borders and to get people who may
not otherwise work together to do so, even if the only common goal they have if profitability. Some
businesses even intentionally hire employees from otherwise conflicting ethnic or religious groups in
order to get them to have the experience of cooperating." Timothy L. Fort, The Times and Seasons of
Corporate Responsibility,44 AM. Bus. L.J. 287, 322 (2007).
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2006 posits that in a post-conflict environment local business has a role to play by
facilitating the rebuilding of damaged societies and by promoting dialogue among
former enemies.332 Local businesses, this report argues, provide a space for people
to participate in joint economic activities:
Doing business may be one of the few remaining points of contact
between two sides in a conflict-and one of the first to resume in its
aftermath. In many instances, these points of contact are both
profitable and inspiring as they demonstrate that peaceful interaction
for mutual benefit is possible as well as desirable.
333
The exploratory survey mentioned above, coupled with journalistic evidence,
suggests that the increased collaboration (and economic rewards) that have resulted
from the pursuit of commercial activities in the coffee sectors is encouraging more
positive feelings towards others and towards reconciliation.
334
To provide further detail, the exploratory field survey we sponsored was
conducted in the June 2008. Coffee farmers 335 were asked ninety-four questions
related to their membership (if appropriate) in a coffee cooperative; the social
climate (either in a cooperative or the local community for people selling at private
washing stations); the economic benefits of coffee production; and their attitude
towards reconciliation with the other ethnic group (as well as demographic
questions).
Survey results suggest 336 that membership in a coffee cooperative, being
associated with a particular coffee washing station comparatively longer, and
economic as well as general life satisfaction are significant correlates of positive
attitudes towards reconciliation.337  In particular, participants with greater
332. International Alert, Local Business, Local Peace: the Peacebuilding Potential of the Domestic
Private Sector - Executive Summary, available at http://www.intemational-
alert.org/pdf/LBLPRussian-exec-sum.pdf.
333. Id.
334. Reconciliation can be defined as a change in identity. Herbert C. Kelman, Reconciliation as
Identity Change: A Social-Psychological Perspective in FROM CONFLICT RESOLUTION TO
RECONCILIATION 111 (Yaakov Bar-Siman-Tov, Ed.) (Oxford University Press 2004). It can also be
defined as a change in psychological orientation towards the other, involving mutual acceptance
between groups, Ervin Staub, Reconciliation After Genocide, Mass Killing or Intractable Conflict:
Understanding the Roots of Violence, Psychological Recovery and Steps Toward a General Theory,
27(6) POL. PSYCHOL., 867, 868 (2006). Another definition is a process involving reciprocating
empathy and compassion as well as a peaceful expectation of future intergroup relationships Arie
Nadler & Ido Liviatan, Intergroup Reconciliation: Effects of Adversary's Expressions of Empathy,
Responsibility, and Recipients' Trust, 32 (4) PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 459, 462 (2006).
335. Field Study 2008, supra note 251 (discussing the demographic polled).
336. Id. Although the study's sample represents a minority of coffee farmers in Rwanda, i.e. those
benefiting from the results of privatization in Rwanda's coffee sector, and the survey design prohibits
generalizations beyond the group examined, the observed correlations match current theories of
reconciliation and are corroborated by journalistic evidence. Moreover, while correlation is not the
same as causation, the absence of a correlation suggests the absence of a causal relationship. Here, there
are strong correlations. See, e.g., Staub, supra note 334, at 874; Kelman, supra note 334, at 24.
337. Field Study 2008, supra note 251.
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economic security reported low distrust towards members of the other ethnic
group, and a tendency towards conditional forgiveness. 338 Coffee washing stations
that had been in operation for a comparatively longer period of time were also
significantly correlated with a reduction in ethnic distance over time.339  Life
satisfaction significantly correlated with economic security variables, and those
farmers reporting greater satisfaction with life also expected a more positive,
peaceful future in Rwanda.340 These observations were discernible independent of
gender, education, the participants' ethnicity or the ethnic mix at a location.34 1
The survey also revealed a change in attitudes over time. Of the participants
that reported disagreements in their community, 75% reported fewer
disagreements 342 today than in the past (i.e. since joining the cooperative or, for
non-cooperative members, in the past five years).343 Conversely, 91% of all survey
respondents reported that conflicts are better resolved today than in the past.3"
When polled on levels of trust towards buyers, 32% of farmers indicated
intermediate and high levels of trust before, whereas 89% indicated intermediate
and high levels of trust now. 34 5 Perhaps the most suggestive data was the increase
in farmers willing to engage in socially inclusive behavior today in comparison to
the past.346 Out of the three-quarters of participants who answered questions about
their willingness to greet a member of the other ethnic group, work with this
person every day, share a beer, or allow their child to marry such a person, the
percentage of those who engaged in such social behavior today, compared to the
past, had more than doubled across all questions.347 Moreover, 46% of the
respondents who answered these questions reported that they had not carried out
any of these social acts in the past.348 Only 1% reported not doing so today.349
Interestingly, the survey data further suggests that membership at
cooperatives provides greater economic and social benefits. Members of coffee
cooperatives were more likely to have experienced a positive change in economic
338. Id. at questions 55, 60.
339. Id. at questions 61-62.
340. Id. at questions 55, 60.
341. Id. at question 55.
342. At cooperatives, the main disagreement is how money is used. Other disagreements (at both
cooperative and private washing stations) include how much farmers are paid for cherries, job
opportunities, and how benefits are shared. Id. at question 25.
343. Id. at question 24.
344. Throughout the survey, the past was framed as since joining the cooperative for cooperative
members. For non-cooperative members, the past was defined as five years ago. Id. at question 48.
345. For cooperative members, the past was defined as since joining the cooperative. For non-
cooperative members, the past was defined as five years ago. Id. at question 17.
346. Not all participants answered these questions (approximately 75% did). However, given that
the question was framed towards the present and the past, it's unlikely that a participant would feel
compelled to answer positive towards one and not the other, and moreover, answer positive to the
present but not to the past. Field Study 2008, supra note 251.
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id. at question 52.
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satisfaction, and also rated their life satisfaction today higher than coffee workers
not associated with a cooperative. They were also less likely to report high
distrust. Members also reported more positive contact affect as well as
350
significantly deeper contact with members of the other ethnic group.
As noted above, this survey was exploratory in nature. These results do not
establish a causal link between economic liberalization and informal reconciliation.
Rather, they suggest that in these particular settings coffee farmers are
experiencing a variety of positive benefits, including lower levels of distrust
towards members of the other ethnic group, when economic benefits are
experienced. To the extent that broad-based economic liberalization creates
opportunities for increased positive collaboration and economic benefits, levels of
trust and feelings about reconciliation among former enemies may improve-an
important insight for policy making options in post-conflict environments.
This survey work was inspired by a body of journalistic evidence that
identifies a link between working in a cooperative and reconciliation. For
example, a 2006 article in the New York Times tells the story of Gemima
Mukashyaka, a member of the Maraba coffee cooperative.3 5' Ms. Mukashyaka
lost most of her family during the genocide.352 Her life was spared only because a
young Hutu man intervened with the Interahamwe militia and bought her.353 After
the killing ended she escaped and, with two surviving sisters, returned to her
family farm, only to find it devastated.354 Laura Fraser writes, "After joining the
co-op, Ms. Mukashyaka doubled her coffee earnings in one year. She also grew
less isolated and less distrustful of her neighbors, since she had people to talk to at
the washing station and in co-op meetings. ' 355 Gemma Uwera, another member of
the Maraba co-op is quoted as saying:
After the genocide, I feared other people's reaction when they got to
know that my husband is in jail, so it was not easy to join the co-op....
Now I have friends, I meet regularly with widows of genocide, and we
plan how we can help each other if someone has a problem.356
A Christian Science Monitor story discusses Jeannette Nyirabaganwa, who
lost her husband, parents, and a child in the genocide. 7 Anastaz Turimubakunzi
is, the report says, "a confessed killer who, Jeannette says, helped murder her
350. Id. at question 56.
351. Laura Fraser, Coffee, and Hope, Grow in Rwanda, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2006, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/06/business/yourmoney/O6coffee.html?_r=l &pagewanted=all&oref=
slogin#.
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. Id.; see also Coffee 'Key to Reconciling Rwandans', BRIT. BROAD. CORP.,
http://news.bbe.co.uk/2/hi/africa/5299286.stm (last visited Nov. 10, 2008).
357. Abraham McLaughlin, Why Jeannette Employs Her Family's Killers, THE CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Oct. 24, 2006, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/1024/pOlsO3-woaf html.
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husband." '358 Today, Jeannette runs a coffee farm and pays Anastaz to work in her
fields. Jeannette explains how it is possible for her to work with a man who helped
kill her husband: "The only solution was to go together with my countrymen -
even the killers. There was no alternative.,, 359 So in 1999, a group of neighbors
decided to start a coffee cooperative, the Abahuzamugambi Cooperative.
360
Jeannette wanted to participate to increase her income, but that was not her only
motive. She is quoted as saying: "I thought that coffee-growing could connect me
to other people. 361  Jeannette goes on to say that because of the cooperative
"we've been building a relationship that changed our lives. We ended up
reconciling in a way we didn't know." And this, the story argues: "is a tale of
Rwandan-style reconciliation. It may seem almost incomprehensible to outsiders,
yet in some cases it works here." 362 In a different report, Fatuma Ngangiza, head
of Rwanda's National Unity and Reconciliation Commission says of coffee
farmers, "[as] they work together, cleaning the coffee, they talk together so they
start talking business but later they start talking family affairs. It fosters
relationships and reconciliation., 363
There is some research that suggests that women have played a particularly
important role in reconciliation efforts in Rwanda. 364 After the genocide, women
like Gemima and Gemma, one a survivor, the other married to an alleged
perpetrator, returned to ruined farms. 365 There were few able-bodied men at the
time available to work so the women, on their own, had to manage their farms and
feed and care for their children.366 In a desperate situation it is reasonable to
imagine they would recognize the benefits of working together cooperatively in
order to rebuild their lives and livelihoods.367
358. Id.
359. Id.; see also Jim Fisher-Thompson, U.S. Interests in Conflict and Coffee Combine to help
Rwanda, WASH. FILE, May 28, 2006, http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-
english/2006/May/20060528102558nospmohtrehsifjO.6521723.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2008)
(quoting Steven Livingston, who states: "[w]ith the coffee cooperatives and role of Starbucks" (which
has purchased Rwandan coffee for its Black Apron product line) "'and other coffee companies
interested in Rwanda what we see is that if you give people the expectations of hope from economic
development' ethnic tensions are lessened.").
360. McLaughlin, supra note 357.
361. Id.
362. Id.
363. BRIT. BROAD. CORP., supra note 355; see also Land of a Thousand Hills Coffee,
http://www.landofl000hills.com/learn/our-story (last visited Nov. 10, 2008).
364. ELIZABETH POWLEY, STRENGTHENING GOVERNANCE: THE ROLE OF WOMEN IN RWANDA'S
TRANSITION (Sanam Naraghi Anderlini ed., 2003), available at
http://www.huntaltematives.org/download/10-strengthening-govemance the-role-of women in rwan
da_s transition.pdf.
365. Fraser, supra note 351.
366. Id.
367. Powley, supra note 364, at 16 (citing one interviewee: "[m]ost of the widows have children to
take care of. Naturally they find that they can't cope on their own. Even if she is a [genocide] survivor
in the middle of all those people she thinks were against her, she is forced to work with them because
she has nobody to turn to .... Women need more cooperation in the community.").
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Our field study supports the journalistic evidence that women have played an
important role in reconciliation and suggests further that women are enjoying
greater empowerment in post-conflict Rwanda. Ninety-two percent of those
., - 368
surveyed believed that women contributed significantly to reconciliation, and79% believed that women definitely play a large role in resolving conflict. 3 69
When farmers were asked if it is better to have a man in change, 59% of those
surveyed responded definitely not3 70 (49% of those surveyed were women 371).
When asked if men make better peace-makers, 53% strongly or moderately
disagreed.372 While this area requires further research, the evidence suggests that
opportunities present in the liberalized coffee sector are benefiting women.
Women are enjoying greater economic empowerment and a political voice. Eighty-
six percent reported that participation of women in decision-making had improved
since the joining the cooperative or, alternatively, in the past five years in the
community. 373  Seventy-one percent believed that women could participate in
374decision-making as much as men.
The anecdotal/journalistic and survey evidence presented is not dispositive
but rather strongly suggestive of the role that necessity and economic opportunity
can play in improving relations among former enemies and also possibly
empowering previously disenfranchised groups, like women. However, the
Rwandan experience raises a challenging question: does this cooperative behavior
represent merely a short-term and necessitous change or is it likely to be something
more substantial, a long-term shift in behavior and perspective? In other words, is
cooperation in cooperatives prompting informal reconciliation or something else?
The answer is still unclear. However, the Rwandan coffee sector has become
a forum for people of all groups to engage in repeat dealings and to work jointly in
pursuit of a common goal: making ends meet. Working together to achieve a goal
that everyone desires-earning a better living-seems to be helping some farmers
overcome animosities. People in Rwanda recognize that commercial activities
generally, and the coffee industry specifically, are a potential path to
reconciliation. Dr. Timothy Schilling of PEARL has said that:
By bringing villagers together to work toward a common economic
goal... co-ops have helped Rwandans with the monumental task of
reconciliation, since genocide widows work side by side with women
whose husbands are in jail for participating in the killing.... What's
reconciliation if it's not people who have conflict getting together and
talking?
3 75
368. Field Study 2008, supra note 251, at question 58.
369. Id. at question 27.
370. Id. at question 42.
371. Id. at question 87.
372. Id. at question 79.
373. Id. at question 49.
374. Id. at question 41.
375. Fraser, supra note 350.
VOL. 37:2
CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC
Similarly, Rwandan Minister of Agriculture Murekezi, argued:
Industry has certainly contributed to reconciliation.., in every village
we've had this very bad experience with genocide. Coffee producers
were both victims and killers. Afterwards, the killers were imprisoned.
Their wives and their children were at home. Close by were the
survivors of the genocide. The victims were living next to the families
of those killed. But now we have the experience of people working
together. We have seen coffee producers working together.
I believe the secret is increasing income through washing coffee.
This is the same concern for all the families. They are working together
now through co-ops. The co-ops are friendly associations. These
farmers are getting more income now than in the past, and they are
happy to get more because they are working together. Now, we can
value each family based on [its] real achievements in improving quality
and quantity of coffee, not on ethnicity. This is a new value: a focus on
work and results.
37 6
Minister Murekezi suggested that people now work together precisely
because of the market signals associated with specialty coffee production.377
Specialty coffee fetches higher prices so more farmers would like to produce it. 37
8
To do this, they often join a cooperative. Once they are members of a cooperative,
they have an opportunity to work with other farmers to accomplish a shared
goal.379  The stories above, and our survey results, suggest this joint effort
produces positive social benefits as well. If, as seems to be the case, Rwanda's
inclusive liberalization catalyzes inter-group cooperation then, importantly,
policies that expand economic opportunity for many citizens provide an additional
strategy for post-conflict reconciliation.
VIII. REASONS FOR CAUTION IN THE COFFEE SECTOR
The specialty coffee industry is doing good things in Rwanda. However, the
smallholder farmers and the entrepreneurs who work in this sector face several
challenges. These include improving the management of cooperatives to benefit
members, limiting the possibility of harmful interference by OCIR-Caf6, the
government-run coffee board, and avoiding dislocations to poor Rwandans,
particularly women, that may result from the 2005 Land Law. 380 These issues are
discussed below.
A. The Need for Better Cooperative Management
A serious challenge for smallholders who voluntarily join together into
cooperatives is to create a culture of entrepreneurship within the cooperatives so
376. Murekezi interview, supra note 282.
377. Id.
378. Id.
379. Id.
380. See generally Swanson & Bagaza, supra note 260.
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that cooperatives become more "business minded., 381 A key problem identified by
the SPREAD project is the need to attract and retain more professional managers
in cooperatives and, at the same time, to reduce the influence of volunteer Boards
of Directors (BOD). 382 A recent assessment of a group of Rwandan cooperatives
states "[a] professional, entrepreneurial General Manager is the most important
individual to a cooperative's ultimate success.
'383
However, the report's authors find that no cooperatives in the group under
investigation have such a manager. The reason for this seems to be that the BODs
are reluctant to pay high enough salaries to attract a professional manager.
384
Further, the BOD often prefers to have a local person, rather than an "outsider," fill
this role. 385 However, locals are less likely to have the skill set needed to manage
the cooperative effectively. Cooperatives are capable of producing very high
quality coffee, but they are experiencing real difficulties creating effective
management structures.386
A related problem is that the BOD often interferes inappropriately in the daily
management of the cooperative. The assessment notes that "BOD members,
particularly Presidents, do not want to relinquish their authority to a strong General
Manager., 387 While it is essential that the BOD take seriously its fiduciary duties
to create general policies and oversee management activities, the assessment
recommends that they give managers increased decision-making authority and
discretion.
388
Management of the cooperatives, BOD and professional managers, need to
communicate more effectively with members so that members understand the
ownership structure of the cooperative as well as the rights members hold.389 To
date, this has not been done effectively. Members report that they are unclear as to
who "owns" the cooperative, 390 and some believe cooperative leaders are over
compensated for their work.391  Cooperatives also need to develop and
communicate effective business plans and to improve financial record keeping and
documentation. When members lack clear information about the financial state of
the cooperative, and about likely prices for cherries and benefits to cooperative
members, the possibility of corruption and conflict over resources rises. In our
field study, 41% of cooperative members had expected benefits they had not
381. Id. at 11.
382. Id. at 8.
383. Id. at 12.
384. Id.
385. Id. at 11.
386. Id. at 8.
387. Id. at 13.
388. Id. at 11.
389. Id. at 14, 15.
390. Id. at 14.
391. 55% moderately or strongly disagreed with the statement that "cooperative leaders get more
than they deserve." Field Study 2008, supra note 251, at question 46. 62% moderately or strongly
agreed with the statement that "cooperative leaders earn what they deserve." Id. at question 50.
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received, and about half moderately and strongly believed that there was anger in
the cooperative because benefits were not distributed fairly.392 These are
especially important issues to resolve because cooperatives are facing increasing
competition from other coffee entrepreneurs and must find a way to meet this
challenge.
393
Cooperatives have provided a pivotal role for Rwanda's smallholder farmers,
allowing them to earn more money from coffee, develop additional skills, and
work cooperatively with others in ways that may promote reconciliation.
However, cooperatives must now address serious shortcomings in terms of
management practices and capabilities if they hope to continue playing this role in
the future. There is, however, reason to be optimistic. In our field study,
approximately three-quarters of cooperative members indicated that their trust in
cooperative leaders had improved since joining, as has the level of participation
from ordinary farmers in cooperative decision-making.394 As cooperatives seem to
provide a space for cooperative behavior and even informal reconciliation, further
support efforts to help accomplish the goal of creating transparent and accountable
management may well be justified.
B. The Role of OCIR-Caf6
A different concern is that the government agency OCIR-Caf& may interfere
with positive developments in the industry.395 Although this agency's role has
been modified over time, OCIR-Caf6 continues to create policies and strategies for
the coffee sector to implement these policies and strategies, to set up quality norms
and classification systems, quality control, and delivery of Origin Certificates. 396 It
is also supposed to provide extension services, research, and training to farmers.397
OCIR-Caf& continues to supply some subsidized inputs to coffee farmers.
It is, however, the agency's role as the official "brander" of Rwandan coffee
that raises most concerns. The agency claims a key role in creating "quality norms
and classification systems," including the issuance of Origin Certificates. 398 In an
interview in March 2006, the then-Director General of OCIR-Caf6, Laurien
Ngirabanzi, argued that the government should help train producers to meet these
quality standards. 399  However, Mr. Ngirabanzi added that if farmers fail to
comply, the agency should consider fining them or seizing their crops.4
a°
392. Statements such as "'we buy fertilizer at the same price as non-coop members," "sometimes we
don't get profits," "promised to get bike (or loan) but not yet," "no subsidies, the prices are low," and
"inputs are not available for all" were common. Field Study 2008, supra note 251, at questions 14, 15,
30.
393. Swanson & Bagaza, supra note 260, at 10.
394. Field Study 2008, supra note 251, at questions 45, 47.
395. OCIR-Caf6 is a department of Rwandan Ministry of Commerce. See The Role Of OCIR
Coffee In The Coffee Industry, WORLD INVESTMENT NEWS, available at
http://www.winne.com/rwanda/to 13.html/to000.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2008).
396. Id.
397. Id.
398. Id.
399. Interview with Laurien Ngirabanzi, Director General of OC1R-Caf6, in Kigali, Rwanda, (Mar.
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More recently, coffee dealers have been pressuring the agency to "abolish"
the traditional, dry-process production of coffee.40 1 Because the country has a
limited number of coffee washing stations, the majority of Rwandan coffee is still
processed in the traditional way-at home by smallholder farmers.40 2 These beans
are then sold to local dealers, who in turn, sell to exporters.4 3 Because home
processing does not ensure high quality, these beans command a lower price on the
market than does specialty coffee.40 4 While it is clearly a worthwhile goal to raise
farmers' incomes, the agency should, at best, educate farmers about the benefits of
washing coffee and avoid coercing farmers by seizing their home-based equipment
(as suggested by one coffee processor).40 5 For this industry to continue benefiting
smallholders, government involvement in the production process should be
limited.
In particular, there is little reason why a government agency needs to oversee
quality control functions and issue certifications of origin. Rather than entrust a
government agency, which is subject to a variety of political pressures, to handle
such tasks, private-sector organizations, such as the East African Fine Coffees
Association (EAFCA), can serve this role. EAFCA "is an association of coffee
producers, processors, marketing people, and organizations in the ten Eastern and
Southern African countries of Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Rwanda,
Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and the Democratic Republic of Congo as
well as others from outside Africa.40 6 Membership thus includes processors,
associations, roasters, dealers, retailers, and coffee professionals from all over the
world., 40 7 The association conducts trade missions and creates linkages between
producers and buyers.40 8 It holds national cupping competitions to help improve
quality and sponsors an annual African Taste of Harvest competition in which
producers across East Africa compete.40 9 Not subject to the kinds of pressures that
a public institution faces, EAFCA already serves as a training resource, provides
quality control information, and assists with marketing.4 10
2006) (on file with author).
400. Since March 2006, several different people have filled the role of Director General of OCIR-
Cafe. Interview with Tom Bagaza, Assistant Director, SPREAD, in Kigali, Rwanda, (Feb. 18, 2008)
(on file with author).
401. Eugene Kwibuka, Rwanda: Country Must Enhance Traditional Ways of Milling Coffee
Cherries to Improve Quality, THE NEWS TIMES (Kigali), Aug. 31, 2008, available at
http://allafrica.com/stories/200809010695. html.
402. Id.
403. Id.
404. Id.
405. Id.
406. E. African Fine Coffees Ass'n, About Eastern African Fine Coffees Association (EAFCA),
http://www.eafca.org/about.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2008).
407. Id.
408. Id.
409. E. African Fine Coffees Ass'n, What is the AToH&A?, http://www.eafca.org/atoh.htm (last
visited November 10, 2008).
410. Id.
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Unquestionably, Rwandan coffee producers and cooperative members have
many needs. They must improve a variety of skills; they must continue to improve
the quality of their product; and they must get more of their product to market in a
cost-effective manner.4 11 The question is not whether there are continuing needs
within the sector; the question is what is the best way to meet these needs? With
growing international acclaim for Rwandan specialty coffee,4 12 opportunities arise
for producers to partner with importers, to raise capital, and to improve production
processes. Creating private-sector partnerships may, in the long-run, be a more
effective strategy for ensuring the growth of Rwanda's coffee sector than is one
that relies too extensively on a centralized, government-run marketing board.
C. A Problematic Land Law
As an extremely scarce resource, land is highly contested in Rwanda: "[L]and
was a factor behind social tensions before every major open conflict. Even today,
more than 80% of all disputes in Rwanda are related to land.' '413 For much of its
history, Rwanda's rulers have owned most of the land.414 With control of land in
the hands of government, formal land markets did not develop. 4 15 Transfers often
took place informally, and confusion and insecurity were common.416  Local
officials had great discretion over land allocation and could favor politically
powerful individuals over marginalized people who may have held traditional use
rights.4 17
In 2003, the Rwandan Parliament approved a Land Reform Decree that
provides for individualized rights to property.418 This policy provided the basis for
the 2005 Land Law.419 The Land Law specifies that people or associations that
411. See Kwibuka, supra note 401.
412. This growing acclaim is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that for the first time, in 2008, an
African country hosted the Cup of Excellence coffee competition-the country was Rwanda. See Cup
of Excellence, 2008 Rwanda Program,
http://cupofexcellence.org/CountryPrograms/Rwanda/2008Program/tabid/418/Default.aspx (last visited
Sept. 8, 2008).
413. Implications Case Study, supra note 293; see also Van Hoyweghen, supra note 293.
414. See Rwanda-History, EAST AFRICA LIVING ENCYCLOPEDIA, African Studies Center at the
Univ. of Pa., http://www.africa.upenn.edu/NEH/rwhistory.htm (last visited November 11, 2008); see
also Tor Sellstrom and Lennart Wolgemuth, The International Response to Conflict and Genocide:
Lessons from the Rwanda Experience, STEERING COMMITTEE OF JOINT EVALUATION OF
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO RWANDA at Ch. 2, March 1996,
http://www.reliefweb.int/library/nordic/bookl/pb020.html.
415. Implications Case Study, supra note 293, at 11.
416. Id.
417. Id. (explaining that sales were restricted according the size of the buyer and seller's total land
holdings); see also Musahara, supra note 293, at 4.
418. INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF LAND ISSUES, VOL. III, 2006-2007, EASTERN AND SOUTHERN
AFRICA 29-30 (Martin Adams and Robin Palmer eds., 2007), available at
http://www.kubatana.net/docs/landr/adams-palmer indepreviewland issues_0706.pdf.
419. Organic Law No. 08/2005 of 14/07/2005, Determining the Use and Management of Land in
Rwanda, July 14, 2005, http://www.minirena.gov.rw/IMG/pdf/LOI-ORGANIQUE-FONCIERE.pdf.
As of May, 2008 the Land Law had not yet been fully implemented as orders were still being drafted to
facilitate the implementation. Interview with Minister of Natural Resources in Kigali, Rwanda (June 3,
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own land via custom, or who have obtained land by previous purchase, or who
have previously acquired it from a "competent authority" are "allowed to own it on
long term lease., 420 These leases may be sold and transferred. Rural land is being
registered locally, and urban, commercial property will be registered in a national
cadastre in Kigali.42' The government maintains a role in the resettling of people
and in devising land-use and land-planning policy.
422
The government hopes the land law will promote the consolidation of land
holding.423 By permitting the sale of leaseholds, small parcels could be sold to
commercial farmers who will consolidate the land and create viable agri-
businesses. This is both good and potentially bad. Farmers who wish to sell their
land may benefit from a more formalized market. However, the law also contains
provisions that could force some farmers to give up small parcels of land.424 As
Musahara notes, small, dispersed land holdings serve as a kind of insurance policy
for subsistence farmers who would, in bad year, would risk losing all crops if land
were consolidated:
[L]and fragmentation in Rwanda serv[es] as a coping mechanism in
smallholder agriculture, the typical Rwandan household farms an
average of five plots. Some are in the valleys, others are upland and
some near the household. In some parts of southern Rwanda, a
household may have up to 14 crops growing in different fragments at
different seasons.... Recently, Blarel, et. al., noted that the costs of
consolidation in Rwanda may not exceed the benefits of using land
fragmented over the years in adopting to land scarcity.
425
A more open, transparent land market is desirable, but the coercive provisions
of the law could limit the evolved coping strategies of the poor. Pottier suggests
that the law may actually bar people who own less than one hectare from
registering their property.426 The government is supposed to provide compensation
for such confiscations, but it has not established clear standards for such payments.
Although the government says that it wants to increase tenure security,427 the new
law may increase insecurity for those who are most vulnerable. These prohibitions
and potentially vague use requirements place undesirable limits on the market for
2008); see also Pottier, supra note 293, at 510.
420. Organic Law No. 08/2005, supra note 419, at art. 5.
421. Id. at art. 31.
422. See id.
423. Id. at art. 20.
424. Id.
425. Musahara, supra note 293, at 11.
426. Pottier, supra note 293, at 521 (interpreting Arts. 62-65); see also Cramer, supra note 17, at
208-10 (discussing the English enclosure movement). The Rwandan land law may call the enclosure
movement to mind. Compare Pottier, supra note 293, and Cramer, supra note 17.
427. The government "sees increased security of tenure or rights of address to land, and more
effective land management, as important factors for the improvement of the agricultural sector and the
economy as a whole, helping to create the resources needed to reduce poverty and to consolidate peace
and social cohesion." Pottier, supra note 293, at 511.
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real property. Further, they might well promote more corruption if individuals
wish to consolidate land, or skirt these constraints and demands.
The new law may pose a special problem for women smallholders and their
children. Under the 2005 law, people are required to register all parcels of land in
the country; 428 however, women will face particular difficulties registering,
inheriting and acquiring rights to land. Although the law prohibits discrimination
on the basis of sex in relation to the ownership of or possession of rights over
land,429 Musahara argues that the law applies only to legally married women:
"those in long-term unmarried relations (who are numerous) are not covered.A 30
Only legally married women and their children are considered joint owners
capable of providing consent431 to the sale of jointly owned property; thus,
unmarried women may not be able to stop the sale of land by their partners. There
is uncertainty in the law regarding inheritance. For example, it is unclear if women
inherit via the inheritance law or via the land law, for example. 432 Also of concern
is the fact that custom still bars women from exercising their legal rights under the
Land Law. 4 33 Unless these issues are resolved, the Land Law may create special
difficulties for Rwanda's women, who do most of the agricultural work in the
country.
4 34
Security and clarity of tenure rights, whether customary or leasehold, are
essential both to avoid future conflicts and to encourage increased investment in
agriculture. However, the Land Law raises serious concerns, especially for women
and for uneducated farmers who might be dispossessed of their land. Surely, these
risks are undesirable in a nation with such high levels of poverty and such strong
dependence on agriculture as a livelihood.
IX. CONCLUSION
Despite strong economic growth and clearly beneficial liberalization efforts in
the coffee sector, much remains to be done to move Rwanda towards the VISION
2020 goal of becoming a stable, middle-income nation. Most Rwandans remain
desperately poor and many will bear the physical and psychological wounds of
genocide to their graves.
Yet there is reason for cautious optimism. The recent success of the nation's
specialty coffee industry means that the income of some smallholder farmers is
rising, and in turn, they are better able to feed themselves and their family, to send
children to school, to buy insurance, to repair or improve homes, and to do other
things that improve their standard of living. These benefits can be attributed to the
428. Organic Law No. 08/2005, supra note 419, at art. 30.
429. Id. at art. 4.
430. Musahara, supra note 293, at 12 (pointing out that "many couples are not legally married
because of the expense, and polygamous households are not legally recognized and their offspring are
not eligible to receive land as inheritance.").
431. Organic Law No. 08/2005, supra note 419, at art. 36.
432. Musahara, supra note 293, at 12.
433. Id.
434. Id. at 11.
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government's liberalization of the coffee sector, which allows smallholders to keep
more of the value of the product they grow. By freeing the coffee sector from the
heavy-handed involvement of the government, the post-genocide administrations
have given all farmers, Hutus and Tutsis, greater freedom to pursue entrepreneurial
opportunities.
To deal with the nations' tragic past, the Rwandan government has adopted a
multifaceted approach to reconciliation, including participation in the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, creation of the Gacaca Courts, the National Unity
and Reconciliation Commission, and a National Human Rights Commission.
These efforts will likely bring a sense of justice and healing to citizens. However,
these efforts have proved disappointing to many. What is perhaps most intriguing
about the rise of the country's specialty coffee sector is the unintended
consequence of this particular, broad-based liberalization: commercial activity
within the sector seems to be prompting the development of more positive attitudes
towards others. People who work together in the sector, at coffee cooperatives
particularly, are more willing than they were in the recent past to interact with
members of the other ethnic group. Trust levels are rising and people have more
positive attitudes towards reconciliation. Though additional research needs to be
done in this area, our exploratory survey work, combined with journalistic
evidence presented above, suggests that people working together in the specialty
coffee sector are finding an alternative path towards reconciliation.
Whether this kind of reconciliation is effective in the medium to long-term
remains to be seen; however, the experiences of workers in the coffee sector
strongly suggests that in post-conflict environments, governments should follow
Rwanda's lead and liberalize trade and promote commercial interaction between
former enemies. Such policy changes might just provide a cost-effective
complement to more traditional reconciliation efforts and help forge new, shared
identities.
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"Whether a cat is black or white makes no difference. As long as it catches
mice, it is a good cat. " Deng Xiaoping
I. INTRODUCTION
The People's Republic of China, or the PRC, known more widely simply as
China, holds nearly one-sixth of the world's population. It possesses one of the
fastest growing economies in the world. In 2007, China experienced a growth rate
of 114%.1 As a result of its strong economy and growing population, China has
the ability to greatly influence the global economy. It is not surprising, therefore,
that the newly adopted Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law, or AML, has been the
subject of much interest, discussion, and debate. The legislation, which became
effective August 1, 2008, has a variety of purposes: to safeguard competition in
China; to protect the Chinese economy against monopolistic conduct; to improve
economic efficiency; and, perhaps most importantly from the Chinese perspective,
to promote the healthy development of its "socialist market economy."
2
* The Denver Journal of International Law and Policy expresses no opinion as to the accuracy of
this article's Chinese language sources, with regard to citations, references, and translation.
.. Associate Professor of Business Law & Ethics, Sawyer Business School, Suffolk University,
Boston, Mass. Director, Center for Global Business Ethics & Law.
*** Professor of Legal Studies and International Business, Stillman School of Business, Seton
Hall University, South Orange, New Jersey. Fellow, Institute for International Business.
.... Assistant Vice President, The Bank of New York Mellon.
1. Information relating to economic growth, investment, foreign trade, population, and other
economic and political factors are garnered and adapted from the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,
THE WORLD FACTBOOK (2007), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbooklgeos/ch.html#Econ [hereinafter CIA].
2. Not surprisingly, various translations and drafts of the AML exist. See Anti-Monopoly Law of
China (adopted by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Aug. 30, 2007), art. 1, translated in
Nathan Bush, O'Melveny & Myers L.L.P., The PRC Antimonopoly Law: Unanswered Questions and
Challenges Ahead, THE ANTITRUST SOURCE, at app. 1-14 (Oct. 2007),
http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-source/07/10/OctO7-BushI 0-18f.pdf; Anti-Monopoly Law of China
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008),
2007 Order of the President No. 68, translated in 2007 China Law LEXIS 1950. The content of this
article, however, refers to the AML translation provided in Nathan Bush, The PRC Antimonopoly Law.
See also H. Stephen Harris, Jr., Legal Implications of a Rising China: The Making of an Antitrust Law.
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Minister of the National Development and Reform Commission, Ma Kai, has
underscored the contextual importance of China's transformation and transition in
the development of the AML. The Minister noted on July 12, 2005, that China had
essentially completed the transition to a socialist market economy from a highly
centralized planned economy "after 26 years' endeavor on reform." 3 Minister Ma
asserted that China had successfully established the fundamental basis of an
economic system in which public ownership of the economy plays the "leading
role and co-exists and shares opportunities with the economy in various other
ownerships.",4 Indeed, by the end of 2004, more than fifty percent of the nearly
3,000 state-owned or state-controlled large major enterprises had turned into stock-
sharing (so-called joint stock) companies. As an indication of the pervasiveness
of market forces in the "new Chinese market," the private sector now provides
"four-fifths of new job opportunities and generate[s] one-third of Chinese GDP."6
In this context, the drive for both foreign direct investment and foreign trade-key
aspects of the Chinese economy that would rely heavily on the proper functioning
of a truly competitive market--occupy unique positions of importance.
The Chinese AML was drafted within the context of three principal
international concerns relating to the restrictive or monopolistic nature of
competition within the Chinese market: regional monopolies, enjoying local or
regional protection; certain sectoral monopolies by established Chinese firms and
state-owned enterprises (SOEs), termed administrative monopolies; and the
perception of significant abuse of their dominant positions by some multinationals
operating within the Chinese market.7
While the legislation represents yet another significant step towards China's
transition to a full market economy and away from one that is centrally planned, 8
The Pending Anti-Monopoly Law of the People's Republic of China, 7 CHI. J. INT'L L. 169, 183-84
(2006) (providing information on the AML history and draft).
3. China has Socialist Market Economy in Place, PEOPLE'S DAILY ONLINE, July 13, 2005,
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200507/13/eng20050713_195876.html.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. See Jun Wei & Janet L. McDavid, Antitrust Law, China's Anti-Monopoly Law, NAT'L L. J.,
Oct. 15, 2007, available at http://www.hhlaw.com/files/Publication/1495de2a-b3Od-44ad-822c-
6ffea0cd69bf/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/145c9a50-bl eb-4083-885f-
863242014c68/15Oct07_NLJChinaAntiMonopolyJWeiJMcDavid.pdf.
8. The Polish process of economic transformation is quite instructive and has provided a more
general model for Eastern and Central European nations, as well as for a systemic comparison for
China. Named for the Minister of Finance and Deputy Prime Minister Leszek Balcerowicz, the
program in Poland was based on five philosophical pillars of economic transformation: (1)
transformation of the monocentric system of state central planning into a functioning market economy;
(2) liberalization of economic functions, especially in relation to foreign trade and foreign direct
investment; (3) privatization of state-owned-enterprises (SOEs); (4) construction of an effective social
safety net; and (5) mobilization of international financial assistance to support the process. In the
process of economic transformation, Balcerowicz was aided by a well-prepared transition team
consisting of Polish nationals and so-called "Polonia" (6migre) specialists. The leading foreign expert
was Harvard Economist Jeffrey Sachs. Both Balcerowicz, who later served as President of the National
Bank of Poland, and Sachs remain enigmatic and quite controversial figures even today in Poland. For
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many commentators have expressed concern over the vague and inefficient
mechanics of the proposed legislation.9 One specific concern is that China will
reserve to itself the ability to review any transaction affecting its "national
security," which may provide China with unreasonable control over multi-
nationals operating in the Chinese market.
This article will analyze several of the concerns raised by the new legislation.
In order to accomplish this purpose, the article will first discuss the history and
progression of the legislation, beginning with the circumstances that led to initial
discussions on the issue which began as early as 1994. Information on the
background of the legislation from a comparative systemic viewpoint-that is,
from the standpoint of Poland, itself a "transition economy"-will be offered. The
article will next review several of the most important provisions of the new law
and will discuss similarities and differences between the final draft legislation and
the competition laws of other nations. Finally, the article will conclude with an
analysis of why the legislation may prove unworkable for China in the long run in
the global business environment without significant refinement or amendment by
raising several of the persistent concerns raised by its implementation.
II. CHINA IN TRANSITION - THE CONTEXT
In 1978, Chinese President Deng Xiaoping began a series of initiatives in
order to transform China's economy from a traditional command-and-control
economy into China's version of a "market economy," later termed a "socialist
market economy." In fact, the Chinese Constitution itself was amended in 1988
and 1999 to incorporate the concept of a "socialist market economy," rather than
one based solely on state central planning.10 The initiatives carried out were a part
a discussion of the core transformation program from a "foreign" viewpoint, see JEFREY SACHS,
POLAND'S JUMP TO THE MARKET ECONOMY 45-46 (1994). For a unique "insider" view of the process,
see LESZEK BALCEROWICZ, SOCIALISM, CAPITALISM, TRANSFORMATION 273-369 (1996).
Interestingly, the elements of the "Balcerowicz Plan" all have been implemented, in one form or
another, in China in its transition to a socialist market economy.
9. Leszek Balcerowicz, the architect of "shock therapy" in Poland, has identified certain
derivative traits of the command-and-control economy that were pervasive in the entire region of
Central and Eastern Europe, and as well in China, and which were the object of systemic economic
reform. These include:
" Administrative price fixing by central authorities;
" Isolation of domestic producers from foreign markets;
" Excessive regulation of imports through licenses and import quotas;
" The tendency by central planners to engage in "import substitution," often accomplished
through rationing, queues, lines and coupons;
" "Soft budget constraint" in which targets of planning are revised downward or inputs
significantly increased in order to meet plan targets;
" The lack of true commercial andfinancial institutions;
" Monopolization of the state sector due to extreme organizational concentration, the
centralization of organizational rights, and the lack of foreign competition; and perhaps most
importantly,
* The lack of any motivation mechanisms for either line managers or workers.
See generally RICHARD J. HUNTER, JR. & LEO V. RYAN, FROM AUTARCHY TO MARKET: POLISH
ECONOMICS & POLITICS 1945-1995,37 (1998).
10. See XIAN FA art. 15 (1988) (P.R.C.) (amended Mar. 29, 1993); XIAN FA pmbl. (1988) (P.R.C.)
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of a pursuit of Four Modernizations in the areas of industry, agriculture, science
and technology, and the military.' During this transition period, China became
more and more reliant on international trade and foreign investment for its growth.
Professor Mark Williams has noted:
The expansion of China's participation in international trade has been
one of the most outstanding features of the country's economic
development. Chinese exports rose on average 5.7 percent in the 1980s,
12.4 percent in the 1990s, and 20.3 percent between 2000 and 2003. By
2003, China's exports growth rate was seven times higher than the
export growth rate recorded by the world as a whole. Foreign direct
investment has also soared, and currently over a billion dollars in FDI
are invested in China each week.
12
(amended Mar. 14, 2004); XIAN FA art. 11 (amended Mar. 14, 2004) available at
http://english.people.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2008). For a definitive
description of the system of central planning, see JANOS KORNAL, THE SOCIALIST SYSTEM: THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF COMMUNISM (1992). As early as 1960, Polish economist and diplomat Oskar
Lange had written of a "'new economic calculus' where decentralization in planning and management
of the economy was both vital and necessary.' Lange had argued that the Stalinist scheme was not
suited to a "mechanical translation," and that prices, for example, should be fixed on the basis of a
"market mechanism," linking state planning to market forces. See HUNTER & RYAN, supra note 9, at
23-24; see also OSKAR LANGE, FUNKCJONOWANIE GOSPODARKI SOCJALISTYCZNEJ [The Functioning of
the Socialist Economy] (1960). For a spirited criticism of Lange, however, see JOHN MONTIAS,
CENTRAL PLANNING IN POLAND 267 (1963). While Lange's criticisms were made in the context of
analyzing the flaws of central planning in Poland, their application can be seen as relevant for China as
it has sought to adapt its Stalinist economic model to the market.
11. See Robert C. Berring, Chinese Law, Trade and the New Century, 20 NW. J. INT'L L. & Bus.
425, 436 & 444 (2000) ("Call the current economy 'market socialism' if you wish, but it bears no
relation to communist or socialist theory.").
12. Mark Williams, Wal-Mart in China: Will the Regulatory System Ensnare the American
Leviathan? 39 CONN. L. REV. 1361, 1366 n.9 (2007) (citing Javier Silva-Ruete, Alternate Executive
Dir. of IMF for the Constituency of Arg., Bol., Chile, Para., Peru, & Uru., The Development of China's
Export Performance, Address before Conference at the Central Reserve Bank of Peru (Mar. 7, 2006),
available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2006/030706.htm). Professor Williams describes
the influx of foreign capital into China and notes that "[floreign investment in China is generally
structured via a joint venture vehicle with a local enterprise." Id. at 1371. In the 1990s, Chinese law
required foreign owned retailers to be in the form of a joint venture and, in addition, imposed other
restrictions. Id. at 1367. This regulation was repealed as a result of Chinese accession to the WTO. Id.
at 1371. As a result, China now permits foreign investors to establish wholly-owned foreign
enterprises, which are Chinese legal entities, possessing a separate legal personality. Many may also
have limited liability. See id. at 1372 n.39 (citing Law on Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises (Adopted
by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong. Apr. 12, 1986, revised Jul. 24, 2006), available at
http://openchina.com.es/wp-content/uploads/2007/04/wholly-foreign-owned-enterprise-law-of-the-
people.pdf). The international law firm of Jones Day reports the following information concerning the
basics of foreign investment in China:
Direct foreign investment into the People's Republic of China ("PRC") is
generally carried out through the establishment of a Sino-foreign joint venture
(either an equity joint venture ("EJV") or a cooperative joint venture ("CJV") or
a wholly foreign-owned enterprise ("WFOE") (such vehicles are collectively
referred to as "foreign investment enterprises," or "FIEs"). For more passive,
indirect business activities . foreign companies may establish representative
offices in China.
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With the development and growth in international trade and international
investment, China recognized a need to ensure that its domestic market would be
free from price fixing, monopolization, and the effects of invidious agreements
between suppliers and/or competitors that restricted competition. There was also a
strong perception that China needed to curtail foreign economic dominance and to
transform poorly performing state-owned-enterprises (SOEs) into fully-functioning
private enterprises. Attorney Stephen Harris noted: "These policies and many
subsequent structural reforms have been pursued in an avowed effort to transform
China's centrally planned economy, dominated by state-owned-enterprises, to a
system that embodies free market characteristics but retains certain socialist
attributes."' 3 An early attempt at reform was the enactment of the Enterprise Act
of 1988. This law promised that factories would no longer be able to depend on
state subsidies and state support and would face the real prospect of "bankruptcy if
they failed to adapt to market competition." 14 This law, seen as revolutionary in its
time, was described by Zhang Yanning, Deputy Minister of the State Commission
for Restructuring the Economy, as moving away from direct control of central
government departments or authorities over industries toward a system in which
"the state regulates the market, which in turn guides the enterprises," in large part
by making managers responsible for profits and losses.15 However, the effect of
In terms of the legal form, FIEs are almost always established as limited liability
companies, although joint stock companies are also permitted under PRC law.
FIEs closely resemble Western-style corporations in many respects but also
differ in certain fundamental areas, such as the following:
" Investors in an FIE limited liability company do not hold issued
shares per se, but instead hold equity interest in the "registered
capital" of the relevant FIE;
* Voting and decision-making authority in an FIE is generally vested in
the board of directors rather than the investors;
* FIEs generally have a specified term (e.g., 30 years) depending on the
nature of the project, which term can be renewed under PRC law,
although the conditions of any such renewal are not clearly specified
in the law;
* Various matters, including the initial establishment of an FIE, transfer
of a party's equity interest, increase of an FIE's registered capital,
change of an FIE's business scope, and dissolution of an FIE, are
subject to approval by the Chinese authorities; and
" FIEs must operate within an approved "scope of business," which
tends to be relatively specific and, for manufacturing FIEs in
particular, will limit sales activities to the sale of "self-manufactured"
products.
Jack J.T. Huang et al., JONES DAY, Mergers and Acquisitions in China, July 2006,
http://www.jonesday.com/pubs/pubs detail.aspx?publD=S3571. As Professor Berring notes, "To
attract foreign investment China had to do several things. The first was change its internal culture, the
second was to win the trust of the rest of the world that investing in China was a rational move."
Berring, supra note 11, at 437.
13. Harris, supra note 2, at 173 (citing the Chinese Enterprise Act (1988), the Anti-Unfair
Competition Law of 1993, the Company Law (1993), and the Price Law (1997)).
14. Id. (citing Mark E. Monfort, Reform of the State-Owned Enterprises and the BankrTuptcy Law
in the People's Republic of China, 22 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 1067 (1997)).
15. China Enacts Law Giving More Power to Enterprises, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 1, 1988
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this law was problematic. Harris notes that "it [was] broadly agreed that
entrenched government monopolies and local and regional protectionism have
hampered any wholesale transition to market competition."
'1 6
Perhaps reflecting this lack of real progress, China engaged in a wholesale
revamping of its legal system in areas dealing with monopolistic conduct. One of
the first laws enacted was the Law Against Unfair Competition.17 This law was
(quoted in Harris, supra note 2, at 173 n.15).
16. Harris, supra note 2, at 173. One of the reasons for this failure may have been the existence of
the bureaucratic system in managing enterprises. An analogy to the Polish experience seems apt. By
the time of the collapse of the Soviet system in Poland in the period 1989-199 1, the nomenklatura or
bureaucratic system in Poland had developed into a highly centralized administrative structure-not
only for national economic and political organs, but also for intermediary organizations, whereby
smaller enterprises operated only as a part of a huge centrally organized bureaucracy. By the 1980's,
the system had virtually elapsed into a "lunatic collage of incompetence, privilege, pandering and
outright corruption," based on a principle of underqualification and a perverted practice of negative
selection. See, LAWRENCE WESCHLER, SOLIDARITY, POLAND IN THE SEASON OF ITS PASSION102
(1982). It appears that the Chinese system has exhibited many of these same characteristics. For a
description and discussion of the Chinese bureaucratic system, see Eric Zusman & Jennifer L. Turner,
Beyond the Bureaucracy: Changing China's Policymaking Environment, CHINA'S ENVIRONMENT AND
THE CHALLENGE OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 121 (Kristen A. Day ed., 2005); David Li, Address at
the Shorenstein Seminars on Contemporary East Asia on The Dynamics of Institutional Change in
China: The Role of the Bureaucracy (Mar. 31, 1998),
http://ieas.berkeley.edu/Shorenstein/1998.03.html; DAVID M. BACHMAN, BUREAUCRACY, ECONOMY,
AND LEADERSHIP IN CHINA (1991). For an interesting "inside" description of the nomenklatura system
as it operated in Central and Eastern Europe, see MILOVAN DJILAS, THE NEW CLASS (1957). Djilas is
credited with coining the term "New Class" as a description of the political and economic bureaucracy.
The term "apparatchik" usually referred to party members, especially in the former Soviet Union. The
term most often used in China to describe the "ruling class" is oligarchy. See also, e.g., Richard J.
Hunter & Leo V. Ryan, Economic Transformation Through Foreign Direct Investment in Poland, 6 J.
EMERGING MKTS. 18 (2001) (providing a comprehensive "country study" of Poland). The role of the
nomenklatura is still hotly debated in Polish society, as it will no doubt be in China. A pattern was
common in transition economies throughout the region of Central and Eastern Europe that has been
duplicated during the Chinese "transition." Not surprisingly, members of the nomenklatura in Poland
almost immediately became active in private businesses and banks-especially as the prospects for
advancing their bureaucratic careers in the "new system" appeared more limited. The particular type of
privatization carried out by the nomenklatura in the early period has sometimes derisively been referred
to as "spontaneous privatization," but was, in reality, theft of public assets and property. For a
discussion of the phenomenon of "spontaneous privatization," see HUNTER & RYAN, supra note 9, at
112-13. Directors and managers often used their new authority to split up or divide state companies or
to spin off or divest units into limited liability companies or other new joint ventures-many under their
own control or the control of their friends and associates. Skilled workers were often transferred to the
new enterprises to the detriment of their former enterprises. In many nations of Central and Eastern
Europe-but most especially in Poland-members of the nomenklatura also greatly benefited both
politically and economically from popular discontent that was practically unavoidable during economic
reforms started under very difficult economic and political conditions and circumstances. Members of
the nomenklatura were seen as major "winners" in the transformation process. The issue of winners vs.
losers in post-Communist Poland is discussed at length in Richard J. Hunter, Jr. et al., Out of
Communism to What?: The Polish Economy and Solidarity in Perspective, 39 THE POLISH REV. 328-
329, 334-335 (1994). We offer this information for comparative purposes based on our extensive study
of the processes and results from the transformation throughout the region of Central and Eastern
Europe.
17. Law Against Unfair Competition (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'I People's Cong.,
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enacted in 1993 and would be administered by the State Administration of Industry
and Commerce (SAIC). The major significance of this legislation was that while it
prohibited a broad range of anticompetitive acts, in practice, the law only applied
to the protection of trademarks.'
8
The next significant piece of legislation was the Price Law, which became
effective in 1997, and was administered by the National Development and Reform
Commission (NDRC).19 Similar to the Law Against Unfair Competition, this
legislation had a broad scope-namely, to outlaw all price fixing. Yet, in a similar
fashion, the Price Law was applied in a more narrow fashion. In particular, the
Price Law merely provided local authorities with the power to control prices and
thus served goals other than ensuring free competition.2 0  In addition, China
enacted other laws, such as the Protection of the Rights of Consumers Act (1993)
and The Company Law (1994)-but these laws too were narrowly construed.2'
General confusion seemed to reign among the various governmental agencies as to
which agency would enforce which laws,22 different remedies were provided for
the same underlying actions, and perhaps most importantly, Chinese officials
lacked the expertise to fully appreciate the complexities of market forces and the
harmful effects that certain other seemingly minor actions might have on the
creation of an otherwise competitive market.
III. CHINA AND THE WTO
China concluded negotiations with the World Trade Organization (WTO) on
September 17, 2001, concerning China's terms of membership. Among the
commitments undertaken by China were the following:
China will provide non-discriminatory treatment to all WTO
Members. All foreign individuals and enterprises, including those
not invested or registered in China, will be accorded treatment no
less favorable than that accorded to enterprises in China with
respect to the right to trade.
China will eliminate dual pricing practices as well as differences
in treatment accorded to goods produced for sale in China in
comparison to those produced for export.
Sept. 2, 1993, effective Dec. 1, 1993), translated in CCPIT Patent and Trademark Law Office,
http://www.ccpit-patent.com.cn/references/Law-Against-Unfair-CompetitionChina.htm (last visited
Dec. 23, 2008) (P.R.C.).
18. Harris, supra note 2, at 175 (citing Paul B. Birden, Jr., Trademark Protection in China: Trends
and Directions, 18 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 431, 447-49 (1996)). See Law Against Unfair
Competition, art. 5(1).
19. Price Law (issued by President's decree, Dec. 29, 1997, adopted by the Standing Comm. Nat'l
People's Cong., May 1, 1998), translated at China Development Gateway (2004),
http://en.chinagate.com.cn/english/430.htm.
20. Again, the purpose of the law was to establish a new pricing system "compatible with the
requirements of a socialist market system." Harris, supra note 2, at 176 n.33 (citing China's Price Law
Embodies Features of Modern Market Economy, CHINA BUS. INFO. NETWORK, (Apr. 30, 1998)(quoting
Wei Dale of the State Development Planning Commission). See Price Law, art. 19.
21. See Monfort, supra note 14, at 1095.
22. See Harris, supra note 2, at 175.
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* [P]rice controls will not be used for purposes of affording
protection to domestic industries or services providers.
* [T]he WTO Agreement will be implemented by China in an
effective and uniform manner by revising its existing domestic
laws and enacting new legislation fully in compliance with the
WTO Agreement.
* Within three years of accession, all enterprises will have the right
to import and export all types of goods and trade them throughout
the customs territory with limited exceptions.
* China will not maintain or introduce any export subsidies on
agricultural products. 23
As China acceded to membership in the WTO on November 11, 2002, many
of China's potential trading partners were quite skeptical that China would be able
to abandon practices that discriminated in its own favor, or would be able to enact
comprehensive legislation aligning the Chinese legal system with global trade
rules and norms.24 After all, it was widely held that "China has traditionally been
suspicious of trade with the West, and has imposed substantial limits and
regulations upon foreigners within the country."2 5 In addition, China voiced a
concern that following "international norms" might result in significant job losses
as a result of the almost inevitable demise of its state-owned-enterprises.
26
However, in balancing these concerns with the prestige and power that
membership in the WTO would certainly bring to China, the overriding hope of
China's accession was that membership in the WTO would act as a "catalyst for
reform as investors seek a more stable, predictable destination for capital. 27
Professor Hoogmartens writes: "The international investor confidence resulting
from WTO membership determines its attractiveness and allows the country to
amass foreign capital to pay for sound domestic reforms and hence, further
industrialization. "
28
In this process, the legal system necessarily would play an important, perhaps
critical, role. The World Bank had noted in 1997: "The transition from a command
economy to a market-oriented economy makes legal rules matter. Direct
23. Press Release, World Trade Organization, WTO Successfully Concludes Negotiations on
China's Entry (Sept. 17, 2001), available at http://www.wto.org/english/newse/pres0l_e/pr243_e.htm.
24. See generally Lindsay Wilson, note, Investors Beware. The WTO Will Not Cure All Ills in
China, 2003 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1007, 1007 & 1009-14 (2003) (describing the main issues
confronting the Chinese legal system). By 1980, China had joined both the IMF and the World Bank.
See HAROLD K. JACOBSON & MICHEL OKSENBERG, CHINA'S PARTICIPATION IN THE IMF, THE WORLD
BANK, AND GATT: TOWARD A GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDER 75 (1990). China gained observer status in
GATT in 1984-a prelude to full WTO membership.
25. Wilson, supra note 24, at 1007.
26. See generally Jan Hoogmartens, Can China's Socialist Market Survive WTO Accession?
Politics, Market Economy and Rule of Law, 7 LAW & Bus. REV. AMs. 37 (2001).
27. Wilson, supra note 24, at 1029.
28. Hoogmartens, supra note 26, at 43 (citing Monica Hsiao, comment, China and the GATT.- Two
Theories of Political Economy Explaining China's Desire for Membership in the GA TT, 12 UCLA PAC.
BASIN L.J. 430, 431 (1994)).
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government control over economic decisions is replaced by the rule of law that is
necessary to protect private property and contract rights." 29  As early as 1999,
China had announced a Five Year People's Court Reform Plan which sought to
"improve China's court system by improving the expertise of judges, enforcing
anticorruption regulations, allowing some discovery, and improving the efficiency
and enforcement of judgments." 30 It may seem ironic, but "The WTO does not
require a member state to have a good legal system, however, or even a fair one.
Instead, it merely insists that foreigners and nationals are treated alike, for better or
for worse., 31 Attorney Lindsay Wilson identified three major "points of interest"
concerning Chinese legal institutions "(1) the lack of a cohesive legal "system;" (2)
pervasive vagueness in the language of statutes and administrative rules; and (3)
difficulty of enforcing judgments once they are obtained., 32
29. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) notes: "The rule of law is generally defined as (i)
general, abstract rules that are prospective, never retrospective, in their effect; (ii) rules that are known
and certain; (iii) rules that are equal in that they do not discriminate based on irrelevant distinctions; and
(iv) a separation between regulators and the regulated. The rule of law in the business environment is
expected to guarantee transparency, predictability, and consistency." ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK,
PRC PRIVATE SECTOR ASSESSMENT, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 23 (2003),
http://www.adb.org/Documents/Reports/PSA/PRC/PRCPSA.pdf. During the 1980s, judges were
routinely appointed from among the ranks of the Chinese Communist Party or from the military. "Only
rarely did these judges have a college education, let alone any sort of legal training." See Wilson, supra
note 24, at 1010. In terms of reforming the "lawyer system" itself in the PRC, it is also important to
note that prior to 1993, lawyers were classified as "state legal workers," and virtually all law firms were
owned or controlled by the State. Beginning in 1993, the Ministry of Justice took several measures to
achieve a fundamental change. These measures included encouraging lawyers to set up private law
firms. See Ma Chenguang, Better Legal Services Sought, CHINA DAILY, Jan. 5, 1994, at 1; encouraging
more Chinese citizens to take up the legal profession. See also Chang Hong, State Aims to Triple
Number of Lawyers, CHINA DAILY, July 22, 1993, at 3 (scheduling national bar examinations once
each year instead of once every two years); Annual Exam Set for New Lawyers, CHINA DAILY, June 12,
1993, at 3 (granting lawyer status to those who have obtained law degrees in foreign countries, without
first having to pass national bar examinations, provided that the lawyer has worked in a domestic law
firm for one year-designed to accommodate the need for lawyers with certain critical "specialties" or
skills); He Jun, Lawyers to Grow in Number and Role, CHINA DAILY, Oct. 16, 1993, at I. An
interesting parallel to Poland's entry into the EU can be seen in China's accession to the WTO.
30. Stephanie M. Greene, Protecting Well-Known Marks in China: Challenges for Foreign Mark
Holders, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 371, 382-83 (2008).
31. Wilson, supra note 24, at 1009.
32. Id. See also Greene, supra note 30, at 383. For a comparative view of various legal aspects of
the transformation process, see Richard J. Hunter, Jr. et al., Legal Aspects of the Transformation
Process in Poland: Business Association Forms, 40 THE POLISH REV. 387, 387-407 (1995). See also
RICHARD J. HUNTER, JR. ET AL., POLAND: A TRANSITIONAL ANALYSIS (2003) (discussing the issues of
foreign direct investment, international trade, taxation, and Poland's accession to the European Union in
the context of economic transition). These issues are equally central in the context of China's
continuing transition or evolution to its unique "socialist market economy." Poland's antimonopoly law
is today a mainstay of its economic transformation. It is termed The Law on Competition and the
Protection of Consumers' Interests of 15 December 2000, and provides:
" Prohibition of concerted practices, agreements and associations between firms which may
prevent, restrict or distort competition and prohibition of abuse of a dominant position;
" Preventive supervision of mergers which may create or strengthen a dominant market position.
POLISH INFORMATION AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT AGENCY, COMPETITION LAW (2006),
http://www.paiz.gov.pl/index/?id=Oe139bI7a92b2df7d6c3c840e5I465fe (summarizing the law and
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As of September 2002, as a part of its accession to the WTO, 2,300 of China's
laws and government regulations that were deemed potentially incompatible with
WTO requirements were carefully reviewed and either amended or repealed.33
China further announced that if there were a conflict between domestic law and
China's obligations to the WTO, the latter would rule-as an indication that the
Chinese Government was committed to the adaptation of the WTO rules-based
regime.34 In addition, and perhaps most importantly, in March of 2001, China's
National People's Congress (NPC) Standing Committee declared that China would
soon issue a draft of a comprehensive antitrust law that would deal directly with
many of the perceived difficulties in assuring real competition in the Chinese
market.35
IV. DRAFTING THE ANTIMONOPOLY LAW
As China began to develop its unique socialist market economy, many
commentators noted that it was important to create a transparent legislative regime
that would apply to transactions that directly involved the acquisition of domestic
companies by foreign investors (termed onshore transactions), as well as to
foreign transactions (termed offshore transactions). There were several attempts in
the period 2002-2005 to construct viable and workable antimonopoly legislation.36
The following are the main highlights of the process:
" "In 2002, the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation
('MOFTEC'), a predecessor of MOFCOM [the Ministry of Commerce],
promulgated draft rules on the notice and approval process for
concentrations involving foreign multinationals. These rules were largely
based upon... preexisting restrictions on foreign investment, and were
criticized for the implication that they would be applied solely to foreign
companies [and not to Chinese organizations]. 37
" "In March 2003, the Provisional Mergers & Acquisitions Rules were
promulgated by MOFCOM and SAIC [the State Administration for
Industry and Commerce]. 38
" In June 2003, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC)
promulgated the so-called "Provisional Rules" in order to deal with the
explaining that it deals with antitrust, merger control, and state aid).
33. See generally, ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 29. Among the laws that were
repealed in China was the law that required foreign-owned retailers to be in the form of joint ventures.
See Amendments to Law on Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures Submitted to NPC, PEOPLE'S DAILY
ONLINE, Mar. 9, 2001, available at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200103/09/eng20010309
64556.html.
34. ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 29.
35. Harris, supra note 2, at 176-77.
36. A chronology of the various iterations and stages of the antimonopoly law may be found in
Harris, supra note 2, at 177-181. Harris is a distinguished and recognized expert in the field and was a
participant in a major conference hosted by MOFCOM outside of Beijing in October 2003, attended by
leading academics from China and practitioners from Japan, Germany, and the United States.
37. Id. at 176-77 (citing ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, New Antitrust Rules (Oct. 24, 2002).
38. Id.
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expected flood of foreign direct investment prior to the final enactment of
any comprehensive legislation.39  These "provisional rules" were later
called "Regulations on the Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic
Enterprises by Foreign Investors. ' 4° The limited application of the 2003
rules concerned some foreign investors who interpreted the regulation's
"target" on foreign investors as a possible harbinger of biases that might
continue to prevail in the substance or enforcement of any future
legislation. These "Provisional Rules" included several more traditional
antitrust provisions dealing with price fixing, monopolistic conduct, and
predatory pricing. Harris notes that some saw these provisional rules as a
"serious move toward the enactment of a comprehensive antitrust law.
Others, however, saw the Provisional Rules as an indication that the
drafting of such a law was bogged down, resulting in a few elements of the
draft law being issued in the form of the Provisional Rules. Enforcement
of the Provisional Rules was ultimately abandoned.,
4 1
* In 2003, the State Council Legislative Office (LAO) undertook a thorough
review of the 2002 Draft Antimonopoly Law, prepared by the former State
Economic and Trade Commission (SETC).4 2 The October 2002 Draft had
proscribed collusion among businesses, abuse of market dominance, and
excessive concentrations. The 2002 draft had also included provisions
prohibiting abuses of administrative power by governmental units through
what were termed administrative monopolies. Interestingly, Chapter 6 of
the 2002 Draft Law provided for the creation of an Anti-Monopoly
Management Body of the State Council. A later draft diffused
enforcement of the Draft Law among three separate agencies: MOFCOM,
with responsibility for merger review and administrative (state)
monopolies; SAIC, responsible for overseeing "monopoly agreements" and
abuses of a dominant position; and the NDRC, responsibility for price
collusion and bid-rigging.
* The February 2004 draft called for the establishment of a single
"competent Anti-Monopoly Authority under the Ministry of Commerce.'A3
This provision was retained in the July 2004 draft (it was actually
promulgated in March 2004) issued by MOFCOM. Concerns about abuses
39. Id.
40. See Do's, Don'ts of M & As, CHINA DAILY, May 30, 2005, available at
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-05/30/content_446763.htm. See also FRESHFIELDS
BRUCKHAUS DERINGER, NEW CHINESE MERGER CONTROL RULES 1 (2003),
http://www.freshfields.com/publications/pdfs/practices/5356.pdf (noting that the rules stipulate that
mergers and acquisitions may not "result in excessive concentration and exclusion of competition and
may not disturb the social or economic order or harm public interest"). The four issuing governmental
bodies were the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC-now the Ministry
of Commerce), the State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC), the State Administration
of Taxation, and the State Administration of Foreign Exchange.
41. Harris, supra note 2, at 178.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 179.
2009
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y VOL. 37:2
by foreign firms-including Microsoft, Kodak, and TetraPak 44-were
raised in a report issued by the Fair Trade Bureau of SAIC, although
allegations were vigorously denied by these firms. 45 Prior to the release of
the February and March drafts, SAIC indicated in January 2004 that it
supported a limitation of enforcement to private conduct, thereby
exempting official government conduct.46 MOFCOM proceeded to set up
its own Anti-Monopoly Office in September 2004.
" MOFCOM's Anti-Monopoly Office proffered a "Submission Draft" in
February 2004, which was similar to a subsequent March 2005 draft.47
This draft dropped the reference to creation of the MOFCOM enforcement
authority and instead called for the establishment of an "anti-
monopolization authority under the State Council." In April 2005, the
State Council released a draft law, providing for the establishment of an
Anti-Monopoly Authority under the State Council 48 with broad powers to
both implement and enforce the underlying law.49
" A revision dated July 27, 2005, provided a strong basis for the eventual
Anti-Monopoly Law. This draft provided for an Anti-Monopoly Authority
44. See Wang Xiaoye, Report.- Anti-Monopoly Law Vital, CHINA DAILY, Aug. 20, 2004, at 11,
available at: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-08/22/content_367692.htm (cited in
Harris, supra note 2, at 179 n.52).
45. See, e.g., Kodak Denies Monopolistic Accusations, CHINA DAILY, June 8, 2004, available at:
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-06/13/content_338954.htm (cited in Harris, supra note
2, at 179 n.53).
46. See Xue Zheng Wang, Challenges/Obstacles Faced by Competition Authorities in Achieving
Greater Economic Development through the Promotion of Competition, 2, Org. Econ. Coop. Dev.
[OECD] Doc. CCNM/GF/COMP/WD(2004)16 (Jan. 9, 2004), available at:
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/18/51/23727203.pdf (cited in Harris, supra note 2, at 180 n.54)
(asserting that "[a]ntitrust law is supposed to be against private anticompetitive conduct and is not
supposed to be applied to markets that are controlled or regulated by the government"). The SAIC
submission was to an OECD Global Competition Forum.
47. Harris, supra note 2, at 180.
48. Beijing Official Website International, Political System and State Structure,
http://www.ebeijing.gov.cn/Beijinglnfo/BJlnfoTips/BeijingHistory/t951208.htm (last visited Nov. 15,
2008) ("The State Council, the Central People's Government, is the highest state administrative body.
The State Council carries out the laws enacted and decisions adopted by the NPC and its Standing
Committee. The State Council is responsible to the NPC and its Standing Committee, and reports to
them on its work. The State Council exercises the following functions and powers: in accordance with
the Constitution and statutes, formulates administrative measures, enacts administrative regulations,
promulgates decisions and orders; exercises unified leadership over the work of the ministries and
commissions and the work of other organizations under its jurisdiction; exercises unified leadership
over the work of local state administrative bodies at different levels throughout the country; draws up
and implements national economic and social development plans, and the state budget; directs and
administers economic work, urban and rural development, and work in education, science, culture,
public health, physical culture and family planning; directs and administers civil affairs, public security,
judicial administration and supervision, as well as national defense construction; manages foreign
affairs and concludes treaties and agreements with foreign states; and in accordance with the law,
appoints, removes and trains administrative officers, appraises their work, and rewards or penalizes
them. The State Council is composed of the premier, vice-premiers, state councillors, the heads of the
various ministries and commissions, the auditor-general and the secretary-general.").
49. Harris, supra note 2, at 180-81.
CHINA'S COMPETITION LAWS
under the State Council, as did the later drafts of September 14, 2005,
September 30, 2005, and of November 2005.50
The Draft Anti-Monopoly Law of 2005 was the culmination of the previous
efforts which began in 2002. Article 1 of the Draft is important because it sets
forth the general parameters and objectives of antimonopoly policy in China: 51
This law is enacted for the purposes of prohibiting monopolistic
conduct, protecting and promoting market competition, safeguarding
the legitimate rights and interests of consumers and public interests, and
ensuring the healthy development of the socialist market economy.
Article 3 of the 2005 Draft defined monopolistic conduct as follows:
"'Monopolistic conduct' is defined in this law as the following activities
which eliminate or restrict competition or are likely to have the effects
to eliminate or restrict competition:
(i) actions among undertakings to come to agreements, decisions, or
other consensus that eliminate or restrict competition (termed
"Monopoly Agreements");
(ii) abuse of dominant market positions by undertakings;
(iii) concentration of undertakings that are likely to have the effects of
eliminating or restricting competition. 
'52
This article will not extrapolate on the 2005 Draft and the other "intermediate
steps" noted above. Suffice to note that the drafting of the final legislation in 2006
provoked a great amount of both internal and external debate, including the
solicitation of views and commentary from several international experts and
international organizations such as the OECD, the World Bank, the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development [UNCTAD], the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation, and nations such as the United States, Japan, Australia and South
Korea, as well as the European Union.53 In early June 2006, the State Council
50. Id. at 182.
51. Id. at 183-84 (asserting that the 2002 Draft had prohibited the existence of "monopoly status,"
seemingly condemning the status of having achieved dominance in the market, even through lawful
competition or conduct). The April 8, 2005 Draft and all subsequent drafts have clearly prohibited
" monopolistic conduct" rather than monopoly itself-placing Chinese law in line with the prevailing
world viewpoint regarding monopolistic conduct. See, e.g., Treaty Establishing the European
Community, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 82, available at http://www.okm.gov.hu
/doc/upload/200509/hatalyosalapszerzodes_en.pdf (prohibiting abuse of a dominant position, not the
possession or status of a dominant position within the European Union).
52. Harris, supra note 2, at 184.
53. Id. at 175-76. An important International Seminar on Anti-Monopoly Legislation was held in
Beijing in May 2005, hosted by the LAO. The Financial Times recently reported that "China and India
are implementing regimes based on the European Union model, covering anti-competitive agreements,
abuses of dominance, and merger control-with the potential effect on M&A causing concern among
multinational companies." Sundeep Tucker & Patti Waldmeir, Asian Antitrust Laws Threaten Deals,
FIN. TIMES, Jul. 27, 2008, available at http://us.ft.com/ftgateway/superpage.ft?news id
=fto072720081742322031. However, the authors note that "[1]awyers and business executives believe
China and India's thresholds for merger filings are too low, and are likely to ensnare global deals that
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approved in principle the 2005 Draft.54 China's National Party Congress finally
adopted the new Anti-Monopoly Law on August 31, 2007, effective August 1,
2008. 55
V. CHINA'S NEW ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW (AML)
56
The AML seeks to address issues centering on competition in a
comprehensive manner, not just those relating to monopolization. Thus, the
legislation covers price fixing, conspiracies, mergers, and the abuse of intellectual
property rights, as well as providing a definition of the "market" and penalties for
substantive violations of the law. Article 1, which tracks the 2005 Draft version
very closely, lays out the broad purposes of the AML:
This law is enacted for the purposes of preventing and prohibiting
Monopolistic Conduct, protecting fair market competition, promoting
efficiency of economic operation, safeguarding the interests of
consumers and the public interests, and promoting the healthy
development of the socialist market economy.
57
Article 4 is also expositive of the general framework for the creation of the
AML:
The State shall formulate and implement competition rules suitable for
the socialist market economy to improve control of the macro-economy
and to strengthen a unified, open, competitive, and orderly market
system.58
There are four major aspects of the AML that will be reviewed in detail:
sections dealing with the scope of review, sections dealing with the creation and
duties of the Anti-Monopoly Commission, sections dealing with prohibited
conduct, and sections dealing with legal liabilities and penalties.
A. Scope of Review
Chapter 1, Article 2 discusses the scope of review. The AML is applicable to
monopolistic conduct 59 in economic activity within the territory of the People's
Republic of China (PRC). The AML is also "applicable to monopolistic conduct
outside the territory of the People's Republic of China that have eliminative or
will have little effect on competition locally. They also fear enforcement agencies in each country will
lack the resources and expertise to deal quickly with complex merger cases." Id.
54. Hu Yuanyuan, China Okays Draft Anti-Monopoly Law, CHINA DAILY, Jun. 8, 2006, available
at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-06/08/content_611238.htm.
55. China Legislature Passes Anti-Monopoly Law, THE CHINA POST, Aug. 31, 2007, available at
http://www.chinapost.com.tw/business/asia/2007/08/31/120617/China%2Dlegislature.htm.
56. AML, translated in Bush, supra note 2, at app.
57. Id. art. 1.
58. Id. art. 4.
59. Id. art. 3. "Monopolistic Conduct," as defined in Article 3, includes:
(1) conclusion of monopoly agreements by undertakings;
(2) abuse of dominant market positions by undertakings;
(3) concentrations of undertakings that have or are likely to have the effect of eliminating or
restricting competition.
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restrictive effects on competition in the domestic market of the People's Republic
of China."
60
It is important to note that Article 7 specifically addresses questions relating
to activities of state-owned-enterprises or industries that are controlled by the state
that are deemed "critical to the wellbeing of the national economy and national
security, as well as industries in which exclusive operation and exclusive sales are
the norm of business in accordance with the law.... ,,61
B. Creation of the Anti-Monopoly Commission
Chapter 1, Article 9 calls for the State Council to establish an Anti-Monopoly
Commission which will be responsible for "organizing, coordinating, and guiding"
the administrative activities associated with prohibited conduct.62 Specifically, the
Anti-Monopoly Commission is charged with carrying out the following
responsibilities or duties:
(1) to research and formulate competition policies;
(2) to organize investigations, access the overall market competition
conditions, and publish assessment reports;
(3) to formulate and promulgate anti-monopoly guidelines;
(4) to coordinate the anti-monopoly administrative enforcement work; and
(5) to undertake other duties as designated by the State Council.63
Article 9, however, does not establish whether an existing agency such as
MOFCAM or SAIC will be designated as the Commission or whether a wholly
new Commission will be created. Interestingly, the creation of the Anti-Monopoly
Commission may not completely alleviate concerns over the lack of expertise or
biases of judges who will hear disputes. However, as noted by Subrata
Bhattacharjee of the American Bar Association's Antitrust Section, "since the
enforcement of antitrust law is a relatively new phenomenon [for China], judges
may not have the requisite level of knowledge to produce decisions that conform to
international practice and reflect micro-economic analysis, an observation
admittedly common to many jurisdictions."64  In addition, "in the context of
60. Harris, supra note 2, at 186.
61. AML, art. 7, translated in Bush, supra note 2, at app. See, e.g., Robin Gerofsky Kaptzan &
Michael Jacobs, Blake Dawson Waldron, The New Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law and Foreign Business
in China, available at:
http://www.abanet.org/intlaw/committees/business-regulation/antitrust/China'sAntiMonopolyPowerPoi
nt.ppt (last visited Dec. 23, 2008) (listing that the SOEs operating in strategic sectors of the Chinese
economy are "petroleum, natural gas, telecoms, electricity, coal, civil aviation, waterway transport, and
national defense"); see, e.g., Zhengjun Zhang & Zhaoxi Li, Enterprise Research Institute &
Development Research Center of the State Council China, Policy Challenges of Corporate Governance
Reform of SOEs in China (May 15-16, 2006), available at:
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/60/35/37340418.pdf (discussing current issues concerning Chinese
SOEs).
62. AML, art. 9, translated in Bush, supra note 2, at app, 2.
63. Id.
64. Subrata Bhattacharjee, The Merger Review Process under the New PRC Anti-Monopoly Law:
Selected Issues, 2008 A.B.A. SEC. ANTITRUST 9 (presentation at the New Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law
Teleseminar, Jan. 23, 2008). See also Youngjin Jung & Qian Hao, The New Economic Constitution in
China: A Third Way for Competition Regime?, 24 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUs. 107, 164 (noting that before
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China's current legal system, it has been suggested that the Chinese judiciary lacks
independence. 65 Mr. Bhattacharjee continues:
The current structure of China's court system and the process for
selecting and promoting judges allows local governments to influence
decisions regarding personnel, as well as financial and material
resources. Accordingly, even if a party exercises its right to judicial
review, some would argue that it is unlikely that a court will come to a
different decision from the one made by the Authority, which may
result in interpretations that are not based on economic principles.
66
C. Prohibited Conduct
Articles 13 through 37 describe the types of conduct that are proscribed by the
AML. The following types of conduct are generally prohibited.
1. Vertical and Horizontal Agreements:
The first type of conduct that is prohibited under the AML is the creation of
horizontal agreements-agreements between competing companies, which are
termed Monopoly Agreements among undertakings with competing
relationships-that restrain trade; or vertical agreements-agreements between a
manufacturer or a distributor within the same marketing chain, which are termed
Monopoly Agreements with their counter-parties.6 7
Article 13 prohibits the following horizontal Monopoly Agreements that
concern:
(1) fixing or changing the price of commodities;
(2) limiting the outputs or sales volume of commodities;
the adoption of the so-called Judge's Law in 1995, "no uniform credentials were required ofjudges, and
formal legal training was also not a prerequisite"); see also Judge's Law (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Feb. 28, 1995, effective July 1, 1995), translated in
http//www.accci.com.au/judges-law.htm (2002).
65. Bhattacharjee, supra note 64, at 9.
66. Id. Attorneys H. Stephen Harris, Jr. and Rodney J. Ganske note:
In countries transitioning to market-based economies, especially where there is
no history of competition enforcement, it is often best not to rely on existing
courts for competition enforcement. A manageable number of specialized
competition judges could be trained within a reasonable time following
enactment and prior to the August 1, 2008 effective date of the Anti-Monopoly
Law, participating perhaps in appropriate portions of the training to be provided
to the staff of the Anti-Monopoly Enforcement Authority. The need for such a
specialized court would seem most important in cases involving allegations of
violations through single-firm conduct, i.e., abuses of dominance under Chapter
III, as such cases require sophisticated understanding of definitions of product
and geographic markets and an understanding of alleged effects on competition,
unlike more straightforward cases involving horizontal collusion such as bid-
rigging or market division.
H. Stephen Harris, Jr. & Rodney J. Ganske, Alston & Bird LLP, American Bar Association Section of
Antitrust Law 5 6 h Annual Antitrust Spring Meeting, The Monopolization and IP Abuse Provisions of
China's Antimonopoly Law 19 (Mar. 26-28, 2008), available at: http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-
committees/at-ic/pdf/spring/08/03-28-08-Harris-Ganske.pdf.
67. Harris, supra note 2, at 189-90.
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(3) allocating the sales markets or the raw material purchasing markets;
(4) restricting the purchase of new technology or new equipment or
restricting the development of new products;
(5) jointly boycotting transactions; or
(6) other Monopoly Agreements determined by the AML Enforcement
Authority under the State Council.68
Article 14 prohibits the following vertical agreements that:
(1) fix the resale price of commodities sold to third parties;
(2) limit the minimum resale price of commodities sold to third parties; or
(3) other Monopoly Agreements determined by the AML Enforcement
Authority under the State Council.69
However, Article 15 contains significant exceptions to what otherwise might
be considered as "per se" violations of the AML under both Article 13 and Article
15. These include activities conducted:
70
(1) for the purpose of improving technology, researching and developing
new products;
(2) for the purpose of improving the product quality, reducing costs,
enhancing efficiency, unifying specifications and standards of products,
or implementing division of labor based on specialization;
(3) for the purpose of improving operational efficiency of small and
medium-sized undertakings and enhancing their competitiveness;
(4) for the purpose of achieving public interests, but not limited to, energy
saving, environmental protection, and disaster relief;
(5) for the purpose of alleviating serious decreases in sales volume or
distinctive production surpluses due to economic depression;
(6) for the purposes of safeguarding legitimate interests in foreign trade and
foreign economic cooperation;
(7) other circumstances as stipulated by laws and by the State Council.71
68. AML, art. 13, translated in Bush, supra note 2, at app. See id. art. 10 (creating the Anti-
Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority under the State Council to perform the function of anti-
monopoly enforcement. The AML specifically permits the delegation of this authority to the
" corresponding agencies of the People's Governments at levels of province, autonomous region and
municipality directly under the central government responsibilities....").
69. Id. art. 14.
70. Id. art. 15. See also United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 607-08, 615-19
(1972) (discussing a comparative review of per se violations under United States antitrust law, "[i]t is
only after considerable experience with certain business relationships that courts classify them as per se
violations of the Sherman Act."). Traditional examples of per se violations include horizontal price
fixing and horizontal division of markets.
71. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) (explaining the view of the United
States concerning the application of the reasonableness test and applying a rule or reason test in
recognition that there is a range of economic effects that may result from different types of restraints in
different market structures.). The reasonableness test under the Chinese AML differs from the United
States' reasonableness test in that the United States does not balance the anticompetitive effects of an
agreement against its social or political benefits. It simply inquires whether the agreement promotes or
suppresses competition. See Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'I Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978)
(expressing that "[T]he statutory policy [of the Sherman Act] precludes inquiry into the question of
whether competition is good or bad."). The United States Supreme Court noted: "The true test of
legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes
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Interestingly, if clauses 1-5 are offered as reasons for the non-applicability of
the provisions of Articles 13 and 14, the "relevant undertakings 72 must also prove
that the agreement so concluded will not materially restrict competition in the
Relevant Market 73 and that the agreement can allow consumers to share the
benefits generated therefrom. 74
In addition, also reflecting a "reasonableness" standard, Article 27 contains
the "factors [that] shall be taken into consideration in the review of concentrations
by undertakings":
(1) the market shares of undertakings participating in the concentration in
the Relevant Market and their ability to control... the market;
(2) the degree of concentration in the Relevant Market;
(3) the effect that the concentration of undertakings may have on market
access and technological progress;
(4) the effect that the concentration of undertakings may have on consumers
and other relevant undertakings;
(5) the effect that the concentration of undertakings may have on the
development of the national economy;
(6) other factors affecting the market competition that the AML
Enforcement Authority under the State Council deems shall be taken into
consideration.75
competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition." Id. at 691 (citing Bd.
of Trade of City of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 246 (1918), quoted in Cont'l TV., Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 n.15 (1977)). The United States Supreme Court continued in its
discussion of the considerations contained in a rule of reason analysis. "In the second category are
agreements whose competitive effect can only be evaluated by analyzing the facts peculiar to the
business, the history of the restraint, and the reasons why it was imposed. In either event, the purpose
of the analysis is to form a judgment about the competitive significance of the restraint; it is not to
decide whether a policy favoring competition is in the public interest, or in the interest of the members
of an industry. Subject to exceptions defined by statute, that policy decision has been made by the
Congress." Id. at 692.
72. As used in the AML, "undertakings" refers to natural persons, legal persons, and other
organizations that are engaged in manufacturing or otherwise dealing with commodities, or providing
services. AML, art. 12, translated in Bush, supra note 2, at app, 3.
73. As used in the AML, "Relevant Market" generally means the "scope of commodities and the
scope of territory within which the undertakings compete with each other during a specific period of
time with respect to specific commodities or services (collectively 'commodities')." Id.
74. Id. art. 15(7).
75. Id. art. 27.
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2. Abuse of Power by Dominant Market Holders
A second type of prohibited conduct, stemming from the "abuse of power" by
"dominant market holders," 76 is considered in Chapter 3, Article 17. These
activities include:
(1) selling commodities at unfair high prices or buying commodities at
unfair low prices;
(2) selling commodities at prices below cost without any justification;77
(3) refusing to transact with counter-parties with respect to a transaction
without any justification;
(4) restricting, without any justification, their counter-parties to transact with
such undertakings exclusively or to transact with other parties designated
by such undertakings exclusively;
(5) engaging in tie-in sales of commodities or imposing other unreasonable
conditions with respect to transactions without any justifications;
(6) applying differential treatments to counter-parties to transactions who
have the same qualifications with respect to transaction price and other
transaction terms, without any justification;
(7) other activities that are deemed by the AML Enforcement Authority of
the State Council as abusing dominant market positions.
78
As with other prohibited conduct, this type of conduct is subject to the
"reasonableness" standard, meaning that the conduct may be proved justified or
legitimate. However, undertakings may be presumed to have a Dominant Market
Position if they satisfy any of the following conditions:
(1) the market share of one undertaking in the Relevant Market accounts for
1/2;
76. The determination that an undertaking has a Dominant Market Position is based on the
following factors as found in Article 18:
(1) The market share of the undertaking in the Relevant Market, and the competition
conditions in the Relevant market;
(2) the ability of the undertaking to control the sales market or the raw material purchasing
market;
(3) the financial resources and the technical capacities of the undertaking;
(4) the extent to which other undertakings depend on the subject undertaking with respect to
relevant transactions;
(5) the level of difficult for the undertakings to enter the Relevant Market;
(6) other factors relating to its determination whether the subject matter has a Dominant
Market Position.
77. The problem of dumping is an especially vexing one for China. Dumping requires a
comparison of "the price of export with the home-market price to see if the former is lower than the
latter so that there is a 'margin of dumping."' JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 335
(2nd ed. 1997). Jackson continues:
Almost by definition, given that such an economy is not based on pricing
principles, the nominal price of goods may bear little relation to prices that
would be set by enterprises in a market/price oriented economy. The prices may
be set by a state planning commission, and may vary according to end user.
Furthermore, the prices may bear little relation to the cost of an enterprise, or
Iprofitability.'
Id.
78. AML, art. 17, translated in Bush, supra note 2, at app, 5.
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(2) the joint market share of two undertakings in the Relevant Market
accounts for 2/3; or
(3) the joint market of three undertakings in the Relevant Market accounts
for 3/4.79
In the case of circumstances set forth in clauses 2 and 3 above, if any of such
undertakings has a market share of less than 1/10, it shall not be presumed to have
a Dominant Market Position. Further, if an undertaking which is presumed to have
a Dominant Market Position presents evidence showing otherwise, it shall not be
deemed to have a Dominant Market Position. Attorneys Harris and Ganske write
that although Article 27 contains the factors noted above for determining "market
dominance," the AML does not fully define how product and geographic markets
will be identified. Further, the inadequacy of this definition has been described as
"unique and troubling" by some scholars."s
3. Certain Concentrations with and without Notification or Approval
There are three concentrations contemplated by Chapter 4, Article 20:
(1) a merger of undertakings;
(2) an acquisition by an undertaking of the control of other undertakings
through acquiring equity or assets;
(3) an undertaking, by contracts or other means, acquiring control of other
undertakings or the capability to exercise decisive influence on other
undertakings.
81
Article 21 stipulates that if a concentration described above meets the
thresholds for notification as stipulated by the State Council, the relevant
undertakings shall file a notification with the Anti-monopoly Law Enforcement
Authority under the State Council in advance. Without filing such a notification,
the undertakings will be prohibited from implementing the concentration. In such
a case, the undertakings are required to file a variety of documents and other
materials.
82
79. Id. art. 19.
80. See generally Harris & Ganske, supra note 66 at 2. The authors report that "[u]nder U.S.
antitrust law, market share is the .usual starting point' for assessing the existence of market power." Id.
at 10-11. See also A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, I ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 66 (6th ed. 2007).
Low market shares "virtually preclude a finding of market power, whereas a high market share
indicates the possibility that market power exists." Id. Indeed, proof of a "dominant market share" has
been held to be a requirement for the establishment of market power. See Flegel v. Christian Hosp., 4
F.3d 682, 689 (8th Cir. 1993). However, a high market share alone is not proof of market power. An
economic analysis of other "competitive factors" may be able to demonstrate the absence of the
requisite market power despite a high market share, particularly when barriers to market entry are low.
In sum, unlike the application of China's market share percentages, U.S. antitrust law does not establish
presumptions of market power based solely on market share. Id. See, e.g., Ball Mem'l Hosp. v. Mut.
Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1336 (7th Cir. 1986). See generally A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION,
MARKET POWER HANDBOOK: COMPETITOIN LAW AND ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS (2005).
81. AML, art. 20, translated in Bush, supra note 2, at app, 6.
82. Included are the following documentation items: the notification, including the name, address,
and business scope of the participating undertakings, the proposed date for implementing the
concentration, and other matters stipulated by the AML Enforcement Authority under the State Council;
a statement explaining the impact of the concentration upon the competitive conditions (i.e.,
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Article 27 lays out the factors that should be taken into account in the review
of the proposed concentration by the AML Enforcement Authority under the State
Council. These include:
(1) the market shares of the participating undertakings in the Relevant
Market and their ability to control the market;
(2) the degree of concentration in the Relevant Market;
(3) the effect that the concentration may have on market access and
technological progress;
(4) the effect that the concentration may have on consumers and other
relevant undertakings;
(5) the effect that the concentration may have on the development of the
national economy;
(6) other factors affect competition that the AML Enforcement Authority
under the State Council deems shall be taken into consideration.
83
In reviewing these considerations, the AML Enforcement Authority under the
State Council shall prohibit a proposed concentration "if such [a] concentration has
or may have the effect of eliminating or restricting competition."t 4 However, the
authorities may instead decide not to prohibit a concentration "if the undertaking
can prove that the positive effects of such concentration on the competition
obviously overweigh its negative effects or that the concentration is in the public
interest." 85 In the alternate, if the AML Enforcement Authority under the State
Council does not prohibit the concentration, it may instead decide to impose
restrictive conditions in order "to reduce the adverse effects that the concentration
may have on competition." 86 In either case, the AML Enforcement Authority
under the State Council shall publicize, in a timely manner, its decision to prohibit
the concentration or to impose any restrictive conditions.87
A second category of prohibited conduct under Chapter 4 is the merging or
acquiring of companies under certain circumstances without notification or
approval, found in Article 22. Undertakings are not required to file any
notification with the AML Enforcement Authority under the State Council if their
concentration meets any of the following conditions:
(1) one undertaking participating in the concentration owns more than 50%
of the voting shares or assets of each of the other participating
undertakings;
competition) of the Relevant Market; the concentration agreement; audited financial and accounting
reports of the undertakings participating in the proposed concentration in the preceding fiscal year; and
other documents and materials under the AML Enforcement Authority under the State Council. Id. art.
23.
83. Id. art. 27.
84. Id. art. 28.
85. Id. (emphasis added).
86. Id. art. 29.
87. Id. art. 30. Articles 24-26 deal with issues concerning the required filing of supplementary
documents (Art. 24), a preliminary review and notification requirements (Art. 25), the completion of the
review (Art. 26), and the circumstances that involve an extension of time (Art. 26, para. 2 (1)-(3)).
2009
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
(2) more than 50% of the voting shares or assets of every undertaking
participating in the concentration are owned by a single undertaking that
does not participate in the concentration.
88
Four specific problems may be identified concerning Article 22. First,
acquiring control of a company is considered a concentration, but the term control
is never fully defined. 89 Bhattacharjee cited Harris and Yang, and notes somewhat
wryly that "experience in other jurisdictions reveals that creative lawyers and
businesspersons can structure transactions in a manner to avoid being caught by
the merger rules." 90 Second, no specific timeline has been established concerning
the time period during which a company must notify Chinese authorities; instead,
Article 21 uses the term "in advance." Third, as with other provisions, Article 28
permits parties to attempt to persuade the AML Enforcement Authority that the
positive effects of a concentration outweigh (overweigh) any negative effects; but
the AML provides no real guidelines on this point, unless the provisions
established under Article 15 are applicable under this article as well. Fourth,
thresholds for concentrations requiring notifications are not set, perhaps reflecting
the earlier criticisms of notification requirements generated in earlier drafts and in
the current mergers and acquisitions rules.91  Article 22 describes only two
situations, noted as "exemptions," from the notification requirements, and these
exemptions do not reference traditional exemption thresholds, such as
concentrations not exceeding certain defined market shares or market values. On
this specific topic, Bhattacharjee noted:
The AML is silent on the nature of merger notification thresholds.
Ordinarily, this would not be a concern, given the tendency in many
jurisdictions to leave such details (which may change over time) to
regulation. However, the AML is silent with respect to the basis for
notification. Earlier drafts of the AML included notification thresholds
based on assets, turnover and market share, but the current AML does
not define the notification threshold in any way.
92
In addition, and perhaps most importantly, Article 31 requires approval that is
separate from the normal merger approval for concentrations between a foreign
investor and a domestic company which "concerns national security." This
provision is highly controversial and problematic, both because it fails to define
88. Id. art. 22.
89. See Bhattacharjee, supra note 64, at 8 (noting that examples night include defining "control"
as control at the board of directors level through the holding of voting interest or the possession of
contractual power to designate a portion of the board-as is the case in the United States and Canada).
The author also raises the possibility that control might include exercising "decisive influence" over an
undertaking-as is the case in the European Union. The issue of control raises the question of the
continued existence of the "Golden Share" in China, which perpetuates majority Chinese control of
foreign investment. The existence of the "Golden Share" is problematic in light of China's membership
in the WTO.
90. H. Stephen Harris & Kathy Lijun Yang, China: Latest Developments in Anti-Monopoly Law
Legislation, 19 ANTITRUST 89, 92 (2005) (cited in Bhattacharjee, supra note 64, at 7 n.28).
91. See Harris, supra note 2, at 211 (describing the criticism of the prior legislative thresholds).
92. Bhattacharjee, supra note 64, at 8.
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"national security," and because it is not standard policy for a sovereign to frame
its antitrust laws to this extent and in this manner.93 Many commentators have
voiced concern that the vagueness of this provision will allow China to reject or
approve a transaction for political rather than legal or economic reasons,94
reflecting the increasing concern that China has voiced about alleged foreign
domination in important sectors of its domestic market. In defense of the Chinese
position, however, it should be noted that in 2002, Kodak dominated almost 50%
of the photographic film market in China; Nestle held about 40% of the instant
coffee market; Procter and Gamble had a 30% share of the hair care market;
Hewlett-Packard held 25% of the commercial internet-service market; and Epson
held a 30% share of the computer-printer market.
95
4. Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights
The fourth type of prohibited conduct is the abuse of intellectual property
rights (IPRs).96 Specifically, Article 55 of the AML states:
This law shall not apply to Undertakings' conducts that are exercising
their intellectual property rights in accordance with the provisions of
laws and administrative regulations relating to intellectual property
rights. However, this law shall apply to Undertakings' conducts that
93. For a full discussion of the issues surrounding an assertion of "national security," see id. at 9-
10. See also id. at 10 n.41 (providing "negative media attention" and citing Jamil Anderlini, Investors
Fear China Monopolies Law, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2007); China Approves Anti-Monopoly Law that
Bans Discrimination Fears, INSIDE US-CHINA TRADE, (Sept. 5, 2007).
94. See Zhuoyao Hui, Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law: A Pretext for Local Protection or an
Aspiration to Comply with the International Norm? ILL. BUS. L.J. (2007), available at
http://iblsjoumal.typepad.com/illinoisbusiness law-soc/2007/l I /chinese-anti-mo.html (noting that
Chinese AML is based upon the European Community (EC) anti-competition law, Japanese AML, and
U.S. Antitrust Law, and stating that none of these countries' competition laws include some "abstract
aspirational goals that might give the Chinese government grounds for invalidating a foreign
enterprise's business conduct").
95. See MARK WILLIAMS, COMPETITION POLICY AND LAW IN CHINA, HONG KONG AND TAIWAN
198 (2005).
96. For a general discussion of key IPR issues in international business, see Richard J. Hunter, Jr.,
A Primer on Key International Intellectual Property (IPR) Issues, 5 EUR. J. ECON., FIN. & ADMIN. SCI.
103 (2006). The International Chamber of Commerce has identified general issues and "tensions"
between intellectual property rights and antitrust and three "distinct ways in which anti-competitive
practices may prove to be anticompetitive:
(i) A dominant position resulting from ownership of IP property may be
abused by its owner.
(ii) A licensor may impose restrictive licensing terms on his licensee which
secure inappropriate reward for his intellectual property.
(iii) If a patent Office grants patents of low quality, and if the law is generally
uncertain, competitors of patentees may choose to respect them rather than
to ignore or challenge them. "
INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, CURRENT AND EMERGING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
ISSUES FOR BUSINESS 65 (9th ed. 2008), available at
http://www.iccwbo.org/uploadedFiles/ICC/policy/intellectualproperty/pages/IP_Roadmap-
2005(l).pdf.
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eliminate or restrict competition by abusing their intellectual property
rights.97
Revamping of Chinese law in the area of IPR protection was seen as critical
to the prospects for the long-range development of the Chinese economy, as
"Rampant piracy of intellectual property in China has undermined foreign
confidence in the Chinese market's ability to absorb foreign technology and
copyrighted material without cannibalizing it." 98 Lee and Mansfield reported that
China's weak IP protection has "a significant negative impact on the location of
U.S. FDI."99 As a result of the world-wide importance placed on IP protection,
this provision perhaps may be the most controversial of all because of its
vagueness and because China has historically offered limited, if any, protection to
intellectual property holders. Jianyang Yu, a partner in a Chinese law firm,
reported on the early period of China's transition from a socialist to a market
economy. Yu noted that despite major changes in the IPR regime in China,
"problems continue[ed] to exist in the protection of intellectual property. There
are defects in intellectual property laws and in the coordination among the courts
and government agencies, and there is much to be done to enforce the intellectual
property laws effectively."' 00 "According to Maria Lin, an attorney with Morgan
97. AML, art. 55, translated in Bush, supra note 2, at app, 14.
98. Jonathan C. Spierer, Intellectual Property in China: Prospectus for New Market Entrants,
HARV. ASIA Q., 46 (Summer 1999) (cited in Yahong Li, Pushing for Greater Protection: The Trend
Toward Greater Protection of Intellectual Property in the Chinese Software Industry and the
Implications for the Rule of Law in China, 23 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 637, 640 n.14 (2002)).
99. Reported in Yahong Li, supra note 98, at 641 n.16. It is also quite ironic, but as Alford points
out, "[t]he most significant rationale for intellectual property law lies with the welfare of the Chinese
people themselves. They are now, and seem likely in the foreseeable future to continue to be, the
greatest victims of the infringement of intellectual property that is rampant throughout the vast nation.'"
William P. Alford, Making The World Safe for What? Intellectual Property Rights, Human Rights,
Property Law and American Foreign Policy in the Post-European Cold War World, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L
L. & POL. 135, 136 (1997). See also Robert Bird & Daniel R. Cahoy, The Impact of Compulsory
Licensing on Foreign Direct Investment: A Collective Bargaining Approach, 45 AM. Bus. L.J. 283
(2008).
100. For a description of the early efforts (1992-1994) at reforming the Chinese IPR regime, see
Jianyang Yu, People's Republic of China: Protection of Intellectual Property in the P.R.C.. Progress,
Problems, and Proposals, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 140 (1994). Yu counted among the various
changes an amended Patent Law and Trademark Law; China's joining four international conventions on
intellectual property; strengthening or making available criminal sanctions on infringement of
intellectual property; and China's courts and administrative authorities aggressively attempting to
enforce its IPR law in practice. Id. at 161. Among the international conventions mentioned by Yu
include the Beme Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, effective on October
15, 1992; the Universal Copyright Convention, effective on October 30, 1992; the Convention for the
Protection of Producers of Phonograms Against Unauthorized Duplication of Their Phonograms,
effective on April 30, 1993; and on September 25, 1992, China issued the International Copyright
Treaties Implementation Rules ("Rules"), which became effective on September 30, 1992. These rules
were formulated in order to implement the various international conventions which China had joined-
most especially the Berne Convention. Key provisions of the 1992 "Rules" include:
" protecting unpublished foreign works under the copyright laws;
" protecting foreign works of applied art for a term of twenty-five years;
" protecting foreign computer programs as literary works without requiring their registration;
" protecting foreign works that are created by compiling non-protectable materials, but which
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& Finnegan, 'While China has many laws to protect intellectual property ....
enforcement of such laws has been problematic as the court system is still in the
process of reform, and relevant administrative bureaus have problems delegating
authority.' 10 1
Concern over the lack of protection of IPRs was voiced by the International
Bar Association in 1995, which noted:
[T]he borderline between fair exercise of IP rights and the abuse of IP
rights is not well defined under any jurisdiction. An attempt to draw a
dividing line through legislation is commendable but should leave no
illusions as to the urgent need for future clarification through case-law
or administrative practice.... Therefore, timely guidance on the concept
of restrictions of competition "beyond the laws and administrative
regulations on intellectual property rights," under this provision would
be appreciated, especially as intellectual property laws are typically
silent on competition-related questions. 102
Attorneys Harris and Ganske report that the vagueness of the AML
concerning issues relating to the abuse of IPRs has caused many to question
possess originality;
" eliminating certain limitations imposed by the Copyright Law on the copyright owner's rights
to comply with the Berne Convention; and
" protecting foreign works which, at the moment when the various international conventions
came into force in China, have not yet fallen into the public domain in the country of origin
after the expiration of the term of protection.
Id. at 143. Yu also identifies a problem with the legal system itself. China officially operates on the
basis of the "civil law" system in which judicial decisions do not enjoy stare decisis status, "[h]ence
there are notable disparities among court decisions and no clear judicial tests to determine whether
infringements have occurred." Id. at 158. Yet, as Professor Berring notes, "[t]he existing Chinese
legislative opus is a patchwork drawn from both the civil and common law traditions. Each year it
grows more complete and its implementation improves. Huge problems remain in predictability and
enforcement but the commercial structure grows more stable." Berring, supra note 11, at 439 (citing
STANLEY B. LUBMAN, BIRD IN A CAGE: LEGAL REFORM IN CHINA AFTER MAD 383-432 (1999)). The
situation may have been exacerbated by China "reclaiming" Hong Kong on July 1, 1997. Hong Kong
had generally adopted the Common Law system, based on precedent and the rule of stare decisis. Hong
Kong has held an advantage in that its common law tradition has allowed it to maintain its status as a
part of a global legal system, with membership in a number of international treaties and organizations.
Thus, at least as it relates to commercial transactions involving Hong Kong and China, there exists the
paradigm of "one nation, two systems." See Berry Fong-Chung Hsu, Legislative Control of Hong Kong
Financial Markets: Some Aspects of Banking and Securities Regulations, 28 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus.
649, 651-52 (1997). Interestingly, as Shanghai has made known its intentions to be the commercial
leader in China, its legal system has come under some scrutiny. In contrast to Hong Kong, Shanghai
has a reputation for rendering verdicts "in the national interest"-at least in its maritime courts. See
Richard McGregor, Shanghai Sees Law as Key to Being Commercial Hub, FIN. TIMES, July 1, 2002.
See also Mei Ying Gechlik, Judicial Reform in China: Lessons from Shanghai, 19 COLUM. J. ASIAN L.
97, 99-100 (2005).
101. Yahong Li, supra note 98, at 650.
102. See Working Group on the Development of Competition Law in the People's Republic of
China, International Bar Association, Comments on the Draft Anti-Monopoly Law of the People's
Republic of China (PRC) 69-70 (2005), available at http://www.ibanet.org/images/downloads/IBA%/
20Submission.pdf.
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whether this provision, as it will be enforced, will result in the loss or diminution
of adequate intellectual property protection in China. They urge that the law be
significantly clarified and note:
Absent such clarification, holders of valuable IP may fear the
imposition of compulsory licensing (or compulsory disclosure of
technical data) as a sanction for a finding of an abuse based on a mere
refusal to license IP, or the imposition of conditions in IP licenses that
are later determined to be unfair.
10 3
The United States has been especially pointed in its criticism of China's IPR
policies. The Office of the United States Trade Representative annually issues a
"Special 301 Report" on the adequacy and effectiveness of intellectual property
rights (IPR) protection by U.S. trading partners.' 0 4  This Report provides an
important worldwide benchmark for the evaluation of China's IPR regime. Article
55 of the AML is an attempt to deal with the problematic nature of China's IPR
protection.'°0
Concerns have been raised concerning the vagueness of Article 55. Some
observers have been optimistic that this provision will, in fact, be further clarified
and that Article 55 will provide adequate protection of intellectual property rights.
They point to the creation of a Judicial Court of Intellectual Property as an
103. Harris & Ganske, supra note 66, at 7.
104. See OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2008 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 19
(2008), available at http://www.ustr.gov/Document Library/Reports Publications/2008/2008_Special
301 ReportlSectionIndex.html. Concerning China, the Report notes:
China remains a top intellectual property enforcement and TRIPS compliance
priority for the United States. China will remain on the Priority Watch List, and
remain subject to Section 306 monitoring. The United States is seeking to
resolve its concerns with respect to three IPR protection and enforcement issues
through WTO dispute settlement with China .... The United States recognizes
and appreciates the efforts of the many officials in China who continue to give
voice to China's commitment to protecting intellectual property rights and are
working hard to make it a reality. In spite of these efforts, the shared goal of
significantly reducing IPR infringement throughout China has not yet been
achieved.
Id. The Special 301 Report placed forty-six countries on the Priority Watch List, the Watch List, and
the Section 306 Monitoring List. There are nine countries that have been placed on the 2008 Priority
Watch List: China, Russia, Argentina, Chile, India, Israel, Pakistan, Thailand, and Venezuela.
According to the United States government, through the office of the United States Trade
Representative, countries on the Priority Watch List "are the focus of increased bilateral attention
concerning the problem areas." Id. at 18. Thirty-six trading partners are on the lower level Watch List,
meriting bilateral attention to address IPR problems: Algeria, Belarus, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Greece, Guatemala,
Hungary, Indonesia, Italy, Jamaica, Kuwait, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mexico, Norway, Peru, Philippines,
Poland, Republic of Korea, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Taiwan, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan,
Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam. Paraguay will continue to be subject to Section 306 monitoring
under a bilateral Memorandum of Understanding that establishes objectives and actions for addressing
IPR concerns in that country. Id.
105. AML, art. 55, translated in Bush, supra note 2, at app, 14.
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indication of the seriousness of China's intentions. 106  Harris stresses theimportance of effecting further concrete steps in the area of IP protection:
One step toward reaping these rewards would be clarifying the
provision regarding possible violations of the new law by virtue of
undefined "abuses" of intellectual property rights. Otherwise, a
contraction in investment in China's high technology markets and a
forestalling in the licensing of leading technologies to Chinese
enterprises can be expected.
10 7
However, on the other hand, other commentators are less optimistic, noting
recent comments by We Zhenguo, Deputy Director General of MOFCOM's
Department of Treaty and Law/Anti-Monopoly Office, who described common
abuses from IP holders that limit "competition and seek monopolies by means of a
package of compulsory licensing, placement of supplementary irrational conditions
in licensing contracts and collection of irrational license fees by making use of
their dominant market positions." 10 8
Finally, a substantive criticism of Article 55 lies in the fact that the AML is
silent on the question of punishment of an Article 55 violation. Columnist Adam
Cohen notes that the Article must clarify whether a consequence of a violation of
Article 55 should include nullification of the rights or compulsory licensing. 10 9
D. Legal Liabilities and Penalties
A discussion of Legal Liabilities and Penalties may be found in Chapter
Seven, Articles 46-50. These articles are "subject matter/category" based. In
general, Article 46 provides for several generic penalties by the AML Enforcement
Authority in the case where undertakings conclude and implement illegal
Monopoly Agreements. These penalties and actions include:
* an order to the undertakings to stop such illegal acts (similar to a "cease
and desist" order under U.S. antitrust law);
106. China to Open Anti-piracy Court, BBC NEWS, March 10, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4793530.stm. The article reported that in 2005, 700 people had
been convicted in 505 criminal piracy cases; China also shut down 76 websites and demanded that 137
others remove illegal materials. Ironically, the BBC reported that "The vast majority of product piracy
cases-95%-involve imitation of Chinese products by Chinese companies." Id. (emphasis added).
107. Harris, supra note 2, at 171.
108. Reported in Harris & Ganske, supra note 66, at 8.
109. Adam Cohen, China's Draft Antitrust Law Sows Worries in the West, WALL ST. J., Jan. 30,
2006, at A12 (describing the concerns of the world's largest holders of patents and the possibility of
forced royalty-free licensing). The WTO defines compulsory licensing as "[W]hen a government
allows someone else to produce the patented product or process without the consent of the patent
owner. It is one of the flexibilities on patent protection included in the WTO's agreement on
intellectual property - the TRIPS (Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) Agreement."
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, COMPULSORY LICENSING OF PHARMACEUTICALS AND TRIPS (2006),
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/TRIPse/public healthfaq_e.htr. See also Agreement on
Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Dec. 15,
1993, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, Multilateral Trade
Negotiations-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994).
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* confiscation of "illegal gains"; 110 and
* the imposition of fines of more than 1% and less than 10% of their sales in
the preceding year.11
Article 46 provides that if the monopoly agreement has not been implemented,
fines of less than RMB 500,000 may be imposed. 12 Further, if the undertakings
on their own initiative report information and provide important information, the
AML Enforcement Authority may reduce the penalty imposed or grant an
exemption from the penalty.
Article 47 provides for the same penalties as noted above where undertakings
illegally abuse their Dominant Market Positions.11 3  Article 48 provides for
penalties in the cases of illegal concentrations, relating to illegal merger or
acquisition activities. In such cases, the AML Enforcement Authority shall:
* order the undertakings to stop implementing the concentration;
14
* dispose of equity or an asset within a specified time limit; 
15
* transfer their business within a specified time limit;' 1 6 and
* take other necessary measures to revert to the condition of the undertakings
before the concentration.'
1 17
In addition, the AML Enforcement Authority may impose a fine of no more
than RMB 500,000. In considering the appropriateness of any potential fines to be
levied under Articles 46, 47, and 48, Article 49 stipulates that the AML
Enforcement Authority shall take into account the "nature, extent and duration of
the illegal act and other factors in determining the specific amount" of any fine
imposed."1 t
Article 50 is both interesting and potentially controversial. It provides that
"Undertakings that cause loss to others as a result of their Monopolistic Conduct
110. In infringement cases, damages are usually calculated on one of the following bases: "(1) the
intellectual property owner's actual economic loss caused by the infringement; (2) the infringer's total
profits derived from the infringement; or (3) an amount no less than a reasonable royalty." Jianyang
Yu, supra note 100, at 159.
111. AML, art. 46, translated in Bush, supra note 2, at app, 12.
112. As of the writing of this paper, 1 CNY (China Yuan Renminbi- RMB) = 0.1458 USD (July 7,
2008). Exchange Rates Data, Chinese Yuan, American Dollar, x-rates.com, http://www.x-
rates.com/d/USD/CNY/data120.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2008). RMB 500,000 would amount to a
maximum fine of approximately $72,900. The RMB is a "fixed currency." The current amount of any
fine would not be expected to fluctuate greatly.
113. AML, art. 47, translated in Bush, supra note 2, at app, 12.
114. Id. art. 46.
115. Id. art. 48.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. art. 49.
VOL. 37:2
CHINA'S COMPETITION LAWS
shall be liable for civil liabilities in accordance with laws." 119  At least one
commentator has argued that this provision applies to consumers 12 but may not be
applicable to competitors within or outside the Chinese market.
VI. TENTATIVE OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
China's new AML represents a significant step in China's transition from its
command-and-control economy toward the creation of a socialist market
economy-however that may ultimately be defined. The enactment of the
comprehensive AML also represents a significant step towards assuring the global
acceptance of China as a full international partner in international trade and in the
continued attraction of significant amounts of foreign direct investment.
1 2 1
However, the AML which became effective on August 1, 2008, is but the first step
in what may prove to be a long process of reconstruction and revision of China's
antimonopoly regime. In their evaluation, Harris and Ganske lay out several major
concerns that will need to be addressed if China is to remain on its glide path to
success and continued economic progress.1 22  We strenuously urge policy
makers-both in China and in the capitals of their trading partners-to pay special
and close attention to the recommendations of these noted policy experts. Based
upon our detailed analysis of the most important provisions of the AML, we will
amplify upon these conclusions and add our own concerns. These include:
1. Provisions of the AML related to dominant market position (Articles 6
and 17) are vague and will require significant refinement and the
adoption of clarifying guidelines in a relatively short time after the
effective date, through the adoption of Implementation Rules or other
clarifying guidelines.
119. Id. art. 50.
120. Michael X.Y. Zhang, Private Civil Lawsuits under China Anti-Monopoly Law, Antitrust Law
Blog, http://www.antitrustlawblog.com/2008/04/articles/article/private-civil-lawsuits-under-china-
antimonopoly-law (April 7, 2008) (hosted by Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton L.L.P.). It appears
that the writers of the AML changed the wording of Article 50 to "others" from the terms previously
used in earlier version-"party with interest." Id. Zhang concludes that "The AML should be very
cautious in granting the right to sue to competitors, and perhaps withhold entirely until the potential
procedural abuses are resolved, and the scope of the AML itself is more established." Id.
121. The CIA reports that aggregate FDI into China had reached 758,900,000, 000 in 2007. In
addition, Chinese exports reached 1,217,000,000,000 and imports into China were 901,300,000,000 in
2007. CIA, supra note 1. The Asian Development Bank reported that government policy in China has
"'changed substantially" and has evolved through several stages. In the initial stage (1978-1985),
foreign investors were restricted to export-oriented operations. This stage saw "export processing
zones" established for Hong Kong, Guangdong, and the four original "special economic zones" that had
been created in Shantou, Shenzhen, Xiamen, and Zhuhai. Hainan was later added, offering foreign
investors preferential treatment in the form of tax incentives. The second phase (1986-1991) provided a
list of industrial sectors to which FDI was "encouraged, restricted, and prohibited." Foreign investors
were also allowed to sell and manufacture goods in China. See ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra
note 29, at 16.
122. Harris & Ganske, supra note 66, at 1-2.
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2. Because of the enormity of the issues involved and their importance in
attracting FDI, the AML's relationship to intellectual property rights
needs more clarity, especially in light of the strong worldwide
perception of the lack of enforcement of IPRs in China in the past.
Issues relating to piracy, industrial espionage, and "grey market
goods " must be specifically addressed.
3. The Chinese approach to what has been termed "collective dominance,"
which presumes the dominant position of multiple entities based on
their combined market share, "is unique and troubling.,
123
4. There have been grave concerns raised about the administration of the
AML in two quarters. First, the AML Enforcement Authority has been
placed within the competency of the Chinese State Council-essentially
a political body with close ties to the Chinese Communist Party. In
addition, there is concern that under Article 10, administration of the
AML may be devolved to lower level or local government bodies with
potentially skewed or biased views1 24 against foreign competition.
5. The lack of experience within the legal system in the administration of
antitrust 125 or anti-competition law and a lack of expertise on the proper
functioning of a capitalist market economy in courts of "general
jurisdiction" throughout China may indicate that Chinese courts may be
unable to properly interpret the AML.
6. Provisions relating to "national security" need to be fleshed-out and
limited to circumstances generally accepted as such under international
norms and international law with due respect given to Chinese
sovereignty.
7. Provisions relating to the "well being of the national economy" found
in Article 31 need to be developed and defined. A clear reference point
must be established.
8. The term "public interest" found in Article 1 and Article 15 must be
defined and explained.
9. The phrase, "legitimate interest in foreign trade and foreign economic
cooperation," must be refined and extrapolated.
123. Id. at 1.
124. There continues to be a problem with enforcing judgments in the Chinese legal system.
Attorney Lindsay Wilson reports "Judgments also remain unenforced because of local protectionism
and 'selfish departmentalism.' Government departments often simply refuse to cooperate, and parts of
the government, such as the military, are immune from any legal action unless they choose to submit.
In the private sector, insolvent corporations can escape payment, and it is difficult to dock the wages of
employees. Courts, which depend on political capital even in the most balanced systems, are reluctant
to coerce compliance with their dictates." Wilson, supra note 24, at 1022 nn.105-108 (citing LUBMAN,
supra note 100, 266-68).
125. See Tucker & Waldmeir, supra note 53. The authors note that ironically, in fact China's
threshold for merger filings may be too low-fearing that enforcement agencies may lack both the
resources and expertise to deal with more complex merger cases.
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10. Chinese authorities must explain exactly what is meant when they
assert that they will balance any anticompetitive effects of an
agreement against "social or political benefits." What exactly are these
"social or political benefits"?
11. Concerning abuses in the market, Chinese authorities must define
"unreasonable conditions" concerning the existence of permissible "tie-
ins" in the domestic Chinese economy, especially as China continues to
develop its activities in international franchising and leasing.
126
12. The persistent use of the term "other factors related to its
determination" needs to be accompanied by clear legislative or
administrative guidance so as to avoid the impression that the
established rules are subject to the vagaries of interpretation of the
Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority.
13. China must continue to reform its legal system, especially emphasizing
the need for the existence of a judiciary free from Communist Party
influence.
However, even given these perceived deficiencies-which may more
positively be considered as opportunities for significant improvements-China's
experience with developing its unique "socialist market economy" has generally
proven to be positive.
Today, China is very different from the one established in revolution in 1949
when "Chairman Mao mounted Tiananmen and declared the founding of the
People's Republic of China"; 27 or when China began its "March to the Market" in
1978; or when China began creating an efficient and functioning antimonopoly
regime in 2002. In fact,
[Three hundred] million people have escaped poverty in less than a
generation, and millions are migrating from the countryside to places
like Chongqing, where the juggernaut of capitalism is powering a rapid
transformation.... In the past one saw the occasional car; now the nation
is putting 25,000 new vehicles on the road every day.... People talked
openly about wanting to get rich, a desire once verboten.1
28
The 2008 AML is yet another step in this progression.
126. See generally Hector R. Lozada et al., Master Franchising as an Entry Strategy: Marketing
and Legal Implications, 4 COASTAL Bus. J. 16, 24-25 (2005), available at:
http://www.coastal.edu/business/cbj/pdfs/articles/spring2005/lozada-hunter-kritz.pdf
127. Berring, supra note 11, at 443.
128. Felicia R. Lee, Ted Koppel Tours a China Brimming with Dreams and Consumerism, N.Y.
TIMES, July 8, 2008, at E3 (discussing Ted Koppel's recent visit to China and the documentary "Koppel
on Discovery: The People's Republic of Capitalism").
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COUNTER-TERRORISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS:
THE EMERGENCE OF A RULE OF CUSTOMARY INT'L LAW
FROM U.N. RESOLUTIONS
DR. JOSEPH ISANGA*
In response to the global threat of international terrorism and the counter-
terrorism efforts by national governments, the United Nations General Assembly
(G.A.) and the United Nations Security Council (S.C.) have adopted various
resolutions and conventions.' The effectiveness of the struggle against terrorism
could be enhanced by the establishment of a generally agreed definition of
international terrorism. However, the absence of such agreement to date has, inter
alia, thwarted efforts aimed at adopting a comprehensive international, legally-
binding instrument regarding international terrorism. In spite of its urgency and
the critical importance of terrorism to contemporary international relations,
international terrorism has proven not easily amenable to satisfactory or exclusive
regulation by treaty. Notwithstanding the definitional dilemma, the United
Nations' resolutions regarding counter-terrorism have insisted on the necessity to
protect human rights in the context of counter-terrorism.
2
Although the United Nations currently has no agreed-upon definition of
terrorism, this article will argue that it is nonetheless possible to hold States
engaged in counter-terrorism efforts liable for violations of international human
rights law even when they are not signatories to relevant international treaties. The
basis for such an obligation, it will be advocated, derives from various resolutions
of the United Nations and decisions of national courts which represent a step
toward the codification of a general obligation to protect human rights in the
context of counter-terrorism as an emerging rule of customary international law.
The substance of such a rule would provide that no State can legally adopt
. Assistant Professor of Law, Ave Maria School of Law. LL.B, Makerere University, Kampala,
Uganda First Class Honors and First-in-Class; LL.M., University of Notre Dame, Summa Cum Laude;
J.S.D. University of Notre Dame, Summa Cum Laude. Teaches International Law, International
Human Rights Law, Jurisprudence, and Law, Ethics & Public Policy.
1. See, e.g., Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally
Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167;
International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, G.A. Res. 146 (XXXVI), U.N. Doc. A/34/46
(Dec. 17, 1979); International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, G.A. Res.
52/164, U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/164 (Dec. 15, 1997); International Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism, G.A. Res. 54/49, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/49 (Dec. 9, 1999); International
Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, G.A. Res. 59/290, U.N. Doc,
A/RES/59/290 (Apr. 13, 2005).
2. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 146 (XXXVI), supra note 1, at Preamble; G.A. Res. 52/164, supra note 1,
art. 14; G.A. Res. 54/49, supra note 1, art. 17; G.A. Res. 59/290, supra note 1, art. 12.
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strategies aimed at combating international terrorism if those strategies
simultaneously derogate from established international human rights norms. The
practical utility of this discussion would be to put States on notice that counter-
terrorism efforts oblivious of international human rights standards may be in
breach of international law, regardless of the non-existence of an international
treaty regime regulating State practices in this area. In that regard, States could be
legally liable both domestically and internationally.
As will be discussed, a norm of customary international law depends on the
existence of State practices and the engagement in those practices with a sense of
legal obligation (opinio juris).3  This article will propose that the relevant
international conventions and U.N. General Assembly and U.N. Security Council
paper-trail 4 regarding protection of human rights while combating international
terrorism, as well as on national and international decisions, establishes a sufficient
documentary record of State practice. Similarly, the nature and language of those
resolutions, as well as the respect that national governments have accorded the
decisions of their own national courts in regard to the need to protect human rights
3. See discussion infra Section 1.
4. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 52/164, supra note 1, art. 5 (requiring that each State adopt measures that
may be necessary including domestic legislation to ensure that criminal acts within the scope of the
Convention are under no circumstances justifiable by consideration of a political, philosophical,
ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other nature and are punished by penalties consistent with their
grave nature); G.A. Res. 54/49, supra note I, art. 4; Human Rights and Terrorism, G.A. Res. 56/160,
6, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/160 (Feb. 13, 2002) (calling upon States to "take all necessary and effective
measures, in accordance with relevant provisions of international law, including international human
rights standards, to prevent, combat and eliminate terrorism ... and ... strengthen, where appropriate,
their legislation to combat terrorism"); Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While
Countering Terrorism, G.A. Res. 57/219, 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/57/219 (Feb. 27, 2003) (affirming that
"States must ensure that any measure taken to combat terrorism complies with their obligations under
international law, in particular international human rights"); Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms While Encountering Terrorism, G.A. Res. 59/191, U.N. Doc A/RES/59/191
(Mar. 10, 2005); Human Rights and Terrorism, G.A. Res. 59/195, 3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/59/195 (Mar.
22, 2005) (rejecting the "identification of terrorism with any religion"); Threats to International Peace
and Security Caused by Terrorist Acts, S.C. Res. 1373, 2, U.N. Doe. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001)
(calling on all States to ensure that "terrorist acts are established as serious criminal offences in
domestic laws and regulations and that the punishment duly reflects the seriousness of such terrorist
acts"); S. C. Res. 1535, U.N. Doc S/RES 1535 (Mar. 26, 2004) (stating that States "must ensure that
any measures taken to combat terrorism comply with all their obligations under international law and
should adopt such measures in accordance with international law, in particular international human
rights"); S.C. Res. 1566, U.N. Doe. S/RES/1566 (Oct. 8, 2004) (reiterating much of S.C. Res. 1535);
S.C. Res. 1624, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1624 (Sept. 14, 2005). See also U.N. High Comm'r for Human
Rights, Promotion and Protection of Human Rights: Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, 8, E/CN.4/2006/94 (Feb. 16, 2006) (stating that states have
the right and duty to protect their citizens against terrorist attacks, but state action must be in conformity
with international human rights); U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights, Civil And Political Rights, Including
Religious Intolerance, 103, E/CN.4/2003/66 (Jan. 15, 2003) (submitted by Abdelfattah Amor) (stating
that "non-governmental organizations ... continue to express grave concern that the 'total security'
drive being implemented under cover of anti-terrorist laws . have a direct and immediate impact on
the entire human rights protection system"); Kofi Annan, Sec'y Gen., U.N., Message for Human Rights
Day, Torture, Instrument of Terror, Can Never Be Used To Fight Terror (Aug. 12, 2005), available at
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/sgsmI0257.doc.htm.
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while combating international terrorism, would support the case for the existence
of the requisite opiniojuris.
The argument that will be developed is premised not only on the recent cases
of the International Court of Justice (I.C.J.), but also on the more foundational
I.C.J. cases establishing the circumstances under which codification of
international norms takes place by reference to resolutions of instruments of the
United Nations. In particular, the argument is predicated on the North
Sea/Continental Shelf Case's5 discussion of the codification of customary law from
conventional documents, as well as the I.C.J. decisions in the Case Concerning
Military and Par-Military Activities in and Against Nicaragua,6 Case Concerning
Armed Activities on the Territory of Congo (Congo v. Uganda),7 the Construction
of A Wall Advisory Opinion,8 and the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Advisory
Opinion9 in their treatment of the legal effect of U.N. resolutions. Additionally,
the article will examine the decisions of several national courts that have ruled
anti-terrorism legislations and practices as being overreaching to the extent these
derogated from human rights standards. Specifically, courts in the United
Kingdom, the United States, and India exemplify this trend, with some of these
tribunals having derived their norms of international law by reference to the
resolutions of international organizations.
This article is divided into four sections. Section I will discuss how a rule of
customary international law generally develops, including discussions of
development from conventional sources and the use of United Nations resolutions
for finding a rule of customary international law generally. Section II will
expound the treatment of and reliance upon the United Nations resolutions as a
source of law by the International Court of Justice, in order to facilitate our
discussion of an emerging rule of customary international law from resolutions.
Section III will consider the limitations for using resolutions as binding statements
of opiniojuris. Finally, section IV will analyze the resolutions of both the General
Assembly and Security Council that are particularly relevant to complying with
human rights while combating terrorism and advocate that such resolutions have
established the necessary opiniojuris and, combined with the decisions of the high
courts of influential countries which abide by the rule, confirms a rule of
customary international law that counter-terrorism measures must conform to
human rights.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF A RULE OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW (C.I.L.)
As this article addresses the emergence of a norm of customary international
law from resolutions, a fundamental explanation of the typical development of
5. See North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20).
6. See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
7. See Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2000
I.C.J. I 11 (Nov. 7).
8. See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, 2004 l.C.J. 136 (July 1).
9. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226
(July 8).
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customary international law is in order. The list of sources of international law
under Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice'0 includes what
is labeled as "international custom," also known as customary international law."
Customary international law, which has equal authority with conventional laws,
such as treaty law,12 is often relied upon for its important role inproviding a rule of
law in areas of international law in which no widely applicable conventional rule
exists.
A. General Requirements for the Development of a Rule of C.I.L.
Customary international law receives the status of "law" because the I.C.J.
considers custom as "evidence of a general practice accepted as law" and thus as
"part of the corpus of general international law."' 3 To be accepted as "customary,"
the proponent of an emerging norm must show that States adhere to a practice
demonstrative of such custom and do so with a sense of legal obligation, known as
opinio juris.14 In other words, "[n]ot only must the acts concerned amount to a
settled practice, but they must also be such, or be carried out in such a way, as to
be evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of
a rule of law requiring it.
1 5
The I.C.J. has various approaches to establish the existence of international
custom. In many cases, the I.C.J. is willing to assume the existence of an opinio
juris on the bases of the evidence of a general practice, a consensus in the
literature, or the previous determinations of the Court or other international
tribunals. 16 However, in some cases the Court calls for more positive evidence of
the recognition of the validity of the rules in question in the practice of States.' 7 As
respected international law scholar, Ian Brownlie, points out, the choice of
10. This article is often given preeminence by international legal scholars as the starting point for
sources of international law. See, eg., IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 4-5
(6th ed. 2003) (emphasizing that Article 38 of the I.C.J. Statute "is generally regarded as a complete
statement of the sources of international law").
11. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(l)(b), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S.
No. 993 [hereinafter LC.J. Statute].
12. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. §102 cmt. j (1987)
[hereinafter Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations].
13. I.C.J. Statute, supra note 11, art. 38(l)(b); North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.;
F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, at 28 (Feb. 20).
14. North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. at 41-42.
15. Id. at 44.
16. BROWNLIE, supra note 10, at 8.
17. See, e.g. S.S. "Lotus,' (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 23 (Sept. 7)
(commenting "[e]ven if the rarity of the judicial decisions to be found among the reported cases were
sufficient to prove in point of fact the circumstances alleged by the Agent for the French Government, it
would merely show that States had often, in practice, abstained from instituting criminal proceedings,
and not that they recognized themselves as being obliged to do so; for only if such abstention were
based on their being conscious of a duty to abstain would it be possible to speak of an international
custom. The alleged fact does not allow one to infer that States have been conscious of having such a
duty").
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approach appears to depend upon the nature of the issues - that is, the state of the
law may be a primary point of contention - and the discretion of the Court.IS
B. Development of C.I.L. from a "Conventional" Rule
For rules which develop from purely "conventional" statements of law - i.e.
those arrived at by convention or agreement, such as treaties or charters - before
finding the existence of such rule, the I.C.J. considers: (i) whether the language of
the agreement is norm-creating; (ii) the passage of time since the rule was
embodied in the agreement; and (iii) the consistency of State practice concerning
the rule. 19
As to the first requirement, the I.C.J. has stated that "the provision concerned
should, at all events, potentially be of a fundamentally norm-creating character
such as could be regarded as forming the basis of a general rule of law., 20 Thus, in
the North Sea Continental Shelf Case, the Court found that the provision
concerned was not of a "norm-creating character" for several reasons, including
that it was not phrased in the convention as a rule but as a default (to be used
where parties did not agree to their own method), unresolved controversies about
the scope of the provision existed, and the parties were free to accept the
21
convention while making reservations regarding this provision. In other words,
the ability of States to freely derogate from the rule while accepting the remainder
22
of the convention undercut the argument that it had a norm-creating character.
On the passage of time element, the Court held that development of a rule of
customary international law over a brief period of time from "conventional"
statements of law demands a greater showing of the third element, State practice,
than is generally required to prove such a rule.23 As the I.C.J. expounded in the
North Sea Continental Shelf Case:
Although the passage of only a short period of time is not necessarily,
or of itself, a bar to the formation of a new rule of customary
international law on the basis of what was originally a purely
conventional rule, an indispensable requirement would be that within
the period in question, short though it might be, State practice, including
that of States whose interests are specially affected, should have been
both extensive and virtually uniform in the sense of the provision
invoked; and should moreover have occurred in such a way as to show a
general recognition that a rule of law or legal obligation is involved.24
18. BROWNLIE, supra note 10, at 9-10.
19. North Sea Continental Shelf 1969 I.C.J. at 41-43.
20. Id. at 41-42.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 43.
24. Id. (emphasis added).
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Thus, the brevity of a practice's existence is not a bar to the I.C.J. finding a
rule of customary international law, but may be supplemented by greater
uniformity in State practice than normally required. Brownlie observes that
"[p]rovided the consistency and generality of a practice are proved, no particular
duration is required: the passage of time will of course be a part of the evidence of
generality and consistency.
' 25
The framework provided in the North Sea Continental Shelf Case for the
development of a rule of customary international law from conventional sources is
of particular relevance to discussing the emergence of such a rule from U.N.
resolutions, which arguably serve as conventional sources.2 6 In the context of the
proposed rule, an analysis will demonstrate that the norm-creating character of the
resolutions and uniformity of state practice strongly evidence the rule and trump
any concerns surrounding the brevity of the rule's existence.
However, because many would debate that General Assembly or non-Chapter
VII resolutions have any legal effect, it must first be demonstrated that it is
appropriate to use such resolutions as a conventional source of customary
international law. The next section will extract principles from the I.C.J.'s
jurisprudence on the use of resolutions to strengthen the argument that U.N.
resolutions may be considered a "conventional" source to which the North Sea
framework applies and from which a customary rule of law may be derived.
II. LEGAL EFFECT OF UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS IN THE I.C.J.'S
JURISPRUDENCE
Some international legal scholars would dispute labeling U.N. Resolutions as
a "conventional" source, since such label places them in the same category as
international agreements, and thus imputes legal value to resolutions.27 A number
of scholars subscribe to the view that resolutions of the United Nations have little
or no legal weight and are highly skeptical of any position that puts emphasis on
the legal effect of resolutions.2 8 As a general observation, this proposition is
probably true. Formally, the United Nations Charter regards U.N. General
Assembly resolutions as being "recommendations. 29  Moreover, the General
Assembly is not an official legislature in the ordinary sense that is associated with
25. BROWNLIE, supra note 10, at 7.
26. See Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz, The United Nations Declaration on Friendly Relations the System
of the Sources of International Law: With an Appendix on the Concept of International Law and the
Theory of International Organisation 9 (1979).
27. Id.
28. For example, Professor David J. Bederman argues that suggestions that "the resolutions of
United Nations bodies (particularly the General Assembly, where each nation has a vote) constitute a
binding source of international law are extravagant." DAVID J. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW
FRAMEWORKS, 44 (2d ed., Foundation Press 2006) (2001) [hereinafter BEDERMAN].
29. The U.N. Charter employs the language of "recommend" in referring to the powers and
functions of the General Assembly. Charter of the United Nations art. 10-11, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat.
1031, T.S. No. 993 [hereinafter U.N. Charter].
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political discourse in particular national settings and the resolutions of the Security
Council bind the members only when speaking under enumerated powers.
30
Despite such criticism, resolutions of both the United Nations' General
Assembly and Security Council are often relied upon as evidence of customary
international law both internationally 31 and domestically.32 The International Law
Commission13 in an early report to the U.N. concluded that customary international
law could be derived from the cumulative practice of international organizations,
likely having applicability to U.N. Resolutions.34 More recently, several scholars
have emphasized the importance of resolutions to the rapid development of a rule
of custom, advising that "[m]odern custom can develop quickly because it is
deduced from multilateral treaties and declarations by international fora such as the
General Assembly, which can declare existing customs, crystallize emerging
customs, and generate new customs. ' '35 This statement resonates with those of U.S.
Courts such as in Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina,36 where the 9th
Circuit confirmed that "a resolution of the General Assembly of the United
Nations... is a powerful and authoritative statement of the customary international
law."37 The advantages of relying on resolutions as a source of custom, as has
30. See Lara M. Pair, Judicial Activism in the ICJ Charter Interpretation, 8 ILSA J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 181, 189 (2001).
31. Arbitral Award on the Merits in Dispute Between Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company /
California Asiatic Oil Company and the Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, 17 I.L.M. 1, 28
(1978); Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27) (separate opinion
of Judge Ago); Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapon, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226
(July 8).
32. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 882, 884 (2d Cir. 1980); Almog et al. v. Arab Bank,
PLC, 471 F. Supp. 2d 257, 279-80 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (relying upon G.A. Res. 1566 as evidence of a
customary international law rule against terrorist acts); Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina,
965 F.2d 699, 719 (9th Cir. 1992) ("[A] resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations.. . is
a powerful and authoritative statement of the customary international law of human rights"); Bodner v.
Banque-Paribas, 114 F. Supp. 2d 117, 128 (E.D.N.Y. 2000); Burger-Fischer v. Degussa, 65 F. Supp. 2d
248, 255 (D.N.J. 1999).
33. The work of the Commission is a source of law under the I.C.J. Statute. I.C.J. Statute, supra
note 11, art. 38(1)(d) (stating that "teachings of the most highly qualified publicists" are a subsidiary
source of international law).
34. Int'l Law Comm'n, Report To The General Assembly On Ways And Means For Making The
Evidence Of Customary International Law More Readily Available, A/CN.4/6 (June 1, 1949) (noting
that records of the cumulating practice of international organizations may be regarded as evidence of
customary international law with reference to States' relations to the organizations) available at
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/a-cn4_6.pdf.
35. Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International
Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 757, 758 (2001), relying, in part, on Eduardo Jim~nez de
Ar~chaga, Remarks, in CHANGE AND STABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW-MAKING 48 (Antonio Cassese
& Joseph H. H. Weiler eds., 1988) [hereinafter Roberts]. See also Jonathan I. Charney, Universal
International Law, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 529, 544 (1993) ("Today, major developments in international
law often get their start of substantial support from proposals, reports, resolutions, treaties or protocols
debated in such forums . Sometimes these efforts result in consensus on solving the problem and
express it in normative terms of general application.") (emphasis added) [hereinafter Charney].
36. Siderman de Blake, 965 F.2d 699.
37. Id. at 719.
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been observed, is that the method "is potentially more democratic [than looking to
other sources] because it involves practically all States. 38
Consistently, the International Court of Justice has affirmed that General
Assembly resolutions and non-Chapter-VII resolutions of the United Nations
Security Council have legal significance under certain circumstances. For
instance, in the Construction of A Wall Advisory Opinion,39 the I.C.J. included
"relevant resolutions adopted pursuant to the U.N. Charter by the General
Assembly and the Security Council" among the "rules and principles of
international law" which were useful in assessing the legality of the measures
taken by Israel.4° In various cases, therefore, the International Court of Justice has
employed resolutions of the General Assembly and non-Chapter-VII Security
Council resolutions not only as material sources of international law but, more
importantly, in providing norms for resolution of international disputes, especially
in the context of surveying and establishing the development of a rule of
customary international law.
To the extent the I.C.J.'s jurisprudence is relevant to establishing a norm of
customary international law from various resolutions of the General Assembly and
Security Council, this discussion is narrowly focused on the purposes for which
resolutions have been invoked by the Court. The three primary purposes for which
resolutions have been used - those that are relevant to our analysis - are: (i) as
indicative of a State's subscription to or pledge to abide by the norm embodied in
the relevant resolution; (ii) as evidence of the ongoing practices of States; and (iii)
as proofofopiniojuris. Each of these uses will be discussed in turn.
A. State's Votes on Resolutions as Subscription to the Embodied Norm
As to the first purpose, the I.C.J. has indicated that States must be careful in
voting for resolutions, as such votes evince a pledge to uphold the resolution's
embodied norn and may be legally binding against the States if a later controversy
arises.41 For example, in the Case Concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary
Between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria; Equatorial Guinea
Intervening),42 the Court was called upon to resolve a dispute concerning the
delimitation of the boundary between the States and Cameroon's sovereignty over
the Bakassi Peninsula. Resorting to a resolution of the General Assembly, the
Court observed that "this frontier line was acknowledged by Nigeria when it voted
in favour of General Assembly resolution 1608 (XV)., 43  Nigeria's
acknowledgment by voting in favor of the resolution had therefore become binding
upon it as a legal recognition of Cameroon title to the disputed territory, and the
38. Roberts, supra note 35, at 768.
39. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136 (July 9).
40. Id. at 171.
41. See, e.g., Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nig.;
Eq. Guinea intervening), 2002 I.C.J. 303, 410 (Oct. 10).
42. Id.
43. Id. at410.
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Court held that "[n]o Nigerian efectivit~s in Bakassi before that time can be said to
have legal significance for demonstrating a Nigerian title. 44
The Court's opinion in the Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon
and Nigeria case indicates that any State which votes in favor of the United
Nations resolutions must be aware that its vote indicates both that it agrees with the
norm that the Assembly, as a whole, subscribes to in that resolution and also that it
cannot be allowed by the Court to repent of its position if a matter is raised against
it by another State and that resolution is invoked.45 Further, this principle would
likely extend not only to resolutions of the General Assembly, but also non-
Chapter-VII Security Council resolutions as well for States which hold or have
held a position on the Council.
B. Resolutions as Evidence of Ongoing State Practice
The second purpose for which resolutions have been used is as evidence. To
successfully demonstrate the existence of a State practice for the purpose of
proving a rule of customary law, a court needs evidence, and one way to adduce
such evidence may be to rely upon a long string of resolutions on a particular
topic. 46 Not surprisingly, therefore, the I.C.J. has placed considerable reliance on
resolutions of the General Assembly for this purpose.
For instance, in the Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the
Congo,4 7 the I.C.J. used United Nations resolutions liberally for evidentiary
purposes. Both parties presented to the Court various resolutions of the United
Nations Security Council.48  Many of the resolutions invoked were not
promulgated under Chapter-VII of the U.N. Charter and would not be considered
legally binding, such as resolution 1234,49 which called for an immediate signing
of the ceasefire agreement.
In rejecting Uganda's self-defense excuse for the use of force in the Congo,
without discriminating between "Chapter-VII" and "non-Chapter-VII" resolutions,
44. Id. at 416.
45. Some commentators would remark that votes in organizations like the U.N. General Assembly
are "political" and therefore non-binding in any legal sense. See, e.g., Stephen Zamora, Voting in
International Economic Organizations, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 566, 589 (1980) ("Formal votes, when taken,
are often taken for a political purpose ... ; they may attempt to set norms for States to follow, but they
do not legally bind the organization or its members to carry out specific activities ... The U.N. General
Assembly is the clearest example... "); Damir Amaut, When in Rome ... ? The International Criminal
Court and Avenues for U.S. Participation, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 525, 581 n.258 ("[T]he history of General
Assembly resolutions may be understood to demonstrate that they are often based on purely political
considerations "). Such categorization may be applicable to votes which are simultaneously
accompanied by State declarations that such votes are considered political. See, e.g., infra note 62. It
does not address the circumstance where a simultaneous declaration of that purpose is absent, nor the
weight given votes in I.C.J. jurisprudence, to the extent it is critical of General Assembly votes as a
whole.
46. See, e.g., Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005
I.C.J. 1, 128-29 (Dec. 19).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 15.
49. S.C. Res. 1234, U.N. DOc. S/RES/1234 (Apr. 9, 1999).
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the Court referred to what it respectfully recognized as being the "long series" of
U.N. Security council resolutions 50 which "testif[ied] to the magnitude of the
military events and the attendant suffering., 51 The series cited by the Court was
composed not only of resolutions passed both under Chapter-VII and non-Chapter-
VII powers of the Council, but in fact consisted of a majority of non-binding, non-
Chapter-VII resolutions. 52  The Court further relied on resolution 130453 for
evidence showing that a "loss of civilian lives.., and damage to property inflicted
by the forces of Uganda" were present and for the observation that the United
Nations Security Council had "identified Uganda and Rwanda as having violated
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Congo and as being under the
obligation to withdraw their forces. 54 Indeed, the Court went on to cite even U.N
General Assembly resolutions. 55 For example, in deciding the issue of whether or
not any armed attack took place on Uganda emanating from the Congo, the Court
relied on Article 3(6) of General Assembly resolution 331456 for the definition of
aggression.
57
Based upon the Court's practices, embodied in Congo, the Court's reliance on
the United Nations resolutions as evidence of a State practice is a natural extension
of the evidentiary function of resolutions. The Court's employment of non-binding
resolutions in an evidentiary context indicates how seriously the Court takes those
resolutions as evidence of State action and, it can also be assumed, of State
practice.
C. Resolutions as Providing Necessary Opinio Juris
Finally and most importantly, the Court has also looked to resolutions to
provide a declaratory basis of the opinio juris element for a rule of customary
international law. Thus, in the case of Military and Paramilitary Activities In and
58Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), speaking to a
circumstance where it had been argued that a rule of customary international law
existed, the Court considered whether an opinio juris existed as to the binding
character of the purported obligation. The Court remarked:
This opinio juris may, though with all due caution, be deduced from,
inter alia, the attitude of the parties and the attitude of States toward
certain General Assembly resolutions.... The effect of consent to the
text of such resolutions cannot be understood as merely that of a
"reiteration or elucidation" of the treaty commitment undertaken in the
Charter. On the contrary, it may be understood as an acceptance of the
50. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, 2005 I.C.J. at 54.
51. Id. (emphasis added).
52. See id. at 54.
53. S.C. Res. 1304, U.N. Doc. S/RES/I 304 (June 16, 2000).
54. ArmedActivities on the Territory of the Congo, 2005 I.C.J. at 67, 43.
55. See id. at 15, 53.
56. G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), U.N. Doc. A/9619 (Dec. 14, 1974).
57. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, 2005 I.C.J. at 53.
58. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. V. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
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validity of the rule or set of rules declared by the resolution by
themselves.
59
In other words, the I.C.J. could derive the requisite opiniojuris from a careful
analysis of the resolution in order to determine States' attitudes towards the rule
embodied.
The Court further found that, with regard to the United States, that the weight
of an expression of opinio juris could be attached to its support of the resolution of
the United Nations on the Declaration of Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in accordance with
the Charter of the U.N.60 According to the I.C.J., the adoption by States of this text
afforded an indication of their opinio juris as to the customary international law on
the question. 61 The Court cautioned that multiplicity of resolutions is not, without
more, sufficient to establish a rule of customary international law, as it still
depends upon the "exact content of the principle accepted" and whether "[State]
practice [is] sufficiently in conformity with it" for a rule of C.I.L. to exist.62 The
I.C.J. also indicated that if a State expressly mentions, while voting for a particular
resolution, that it regards the resolution as being merely a political statement
without legal content, then that resolution may not be invoked against it. 63 Despite
these qualifications, the I.C.J. gave G.A. resolutions a prominent place for their
ability to demonstrate opinio juris.64
Further, in the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapon Advisory
Opinion, the Court expanded upon its statement in the Nicaragua Case, examining
General Assembly resolutions to determine whether or not such resolutions
provided the necessary opinio juris for the Court to find a rule of customary
international law.65 The issue arose as some States argued that "the important
series of General Assembly resolutions, beginning with resolution 1653 (XVI) of
24 November 1961,66 that deal with nuclear weapons and that affirm, with
consistent regularity, the illegality of nuclear weapons, signify the existence of a
rule of international customary law which prohibits recourse to those weapons. 6 7
According to other States, the resolutions in question had "no binding character on
their own account" and were not "declaratory of any customary rule of prohibition
59. Id. at 99-100 (emphasis added).
60. Id. at 100; see generally G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. Doc. A/8082 (Oct. 24, 1970).
61. Military and Paramilitary Activities, 1986 I.C.J. at 101.
62. Id. at 107-08.
63. Id. at 106-07 (explaining that while the United States voted in favor of General Assembly
resolution 213 1 (XX), it also declared at the time of its adoption that it considered the declaration in that
resolution to be "only a statement of political intention and not a formulation of law." Resolution 2131
(XX) relates to the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States
and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty).
64. See BROWNLIE, supra note 10, at 15.
65. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 254-55
(July 8).
66. See generally G.A. Res. 1653 (XVI), U.N. Doc. A/5100 (Nov. 24, 1961).
67. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226 at 254.
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of nuclear weapons. ' '68 Additionally, opposing States pointed out that this series of
resolutions not only failed to muster the approval of all of the nuclear-weapon
States but of many other States as well.69 The I.C.J. responded to the issues raised
by stating that:
General Assembly resolutions, even if they are not binding, may
sometimes have normative value. They can, in certain circumstances,
provide evidence important for establishing the existence of a rule or
the emergence of an opiniojuris. To establish whether this is true of a
given General Assembly resolution, it is necessary to look at its content
and the conditions of its adoption; it is also necessary to see whether an
opinio juris exists as to its normative character. Or a series of
resolutions may show the gradual evolution of the opinio juris required
for the establishment of a new rule.
70
The I.C.J. thus rejected the argument of some States that resolutions were
legally insignificant because of their non-binding character, giving resolutions the
power to establish opiniojuris depending upon their content and the conditions of
their adoption.
The Court went on to find that "[e]xamined in their totality, the General
Assembly resolutions put before the Court declare that the use of nuclear weapons
would be 'a direct violation of the Charter of the United Nations'; and in certain
formulations that such use 'should be prohibited. ' '' 7 1 However, the Court found
that "several of the resolutions under consideration in the present case [had] been
adopted with substantial numbers of negative votes and abstentions; and thus,
although those resolutions are a clear sign of deep concern regarding the problem
of nuclear weapons, they still fall short of establishing the existence of an opinio
juris on the illegality of the use of such weapons., 72 Regardless of the outcome,
the clear import of the I.C.J.'s opinion in Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
73Weapons was to signal that, depending upon the level of State consensus,
resolutions of the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly can
establish the existence of requisite opiniojuris7 4
The Court confirmed this principle in the more recent Case Concerning the
Application on the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
Against Genocide.75 Confronting a patently human rights issue, the Court relied on
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 254-55.
71. Id. at 255.
72. Id.
73. See discussion infra Section III.
74. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 254-55
(July 8) (stating that the primary basis for the opinio juris as an ingredient of international customary
law is the Statute of the International Court of Justice itself which refers to "a general practice accepted
as law") (emphasis added); I.C.J. Statute, supra note 11, art. 38(l)(b).
75. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. and Mont.), 46 I.L.M. 188, 142 (Feb. 26).
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several U.N. resolutions in conjunction with the Genocide Convention as a basis
for a customary international law rule that genocide is a crime. 76 The issue in the
case concerned whether any legal significance could be attached to the expression
"ethnic cleansing" in connection with the crime of genocide. 77  Within the
Genocide Convention, the term "ethnic cleansing" had no legal significance of its
own.78 However, the parties to the case submitted, among other sources, several
resolutions of the United Nations. 79 The Court resorted to the preamble of General
Assembly Resolution 47/121 which refers to ethnic cleansing as a "form of
genocide."80 Further, the Court referenced the "contemporaneous Security Council
and General Assembly resolutions condemning the killing of civilians in
connection with ethnic cleansing."
81
More importantly, the Court found that the affirmation that genocide was a
crime under international law, not only in Article I of the Genocide Convention but
also "read in conjunction with the declaration that genocide is a crime under
international law, unanimously adopted by the General Assembly two years earlier
in its resolution 96(I). ,,82 According to the Court, the "affirmation recognize[d] the
existing requirements of customary international law.... ,,83 In other words, this
declaration, which "purport[ed] to reflect legal principles," was considered an
expression of the necessary opinio juris for finding a rule of customary
international law.84
The proposal of the I.C.J. that resolutions may serve as the instrument for
finding customary international law is consistent with other evidence of
international opinion concerning the effect of non-binding resolutions in supplying
the necessary opiniojuris for a rule of customary international law. For example, a
memorandum of the United Nations' Office of Legal affairs has stated that:
[I]n view of the greater solemnity and significance of a 'declaration,' 85
it may be considered to impart, on behalf of the organ adopting it, a
76. Id. at 161.
77. Id. at 190.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 274.
80. Id. at 190 (noting that the Interim Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts had
referred to "ethnic cleansing" to mean "rendering an area ethnically homogeneous by using force or
intimidation to remove persons of given groups from the area").
81. Id. at 274 (noting in particular Security Council Resolution 819 (1993), and General
Assembly Resolutions 48/153 (1993) and 49/196 (1994)).
82. Id. at 161.
83. Id.
84. Cf RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 12, § 102 note 2, cmt. c
(1987) (discussing how General Assembly resolutions have been held to express opiniojuris for rule of
customary international law).
85. "Declarations" are sometimes accorded greater weight than normal resolutions. See Noelle
Lenoir, Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights: The First Legal and Ethical
Framework at the Global Level, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 537, 551 (1999) (noting "U.N.
declarations represent a form of action that is both psychological and political. The principles enshrined
in them can add leverage to claims for rights, especially claims emanating from non-governmental
organizations."); See also, Major Robert A. Ramey, Armed Conflict on the Final Frontier: The Law of
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strong expectation that Members of the international community will
abide by it. Consequently, insofar as the expectation is gradually
justified by State practice, a declaration may by custom become
recognized as laying down rules binding upon States.
86
The "strong expectation" such a declaratory resolution can create that "Members
of the international community will abide by it," 87 supports opinio juris by
evincing that the State practice in question is not coincidental, but is rather
"rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it." 88  The
Restatement 3rd of Foreign Relations Law of the United States 89 also accords with
this principle, confirming that "[r]esolutions of universal international
organizations, if not controversial and if adopted by consensus or virtual
unanimity, are given substantial weight." 90
III. CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH RESOLUTIONS SUPPORT OPINIO JURIS
Given that the I.C.J. has repeatedly affirmed that non-binding resolutions of
the United Nations can in fact support the opiniojuris element for finding a rule of
customary international law, discerning when and under what circumstances they
will be given that effect are important. The primary issues which arise are how to
assess the weight of resolutions and whether doubt should be cast on the legal
force of resolutions when States supporting such resolutions commit inconsistent
acts. Discussion of these problems will occur in light of both the I.C.J.'s own
decisions and other decisions of domestic and international tribunals.
A. Weighing the Force of Resolutions
A key issue that naturally arises is what conditions must be present to give a
resolution force as opinio juris. Such weight for resolutions of the General
Assembly varies depending upon the voting conditions surrounding the
resolutions. 91 The relevant conditions for analysis include not only the amount of
support but also the nature of support - whether the States voting for or against the
resolution represent a significant block of States which are much differently
situated than those in the opposing block.92 For example, in the dispute concerning
Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company and the Government of Libya, the arbitrator
considered it "important to note" that not only a majority of the assembly had
War in Space, 48 A.F. L. REV. 1, 110 n.485 (2000) ("The fact that a General Assembly Resolution
assumes for itself the term "Declaration" does highlight the importance of the document.").
86. Office of International Standards and Legal Affairs, General Introduction to the Standard-
Setting Instruments of UNESCO, Recommendations, available at http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=23772&URLDO=DOTOPIC&URLSECTION=201.html#4.
87. Id.
88. North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 44 (Feb. 20).
89. Restatement Third of Foreign Relations Law is considered a subsidiary source of international
law under the I.C.J. Statute. See I.C.J. Statute, supra note 11, art. 38(1 )(d)..
90. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 12, §103 cmt. c (1987); see also
id. at §102 note 2 (discussing how General Assembly resolutions have been held to express opiniojuris
for rule of customary international law).
91. Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co./California Asiatic Oil Co. v. the Government of Libyan Arab
Republic, 17 I.L.M. 1,28 (1978).
92. Id.; see also Charney, supra note 35, at 544-45.
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voted for the text at hand, but also that the States voting in favor included both
"many States of the Third World, [and] also several Western developed countries
with market economies.... "9' The distinction between third world and developed
countries did not serve in itself as a standard of evaluation, but rather was
remarkable for its relevance to the particular controversy at hand - an economic
dispute crossing the divide of developed and third world economies.
Similarly, the U.S. District Court case of Nguyen Thang Loi v. Dow Chem.
Co.,94 the only domestic case available from the United States which has also
engaged in analysis of the legal weight to be given of a General Assembly
Resolutions for the purposes of establishing customary law, evaluated not only the
voting record but also the position of important players relative to the subject
matter of the resolution. Thus, although a particular resolution concerning the
military use of herbicides passed 80-3, the Court held that it did not evince
consensus on an issue, where two of the three States voting against the resolutions,
the United States, Australia, were among the world's larger military powers, and
such "no" votes were accompanied by 36 abstaining.95  Additionally, the
abstention of one-third of the countries was held to "deprive the resolution of even
precatory force" as it was demonstrative of a lack of consensus.96
In both of these decisions, the tribunals emphasize the same factors in
assessing their legal weight. Namely, they used the voting pattern relative to
whether a consensus is obtained (sometimes meaning a substantial majority or
near-unanimity97 and at other times described as a lack of express objections to the
heart of the norm the resolutions contemplate),98 the number of abstentions (which
in the eyes of some expresses tacit consent), 99 and the positions of key concerned
actors are assessed to determine whether a particular resolution is binding.
Although the I.C.J. itself has not directly addressed the topic, the I.C.J.'s refusal to
derive opinion juris from resolutions in Nuclear Weapons because of "substantial
numbers of negative votes and abstentions," ' '0 indicates that the Court would
follow this generally accepted methodology, in determining the weight of
reductions as providing opiniojuris.
93. Id.
94. Nguyen Thang Loi v. Dow Chem. Co. (In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig.), 373 F. Supp.
2d 7, 126-27 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
95. Id. at 126.
96. Id.
97. See, e.g., id. at 126 (noting "A General Assembly resolution, even though it is not binding,
may provide some evidence of customary international law when it is unanimous (or nearly so).").
98. See, e.g., Charney, supra note 35, at 544 ("unanimous support is not required... The absence
of objections, of course, amounts to tacit consent by participants that do not explicitly support the norm.
Even opposition by a small number of participating States may not stop the movement of the proposed
rule toward law... .
99. Id.
100. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 255
(July 8).
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B. Inconsistent Actions by States Supporting a Resolution
Some argue that no opinio juris can exist if States vote overwhelmingly in
support of particular resolutions but their conduct is inconsistent with their
words.0 1 The example given is that States voted overwhelmingly in the U.N.
General Assembly for resolutions condemning State-sponsored torture, yet some of
those States continued to engage in torture. 10 2 Could it, therefore, be said that no
customary norm prohibiting States from engaging in torture existed? The fact of
the matter is that the law against torture is actually a norm of customary
international law.'0 3 To ignore the words simply because they are at times not
accompanied by action would be to ignore an increasingly important source of
norms. A particular country's failure to keep its word does not necessarily mean
that it does not understand its verbal commitments to have legal effect.
The dispute is given a more than hypothetical character when put in context
of the I.C.J.'s jurisprudence on the issue. As previously stated in the discussion
above, 10 4 in the Case Concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary Between
Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria; Equatorial Guinea intervening),1 °5
a country which votes in favor of a resolution may not altogether disregard what
their vote signifies and is, in some ways, bound by their vote. Therefore, scholars
who make the argument that the inconsistency of some States defeats the binding
nature of a resolution must confront the principle the Court referenced in
Cameroon.
IV. ANALYSIS OF COUNTERTERRORISM AND HUMAN-RIGHTS-RELATED
RESOLUTIONS
The resolutions of the U.N. General Assembly and Security Council
concerning fighting terrorism in a manner consistent with human rights support the
finding of opinio juris based upon both their language and voting patterns. As an
analysis of the resolutions reveals, the language is of a strong, norm-creating
character. Moreover, voting patterns show consistent support of a majority of
States which cuts across both the Western democracies waging the "War on
Terror," many of whom have approved of the language in one or more resolution,
and the developing countries on the front lines. Additionally, the decisions of the
high courts of many States 10 6 have recognized the non-derogability of human rights
in fighting terrorism both apart from and in reference to resolutions of the U.N. in
that regard, establishing the requisite State practice and cementing the rule of
101. See BEDERMAN, supra note 28, at 45.
102. Id.
103. Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 864, 882-84 (2d. Cir. 1980) (relying partially on General
Assembly resolutions to hold that torture violates the "law of nations"); BEDERMAN, supra note 28, at
45 (describing General Assembly resolutions as mere evidence of state practice and opiniojuris and not
enough alone to form an international legal obligation).
104. See supra Part Il.a.
105. Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), 2002
I.C.J. 303, 431 (Oct. 10).
106. I.C.J. Statute, supra note 11, art. 38(l)(d) (providing that decisions of national courts are
accorded force as subsidiary sources of international law).
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customary law which the resolutions embody. Thus, despite the brevity of this
rule's existence, first manifesting itself merely six years ago, the uniform
consensus on the norm alleviates the need for a "long" practice.
A. General Assembly Resolutions
The General Assembly Resolutions concerning the topic at issue are primarily
G.A. Res. 56/160, G.A. Res. 58/187, G.A. Res. 59/191, G.A. Res. 59/195, and
G.A. Res. 57/219. The language of these resolutions is consistent with the North
Sea Case requirement that a provision must be norm-creating. °7  As a very
forceful whole, the resolutions emphasize both the non-derogability of human
rights and the duty of states to comply. G.A. Res. 56/160 authorizes States to
"take all necessary and effective measures, in accordance with relevant provisions
of international law, including international human rights standards, to prevent,
combat and eliminate terrorism... and... strengthen, where appropriate, their
legislation to combat terrorism."' 0 8 Consistently, G.A. Res. 57/219 urges that
"States must ensure that any measure taken to combat terrorism complies with
their obligations under international law, in particular international human
rights."" '9 G.A. Res. 58/187 holds that certain human rights are "non-derogable"
and "[r]eaffirms that States must ensure that any measure taken to combat
terrorism complies with their obligations under international law, in particular
international human rights, refugee and humanitarian law." 10 The remaining two
resolutions, G.A. Res. 59/191".. and 59/195112 reaffirm and build off of the
principles contained in G.A. Res. 57/219.
Of the five resolutions at issue, two - G.A. Res. 59/191 and G.A. Res. 57/219
- were passed without a vote. Of the remainder, G.A. Res. 56/160, entitled
"Human Rights and Terrorism," passed unanimously, 102 votes to none, with
sixty-nine abstentions.1 3 Those in favor cover many of the nations in what might
be deemed the "front lines" on the War on Terror - those States that deal
domestically with the suppression of terrorism at its roots - Saudi Arabia, Iran, and
Afghanistan among them. 1 4 Those abstaining, or in the words of one scholar,
expressing "tacit consent," ' 1 5 include many of the Western democracies waging the
107. North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 41-42 (Feb. 20).
108. G.A. Res. 56/160, supra note 4, 6 (emphasis added).
109, G.A. Res. 57/219, supra note 4, I (emphasis added).
110. United Nations General Assembly Resolution on Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, G.A. Res. 58/187, Preamble 1, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/58/187 (Mar. 22, 2004).
111. G.A. Res. 59/191, supra note 4.
112. G.A. Res. 59/195, supra note 4.
113. UNBISNET, United Nations Bibliographic Information System,
http://unbisnet.un.org:8080/ipac20/ipac.jsp?session=VN27665315312.1231 &menu=search&aspect=po
wer&npp=50&ipp=20&spp=20&profile=voting&ri=&index=.VM&term=56%2F I60&matchopt=0%7
C0&oper-and&aspect=power&index=.VW&term=&matchopt=0%7C0&oper-and&index=.AD&term
=&matchopt=0%7C0&oper-and&index=BIB&term=&matchopt=0%7CO&ultype=&uloper=%3D&ulli
mit-&ultype=&uloper=%3D&ullimit=&sort=&x=0&y=0#focus (last visited Nov. 25, 2008)
[hereinafter UNBISNET Vote 56/160].
114. Id.
115. Chamey, supra note 35, at 544.
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war, including the United States, the United Kingdom and France. 11 6 Moreover, in
the context of this particular resolution, it is inapposite to say that the abstentions
"deprive it" of its force, as Ngyuen Thang Loi phrased it,1 17 since the three
aforementioned States supported Security Council resolutions with a similar effect
(each State having veto powers as permanent members of the Security Council, the
resolutions would not have passed but for their votes), and further, the high courts
of two of the States have subsequently recognized the need to afford certain human
rights to suspected terrorists, as will be discussed below. One can only conclude
that the abstentions, rather than a statement of non-support, were for purposes
unrelated to the human rights language of the resolution.
Compared to G.A. Res. 56/160, States manifested even greater support for
G.A. Res. 58/187, passing the resolution not only unanimously, 181 votes to 0, but
with only one country abstaining. 1 8 The resolution is of particular importance not
only for affirming that even in the War on Terror, human rights must be upheld,
but also for placing such a statement within the context of the principle of non-
derogation.119 The effect of the resolution in giving rise to a rule of C.I.L. is
particularly forceful, having passed unanimously with only one abstention.
Moreover, the one country which abstained, India, voted in favor of both G.A. Res.
56/160 previously and G.A. Res. 59/195 subsequently and recognized in the
jurisprudence of its Supreme Court a year later1 20 that human rights deserve
protection even during the War on Terror.
121
Finally, G.A. Res. 59/195, creates additional support for arriving at our
proposed rule of customary international law. The resolution emphasized similar
desires as those stated in 59/191 and 57/219, strongly urging States to combat
terrorism "in accordance with relevant provisions of international law, including
international human rights standards.1 22 The General Assembly cast 127 votes in
favor and 50 in opposition, with 8 abstentions.1 23 The resolution, receiving greater
116. UNBISNET Vote 56/160, supra note 113.
117. Nguyen Thang Loi v. Dow Chem. Co. (In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig.), 373 F. Supp.
2d 7, 126 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
118. UNBISNET, United Nations Bibliographic Information System,
http://unbisnet.un.org:8080/ipac20/ipac.jsp?session=12276H69D8190.3036&menu=search&aspect=po
wer&npp=50&ipp=20&spp=20&profile-voting&ri=&index=.VM&term=58%2F 187&matchopt=0o%7
CO&oper-and&aspect=power&index=.VW&term=&matchopt=0%7C0&oper-and&index=.AD&term
=&matchopt=0%7C0&oper-and&index=BIB&term=&matchopt=0%7C0&ultype=&uloper-%3D&uli
mit=&ultype=&uloper=%3D&ullimit=&sort=&x=0&y=0#focus (last visited Nov. 25, 2008).
119. G.A. Res. 58/187, supra note 110.
120. People's Union for Civil Liberties & Anor v. Union of India, [2004] 1 L.R.I. 1, 17 (India),
available at http://www.lexisnexis.com [hereinafter People's Union].
121. Id.
122. GA/RES/59/195, supra note 4.
123. UNBISNET, United Nations Bibliographic Information System,
http://unbisnet.un.org:8080/ipac20/ipac.jsp?session=IA276M8414R23.4618&menu=search&aspect=po
wer&npp=50&ipp=20&spp=20&profile=voting&ri=&index=.VM&term=59%2F I95&matchopt=0%7
C0&oper-and&aspect-power&index=.VW&term=&matchopt=0%7C0&oper-and&index=.AD&term
=&matchopt=0%7C0&oper-and&index=B1B&term=&matchopt=0%7C0&ultype=&uloper=%3D&ulli
mit=&ultype=&uloper=%3D&ullimit=&sort-&x=0&y=0#focus (last visited Nov. 25, 2008).
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opposition than previous resolutions nevertheless received greater support than
56/160 as well, evincing a growing change in attitude of even those who originally
remained neutral.
B. United Nations Security Council Resolutions
In addition to the resolutions of the General Assembly that are addressed
above, many resolutions of the U.N Security Council touch on human rights while
combating terrorism. Those which directly embody the norm that the War on
Terror must comport with human rights standards, including resolutions 1456,
1535, and 1624, are non-Chapter VII resolutions, meaning they are not
immediately binding upon U.N. Member States.' 24 However, resolutions 1373 and
1566, both binding Chapter VII resolutions, are also of relevance to this discussion
for indirectly indicating the same norm - 1373 by requiring States to conform to
human rights while implementing security measures for their borders and 1566 by
broadly "reminding" States of their obligation to respect human rights.
The first counter-terrorism resolution to include the human rights language
was Security Council Resolution 1456 in January 2003.125 The importance of
resolution 1456 was twofold: it both stressed the general obligation of nations to
combat terrorism "in accordance with international law, in particular international
human rights, refugee, and humanitarian law"'126 and also emphasized the more
specific obligation to accord terrorists due process rights, stating that States had an
obligation under the "principle to extradite or prosecute. 127
Additionally, Security Council resolution 1535 reiterated the State's
obligation to comply with human rights in combating terrorism. 128 In language
reminiscent of resolution 1456, the Council stated that "States... must ensure that
any measures taken to combat terrorism comply with all their obligations under
international law, and should adopt such measures in accordance with international
law, in particular international human rights, refugee, and humanitarian law."'
129
Shortly after the passage of 1535, the Security Council again addressed the
issue in Security Council resolution 1566,130 a binding Chapter-VII resolution. 3 '
Interestingly, resolution 1566 pairs the obligation of States to combat terrorism in
accordance with human rights with the concept that "acts of terrorism seriously
impair the enjoyment of human rights. '132 As will be discussed, this implication
124. See James A. R. Nafziger & Edward M. Wise, The Status in United States Law of Security
Council Resolutions Under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 421, 428
[hereinafter Nafziger & Wise]; see also Jared Schott, Chapter VII as Exception: Security Council Action
and the Regulative Ideal of Emergency, 6 NW. J. INT'L HUM. RTS. 24, 102 [hereinafter Schott].
125. S.C. Res. 1456, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1456 (Jan. 20, 2003).
126. Id. at 6.
127. Id. at 3.
128. S.C. Res. 1535, supra note 4; see also S.C. Res. 1624, supra note 4.
129. Id. at Preamble.
130. S.C. Res. 1566, supra note 4.
131. See Nafziger & Wise, supra note 124, at 428; see also Schott, supra note 124, at 102.
132. S.C. Res. 1566, supra note 4, at Preamble.
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formed the basis of decisions of at least two national courts in defending human
rights in the context of the War on Terror.
133
Lastly, Security Council resolution 1373,'134 also a binding Chapter-VII
resolution, passed shortly after the September 11 th attacks, is relevant to this
discussion for having affirmed the principle of acting in accordance with human
rights in the specific instance of dealing with refugees. Among a list of a number
of actions which the Council called upon the States to implement, the Council
called for States to "take appropriate measures in conformity with... international
standards of human rights..." to scrutinize refugees seeking asylum, ensuring
terrorists did not cross borders unsuspected. 35  The language of 1373 is
particularly important as it bound the States to implement counter-terrorism
measures, yet simultaneously required that human rights would receive priority in
considering what measures were "appropriate."'
136
Each of the foregoing Security Resolutions were adopted by a unanimous
council that permanently includes the United States, the United Kingdom, and
France - three of the Western States most involved in the War on Terror. 137 A
commonality exists in each of these resolutions of the Security Council: the non-
derogability of human rights in fighting terrorism. Moreover, these resolutions and
resolution 1566 in particular, give context to this rule that States respect human
rights in the War on Terror, explicating that terror itself is a violation of human
rights and, as such, counter-terrorism must not fall victim to the very failings of
terrorism. Taken as a unit and in combination with the long string of General
Assembly resolutions to the same effect, these Security Council resolutions
embody a forceful statement of the nations, evincing an opinio juris for the
proposed rule.
C. National Decisions Affirming Human Rights in Countering Terrorism
A uniform sense of legal obligation to protect human rights while countering
international terrorism is manifested in the decisions of the high courts of several
major world powers, including India, the United Kingdom, Australia, and the
United States. 38 Moreover, the practice of these particular States is of particular
importance to an emerging rule of customary international as these States are
among those at the forefront of the global War on Terror and two of these States
hold permanent positions on the U.N. Security Council. 139  From these Court
133. See, e.g., People's Union, supra note 120; R (on the application of A1-Jedda) v. Sec'y of State
for Defence, [2007] UKHL 58 (U.K.); see, also, discussion supra subsection IV(C).
134. S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 4.
135. Id. at 3(f).
136. Id.
137. S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 4; S.C. Res. 1456, supra note 125; S.C. Res. 1535, supra note 4;
S.C. Res. 1624, supra note 4; S.C. Res. 1566, supra note 4.
138. Decisions of national courts are accepted evidence of customary international law according to
the I.C.J. Statute, which recognizes "judicial decisions ... of the various nations.. as among the
"subsidiary sources" of international law. I.C.J. Statute, supra note 11, art. 38(l)(d).
139. U.N. Charter, supra note 29, art. 23, I;see U.S. Department of State, International
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decisions - some of which reference the statements by the U.N. in resolutions of
the General Assembly and Security Council and some of which do not - may be
inferred a State practice implementing the norm embodied in the resolutions
discussed above, not to derogate from human rights standards while fighting terror.
This practice strongly supports finding a customary rule of that nature as "[t]hose
solutions that [are] positively received by the international community through
State practice or other indications of support will rapidly be absorbed into
international law, notwithstanding the technical legal status of the form in which
they emerged from the multilateral forum."
' 140
1. India
The Supreme Court of India has acknowledged that the War on Terror must
be fought in a manner that upholds human rights, in a passage that is consistent
with the principles embodied in Security Council Resolutions 1535 and 1566 and
G.A. Resolution 57/219, in the case of People's Union for Civil Liberties & Anor v
Union of India.14 1 Declaring that terrorism itself breeds the grossest violations of
human rights, the Court nevertheless emphasized:
The protection and promotion of human rights under the rule of law is
essential in the prevention of terrorism. Here comes the role of law and
court's responsibility. If human rights are violated in the process of
combating terrorism, it will be self-defeating. Terrorism often thrives
where human rights are violated, which adds to the need to strengthen
action to combat violations of human rights. The lack of hope for
justice provides breeding grounds for terrorism. [...] In all cases, the
fight against terrorism must be respectful to the human rights. 42
The opinion of the Supreme Court of India evinces the government's affirmation
of the desperate need to protect human rights even while bringing to justice those
individuals who would disregard such rights.
2. The United Kingdom
Similarly, the House of Lords of the United Kingdom in R (on the application
of Al-Jedda) v. Secretary of State for Defence,143 though not acting pursuant to a
specific U.N. resolution, adhered to the principles embodied in those resolutions.
The defendant in Al Jedda was suspected for smuggling weapons for terrorist acts
and complained that he had been held indefinitely, though he had not been charged
with any offense. 44 The Court attested to the emerging norm requiring that terror
be fought consistent with human rights, recognizing that "[o]n repeated occasions
Contributions to the War Against Terrorism, http://www.state.gov/coalition/cr/fs/12753.htm (last
visited Nov. 25, 2008).
140. Chamey, supra note 35, at 545.
141. People's Union, supra note 120, at 17.
142. Id. at 17.
143. See generally R (in re Al-Jedda) v. Sec'y of State for Defence, [2007] UKHL 58, [2008] 1
A.C. 332 (H.L. 2007) (appeal taken from Q.B.), available at 2007 WL 4266094 (HL).
144. The Queen (in re Hilal Abdul-Razzaq Ali Al-Jedda) v. Sec'y of State for Defence, 1-2,
Q.B.D., available at 2005 WL 2003226 (DC).
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in recent years the U.N. and other international bodies have stressed the need for
effective action against the scourge of terrorism but have, in the same breath,
stressed the imperative need for such action to be consistent with international
human rights standards.... 145 The House of Lords therefore held that though a
particular U.N. Security Council Resolution (UNSCR 1546) granted the UK the
power to detain, such grant was still not authority to derogate from human rights
guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights. 
146
In many other cases as well, the House of Lords has upheld human rights
standards in the context of counter-terrorism measures. Particularly relevant
decisions of the House include R (A) v Secretary of State,147 declaring the
inadmissibility of evidence obtained by torturing suspected terrorists as a violation
of abuse of process and the right to a fair trial, 148 and R (Gillan & Anor) v
Commission of Police of the Metropolis,149 holding that extraordinary search
powers were not available for the prevention of terrorist acts. Furthermore, in R
(Abassi & Anor) v Secretary of State,15 an unusual opinion concerning a UK
citizen who was a detainee in the United States' territory of Guantanamo Bay, the
House remarked that it was objectionable to the common law idea of habeas
corpus that a suspected terrorist "should be subject to indefinite detention... with
no opportunity to challenge the legitimacy of his detention before any court or
tribunal.,' 15' The opinion can be understood as a message from the U.K. to the
U.S., disapproving of the United States' practice of disregarding habeas corpus,
even in regards to suspected terrorists, as lacking conformity with human rights.
52
3. Australia
In a 2007 opinion, Thomas v. Mobray, the High Court of Australia upheld the
ight of an acknowledged member of a terrorist organization to be free from certain
restrictions on his liberty, striking down a law which had the stated purpose of
"allow[ing] obligations, prohibitions and restrictions to be imposed on a person by
a control order for the purpose of protecting the public from a terrorist act.' 53 In
the face of the defendant's admitted connections to a terrorist organization, the
Court held that international law "ratified by and binding on Australia, protects the
rights of individuals to be free of arbitrary detention and the unlawful deprivation
of liberty.' 54
145. Id. at 354, [ 37.
146. Id. at 354-55, 39.
147. See generally A v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2 A.C. 68,
(H.L. 2004) (appeal taken from Q.B.), available at 2004 WL 2810935 (HL).
148. Id. at 97.
149. R (Gillan and another) v. Comm'r of Police of the Metropolis and another [2006] UKHL 12,
[2006] 2 A.C. 307 (U.K.).
150. R (In re Abbasi and another) v. Sec'y of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and
another [2002] EWCA (Civ) 1598, [2002] All ER. (D) 70 (Eng.).
151. Id. at 66.
152. Rodney C. Austin, The New Constitutionalism, Terrorism, and Torture, 60 CURRENT LEGAL
PROBLEMS 2007 79, 99 (Colm O'Cinneide & Jane Holder eds., 2007).
153. Thomas v. Mowbray and Others (2007) 237 A.L.R. 194, 170 (Austl.) (Kirby, J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 379.
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4. The United States
Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court, in the cases of Rasul v. Bush,
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, has provided that the suspected
terrorists are entitled to certain basic due process rights. 155 In Rasul v. Bush, the
Supreme Court acknowledged that detainees of the naval base at Guantanamo Bay
have the right to petition for habeas corpus, to have a judicial determination of the
constitutionality of their detention. 56 Additionally, the case of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,
decided simultaneously with Rasul, recognized the rights of suspected terrorists to
limited Due Process, including the right to "a meaningful opportunity to contest
the factual basis for [their] detention before a neutral decision-maker. 1 57 More
recently, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Court struck down the use of military
tribunals by the U.S. during the prosecution of terrorists as being inconsistent with
the procedural rights owed to the defendants in such cases. 58
5. What Follows
The consistent practice of the high courts of these particularly important
States is demonstrative of opinio juris regarding the obligation to protect
international human rights while countering international terrorism. In many of the
decisions mentioned, references were made to international law in the reasoning of
the opinions. Additionally, both People's Union for Civil Liberties & Anor and R
(on the application of Al- Jedda), specifically mentioned the persuasive force of
U.N. resolutions on the key issue of the respective cases. From these decisions, it
is clear that the States' ready acquiescence in admitting that countering terrorism
must still remain consistent with human rights is "rendered obligatory by the
existence of a rule of law requiring it.",
159
V. CONCLUSION
Despite the failure of nations to come to agreement as to what constitutes
"terrorism," a customary rule has emerged which places on States a positive
obligation to respect human rights in taking counter-terrorism measures. This rule
has its foundation in the long string of both General Assembly and Security
Council resolutions enunciating the rule and in the practice of States, evinced in
decisions of their High Courts, which confirms that such rule is obligatory. In
consideration of such a rule, States must be aware that violations of human rights
in the context of counter-terrorism will not be lawful, regardless of whether they
have acceded to human rights treaties. Of further consequence, States are on
notice that the rule renders them responsible to the international community for
violations.
155. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 577 (2007); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004);
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 446 (2004).
156. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 484.
157. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 509.
158. Hamdan, 548 U.S. 557.
159. North Sea Continental Shelf(F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 44 (Feb. 20).
2009

INVISIBLE BORDERS: MAPPING OUT VIRTUAL LAW?
Kathleen Claussen*
I. OVERVIEW
In his preface to a 1945 treatise on international borders, S. Whittemore
Boggs opened with this historical overview:
Boundaries and boundary problems have undergone great changes.
When Marco Polo crossed frontiers from one jurisdiction to another
there were no precise boundaries like those of our time. Even a century
and a half ago the international boundary picture bore little resemblance
to that of today. In Asia there were few treaty or other definite lines,
but only fluctuating limits of various kingdoms.... European boundary
concepts have proliferated until they now extend to nearly all
international boundaries in all continents.
Since Boggs penned those words over sixty years ago, more than ninety states
have made their (re-)introduction to the global landscape. United Nations
membership has expanded in forty-two of the last sixty-three years as state borders
have been drawn and reconfigured.3 Independence movements, changes in natural
landscapes, and shifting populations as a result of war, famine and disease are
among the many causes for border (re-)drawing.
Much is at stake in these cartographic revisions, as made evident by the
proliferation of border dispute resolution commissions and the many cases related
to territorial sovereignty initiated in the International Court of Justice. For this
reason among others, border disputes are some of the most hotly contested
controversies to arise in international arbitration. Yet, the 1945 treatise is the
most recent comprehensive examination of international law on delimitation and
5demarcation processes.
J.D. candidate, 2010, Yale Law School. The author wishes to gratefully acknowledge
Professor W. Michael Reisman for his generous support and guidance on this project.
1. S. Whittemore Boggs, Foreword to STEPHEN BARR JONES, BOUNDARY-MAKING: A
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2. United Nations Member States, http://www.un.org/members/growth.shtml (last visited Nov.
23, 2008).
3. See id.
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Despite the evolution of the law in other areas of science, 6 the technology of
border drawing has advanced significantly while the legal guidelines have not
changed. In the absence of any impetus from states or international organizations,
the legal norms for demarcation remain the same as those that were used at the
time of the Roman Empire.7 This Essay aims to draw attention to this discrepancy
between science and the law on international boundaries and proposes the
development of an institutional mechanism that would harness the potential of the
recent advances in border technology and assist in ameliorating ongoing boundary-
related controversies.
The Essay begins with an overview of the intersection between law and the
scientific enterprise. It suggests boundary-marking as a test case for the self-
updating prerogative of the law by shedding light on the antiquated and inefficient
methodology currently employed by states in demarcating borders. Part II
provides a brief overview of the science of demarcation. It addresses the history of
demarcation, changes in the methodology, and the terminology used by boundary
engineers-geographers, surveyors and cartographers. The third Part takes up
changes in the law through the perspective of boundary architects-diplomats and
state leaders. It reviews the international law on demarcation by focusing on three
boundary commissions and their reasoning in adopting a particular approach to
boundary-marking.
I conclude by proposing the creation of a central depository for border
information that would serve as the authoritative source of boundary demarcation
data. Although some states keep their own records of boundary demarcation data
for other states, many of these records contain conflicting information and
perpetuate the problematic discrepancies in determining border locations. A
central depository within the United Nations that uses the latest technology to
effectuate precise and accurate boundaries would help to put an end to
measurement error and incongruities in the location of contentious borders.
Note that this Essay is directed at boundary-marking, rather than boundary-
making, but, at the same time, it argues that by drawing upon the most updated
technology in the field, these two processes will become inseparably integrated; in
other words, through marking the boundary using the most modern technology,
delimitation and demarcation will finally produce single, coherent outcomes.
II. LAW AND TECHNOLOGY - AT THE MACRO LEVEL
Domestic legal processes are constantly adjusted with respect to the latest
technologies. The development of the "electronic courtroom," for example, has
facilitated the use of video conferencing for special hearings over the last ten to
twenty years.8 Everyday tools in legal processes, such as the use of word-
6. See, e.g., KEITH E. MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, GROWTH AND TRADE (2008)
(describing how intellectual property rights affect the provision of public goods and influence prospects
for economic development); DAN JERKER B. SVANTESSON, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
INTERNET (2007) (discussing characteristics of internet communications relevant to legal processes).
7. A.O. CUKWURAH, SETTLEMENT OF BOUNDARY DISPUTES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW I 1 (1967).
8. See, e.g., Fredric Lederer, The Road To the Virtual Courtroom? A Consideration of Today's -
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processing in the taking of depositions, are in fact relatively recent additions to the
way in which law is practiced. Likewise, science is continually incorporated into
the substance of the law. In both domestic and international realms, the law is
constantly bringing itself up-to-date. The propagation of international agreements
such as the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, 9 the Stockholm Convention on
Persistent Organic Pollutants, 10 and the U.N. Convention on the Use of Electronic
Communications in International Contracts" confirms this anecdotal trend.
Although many of these international conventions aim to restrict the use of
technological innovations for malevolent purposes, scientific advances in other
areas may ease and empower states and individual actors. The advent of
communications technology in the nineteenth century, for instance, vastly changed
the framework of admiralty law by giving individuals means to settle disputes
through deliberate, immediate and regulated dialogue, rather than resort to
complex state negotiations or violent retribution.' 2 Looking beyond the restrictive
legal mechanisms according to which technology is regulated, lawmakers should
be equally interested in exploiting the potential of technological advances in order
to realize desired social outcomes.
13
At first glance, overlaying the scientific agenda on the legal agenda may
reveal disparate, though not mutually exclusive, goals. Insofar as both aim to
enhance the quality of life for their constituencies, the scientific and legal agenda
should be integrated. Some scholars have painted the relationship between law
and science as conflictual or problematic, suggesting that technology has the power
to destroy international law or that international law and technology will
"collide"4; however, other areas of the law as noted above and below suggest that
this antagonistic relationship is not pre-determined. The Law of the Sea
Convention, for example, undertakes to govern states' use of and access to "marine
genetic resources" realized by advances in technology.' 5 As a result of these
developments, the definition of "resource" was expanded; the law was shaped by
ingenuity and need.
And Tomorrow's -High Technology Courtrooms, 50 S.C. L. REV. 799, 801-802 (1999).
9. Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Jan. 29, 2000, 39
I.L.M. 1027.
10. Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, May 22, 2001, U.N. Doc.
UNEP/POPS/CONF/2, 40 I.L.M. 532.
11. United Nations Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in International
Contracts, G.A. Res. 60/21, U.N. GAOR, 60th Sess., Supp. No. 17, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/21 (Nov. 23,
2005).
12. Joseph W. Dellapenna, Law in a Shrinking World: The Interaction of Science and Technology
with International Law, 88 Ky. L.J. 809, 817-19 (2002).
13. See W. Michael Reisman, The View from the New Haven School, 86 AM. SOC'Y INTL L. PROC.
118, 121-22 (1992).
14. Colin B. Picker, A View from 40,000 Feet: International Law and the Invisible Hand of
Technology, 23 CARDOzO L. REV. 149, 151 (2001).
15. Press Release, Countries to Address Marine Genetic Resources, at United Nations 25-29 June,
U.N. Doc. SEA/1889 (June 21, 2007).
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Similarly, in boundary-marking, technology and necessity have produced an
alternative methodology and, therein, a new modality for international law in this
area, though it has not been widely embraced. One explanation for states'
reluctance to pursue changes to the status quo is that the science of boundary-
16
marking is intimately interwoven with concerns about sovereignty. The
intersection of diplomacy and earth science is inevitably implicated in delimitation
and demarcation. Thus, there is not only a delay but also a general reluctance to
draw from the inventive solutions geographical positioning and imaging systems
might offer. 17 Only a few boundary dispute commissions have employed readily
available technologies for the purpose of demarcating the border.' 8 The next Part
explains demarcation, delimitation and their historiographies in more detail.
III. THE SCIENCE OF DEMARCATION
"The best boundary is one which would promote both minimum world public
order, understood as a prohibition of unlawful coercion across adjacent boundary
lines, and optimum order, in the sense of the promotion of the greatest cooperation
in common interest on both sides of international boundaries. ",9
A. Definition
Border determination involves a multi-step process: allocation of territory,
delimitation, demarcation, and ongoing administration.20 Allocation, as the name
suggests, refers to the initial political division of territory. 21  To allocate the
territory means to use diplomatic channels to reach an agreement regarding which
general area belongs to each state.22 Delimitation refers to the selection of the
boundary site and its written definition in words or measures in a treaty or other
formal document.2 3 In contrast, demarcation refers to the construction of the
boundary on the ground, originally conceived as the erection of monuments along
the line defined in the delimitation process.24 The final step, administration, is a
continuing project of managing the border; administration here does not
necessarily refer to the management of goods and people that cross the border, but
rather it refers to the physical maintenance of the boundary itself as demarcated.25
16. See generally Steven R. Ratner, Land Feuds and Their Solutions: Finding International Law
Beyond the Tribunal Chamber, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 808 (2006).
17. Ron Adler, Presentation at the Forum of International Geography: Surveyors Role in
Delineation and Demarcation of International Land Boundaries 5 (Apr. 19, 2002) (on file with the
author), available at http://www.fig.net/pub/fig-2002/Js2O/JS20-adler.pdf.
18. See id. at 4-5.
19. JONES, supra note 1, at 37.
20. K.T. Chao, Legal Nature of International Boundaries, 5 CHINESE TAIWAN Y.B. INT'L L. &
AFF. 29 (1985).
21. Id. at 30.
22. See generally id.
23. CUKWURAH, supra note 7, at 27.
24. Id. at 28.
25. Id. at 83; see also Chao, supra note 20, at 30.
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The terms "delimitation" and "demarcation" became terms-of-art upon their
use by Sir Henry McMahon in an 1897 lecture.2 6 Although delimitation was
designed to be the final political act of the states party engaged in border
negotiations and demarcation was its realization by way of monumentation, the
Jones treatise outlines the traditional methods of delimitation, all but the first of
which indicate that political decisions will be required in later steps.2 7 The first
method is "complete definition" in which surveying is completed to the highest
level of precision possible.28  Second, and much more common, is "complete
definition with the power to deviate" which allows flexibility for natural
boundaries not accounted for at the negotiating table as well as for accommodating
personal properties along the boundary.29 Third is boundary definition based on
major turning points along an estimated route. 30 Each of the final four methods
becomes less precise; the last and most vague delimitation specification is
delimitation based on natural features.3 1
Thus, demarcation-the translation of the delimitation agreement onto the
landscape-is also a political act that requires real-time decision-making premised
on law. In the past, greater precision was inevitably given at this stage to the
definition carried out at the delimitation stage when it was otherwise unavailable.32
But the search for codified and concrete guidance on the law governing
demarcation is somewhat futile. One might look to the many commission and
tribunal decisions overseeing boundary disputes; however, these do not constitute a
comprehensive and coherent legal doctrine. Nonetheless, it is instructive to look to
history in order to identify state practice, outlined in the following section with
greater detail.
B. Derivation
The most common method of marking an international border, introduced by
the Roman Empire and still used today, is by means of erecting monuments from
concrete or another durable material available in the region.33  States formally
mark their borders with actual monuments built along the delimited line.34 The
26. Dennis Rushworth, Mapping In Support of Frontier Arbitration: Delimitation and
Demarcation, IBRU BOUNDARY AND SECURITY BULLETIN, Spring 1997, at 61.
27. JONES, supra note 1, at 58.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See, e.g., Gbenga Oduntan, The Demarcation of Straddling Villages in Accordance with the
International Court of Justice Jurisprudence: The Cameroon-Nigeria Experience, 5 CHINESE J. INT'L L.
79 (2006).
33. "It is to be doubted if, today, there is much difference of opinion on this subject, as the
monumentation of boundaries is an established practice in all but the wildest lands." JONES, supra note
1, at 210; see also Dr. Alec McEwen, Presentation at a Training Workshop on The Demarcation and
Maintenance of International Boundaries at the University of Durham: The Demarcation and
Maintenance of International Boundaries (July 8-10, 2002).
34. There are a few exceptions. Some treaties used maritime delimitations to allocate land
territories. See, e.g., Lucius Caflisch, A Typology of Borders 7 (2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with the author) (noting how the Treaty of Tordesillas of 1494, which marked out the territory
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composition of the monuments varies from place to place depending on the
materials available for their construction. 35 For example, Canada and the United
States use more than twenty-one types of monuments, including iron, granite,
aluminum, concrete, stainless steel, and bronze markers.36 They also allow for
37
special types" of markers such as lake buoys as necessary.
The monumentation method has always posed some difficulties and is
necessarily incomplete. Throughout history, in areas where the physical
construction of monuments was not possible, straight lines or physical features,
which change over time, were used as reference points.38  The 1884 Berlin
Conference that divided Africa into spheres of control relied on astronomically
based straight lines, though technological advances since the time of the
Conference have rendered these measurements obsolete.39  Such a physical
manifestation on the ground might have made sense when no other means were
available and when passage by foot or animal-back was the norm. The monuments
were thought to serve an important function in helping states avoid future
disagreement.4" Still today, the monuments are intended to serve a practical
purpose of defining the boundary for inhabitants and travelers on both sides.4 '
Despite their seeming durability and permanency, monuments do not always
reflect the exact intention of the parties. Their deviation from the stated terms of
an agreement arises at three levels: first, at the stage of surveyance as the boundary
engineers attempt to implement the delimitation decision; second, in the time that
follows their emplacement; and third, in the years that follow as technology
furnishes additional data to boundary-makers.
First, in his 1945 treatise, Jones outlines the legally sanctioned means by
which demarcation by surveyance may take place.42 He locates the earliest and
only general instructions to demarcation commissions in the Paris Treaties of
1783. 43 The Treaties specify that the demarcation commission will be responsible
for representing the specific definition of the boundary based on the direction
provided in the delimitation documents.44 They provide, in vague terms, the
methods available to the commission to account for necessary on-the-ground
modifications: adjustment with natural points of reference, geographic coordinates,
rectangular coordinates, comparison with neighboring markers, marking on a map,
and photographs "taken in known directions. 45 Thus, surveyors are sometimes
belonging to the Spanish and the Portuguese, relied on a longitudinal line running through water).
35. McEwen, supra note 33, at 6.
36. Id. at 5-6.
37. Id. at 6.
38. Pierre Englebert, Stacy Tarango & Matthew Carter, Dismemberment and Suffocation: A
Contribution to the Debate on African Boundaries, 35 COMP. POL. STUD. 1093, 1096 (2002).
39. Id.
40. See id.
41. McEwen, supra note 33, at 5.
42. See JONES, supra note 1, at Part III.
43. Id. at app. 1.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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forced to make decisions and place monuments off the intended course due to
limits on their measurements or natural features. In so doing, they often have the
liberty to adjust the borders agreed to the delimitation decision-they create their
own boundary absent official authorization.
Second, despite their intended resilience, border monuments frequently fall
victim to vandalism, theft, or natural disruption of some sort, causing the border
states to have to repair and rebuild them as often as every five years.46 Animals
have uprooted pillars and caused their disintegration by trampling on them.
Property owners along the border have been known to secretly shift boundary
marks. Natural forces like rainfall and water flow in lakes and rivers have caused
markers to crumble. In certain environments, border markers have fallen victim to
unintending hunters who spray them with bullets. With these problems in mind,
surveyors have sought other means by which to demarcate or to replace the marker
without delay. For example, placing a "subsidiary mark," such as a metal bar in
concrete buried below the original marker, from which an expert can restore the
monument should the need arise has become common practice.47
Third, as noted above with respect to the Berlin Conference, measurements
based on antiquated surveying techniques quickly become outdated.48 Extensive
exploration in colonial territories coincided with the advent of aerial photography,
allowing colonizers to create more precise boundaries by learning more about the
terrain before placing monuments.49  Since that time, however, additional
developments in technology have made it possible to calculate distances and
specify locations with significantly higher degrees of precision using global
navigation satellite systems. These developments will be detailed in the following
Section.
In light of these concerns regarding the unauthorized, impermanent, and
imprecise emplacement of markers, Alex McEwen concedes that "[a]n argument
could be made for greater standardization of monumentation," though he suggests
doing so "by reducing the variety of types and materials used for demarcation.,
50
While this solution may help reduce the need for boundary maintenance, it fails to
eliminate the potential for conflict and the discrepancies noted above. Current
practice in delimitation agreements is to not specify a plan for the maintenance of a
boundary. 51 Because neither side takes ownership of this important task, many
monuments disappear or become obscured.
46. McEwen, supra note 33, at 5.
47. Id.
48. Englebert, et al., supra note 38, at 1096.
49. Id.
50. McEwen, supra note 33, at 6.
51. Id. at 7.
52. Id.
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C. Denotation
As a result of the challenges outlined in the preceding Section, there are
neither any official nor truly authoritative lengths for international boundaries.
53
Today, most states keep demarcation reports that describe their boundaries as they
believe them to exist.54 The reports consist of photos of monuments that have been
erected to mark out the border as well as their corresponding latitudinal and
longitudinal coordinates calculated with reference to whichever datum, or
reference point, is selected by the state.55 These calculations of the monument
locations pose still more challenges for universal harmonization of boundary
information.
Some states use a national datum, though many apply the WGS84 which is
the model used by the United States and its Global Positioning System.56 When a
GPS device computes the coordinates of a particular location on the ground, it is
compiling data reflected from five different satellites as calculated with reference
to the WGS84 geoid.57 As mentioned above, some countries use their own points
of reference (datums). Kosovo, for example, established its own datum in 2007 for
the purpose of carrying out a mass survey of its territory; previously, all
calculations were based on the Serbian datum to which Kosovo no longer has
access.5 8 Japan recently switched its entire system from its own datum to the
WGS84 by way of a complex mathematical transformation.59
Even in 1945, Jones recognized the limitations on the demarcation methods
used at that time:
The difficulties in defining geometrical boundaries arise from [the fact
that] few statesmen or treaty editors possess the technical knowledge of
geodesy to frame a precise definition It is also necessary to
53. Email from Ray Milefsky, Specialist, Office of the Geographer and Global Issues, U.S.
Department of State (July 16, 2007) (on file with author).
54. See id.; Telephone Interview with Ray Milefsky, Specialist, Office of the Geographer and
Global Issues, U.S. Department of State (Mar. 31, 2008) (on file with author).
55. Telephone Interview with Ray Milefsky, supra note 54.
56. Though the U.S. datum is widely accepted and used by many states around the world, it is still
just a reference coordinate and, therefore, subject to abuse. See Rushworth, supra note 26 (noting that
the ideal solution of every point on the earth's surface having a unique set of geographic coordinates
has been achieved). This potential for mischief, or system failure, is part of the reason Europe has
developed the Galileo system which derives coordinates off of its own datum. In the years ahead, using
these two different languages to identify points along the border, states might need to maintain two
coordinates to refer to the same point. There will likely be a period of translation during which both
sets of coordinates will be made to complement one another. Telephone Interview with Ray Milefsky,
supra note 54.
57. The Global Positioning System is a system of 24 satellites that transmit signals to a handheld
device, enabling the determination of location, speed, direction, and time. It is managed by the United
States Government and is the only fully functional global navigation satellite constellation. The geoid
is an extremely precise mathematical model of the shape of the earth.
58. Telephone Interview with Ray Milefsky, supra note 54.
59. Id.
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distinguish between geodetic and astronomic positions. The North
American datum differs from that determined astronomically.
60
However, the real problem for harmonization and universalization of
boundary-marking emerges when states and boundary dispute commissions rely on
treaties and other documents that include reference coordinates without an
indication as to which datum those coordinates are calibrated or if the treaty uses
coordinates that are calibrated to an outdated datum for which there is no longer
any record. For a stable definition of the interstate boundary, we must turn to the
technological advances available to states today for the purposes of standardizing
border demarcation and maintaining permanent points of reference for interstate
boundaries.
The development of the Global Positioning System technology by the United
States, and its European parallel expected to be operational in 2010, has made it
possible to calculate, view and monitor borders with significantly greater precision
than ever before. More precision at the delimitation stage should lead to fewer
controversies at the demarcation stage. Through GIS imagery, for example, states
could re-define their borders down to thousands of an inch while being able to
view exactly what is located at that point. Additional techniques of higher
sophistication are available to those states that can afford them, as described later
in this Essay. Regardless of these advances, border discrepancies and disputes
continue to pose senseless difficulties at the local and national levels. 61 The
distinct, ad hoc methods used by states today perpetuate discrepancies where the
development of international law in this area mandating states to utilize the GPS
coordinate scheme would harmonize and universalize boundary-marking. The
next Part of the Essay examines how boundary commissions have begun to drawn
upon these technologies in an effort to put an end to particularly intractable border
disputes.
IV. BORDER DISPUTES AND THE LAW
"A new international law on boundaries and borderlands is urgently
needed. ,62
In their appraisals of relevant international law for delimitation and
demarcation, many boundary dispute commissions, the Permanent Court of
Arbitration, and the ICJ have handed down varying opinions regarding not which
sources of international law are authoritative in boundary determination but rather
on how to interpret those sources and accurately represent them on the ground.63
60. JONES, supra note 1, at 151. "Geodetic" positions are defined through the use of a geoid, an
extremely precise mathematical model of the earth.
61. See, e.g., Englebert, et al., supra note 38, at 1097-98.
62. Nsongurua J. Udombana, The Ghost of Berlin Still Haunts Africa! The ICJ Judgment on the
Land and Maritime Boundary Dispute Between Cameroon and Nigeria, 2002 AFR. Y.B. OF INT'L L. 13,
59.
63. See Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission: Decision Regarding Delimitation of the Border
Between the State of Eritrea and the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 41 I.L.M. 1057, 1074-75
(Apr. 13, 2002) [hereinafter 2002 EEBC]; see also Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal.
v. Hond.), 1992 I.C.J. 351, 390-92 (Sept. 11).
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Each adjudicatory body has employed different principles of interpretation on
a case-by-case-and sometimes a judge-by-judge-basis. In the Case Concerning
Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana v. Namibia), for example, the International
Court of Justice indicated that the "present-day state of scientific knowledge"
could be used in order to illuminate the terms of the relevant treaty, a document
from 1890. By contrast, Judge Higgins noted in her Declaration in that case that
the task of the Court in resolving the dispute was to determine the general idea of
the parties at the time of signing the treaty and to realize their original idea through
the use of contemporary knowledge.6 5 In another case, Cameroon v. Nigeria, the
Court relied, in part, on the principle of contemporaneity--drawing upon the
circumstances prevailing at the time the treaty was concluded.66 Other decisions
make relevant the subsequent practice of the parties, while still others indicate that
demarcation is not necessary at all.67
I will examine the decisions of three specialized boundary-dispute bodies in
detail: the Taba Tribunal (Egypt-Israel, 1988); the Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Dispute
Commission (1991); and the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (2006). In
each of these cases, the arbitrators confronted the challenge of discrepancies
between the delimitation agreements and the corresponding demarcation. The
overview and analysis carried out here demonstrate a trend on the part of ad hoc
commissions to give shape to the international law on demarcation and attain
coherence through an updated means of boundary-marking. 6t
A. Taba: juris vel factis
In 1986, Egypt and Israel jointly agreed to set up a binding arbitration
mechanism to resolve the boundary dispute involving fourteen demarcation pillars
along their shared border. 69  Their conflict emerged from miscalculations and
manipulations regarding the border's demarcation over the previous eight
decades. 70 Eighty years prior, in 1906, diplomatic representatives of the Ottoman
Empire and Britain, which at the time maintained control over Egypt, signed a
treaty requiring that telegraph poles be used to demarcate the boundary between
64. Case Concerning Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Bots. v. Namib.), 1999 I.C.J. 1045, 1060 (Dec. 13).
65. Id. at 1114 (separate declaration of Judge Higgins).
66. Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nig.), 2002 I.C.J.
303, 346 (Oct. 10).
67. Delimitation need not be formally marked out, contrary to popular belief. Rao notes that the
ICJ has held in the Las Palmas decision that delimitation may be achieved "either by so-called natural
frontiers as recognized by international law or by outward signs of delimitation that are undisputed or
else by legal engagements." In other words, demarcation is not necessary, as a legal requisite for
boundary definition. K. Krishna Rao, The Sino-Indian Boundary Question and International Law, 11
INT'L & COMp. L. Q. 375, 376-77 (1962).
68. It should be reiterated here that this analysis focuses on which technological medium
constitutes the legally authoritative representation of the border. The trend that emerges from the
commissions studied in this section is that methods of demarcation have shifted and simultaneously, the
degrees of legitimacy as representative of the official border of the various media employed in each
method shifted.
69. Haihua Ding & Eric S. Koenig, Boundary Dispute Concerning the Taba Area, 83 AM. J. INT'L
L. 590, 590 (1989).
70. Id. at 592-94.
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what would later become Egypt and Israel. 71 The surveyor responsible for the
original markers noted in his report that his margin of error between where the
treaty intended and the coordinates determined using astronomical surveying
techniques could be up to twelve meters on either side of the delineated straight
line.72 He also conceded that the poles themselves deviated from the intended line
in some places by as much as five hundred meters; while some were corrected or
accepted by the Commissioners present at the time as placed; others may not have
been addressed.73
After the first set of poles was constructed, the Egyptian Office of Public
Works undertook to further mark the boundary with its own additional pillars.74
Commissioners from both sides agreed to this plan and signed off on the proposal
to construct supplementary stone markers.75 In the initial years that followed the
construction of the pillars between December 1906 and February 1907, both sides
helped to maintain them.7 6 Shortly thereafter, however, reports of foul play began
to surface.77 British authorities, among others, were accused of removing border
markers in an attempt to monopolize control in the region.78
In 1981, new surveys were conducted to re-establish the boundary according
to the guidelines of the 1979 Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel. 79 The
Treaty instructed a Joint Commission to demarcate the boundary by locating
existing border stones based on aerial photographs and the descriptions laid out in
the 1906 Agreement." The Joint Commission was unable to agree on the location
of some of the missing pillars and thus turned to the Tribunal to adjudicate the
dispute.81
The Taba Tribunal was charged with a very narrowly defined task: "to decide
the location of the boundary pillars of the recognized international boundary
between Egypt and the former mandated territory of Palestine, in accordance with
the Peace Treaty, the April 25, 1982 Agreement, and the Annex." 82 In its decision,
the majority deduced that the location of the existing boundary pillars constituted a
legally authoritative depiction of the boundary "even if deviations may have
occurred or if there are some inconsistencies with maps." 83  Based on an
71. See id. at 594.
72. See Location of Boundary Markers in Taba between Egypt and Israel, 20 R. INT'L ARB.
AWARDS 1, 21 (Sept. 29, 1988) [hereinafter Taba].
73. Id.
74. Id. at 20.
75. Id. at 30.
76. Id. at 56.
77. Id. at 22.
78. Id.
79. See Treaty of Peace Between the Arab Republic of Egypt and the State of Israel, art. I, Mar.
26, 1979, 18 I.L.M. 362.
80. Id. at art. IV ("organize the demarcation of the international boundary and all lines and zones
described in Annex I and this Appendix").
81. Taba, supra note 72, at 30-3 1.
82. Id. at 111.
83. Id. at 56.
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interpretation of an earlier treatise on boundary-making and the Temple Judgment
by the International Court of Justice, 84 the majority concluded that, in case of
contradiction, a demarcated boundary line prevails over the text of an agreement.
85
In other words, in case of a discrepancy, the location of the monumentation pillars
would trump the language of the treaty and indications made on maps.
In her dissenting opinion to the Award, Ruth Lapidoth argued that the
authoritative and proper boundary should be demarcated according to the
originally intended location of the 1906 telegraph poles and that, despite their
apparent resilience and greater durability, the concrete pillars erected since that
time were not recognized by both parties.86 Lapidoth contended that the majority
assumed, erroneously, that "in international law[,] demarcation prevails over
delimitation." 87 She based her decision on the parties' textual affirmation rather
than the physical manifestations of at least one side's subsequent practice. 88
Cognizant of the potential for manipulation of the boundary markers, Lapidoth
relied on the written understanding. 89
Lapidoth's interpretation of the legal norms on boundaries was rooted in the
principle of uti possidetis juris according to which "preeminence [is] accorded to
legal title over effective possession as a basis for sovereignty. " 9 The majority
placed heavy weight on the existence of stone pillars in 1906 and cited their
appearance in later photographs. Lapidoth, by contrast, emphasized the statements
in the agreements between the two sides about where the original pillars were
intended to be located.91  While the majority stressed that when there is a
discrepancy its authority rests on the pillars themselves (according to the opposing
principle of uti possidetisfactis), Lapidoth looked mainly to treaty text, declaratory
statements, and other records maintained by Egypt and Israel.92
The Taba Award is not the only place where the precedence of boundary
monuments has been disputed, though it is most clearly seen in these two
arguments. Many delimitation agreements fail to specify whether the demarcated
boundary or its theoretical position prevails should a conflict arise between them.
93
The discrepancy that develops may be the result of natural causes (such as the
effect of gravity), human interference as discussed above, the use of astronomic
rather than geodetic coordinates or the limitations of the technology available at
the time of the original survey.94 In arbitration on this point, tribunals and courts
84. Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Laos), 1962 I.C.J. 6 (June 15).
85. Taba, supra note 72, at 57.
86. Id. at 75 (dissenting opinion of Prof. Lapidoth) ("There is thus no reason to prefer pillars.
over the line described in the [1906] Agreement").
87. Id.
88. Id. at 76 (dissenting opinion of Prof. Lapidoth).
89. Id. at 75 (dissenting opinion of Prof. Lapidoth).
90. Id. at 75 (dissenting opinion of Prof. Lapidoth) (quoting Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali),
1986 I.C.J. 554, 566 (Dec. 22)).
91. Id. at 76 (dissenting opinion of Prof. Lapidoth).
92. See id. at 76-77.
93. See McEwen, supra note 33, at 5.
94. Id.
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have more often than not considered the existing monuments on the ground to be
controlling. 95 While some have called this a "commonsense approach" necessary
for achieving "stability,, 96 this approach is in fact highly susceptible to abuse and
potentially ineffective for achieving finality due to the manipulability of the
monuments.
The Taba Award prioritized the pillar locations over not only treaty language
but also over maps.97 Maps, while useful for general guidance and occasionally
more helpful than the textual agreement if very precise, are also easily manipulable
and therefore unreliable. 98 Most maps are made by a single state and do not
represent any kind of joint understanding between the parties. 99  Additional
problems that maps introduce include different coordinate reference terms,
different names for places, and different cartographic symbols. 00 Furthermore,
cartographic techniques change rapidly such that levels of precision and accuracy
have been vastly improved in the last thirty years. 10 1  Older maps lack the
exactitude required for effective boundary maintenance.
10 2
The two opposing opinions from the Taba Tribunal outline the dispute within
international law on demarcation. 10 3 The next section presents another iteration in
the controversy through the work of the Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Commission which
came on the heels of the Taba Tribunal in the early 1990s.
B. Iraq-Kuwait: dedicated to demarcation
Following the cessation of hostilities in the Gulf War, the UN Security
Council passed Resolution 687 (1991) which called upon the Secretary-General to
"lend his assistance to make arrangements with Iraq and Kuwait to demarcate the
boundary between them, drawing on appropriate material.' ' 0 4 Pursuant to the
resolution, the Secretary-General appointed the Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Dispute
Commission (IKBDC). The Commission was uniquely charged with establishing
the boundary (not delimiting, but rather demarcating) using coordinates of latitude
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Taba, supra note 72, at 56. With reference to the precedence of existing pillars over maps the
tribunal says: "If a boundary line is once demarcated jointly by the parties concerned, the demarcation
is considered as an authentic interpretation of the boundary agreement even if deviations may have
occurred or if there are some inconsistencies with maps." Id.
98. CUKWURAH, supra note 7, at 224.
99. Id. at 223.
100. See id. at 220.
101. See Ray Milefsky & William B. Wood, GIS as a Tool for Territorial Analysis and
Negotiations, in THE RAZOR'S EDGE 107, 108-09 (Clive Schofield et al. eds., 2002).
102. See, e.g., Taba, supra note 72, at 48 ("The Tribunal does not consider these map based
indications to be conclusive since the scale of the map (1:100,000) is too small to demonstrate a
location on the ground as exactly as required . . "); see also Dispute Between Argentina and Chile
Concerning the Beagle Channel, 21 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 53 (Feb. 18, 1977) [hereinafter Beagle
Channel]. This approach is also reflected in Burk. Faso v. Mali, supra note 90, at 583, where the Court
notes that a map "can still have no greater legal value than that of corroborative evidence endorsing a
conclusion at which a court has arrived by other means unconnected with the maps."
103. See generally Taba, supra note 72.
104. S.C. Res. 687, 3, U.N. Doe. S/RES/687 (Apr. 8, 1991).
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and longitude as well as representing those coordinates through markers on the
ground. 105
The IKBDC faced the same the challenge of interpreting vague treaty
language. It relied on the 1963 "Agreed Minutes Between the State of Kuwait and
the Republic of Iraq Regarding the Restoration of Friendly Relations, Recognition
and Related Matters" which referred to points in generalities. 0 6 For example, the
Agreed Minutes make reference to a point "south of ... Urn Qasr"; it is unclear
whether the parties meant the Umm Qasr as it existed in 1963 or as it existed in
1932 (the time of the original treaty at issue). 10 7
Independent surveyance experts assisted the Commission in its work.,0 8 They
proposed a new survey and mapping of the entire border area to enable the
Commission to be as precise as possible, using new and improved technology, and
to guide the Commission's work with relevance to the ground situation.'0 9
Following the Security Council's instructions to draw upon "appropriate
technology,"1 0 much of the experts' proposed methods were implemented."' For
example, their proposal included the establishment of a "geodetic control network
and ground control points for mapping, using satellite-based ([GPS] and Doppler)
methods," using satellite-based technologies, as well as aerial photography."l
2
At the conclusion of the Commission's work, 106 boundary pillars were
erected, and twenty-eight intermediate boundary markers and other points along
the sea were organized;" 3 though it included little legal justification for its
selections, the Commission maintained a list of geographic coordinates for each
pillar and point as instructed." 14  The Secretary-General specified that "[t]he
coordinates established by the [IKBDC] Commission will constitute the final
demarcation of the international boundary . . . . '1 It is not explicitly clear
whether the Council intended for the coordinates to serve as the source of legal
authority for the boundary, though that is a feasible interpretation of these
instructions. ' 16
105. S.C. Res. 833, U.N. Doc. S/RES/833 (May 27, 1993). As discussed above, however, in
carrying out the surveyance work, the Commission did inevitably define the border to some extent.
106. Id.
107. See Adler, supra note 17.
108. Id. at6.
109. Id.
110. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Regarding Paragraph 3 of Security
Council Resolution 687 3-4, U.N. Doc. S/22558 (May 2, 1991).
111. Id. at 4.
112. Adler, supra note 17, at 7 ("Four datum stations, 25 geodetic control stations and 137
photogrammetric control points were established toward the end of 1991, by GPS and Doppler survey
methods").
113. Id. at 9.
114. Jan Klabbers, No More Shifting Lines? The Report of the Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation
Commission, 43 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 904,906 (1994).
115. Report of the Secretary-General Regarding Paragraph 3 of Security Council Resolution 687,
supra note 110, at 3 (emphasis added).
116. Here, some scholars have raised concern about the Security Council's exercise of power in
determining borders. This international organizational dilemma goes beyond the scope of this Essay,
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Following the IKBDC, the Israel-Jordan Boundary Dispute Commission
adopted a similar approach in 1995.117 In that situation, the instructions given to
the Commission required the emplacement of boundary pillars, but also clearly
invested legal authority in the satellite coordinates determined by the
Commission. 118
Thus, the decisions rendered in the Taba Tribunal, IKBDC and Israel-Jordan
Commission reveal a tension and responding shift in the law of boundary-marking.
The Taba decision and Lapidoth's dissenting declaration frame the legal dispute
debating the authoritative role of the pillars." 9 From there, the IKBDC required
coordinates as well as pillars to ensure permanency and to avoid dispute like that
which arose in Taba and, under one interpretation, also placed legal authority in
the coordinates.120  The Israel-Jordan Commission, while also emplacing
monuments, affirmed the authoritativeness of the coordinates. 121 As the scientific
and geographic communities became more comfortable with the technologies,
these border commissions incorporated their added accuracy and durability. The
inclinations on the part of the IKBDC and the Israel-Jordan Commissions to
sustain the legal authority of the coordinates demonstrate the start of a pattern
which culminated with the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission. 122 The next
section investigates how the EEBC drew from the trend out of necessity, and in so
doing, may have augured its completion and the effective establishment of an
emergent legal norm, rendering the need for pillars moot and utilizing the latest
technologies available to design binding demarcation outcomes.
C. Eritrea-Ethiopia and virtual demarcation
The Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC / the Commission) was
established in 2000 pursuant to the Algiers Agreement-the culmination of a
lengthy negotiation process designed to put an end to the hostilities that broke out
in the region from May 1998 to June 2000.123 In addition to mandating the
Commission to adjudicate the delimitation of the shared border, the Algiers
Agreement called upon the Commission to "arrange for expeditious demarcation"
though it did not specify the means or medium according to which demarcation
but is highly relevant for both the IKBDC and the EEBC. See, e.g., Klabbers, supra note 114, at 911.
117. See Adler, supra note 17, at 10 (stating the Israel-Jordan boundary was established through the
use of advanced technology such as orthophotos).
118. Id. at 10-11 ("The boundary pillars shall be defined in a list of geographic and UTM
coordinates based on the joint boundary datum (IJBD 94) to be agreed by the Joint Team of Experts
appointed by the Parties using Global Positioning System measurements .... This list of coordinates..
. shall be binding and shall take precedence over the maps as to the location of the boundary line of this
sector").
119. See Taba, supra note 72, at 75 (dissenting opinion of Prof. Lapidoth).
120. Adler, supra note 17, at 5.
121. Id. at 10-11.
122. See 2002 EEBC, supra note 63; see also, 2006 EEBC Statement, infra note 127.
123. Ethiopia-Eritrea: Agreement Between the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of
Ethiopia and the Government of the State of Eritrea (Peace Agreement), Eth.-Eri., Dec. 12, 2000, 40
I.L.M. 260 (2001).
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would be carried out.124 Still, in the Agreement, Ethiopia and Eritrea committed to
"cooperate with the Commission . . . in all respects during the process of
delimitation and demarcation."'' 25  Moreover, the parties agreed that "the
delimitation and demarcation determinations of the Commission [would] be final
and binding."
26
When both parties later refused to respect the Commission's determination,
the Commission turned their earlier agreement back to them, relying on the Beagle
Channel tribunal decision which held: "It is not admissible that, because of the
total non-cooperation of one of the Parties, contrary to its obligation under a valid
Award, the Court should be compelled to remain indefinitely in existence in a state
of suspended animation.' 27 In the case of Ethiopia and Eritrea, the Commission
noted that the same principle would apply in light of the non-cooperation of both
parties.
121
On July 8, 2002, the Commission promulgated its Demarcation Directions
129
which instructed the parties to appoint appropriate representatives in order to
identify sites for the demarcation pillars. 30  What might otherwise be a simple
process of placing pillars in the locations identified by the Delimitation Decision
became a controversial ordeal yet to be resolved at the time of writing. In the
Commission's attempts to demarcate the central and west sectors of the border,
both parties refused to allow the appointed representatives to carry out their
work.' 31 They proceeded to obstruct the Commission from holding negotiations to
resolve the dispute. 3 2 Resolved against making any progress on the decision of
the Commission, Ethiopia and Eritrea disregarded fourteen Security Council
resolutions calling for their joint cooperation.' 33
After nearly four years of stalemate, the Commission issued a statement at the
end of 2006, following the refusal of Eritrea and Ethiopia to attend the
Commission's dispute resolution meeting. 34 In the statement, the Commission
revisited its original mandate instructing it to demarcate the boundary. 35 It noted
124. Id. at art. 4. 13.
125. Id. at art. 4, 14.
126. Id. at art. 4,T 15.
127. Permanent Court of Arbitration: Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission Statement by the
Commission, Nov. 27, 2006, 46 I.L.M. 155, n.1 [hereinafter 2006 EEBC Statement].
128. Id.
129. Id. at 155.
130. Id. Interestingly, the Commission originally notes that it must specify the boundary reference
point coordinates as measured from satellite imagery based on the WGS84 datum. The principal
reason, it notes, for using this specification is due to the limited availability of information on the
(updated Soviet edition) maps available to the Commission. In its decision, the Commission cautions
that "All coordinates will be recalculated and made more precise during the demarcation as the
commission acquires the additional necessary information." Herein both parties were put on notice of
potential changes in the location of the border. 2002 EEBC, supra note 63, at 8.3.
131. 2006 EEBC Statement, supra note 127, at 156.
132. Id. at 156-57.
133. Id. at 159.
134. Id. at 157-58.
135. Id. at 157.
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that it had previously interpreted the mandate to mean that it must oversee the
actual emplacement of pillars at turning points of the boundary; however, in order
to carry out this task, the Commission assumed it would receive the proper funding
and support from the parties and from the United Nations Mission in Eritrea and
Ethiopia (UNMEE).136 In the absence of the parties' cooperation, the Commission
found it necessary to interpret its mandate in such a way so as to discharge all its
functions effectively. 137 It derived a new interpretation on the basis of changed
facts to which it had to adapt and announced its decision to "adopt another
approach to effect the demarcation of the boundary." 138  The Commission
declared:
If, by the end of [the twelve-month] period, the Parties have not by
themselves reached the necessary agreement and proceeded
significantly to implement it... the Commission hereby determines that
the boundary will automatically stand as demarcated by the boundary
points [determined by the Commission] and that the mandate of the
Commission can then be regarded as fulfilled.13 9
To this end, the Commission discussed how modem techniques of "image
processing and terrain" facilitate demarcation by geographical coordinates with
incomparable accuracy that would achieve most of the same goals as monument
emplacement in the field. 140 It drew in large part from the IKBDC decision noting
how, in the aftermath of its decision, the Security Council supported the legal
principle that coordinates could and would be authoritative boundary markers.
1 41
By way of filling in the legal reasoning lacking in the IKBDC and Israel-Jordan
decisions, the Commission also referred to two comparable situations where
relevant principles have been asserted. First, it made reference to the Argentina-
Chile Frontier Case (1966) in which aerial photography was used to specify the
boundary points. 142 The Argentina-Chile Tribunal held that points indicated on
aerial photographs would constitute "the sole authority for the exact location of the
points.' 4 3 Second, the Commission noted how maritime boundaries, as specified
in the Law of the Sea Convention, rely on a coordinate-only demarcation
system. 144
Following this proclamation, neither side attempted to emplace pillars as
instructed and the Commission's decision became final and binding in November
2007 at which point the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC) officially
dissolved itself.145 As no further action would convince the parties to fulfill their
136. Id. at 158.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 159 (emphasis added).
140. Id. at 158.
141. Id. at 159.
142. Id. at 156, n.4.
143. Id. (quoting Argentina-Chile Frontier Case, 38 I.L.R. 10 (1966)).
144. Id. at 159.
145. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on Ethiopia and Eritrea, 26 &
Annex 11, paras. 1, 3-4, 10-11, 40, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2008/40 (Jan. 23,
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obligations under the terms of their prior agreement, the Commission followed
through with its intended plan to disband.146 With the stroke of a pen, it reported
to the Secretary-General and to the world that the new boundary between Eritrea
and Ethiopia had been defined and, regardless of the lack of physical
manifestations of it on the ground or the consent of the parties, the coordinates the
EEBC had finalized would serve as authoritative markers of the international
border. 147
Although the international media reported that the Commission chose to
"leav[e] the two states to work it out alone," 148 the Commission was clear about the
significance of its conclusions. 149 Leaving behind an Annex containing the results
of its Delimitation Decision set out in geographic coordinates, the Commission had
"virtually" demarcated the boundary. 150  The Annex includes detailed
specifications regarding where the border between Eritrea and Ethiopia stands in
terms of GPS satellite coordinates.' 5 ' It instructs the demarcators on 146 boundary
points, plus seven pages of comments, on how to place each marker and how to
move from one to the next.
152
It is important to note that the Commission expressed its support for the
monumentation principle and emphasized its attempt to enforce the principle, but
in light of the lack of cooperation of the parties to fulfill their obligations, it used
the coordinate-only demarcation method of equal validity.' 53 Rather than reject the
monumentation concept, the Commission affirmed it but found another method to
be equally sufficient. 154 In a letter to the President of the Security Council dated
January 18, 2008, the President of Ethiopia decried the Commission's decision as
having "no validity in international law."' 155 Despite the legal reasoning outlined in
the decision with reference to the IKBDC and Argentina-Chile decisions, Ethiopia
maintains that the coordinates are invalid "because they are not the product of a
demarcation process recognised by international law.' ' 156  As shown above,
however, while monumentation may be considered evidence of an accepted
practice, not all international borders are demarcated with monuments and there is
2008).
146. Id.
147. See id.
148. Daniel Wallis & Andrew Cawthorne, U.N. Probes Eritrea-Ethiopia Border Gunfire (Dec. 27,
2007), http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L2707483 .htm.
149. See Report of the Secretary General on Ethiopia and Eritrea, supra note 145.
150. Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission Annex to the Commission's Statement of 27
November 2006 List of Boundary Points and Coordinates, http://www.pca-
cpa.org/showfile.asp?filid= 10.
151. See id.
152. Id.
153. 2006 EEBC Statement, supra note 127, 20.
154. See id.
155. Report of the Secretary-General on Ethiopia and Eritrea, supra note 145, T 23 (quoting
portions of the Foreign Minister's letter).
156. Id. 41. Notably, no other states have spoken in support of this position. See 2006 EEBC
Statement, supra note 127, at 159.
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no source of legal authority suggesting it is required.'5 7 For its part, Eritrea has
accepted the Commission's decision as binding, though it has not made efforts to
emplace pillars as instructed.1
58
V. A MAP FOR THE FUTURE?
Developing norms of precedence and interpretation for boundary
determination is a daunting task particularly in light of the conflictual holdings by
the International Court of Justice and the various border dispute tribunals. 159 The
first step in border maintenance or border dispute resolution is to look for existing,
authorized documentation agreed to by both sides. The majority in the Taba
Tribunal, as well as the IKBDC, pursued such authorization, but found conflicting
information.1 60  Written documentation, authorized by both states, regarding the
location of the border should be legally binding, but this clarification does not
necessarily solve boundary disputes where documentation conflicts, as was seen in
the case of the IKBDC. 161 Next, the Taba Tribunal looked to monuments along the
border. 162  The boundary pillars, preferably accompanied by at least partial
documentation, represent the de facto situation which supports a claim under the
principle of uti possidetis factis.'6 3 Although the Taba arbitrators attempted to
identify which monuments were the original monuments from the 1906
replacement, it was nearly impossible to do so.'
64
These practical challenges precipitated a call to consider other methods of
demarcation. The monumentation approach might have made sense when no other
means were available; however, in the twenty-first century, when the law has kept
pace with technology in other areas of science, border demarcation should do the
same. Moreover, inconsistencies among boundary commissions and the variety of
state methodologies indicate a need for harmonization in order to clarify and
establish coherent legal norms in this field. Virtual demarcation achieves this goal.
The actual process of carrying out all the calculations and measurements
necessary for virtual demarcation varies depending on the technology employed.
The most accurate and reliable method available today is stereophotogrammetry. 165
Stereophotogrammetry is commonly used for marking points where it would be
157. See supra notes 140-144 and accompanying text.
158. See Report of the Secretary-General on Ethiopia and Eritrea, supra note 145, 26, 41 &
Annex II, para. 4.
159. Cf Convention Revising the General Act of Berlin and the Declaration of Brussels (Treaty of
St. Germain-en-Laye) art. 28, Sept. 10, 1919, 49 Stat. 3027, 8 L.N.T.S. 25 (declaring clear interpretive
rule that"[i]n case of differences between the text and the map, the text will prevail.").
160. See Taba, supra note 72, at 44-45; The Secretary-General, Letter Dated 21 May 1993from the
Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council, 27-45, U.N. Doc. S/25811
(May 21, 1993).
161. See Letter Dated 21 May 1993 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the
Security Council, supra note 160, 27-45.
162. See Taba, supra note 72, at 47-67.
163. See id. at 44-45.
164. Id. at 48-49.
165. Interview with Laurent Bonneau, Research Associate for Geology and Geophysics, Yale
University, in New Haven, Conn. (Mar. 28, 2008) (on file with author).
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impossible to emplace monuments, such as on mountain tops. Geographers use
stereophotogrammetry to ascertain a point that parties agree to on the basis of a
particular set of stereo reference data. Thus, Ethiopia's claim that there is no
precedent for this type of demarcation is incorrect to the extent that
stereophotogrammetry is used in these remote areas.1
66
Despite its value for stability and finality, stereophotogrammetry is also
grossly expensive. Another process known as orthorectified aerial photography is
more commonly used through means of either airplane or satellite. At high levels
of resolution, satellites and traditional aerial photography offer sub-decimeter
resolution. Still, "complete and uniform coverage at the appropriate resolution is
often lacking for much of the developing world.' I67 Moreover, full coverage of a
long boundary even using this less complicated technology can cost millions of
dollars.
While resources might not be available for all states to carry out these
methods on their own, there are fewer obstacles preventing an international
institution from taking on this responsibility and serving as the central depository
for international boundary coordinates. The United Nations, or an affiliated
intergovernmental organization, should develop a shared informational and
standardized system, based on a single datum, that lists all the international
boundaries on record. Resembled after the international treaty series, it need not
be more than a simple list of coordinates that serves as the authoritative source of
coordinate information, demarcating all boundaries with the same (highest
available at the time) level of precision, but with the express purpose of finalizing
the location of international boundaries. Moreover, although the states between
whom the border divides the territory have the most immediate interest in the
delimitation and demarcation, processes, these processes have erga omnes effect
such that all states must respect and accept the boundary as recognized; thus, it
becomes increasingly obvious than an international record should be maintained. 1
68
Boundaries remain even if treaties that created them are no longer in force. 169
With the precision and permanency of these geographic coordinates, this
system would far out-last any monument and be less subject to abuse. Still, it
would likely face challenges, at least in the short-term. First, as shown in the case
of Ethiopia, it is unlikely that states would willingly surrender their border-
marking authority. 170  Second, if an intergovernmental organization such as the
United Nations were to assume control for boundaries and institute a system of
166. Id.
167. Milefsky & Wood, supra note 101, at 116.
168. A related theme meriting further research is the strategy used by states to recognize third-party
(non-bordering states) boundaries; the central boundary depository would harmonize recognition
methodologies with the long-term goal of eliminating the need for "recognition" of contentious borders
since all would be officially recorded.
169. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 83-84 (2d ed. 2005).
170. Given military concerns over border regions, both parties are unlikely to be willing to use
imagery as part of their negotiations. See id. at 423-24.
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virtual demarcation, it could instigate an eruption of minute and large-scale border
disputes as states rush to update and clarify their records.
Although it is an area where technology has the potential to play a significant
role in the creation and modification of international law, boundary-marking has
received little attention in this respect. 17' The systematic transition suggested
herein will undoubtedly take considerable time and effort.' 72  Just as the GPS
coordinate system would eliminate the need for street addresses, this Essay is not
suggesting that we re-design the postal system. Rather, it aims to harmonize and
remodel boundary-marking in such a way that will avoid conflict - physical as
well as numerical.
VI. BORDER-MARKING MEETS BORDER-MAKING
"La caractere marquant de la notion de frontiere est son universalite
d 'acception. "173
Although the technology for "virtual demarcation" is available, it produces a
sort of cognitive dissonance for geographers who have relied on grounded
monuments. As one geographer notes, "demarcation, by definition, means 'mark
on the ground."" 174 On the other hand, many international lawyers concede that the
monumentation principle is not, in fact, required by law. 175 It is a purely technical
operation of minor importance. In fact, most boundaries are not demarcated due to
expense, effort, adverse climate, or emotions of local inhabitants as to the erection
of monuments.17 6  In his 1928 treatise, de Lapradelle asserted that "17]a
demarcation, si elle est utile, d'estpas, en droit, necessaire."
1 77
Thus, the controversy over virtual demarcation oversubstantiates the nature of
any potential contradiction in international law. While monumentation may be
preferable at some levels, a universal, coordinate-based system, maintained by an
171. But see Martin Pratt, The Role of the Technical Expert in Maritime Delimitation Cases, in
MARITIME DELIMITATION 79, 80 (Rainer Lagoni & Daniel Vignes eds., 2006) ("[S]tates are becoming
increasingly aware of the need for geodetically precise boundaries .... [Boundary] courts and tribunals
are coming under closer ... scrutiny by technically-proficient analysts, and errors or deficiencies in the
definition of a ... boundary are sure to be exposed .... [I]t is recommended that a) adjudicators ensure
that they have adequate technical support themselves, and b) they encourage the parties . . to agree
[on] technical standards for delimitation before the adjudicators begin their deliberations.").
172. See Dennis Rushworth, Mapping in Support of Frontier Arbitration: Coordinates, IBRU
BOUNDARY AND SECURITY BULLETIN, Autumn 1997, at 55, 56 ("[I]t will be many years before all
current mapping is compatible with WGS coordinates. Since older mapping and survey data is never
likely to be converted, frontier arbitration proceedings will have to take into account the existence of
incompatible coordinate values for the foreseeable future.").
173. P. G. DE LAPRADELLE, LA FRONTIER: ETUDE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 9 (1928), quoted and
translated in Ron Adler, Geographical Information in Delimitation, Demarcation and Management of
International Land Boundaries, 3 IBRU BOUNDARY AND TERRITORY BRIEFING No. 4 (2001), at I &
n. I ("The notable characteristic of the idea of a frontier is its universality.").
174. Telephone Interview with Ray Milefsky, supra note 54.
175. See discussion supra note 67.
176. Adler, supra note 173, at 10-11.
177. DE LAPRADELLE, supra note 173, at 143 (quoted and translated in Adler, supra note 173, at
10 & n.5 ("Demarcation, although useful, is not necessary in law.")).
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international institution would achieve more uniformity and cultivate worldwide
acceptance of exactly where international boundaries lie.
Although here I have examined the hybrid process of boundary-marking
through the lens of international law, it is the role and purpose of borders that
rightly dominates much of the social science literature on boundaries. After all, "a
boundary is not an idea, nor a paragraph in a treaty, nor a line on a map, but a
functional feature on the face of the earth."'178 The importance of border security
with respect to both people and goods obliges states to keep careful watch over
their boundaries; even in the absence of any controversy between them,
neighboring states often construct multiple legislative and law enforcement
mechanisms for border management. For example, in order to determine and
maintain their border, France and Italy have three treaties, four demarcation
agreements, a maintenance agreement which establishes a binational border
commission, and no fewer than five state agencies responsible for geodetic
measurements, mapping and documentation. 179  Still, adjoining states will
sometimes publish differing lengths for common boundaries which may never be
resolved or may go unnoticed. 180
This Essay has evaluated the current state of affairs with respect to the
technology/supranational law-making nexus in an area that has a significant
bearing on the fundamental values of the discipline. It has argued that a
normatively coherent techno-legal regime in this field is only achievable by
integrating the work of the boundary engineers into the work of the boundary
architects. As long as boundary architects and engineers remain captive to the
monumentation principle as a necessary legal tool in boundary dispute resolutions,
they perpetuate the possibility for further controversy as discrepancies develop
outside their control. The Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission has signaled a
new approach for border-marking that, at the very least, merits jurisprudential and
institutional consideration and has the potential to revolutionize boundary-marking
and boundary-making.
178. JONES, supra note 1, at 6.
179. Michael Bacchus, The Maintenance of Boundary Pillars and Boundary Lines in France (Dec.
12, 2006) (unpublished conference presentation, available at http://www.dur.ac.uk/resources/ibru/
conferences/thailand/france 1 .pdf).
180. Email from Ray Milefsky, supra note 53; see also Interview with Kakha Khandolishvili, Chief
of Internal Affairs, Georgian Border Police, in Tbilisi, Geor. (June 27, 2007) (on file with author).
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RIGHTS OF ACTION FOR PRIVATE NON-STATE ACTORS IN THE
WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM
AARON CATBAGAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
The WTO's Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), 1 and the multi-tiered
dispute settlement system it governs have been heralded as lasting triumphs of the
Uruguay Round . Indeed, the WTO's dispute settlement system avoids many of
the political pitfalls that weakened the dispute settlement system under the original
GATT.3  The WTO's dispute settlement system has also been praised as an
innovation in the ability of member states, whether economic key players or much
less influential members, to challenge violations of international trade law in ways
that may not be practicable through pure negotiation and consultation.4
In spite of many positive qualities attributed to the contemporary dispute
settlement system, commentators argue that developing countries find themselves
at a disadvantage when it comes to effectively litigating trade disputes before
dispute settlement panels and securing remedies against developed WTO member
states. This article proposes and examines an alternative method of resolving
disputes under the DSU. The alternative method is a proposal to give non-state
actors in developing member states opportunities to initiate complaints against
WTO member states. The WTO dispute settlement system would provide the
framework to enable non-state actors to seek remedies for violations of
international trade law through arbitration with WTO member states. The heart of
the proposal is simple: private non-state actors such as firms, industrial
associations, and organizations comprised of business entities of various sizes
would play an important role in ensuring greater equality in the WTO dispute
settlement system.
. J.D., University of Denver Sturm College of Law (2008); M.A., Josef Korbel School of
International Studies (2008). The author is indebted to Assistant Professor Phoenix X. F. Cai for her
encouragement and insightful advice throughout the composition and editing process. Any errors are
solely the responsibility of the author.
1. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, Legal Instruments--
Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter DSU].
2. John A. Ragosta, Unmasking the WTO--Access to the DSB System: Can the WTO DSB Live up
to the Moniker 'World Trade Court'?, 31 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 739, 739-40 (2000).
3. G. Richard Shell, The Trade Stakeholders Model and Participation by Non-state Parties in the
World Trade Organization, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 359, 362-63 (1996).
4. See id. at 363.
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The alternative method proposed in this article deviates from dispute
settlement procedures in the DSU in that, at present, only member states may
initiate complaints against other member states. This proposal has the potential to
radically alter the landscape of jurisprudence relating to international trade
disputes, not to mention the commonplace operation of the WTO dispute
settlement system. It is also an opportunity to bolster the credibility of the WTO
following the collapse of the Doha Round and improve benefits available to
developing countries in the global trading system.
This article will provide a brief overview of the current dispute settlement
system of the WTO in Part II. The proposal allowing non-state actors to arbitrate
alleged violations of international trade law under the WTO dispute settlement
system will be explained in Part III. In Part IV, a case study involving the garment
export industry in Vietnam will be examined to demonstrate why rights of action
for non-state actors would improve the contemporary dispute settlement system
and help the WTO promote international trade between developed and developing
countries. Benefits of the proposal and counterarguments are discussed in Part V,
with brief concluding statements in Part VI.
II. CURRENT METHODS FOR SETTLING TRADE DISPUTES UNDER THE DSU
A. Contemporary dispute settlement by WTO member states
The current system for resolving trade disputes between WTO member states
constitutes an improvement over the dispute settlement system originally devised
under the 1947 GATT.6 In the early years of the GATT system, consensus among
member states was required to establish a dispute settlement panel and to adopt
final panel decisions.7 This was particularly problematic for developing member
states, which often lacked the political and economic clout necessary to initiate
dispute proceedings on the basis of consensus among member states.
8
The contemporary system of formal dispute settlement provides appellate
review following consultations between the complaining member state and
member states accused of violating obligations arising from the agreements listed
in Annex 1 of the DSU.9 The purpose of consultations is to encourage member
states to voluntarily withdraw problematic trade measures without the need for
formal dispute settlement proceedings. Consultation is a preferred method for
resolving trade disputes because the process is more efficient and less time-
consuming than litigation before a dispute settlement panel.10 If consultations
prove to be unsuccessful, the member state raising the complaint may request the
5. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, pmbl. para. 2, 33 I.L.M.
1125, 1144 (1994).
6. Ragosta, supra note 2.
7. THOMAS A. ZIMMERMAN, NEGOTIATING THE REVIEW OF THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
UNDERSTANDING 50-51, 55 (2006); Glen T. Schleyer, Power to the People: Allowing Private Parties to
Raise Claims Before the WTO Dispute Resolution System, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 2275, 2283 (1997).
8. See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 7, at 48, 49.
9. DSU arts. 1.1, 2.1, 4, 7, 17; see also G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and International
Relations Theory: An Analysis of the World Trade Organization, 44 DUKE L. J. 829, 849-53 (1995).
10. See DSU arts. 3.7, 4.
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establishment of a dispute settlement panel after sixty days of the request for
consultations, or within the sixty-day period if the parties jointly determine that
consultations are unsuccessful.l The first level of review is conducted by panels
established by the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), 12 with a final level of review
conducted by the Appellate Body.' 3  Consensus among member states is not
required to adopt decisions by the Appellate Body or DSB. Consensus is only
necessary in case the DSB vetoes panel formation, rejects adoption of panel
findings, or rejects judgments of the Appellate Body. 14 Under the contemporary
system, only member states may raise dispute claims or defend against claims
raised by other complaining member states. 
15
Remedies available to complainants may be found in Article 22 of the DSU. 6
Compensation and suspension of concessions are the chief remedies for successful
complainants if respondents fail to implement panel findings after a reasonable
time. However, these remedies are also described as last resorts. 17 Additionally,
monetary damages are not specifically contemplated. Exclusion of monetary
damages precludes damages for anticipated failures by respondents to comply with
Appellate Body decisions, and eliminates the possibility of attorneys' fees.' 8
B. Roles for non-state actors in the WTO Dispute Settlement System
Although the DSU only provides for dispute settlement among member states,
non-state actors such as firms and industry lobbying groups already play a
significant role in the way that member states initiate and resolve trade disputes
under the DSU. 19 As Gregory Shaffer has stated, "public and private actors depend
on each other's resources... [and] have also adapted public-private collaborative
governance modes to enforce WTO law and otherwise advance their interests....
11. Id. art. 4.7.
12. Id. arts. 6, 8, 11-12.
13. Id. arts. 6, 17.
14. Id. arts. 16.4, 17.14.
15. See id. arts. 2.1, 10, 17.4.
16. Id. art. 22.
17. Id. art. 22.1-22.2. Article 3, paragraph 7 also states: "In the absence of a mutually agreed
solution, the first objective of the dispute settlement mechanism is usually to secure the withdrawal of
the measures concerned ; [t]he provision of compensation should be resorted to only if the
immediate withdrawal of the measure is impracticable . . [t]he last resort which this Understanding
provides to the Member invoking the dispute settlement procedures is the possibility of suspending the
application of concessions or other obligations under the covered agreements on a discriminatory basis.
18. See Joel P. Trachtman, Private Parties in EC-US Dispute Settlement in the WTO: Toward
Intermediated Domestic Effect, in TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMIC DISPUTES: THE EU, THE US, AND THE
WTO 527, 536 (Emst-Ulrich Petersmann & Mark A. Pollack eds., 2003); Alan 0. Sykes, Public Versus
Private Enforcement of International Economic Law: Standing and Remedy, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 631,
641, 654 (2005). See also Thomas Sebastian, World Trade Organization Remedies and the Assessment
of Proportionality: Equivalence and Appropriateness, 48 HARV. INT'L L. J. 337, 338-40 (2007). See
also Alan Wm. Wolff, Remedy in WTO Dispute Settlement, in THE WTO: GOVERNANCE, DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT & DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 783, 807-08 (Merit E. Janow et. al. eds., 2008).
19. See GREGORY C. SHAFFER, DEFENDING INTERESTS: PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN WTO
LITIGATION 144-46 (2003).
20. Id. at 144.
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These "collaborative governance modes," also labeled public-private networks by
Gregory Shaffer, serve an important function in successful dispute settlement for
developed countries.2'
1. Private Actors in the United States and the European Union
Public-private networks integrate the interests of private actors and
government authorities. Public-private networks are an important tool that non-
state actors in the United States wield in addressing international trade disputes.
Unlike other developed countries, the "approach to public-private networks [in the
United States] tends to be more 'bottom-up,' with firms and trade associations
playing a proactive role. '22 Public-private networks in the United States center
around formal and informal channels for lobbying and consultation. Domestic
firms, industry associations, and trade groups directly petition representatives of
the U.S. government to combat perceived trade barriers and discriminatory policies
enacted by foreign governments.23 For some time, the WTO dispute settlement
system has been acknowledged as an option that U.S. companies might use to
combat trade-restricting policies enacted by foreign governments. WTO litigation
has been touted as "a powerful tool in opening foreign markets to U.S. companies"
which could "add significant value for companies seeking to penetrate promising
new markets., 24 Over time, collaborative public-private networks have become a
critical part of WTO dispute settlement strategy in the United States.
Non-state actors in the United States used formal and informal channels to
influence trade dispute settlement even before the United States joined the WTO.
For example, a meeting between U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor, the
president of the Chiquita Brands banana company, and former Senator Robert Dole
significantly impacted United States policy on the decision to join the WTO and to
initiate a long-running trade complaint against the European Communities (EC).
The meeting serves as an example of informal collaboration between senior
members of the U.S. government and industry leaders where both public and
private decision-makers influenced the course of United States trade policy and
trade dispute settlement.26 As a result of the informal agreement that arose among
participants of the meeting, political objectives of the Clinton Administration
regarding the WTO were advanced by Republican leaders in Congress. This
outcome was achieved because U.S. Trade Representative Kantor, as a senior
21. Id.
22. Id. at 6.
23. Id. at 19.
24. Homer E. Moyer, Jr. & Hal S. Shapiro, Are WTO Dispute Settlement Proceedings Right for
Your Company?, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 1998, at 53.
25. Although reference to the European Union is made throughout this article, European
Communities (EC) constitutes the legal name of the organization in Uruguay Round agreements and
consequently WTO dispute settlement proceedings. See J6m Sack, The European Community's
Membership of International Organizations, 32 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1227 (1995) (detailing
European Communities membership in the WTO); see also Rafael Leal-Arcas, Polycephalous Anatomy
of the EC in the WTO: An Analysis of Law and Practice, 19 FLA. J. INT'L L. 570, 576 nn.22-23 (2007).
26. See SHAFFER, supra note 19, at 23-24.
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official in the Clinton Administration, agreed to take up a trade dispute case
against the European Communities on behalf of Chiquita.z7
Formal methods that were intended to foster public-private cooperation have
also resulted in "collaborative arrangements" between non-state actors, the U.S.
Department of Commerce, and the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative over
28trade dispute claims. A significant legal mechanism was established as part of
the U.S. Trade Act of 1974. Under the Trade Act, the U.S. Trade Representative is
responsible for investigating and combating foreign trade barriers "in response to
petitions filed by private firms and trade associations....,, 29 Non-state actors in the
United States may draw attention to purported violations of trade law by other
WTO member states. As a result, those actors influence the types of complaints
that the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative eventually raises under the DSU.
30
Under Section 302 of the 1974 Trade Act, "[a]ny interested person may file a
petition... requesting that action be taken... and setting forth the allegations in
support of the request."'31 As such, non-state actors in the United States have
several ways to influence the course of U.S. dispute settlement. Non-state actors
play an integral role in detecting purported violations of international trade law.
Non-state actors also maintain political pressure to ensure that amenable outcomes
are, as near as possible, achieved by government representatives at the conclusion
of dispute settlement proceedings.
Although public-private networks in the European Union operate differently
from those in the United States, European businesses and authorities have also
benefited from increased levels of collaboration with respect to WTO dispute
claims and settlements. 33  The motivation to develop strong public-private
collaboration is in part based on the interest of authorities in the European Union to
appear responsive to the interests of European businesses due to competitiveness
between similarly-tasked domestic authorities in EU member states.34 Companies
in the EU are now able to register complaints with the Commission using a
centralized Complaint Register webpage. 35  The practice arose out of the
consolidation of the Market Access Unit, an organization charged with developing
27. See id. at 24.
28. See id. at 36-37, 144.
29. Id. at 21 (emphasis omitted).
30. See JAE WAN CHUNG, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 104 (2006)
(detailing the responsibilities of the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, including "[a]ll matters
within the WTO.").
31. 19 U.S.C. § 2412(a)(1) (2008).
32. See SHAFFER, supra note 19, at 39-40, 49, 60. For a generalized review of the political power
disparities between the United States and European Communities on the one handand developing WTO
member countries on the other throughout the dispute settlement process, see Andrea M. Ewart, Small
Developing States in the WTO: A Procedural Approach to Special and Differential Treatment through
Reforms to Dispute Settlement, 35 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 27, 34-37 (2007).
33. SHAFFER, supra note 19, at 65-66.
34. Gregory Shaffer, What's New in EU Trade Dispute Settlement?: Judicialization, Public-
Private Networks, and the WTO Legal Order, 13 J. EUR. PUB. POL'Y 832, 834, 840 (2006).
35. European Commission Market Access Database, Online Complaint Register,
http://mkaccdb.eu.int/madbbarriers/complaint-home.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2009).
2009
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
public-private networks and encouraging active trade dispute resolution.3 6 The
European Commission and EU Trade Directorate have been quite successful in
motivating European firms to communicate about potential violations by WTO
member states. For example, the Market Access Unit received five to ten new
contacts each month regarding alleged trade violations in 2005. 37 Proactive
development of relationships with non-state actors by the European Commission
Trade Directorate-General differs from the United States model because private
firms in Europe have been reluctant to engage with transnational authorities. 38 The
Trade Barrier Regulation has enabled European businesses to directly petition the
European Commission for an investigation of trade violations by WTO member
states, and has convinced non-state actors in the EU to work closely with European
Commission authorities to report potential barriers to trade.39
These efforts have coincided with developments in the law of the European
Union and expanded formal networks. Public-private networks have been
encouraged under Article 133 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community
of 1958, as amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam in May 1999.40 Under Article
133, the European Commission is empowered to seek informal approval from EU
member states prior to litigating alleged trade violations before dispute settlement
panels. 41 Although the straight-forward operation of Article 133 requires formal
consultation between the European Commission and a committee of
representatives from EU member states (known as the Article 133 Committee), the
defacto process involves direct consultation between representatives of European
industry and the European Commission, requiring only informal consent by a
majority of state representatives before the European Commission initiates WTO
trade dispute litigation.42
Formal legal mechanisms such as those provided under Article 133 and the
Trade Barrier Regulation have empowered European firms and industry
representatives to directly complain about foreign trade barriers to authorities in
the European Commission and work closely with European Commission
authorities to prepare trade litigation before formal dispute settlement commences
pursuant to the DSU.
4 3
An example of the way that public-pivate networks place developing
member states at a disadvantage involves disputes between the United States,
Indonesia, the EC, and Argentina over duties on footwear and apparel that were
promulgated by the Argentinean government in the late 1990S. 4 4 The United States
36. SHAFFER, supra note 19, at 69.
37. Shaffer, supra note 34, at 838.
38. SHAFFER, supra note 19, at 71-72, 101.
39. Id. at 74.
40. Id. at 75 n.26.
41. Shaffer, supra note 34, at 839.
42. SHAFFER, supra note 19, at 78-79.
43. Id. at 86; Shaffer, supra note 34, at 839.
44. See Moyer, Jr. & Shapiro, supra note 24, at 53; see also Request for Consultations by the
United States, Argentina-Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles, Apparel and other Items,
WT/DS56/1 (Oct. 15, 1996) [hereinafter DS56 Request for Consultations]. See Request for
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initiated a WTO complaint against Argentina regarding duties on imports in
October 1996.45 U.S. companies and the U.S. Trade Representative disputed the
application of duties on textile, apparel, and footwear imports by the Argentinean
government. The United States brought action under the DSU and successfully
litigated a complaint before a dispute panel.46
Non-state actors in the American export industry became noticeably involved
in the course of dispute settlement after the Argentinean government imposed
duties on footwear from non-MERCOSUR countries.47 The president of the
Footwear Distributors and Retailers of America made a public statement to the
effect that the organization "[would] utilize all available means to fight
[Argentinean duties on footwear] .,,48 Efforts by representatives of the industry did
not stop with the U.S. Trade Representative, but also included efforts to influence
the behavior of other governments, specifically the government of Indonesia.
Lobbying by representatives of the U.S. footwear industry resulted in a separate
complaint by Indonesia against Argentina.49  The United States and Indonesia
sought consultations with representatives of the government of Argentina to protest
duties which allegedly prevented footwear exports from entering Argentinean
markets. 50 Just as members of the footwear export industry in the United States
petitioned the U.S. Trade Representative to formally dispute Argentinean duties on
imported footwear, European industry associations were similarly able to petition
the European Commission to take action against the leather export industries of
Japan and Argentina following release of a study on the impact of foreign trade
barriers to the European leather industry.5 1
Following requests for formal dispute settlement by the EC, the U.S., and
Indonesia, representatives of the U.S. footwear industry continued to document the
actions of the Argentinean government and informed the U.S. Department of
52Commerce of their continuing interest in the matter. At the end of 2002, the
Senior Vice President for the American Apparel and Footwear Association
Consultations by the United States, Argentina-Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, WT/DS164/l
(Mar. 4, 1999) [hereinafter DS 164 Request for Consultations]; Request for Consultations by Indonesia,
Argentina-Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear, WT/DS123/l/Add.1 (Jan. 11, 1999)
[hereinafter DS123 Request for Consultations]; Appellate Body Report, Argentina-Safeguard Measures
on Imports ofFootwear, WT/DS121/AB/R (Dec. 14, 1999) [hereinafter DS121].
45. See DS56 Request for Consultations para. 2; see also John Maggs, U.S. Set to Penalize
Argentina for Piracy; Duty-Free Trade Imports Targeted as Administration's Patience Ebbs, J. COM.,
Jan. 6, 1997, at 1A; see also Moyer, Jr. & Shapiro, supra note 24, at 53.
46. Moyer, Jr. & Shapiro, supra note 24, at 53.
47. See Maggs, supra note 45; see generally DS164 Request for Consultations, supra note 44.
48. Maggs, supra note 45, at IA.
49. See DS123 Request for Consultations, supra note 44; see also Government Considering
Taking Argentina to WTO Panel, JAKARTA POST, Sept. 30, 1998, at 8.
50. DS164 Request for Consultations, supra note 44, para. 2; DS123 Request for Consultations,
supra note 44, para. 3.
51. SHAFFER, supra note 19, at 88.
52. See Letter from Stephen Lamar, Senior Vice President, Am. Apparel & Footwear Assoc. to
U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Office of Trade & Econ. Analysis (Dec. 13, 2002), available at
https://www.apparelandfootwear.org/letters/nteaafacomments021216.pdf.
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addressed a memorandum to the Office of Trade and Economic Analysis under the
U.S. Department of Commerce concerning duties imposed by the Argentinean
government that allegedly continued to violate WTO obligations.53 Although no
panel was composed for the U.S.-Argentina case, 54 and the Indonesian government
decided not to pursue its request for a dispute settlement panel, 55 the example
nevertheless demonstrates how well-connected non-state actors, in this case
representatives from the U.S. footwear industry, utilized formal and informal
methods to convince WTO member states to initiate dispute settlement
proceedings against one developing country. The example is not unique. In other
WTO member countries, non-state actors have recognized the influence exercised
by strong public-private networks in the United States and the European Union.
As a result, responses in developing countries such as Brazil have included efforts
by non-state actors to more assertively influence dispute settlement.
56
2. Challenges for Private Non-state Actors in Developing Countries
Formal and informal networks that enable non-state actors to exercise
influence over dispute settlement are not readily available in developing
countries.57  Although examples suggest that non-state actors have begun to
organize public-private collaboration, those efforts may not be enough to ensure
that the WTO dispute settlement system works for developing countries.
Even if non-state actors established basic infrastructure for public-private
networks within developing WTO member states, non-state actors would still face
significant obstacles before they could actively assert and defend their interests.
Developing countries that have recently joined the WTO occupy the least
favorable position with respect to their ability to secure favorable outcomes in
dispute settlement. Resources necessary for establishing public-private networks
in developing countries are limited. If resources were expended to develop public-
private networks, it is uncertain that non-state actors would ultimately exert the
same influence in WTO dispute litigation and overall WTO policy-making that
was pioneered by private actors in the United States. An alternative to more
effectively level the playing field for non-state actors in developing countries
53. Id.
54. World Trade Organization, Summary of the Dispute to Date, Dispute DS 164 Argentina--
Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu e/cases-e
/ds164 e.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2008).
55. World Trade Organization, Summary of the Dispute to Date, Dispute DS 123 Argentina--
Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear DS, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispue/cases-e
/ds123_e.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2008).
56. Gregory Shaffer, Can WTO Technical Assistance and Capacity-Building Serve Developing
Countries?, 23 WIS. INT'L L. J. 643, 680 (2005); see also Gregory Shaffer et al., The Trials of Winning
at the WTO: What Lies Behind Brazil's Success, 41 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 383, 446 (2008).
57. See Gregory Shaffer, How to Make the WTO Dispute Settlement System Work for Developing
Countries: Some Proactive Developing Country Strategies, in TOWARDS A DEVELOPMENT-SUPPORTIVE
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM IN THE WTO, INT'L CTR. FOR TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DEV.,
RESOURCE PAPER NO. 5, at 1, 27-29 (Victor Mosoti ed., 2003), available at
http://www.ictsd.org/pubs/ictsd-series/resource-papers/DSU-2003.pdf, see also Shaffer, supra note 56,
at 650; Chad P. Bown & Bernard M. Hoekman, WTO Dispute Settlement and the Missing Developing
Country Cases: Engaging the Private Sector, 8 J. INT'L ECON L. 861, 871 (2005).
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constitutes the central focus of this article. Bypassing public-private networks not
only serves as a foundational premise of the proposal discussed in the later parts of
this article, but also distinguishes the proposal from alternatives explored by other
authors who have considered this subject. The proposal calls for changes that
would affect all WTO member countries, and is not predicated solely on attempts
by non-state actors or government authorities in developing countries to change the
WTO dispute settlement system. Such a systemic alteration to the dispute
settlement system has the potential to improve the ability of non-state actors to
advance their interests from a top-down, organizational perspective. By
considering the challenges facing non-state actors in developing countries that
have recently joined the WTO, the advantages of modifying dispute settlement
with consequences for the rights of private actors under the DSU will be
illustrated, along with discussion about why potential disadvantages are not
significant enough to undermine the rationale for implementing modifications.
1II. PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION AS A STRATEGY TO BENEFIT DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES
A. Basic Background to the Proposal
The dispute settlement system of the WTO provides for dispute settlement
exclusively between member states. However, enabling non-state actors to assert
complaints and independently settle trade disputes would confer substantial
benefits upon non-state actors in developing countries, particularly those in new
WTO member states. Various proposals to provide non-state actors with direct
access to dispute settlement proceedings were contemplated from the very
beginnings of the WTO.58 Past proposals were based on amendments to the DSU
that would enable firms, industry organizations, and other private entities that have
been adversely affected by trade policies to initiate complaint procedures under the
58. See Steve Charnovitz, Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in the World Trade
Organization, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L EcON. L. 331, 348-50 (1996) (focusing on the ability of NGOs to file
amicus briefs as a practical proposal and identifying standing for NGOs as an interesting future legal
question); Philip M. Moremen, Costs and Benefits of Adding A Private Right of Action to the World
Trade Organization and the Montreal Protocol Dispute Resolution Systems, II UCLA J. INT'L L. &
FOREIGN AFF. 189, 189, 191, 203-04 (2006) (concluding that private rights of action in the WTO
dispute settlement system would ultimately force states to defect from the WTO trade system)
[hereinafter Moremen--Costs and Benefits]; Andrea K. Schneider, Democracy and Dispute Resolution:
Individual Rights in International Trade Organizations, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L EcON. L. 587, 628, 631-32
(1998); Schleyer, supra note 7, at 2277, 2294, 2296, 2308-09 (arguing in favor of private standing and a
commission to filter "meritless claims" and mitigate political disturbances between member states);
Shell, supra note 9, at 903, 910, 913; Shell, supra note 3, at 377-78. See also Philip M. Moremen,
International Private Rights of Action: A Cost-Benefit Framework, 8 SAN DIEGO INT'L L. J. 5, 14, 31
(2006) (assessing the costs and benefits of promoting private rights of action in international law);
Philip M. Nichols, Extension of Standing in World Trade Organization Disputes to Nongovernment
Parties, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L EcON. L. 295, 302-03 (1996) (arguing against a proposal to expand WTO
standing to private parties which would enable them to argue before the DSB and Appellate Body);
Sykes, supra note 18, at 641 (asserting that negative responses to the participation of private parties as
amicus curiae in WTO disputes indicates private standing would not be supported by WTO member
states).
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DSU.59 As Gregory Shaffer succinctly describes, "[non-state actors] would act as
private attorneys general to ensure governments' respect of WTO obligations.
They would hold rights analogous to those held by private parties against state
legislation under the commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution, and against
European member state legislation under Article 28 of the EC Treaty."
60
The proposal outlined in this article resembles past proposals to improve the
ability of developing WTO member states to utilize dispute settlement procedures
in some respects. Under this proposal, non-state actors would have a right to
independently consider whether policies enacted by WTO member states violated
international trade law. After determining that a violation had indeed taken place
and impacted their businesses, non-state actors would also have the choice to
initiate adjudication of alleged violations through the WTO dispute settlement
system, instead of being limited to presenting their concerns to domestic
authorities responsible for asserting trade dispute claims. Adjudication of alleged
violations initiated by non-state actors would be predicated upon challenging the
policies and activities of WTO member states. Non-state actors would be
considered parties negatively affected by policies and practices of WTO member
states in violation of obligations under international trade law. This outcome
would logically follow from evaluating the current process of WTO dispute
settlement, where member states challenge trade measures enacted by other
member states that negatively impact non-state actors and constituents. Practically
speaking, these reforms would reduce the importance of public-private
collaboration between private actors and government representatives, providing
non-state actors in developing countries with a way to directly challenge trade
measures that impede their interests.
B. Practical Features of the Proposal
The proposal in this article differs from other works that advocate the ability
of non-state actors to independently litigate WTO dispute settlement claims. First,
the proposal is intended to keep reforms of the DSU at a minimum while
maximizing the ability of non-state actors to challenge policies and practices
implemented by WTO member states. Second, this article explores the benefits of
the proposal with emphasis on the ramifications for non-state actors in developing
countries. Third, the proposal supports the expansion of an existing but little-used
feature of the WTO dispute settlement system. Non-state actors, particularly from
developing countries that have recently joined the WTO, are the intended
beneficiaries of the proposal and would have an opportunity to independently raise
their own claims against alleged violations by WTO member states before
59. See Trachtman, supra note 18, at 542-45; Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Why Rational Choice
Theory Requires A Multilevel Constitutional Approach to International Economic Law, 2008 U. ILL. L.
REV. 359, 380 (arguing that domestic courts could offer remedies for violations of WTO rules);
Ragosta, supra note 2, at 746-48; Joel P. Trachtman, The WTO Cathedral, 43 STANFORD J. INT'L L.
127, 162 (2007) (remarking on the potential use of a WTO attorney general that would be responsible
for asserting trade complaints on the basis of public interest for all member states).
60. SHAFFER, supra note 19, at 144.
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arbitration panels. 61 Under the proposal, the DSU would be amended to create
arbitration panels to adjudicate alleged violations. Non-state actors in all WTO
member states would have the right to request the formation of an arbitration
panel. Non-state actors would initially request informal consultations with WTO
member states that have implemented policies with allegedly negative impacts.
This would preserve the imperative toward informal dispute resolution that has
been enshrined in the DSU.
If consultations failed to resolve disputes, complainants would be able to
petition for an arbitration panel under a slightly modified version of DSU Article
25. In its current form, Article 25 provides for the establishment of arbitration
panels to resolve trade disputes following procedures that have been mutually
accepted by member states.62 Under this proposal, Article 25 would be modified to
provide arbitral proceedings between WTO member states and non-state actors
modeled after other forms of international arbitration. A key difference between
other forms of international arbitration and this proposal is that arbitrators would
be determining whether WTO member states violated obligations listed in Annex 1
agreements, and whether non-state petitioners would be entitled to remedies from
offending WTO member states. The process of settling disputes through
arbitration bridges the gap between the current WTO dispute settlement system
and international legal processes that may already be familiar to public and private
actors in many countries. Examples include international arbitration proceedings
where public and private actors commonly resolve a wide array of commercial and
economic disputes.63 If the arbitration panel formed under Article 25 concluded in
favor of non-state complainants, the decision that a violation had taken place
would be binding on non-state complainants and WTO member state respondents,
just as an arbitral award binds parties in other forms of international arbitration.64
In the case of a favorable final decision, non-state complainants would seek
alteration of problematic policies as a remedy. The suggested reform would
prevent unsustainable growth in the number of disputes resolved by dispute
settlement panels, and provide a decentralized approach to handling a potentially
large growth in the total number of disputes resolved under the DSU.
Although the process may provide benefits for non-state actors with minimal
changes to the DSU, it would also provide significant benefits for actors in the
61. See generally Shaffer, supra note 56 (arguing that development and the interests of developing
countries can be strengthened by greater participation in the WTO).
62. DSU art. 25.2.
63. John Beechey, International Arbitration: Evolving National Laws and Institutional Processes,
in AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION & ADR 21,
23 (Thomas E. Carbonneau et al. eds., 2006) (arguing that governments, arbitration practitioners, and
arbitral institutions recognize international arbitration as the preferred means of resolving international
commercial disputes as long as arbitration "remains relevant to the needs of international commerce.").
64. The first arbitration under Article 25.2 of the DSU was conducted in November 2001. See
Award of the Arbitrators, United States-Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act-Resource to
Arbitration under Article 25 of the DSU, 21, WT/DS160/ARB25/1 (Nov. 9, 2001). Three arbitrators
appointed by the Director-General determined that jurisdiction was proper "subject to mutual agreement
of the parties." Id. 2.4.
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developing world. To explore the reasons why the proposal would benefit
developing countries, a case study involving a country that recently joined the
WTO, Vietnam, is examined in Part IV.
IV. CASE STUDY: VIETNAM'S GARMENT EXPORT INDUSTRY
Vietnam's garment export industry provides an ideal subject for considering
the advantages of private rights of action under the DSU. Vietnam joined the
WTO on January 11, 2007, becoming the 150th member state of the WTO.65
According to information gathered by the WTO, Vietnam did not appear as a
complainant or as a respondent in any WTO dispute proceeding in its first year of
WTO membership, although it did participate as a third party in two dispute
settlement cases in 2007.66
Vietnam exported US$8 billion in goods to the United States in 2006.67
Vietnamese garment exporters earned US$5.8 billion in 2006, with US$3.1 billion
generated from export trade with the United States. 68 Export manufacturing is very
important to the Vietnamese economy. Over sixty percent of the workers in the
top 200 Vietnamese firms are employed by 42 footwear, textile, garment, and
69
seafood processing companies. Vietnamese firms are eager to compete in the
global market for clothing, fabrics, housewares, and sundry manufactured fiber
goods.70 However, Vietnamese firms are not entering the world export market on
the same footing as some of their competitors, particularly those based in
developed countries such as the United States. Unlike politically-connected
garment exporting firms and industry associations that command the resources
necessary to advance their interests in global trade, garment firms based in
65. Press Release, World Trade Org., Viet Nam joins WTO with Director-General's tribute for
true grit, (Jan. 11, 2007), http://www.wto.org/english/newse/news07_e/acc_vietnam-1 ijan07_e.htm
(last visited Nov. 9, 2008).
66. World Trade Organization, Dispute Settlement Gateway--Disputes by Country,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispue/dispu-by-country-e.htm (last visited on Nov. 9, 2008);
World Trade Organization, Member Information-Viet Nam and the WTO,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/countries-e/vietnam-e.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2008); Panel
Report, United States--Measures Relating to Shrimp from Thailand, 1.9, WT/DS343/R (Feb. 29,
2008), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispue/cases-e/ds343_e.htm; Request for
Consultations by the United States, India--Additional and Extra-Additional Duties on Imports from the
United States, WT/DS360/1 (Mar. 3, 2007), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e
/dispu.e/cases e/ds360_e.htm.
67. Trade and Tourism Promotion Center of Phu Tho Province, Vietnam Exports to US Expected
to Rise 30%, (Feb. 7, 2007), http://www.phuthotrade-tourism.gov.vn/Newsen.asp?Subid=
13&LanglD=2&NewslD=385&MenuID=O (last visited Oct. 15, 2008); Press Release, World Trade
Org., Working Party Completes Viet Nam's Membership Talks, (Oct. 26, 2006),
http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/news06_e/acc-vietnam_26oct06_e.btm (last visited Nov. 9, 2008).
68. VIVEK SURI & VIET TUAN DINH, TAKING STOCK: AN UPDATE ON VIETNAM'S ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENTS 6 (2007), available at http://go.worldbank.org/OX50TFE870.
69. SCOTT CHESHIER & JAGO PENROSE, TOP 200: INDUSTRIAL STRATEGIES OF VIET NAM'S
LARGEST FIRMS 6 (2007), available at http://www.undp.org.vn/undpLive/digitalAssets/7884
_Top200_e.pdf.
70. Asem Connect, Vietnam Trade Information Center,
http://asemconnectvietnam.gov.vn/Companies (last visited Nov. 9, 2008) (select from "Activities" to
access firms in specific export industries).
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Vietnam lack the same resources and level of organization. As the country
prepared to join the WTO, Vietnamese firms faced a steep learning curve with
respect to understanding the complexities of the dispute settlement system. Instead
of preparing to actively exercise influence in the WTO dispute settlement system,
Vietnamese firms were advised to avoid trade disputes and anticipate possible
challenges from WTO member states. For example, in 2007, the Mutual Trade
Policy and Assistance Program (MUTRAP) toured Vietnam to provide background
information on WTO dispute settlement and assist participants in gaining
experience to "avoid possible trade disputes. ' 71
More importantly, government officials in Vietnam lack comparable
resources to those applied by the U.S. Trade Representative and U.S. Department
of Commerce to monitor compliance of trade law regulations, solicit complaints
from private parties, and initiate complaints against foreign governments for
violations of international trade law.72 Prior to WTO accession in early 2007,
scholars highlighted Vietnam's need to "train and establish a team of highly
competent, multidisciplinary experts (covering a wide range of expertise including
English law, economics, and accounting) to study the anti-dumping law and to
prepare for any potential anti-dumping disputes against Vietnam at the WTO.
' 73
WTO accession was only one of the challenges facing state and non-state
actors in Vietnam. Vietnam's rapid transition from a top-down command
economy to global exporter left the country at a distinct disadvantage with respect
to public-private collaboration, limiting the country's readiness to successfully
initiate and defend against dispute settlement claims.74 Beginning in 1986,
Vietnam undertook fundamental political and economic reforms labeled doi moi
(or "new changes") with the goal of transitioning the economy away from a central
command model and towards a market-based model. As a result of the
considerable range of internal political and economic reforms, the Vietnamese
government no longer exercised direct control over the economy, but retained
influence through state-owned enterprises.76 The reforms also included a transition
towards formalized state oversight in the operation of the economy. Prior to the
71. WTO dispute settlement seminar held in HCM City, VIETNAM NEWS BRIEF, May 18, 2007.
72. See Press Release, Vietnam Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Local Lawyers Taught to Deal with
WTO Disputes Told to Settle Early (Nov. 10, 2007),
http://www.mofa.gov.vn/en/tt-baochi/nr060726082726/ns071113101427 (last visited Nov. 9, 2008).
73. Binh Tran-Nam, Vietnam: Preparations for WTO Membership, 2007 SOUTHEAST ASIAN AFF.
398,401.
74. See CIVICUS WORLD ALLIANCE FOR CITIZEN PARTICIPATION, THE EMERGING CIVIL
SOCIETY: AN INITIAL ASSESSMENT OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN VIETNAM 10 (Irene Norlund, ed. 2006),
available at http://www.un.org.vn/undp/undp/docs/2006/06%20undp%203 3120e%2001 e%20
Civicuc%20report.pdf (describing historical and contemporary conditions limiting the input of the
private sector in Vietnam's economic development).
75. See Valerie Clemen, Note, A Briefing for American Businesses Looking to Invest in Vietnam, 2
HASTINGS Bus. L.J. 507, 509 (2006); U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME [UNDP], UNDP VIET NAM POLICY
DIALOGUE PAPER 2006/3, THE STATE AS INVESTOR: EQUITISATION, PRIVATISATION, AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF SOES IN VIET NAM 2 (2006), [hereinafter UNDP DIALOGUE PAPER 2006/3]
available at http://www.undp.org.vn/undpLive/digitalAssets/6155-HP-paper__E-.pdf.
76. See UNDP DIALOGUE PAPER 2006/3, supra note 75, at 1.
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initiation of doi moi, the actual weakness of the state's involvement in the
Vietnamese economy was masked by ideological primacy of the state in central
economic planning.77 Despite Vietnam's successful economic diversification and
privatization efforts, cooperation and interaction between the Vietnamese
government and Vietnam's fledgling civil society and private business interests
still needed considerable development, particularly in the context of Vietnam's
single-party political system. The struggle for political accountability and
competent state involvement has included a fight to reduce latent corruption that
flourished in lieu of organized political opposition to Vietnam's one-party national
government. 78  Although avenues for dialogue between various levels of
government and members of the business community exist, a one-way
"monologue" has effectively prevented business representatives from fully
communicating their complaints to government authorities. 79 This barrier is
related to the government's interest in retaining significant levels of control and
involvement as the major investor and capital-holding entity in a variety of
economic sectors. 80 As a result of government control over industries and large
firms in the Vietnamese economy, significant impediments to public-private
collaboration between the government and private industry have persisted
following Vietnam's accession to the WTO.81 For example, a 2007 survey of
77. Id. at 2.
78. See CIVICUS WORLD ALLIANCE FOR CITIZEN PARTICIPATION, supra note 74, at II ("In the
last decade, Vietnam has experienced an active integration into the world economy and a multiplication
of organizations within all fields of activity. The [Stakeholder Assessment Group] assessed state
effectiveness as high given Vietnam's level of development. However, the general level of corruption
is also deemed very high and causes problems even within organisations that handle large budgets.").
See also Clemen, supra note 75, at 521.
79. GTZ-MPI SME Development Program, Provincial Business Dialogue (Sept. 17, 2007),
http://www.sme-gtz.org.vn/index.php?option=com alfadocman&&lang=enBG (select "2007" from
dropdown menu on upper right corner of the screen).
80. See UNDP DIALOGUE PAPER 2006/3, supra note 75, at 10, 23; see also Martin Gainsborough,
Globalisation and the State Revisited: A View from Provincial Vietnam, 37 J. CONTEMP. ASIA 1, 14
(2007) ("Similar reservations underlie some of the arguments made about the strength of international
institutions in relation to the state. [Writers] cite scholars who view state power as increasingly
'juxtaposed' with the *expanding jurisdiction of institutions of international governance' and the
constraints and obligations of international law, citing the activities of the World Trade Organisation
(WTO) as an example .... However, this.., seems inappropriate when trying to capture the influence
of transnational actors in Lao Cai and Tay Ninh [provinces], who, like their counterparts in the foreign
business community, are as inclined to highlight the obstacles to their activities put in their way by the
state, including at the subnational level. This was as commonplace for the World Bank as it was for
international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) .... ").
81. CHESHIER & PENROSE, supra note 69, at 40. Impediments have also affected the effectiveness
of collaboration between authorities and local entrepreneurs. See also John Gillespie, Localizing
Global Rules: Public Participation in Lawmaking in Vietnam, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 673, 674
(2008) ("Evidence suggests that Vietnamese lawmakers are enacting a commercial legislative
framework that primarily reflects international treaty provisions and the interests of an elite group of
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and foreign investors. Most domestic entrepreneurs, on the other hand,
struggle to communicate their preferences to lawmakers.")
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Vietnam's largest domestic firms indicated that the Vietnamese government lacked
the organizational resources to effectively support the expansion of Vietnamese
firms in foreign export markets:
Industrial firms have worked hard to establish themselves in foreign
markets. The success of some [General Corporations] ... suggest that
the state has a role to play. Industry associations are also playing an
increasingly important role.... However, more needs to be done,
particularly in export markets themselves. The government can
increase the effectiveness of representatives overseas to raise the profile
of Vietnamese industries as a whole. The government can also provide
assistance to firms seeking to meet regulations and standards specific to
individual markets.
82
Historical obstacles to collaboration between government ministries and
business leaders in the garment industry have been exacerbated by challenges
posed by Vietnam's accession to the WTO. In order to join the WTO, traditional
subsidies to Vietnam's textile and garment industries were reduced . At the same
time, tariffs against imported textiles and footwear were substantially reduced.
84
Although Vietnamese garment exports surged for four months following
Vietnam's WTO accession, the rapid pace of change facing the garment export
industry reinforced the observation that establishing private-public collaboration
between the Vietnamese government and non-state members of the Vietnamese
export industry would be very difficult, even under the best of circumstances.
8 5
One indicator of the government's struggle to develop adequate resources for
successfully litigating WTO trade disputes already suggests that the government
may lack resources needed to fully develop effective public-private networks in the
future. The Vietnamese Ministry of Justice announced a program in early 2008 to
train Vietnamese experts in law and international trade at the cost of US$6.8
million.86 Given the level of experience possessed by domestic legal experts in
Vietnam during the year of the country's WTO accession, it would be inaccurate to
say that the level of sophistication required to successfully manage an international
trade claim existed in Vietnam at the time of accession, and that the situation
would be better for developing countries that plan on joining the WTO in the
future.
82. CHESHIER & PENROSE, supra note 69, at 40 (emphasis added). General Corporations are "a
form of business group in which an apex or umbrella organisation supervises the activities of member
companies" within the same industrial sector. Id. at 10.
83. Vu Long, Textile Support Ending with WTO, VIETNAM INVESTMENT REV., June 19-25, 2006,
at 4.
84. INT'L MONETARY FUND, COUNTRY REPORT No. 07/385, VIETNAM: SELECTED ISSUES 3-4
(2007), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2007/crO7385.pdf.
85. For an overview of the difficulties faced by small and medium enterprises in building
influential connections with Vietnamese authorities through business associations, see generally
Gillespie, supra note 81, at 683, 690.
86. Ministry unveils plan to internationally train JDs, VIETNAM NET BRIDGE, Feb. 15, 2008,
http://english.vietnamnet.vn/biz/2008/02/768727 (last visited Nov. 9, 2008).
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By taking into consideration the challenges faced by Vietnamese government
ministries and members of the garment industry following WTO accession, it is
reasonable to conclude that neither private nor public actors in Vietnam were
especially well-positioned to lodge complaints under the DSU or challenge
violations of international trade law at the WTO.87
In a hypothetical situation where firms, industry associations, and cooperative
groups in the Vietnamese garment industry sought to challenge trade barriers
erected by the United States or other WTO member states, what recourse would
those organizations have for effectively initiating a complaint? For instance,
various medium-sized garment export firms in Vietnam may be forced to curtail
imports to the United States. Anti-dumping policies by the United States would
force garment manufacturers to limit exports to the United States after the
imposition of heightened tariff rates. 88 Indeed, additional tariffs on Vietnamese
exports may have been an outcome of a review conducted in May 2008, when the
U.S. Department of Commerce concluded that Vietnamese manufacturers were not
dumping clothing, apparel and unfinished textile products on United States
markets.89 However, if the Department of Commerce concluded differently and
the United States raised tariff rates, Vietnam would have grounds to dispute the
decision made by trade officials in the United States.
Just as in the United States and other WTO member countries, non-state
actors in Vietnam would work to make their complaint known to representatives of
the Vietnamese government. Representatives for Vietnam would then have
authority and discretion to formally initiate dispute settlement proceedings
pursuant to the DSU.90 As explained above, formal and informal methods that
would otherwise allow Vietnamese garment exporters to petition the country's
legal representatives were in developmental stages during the first year of
Vietnam's WTO accession. Programs designed by international experts to educate
local actors in the Vietnamese economy suggest that the amount of growth which
would have been necessary to match the sophistication of public-private networks
in the United States would have been quite substantial. 91 Although public-private
networks in Vietnam would doubtlessly increase in size and sophistication over
time, resources were not available at the time of accession to provide for complete
preservation of the interests of private actors in Vietnam. The absence of methods
87. China's experience as a newcomer to the WTO supports the concept that new WTO member
states are not generally prepared to aggressively pursue dispute settlement. See generally Junji
Nakagawa, No More Negotiated Deals?. Settlement of Trade and Investment Disputes in East Asia, 10
J. INT'L EcON. L. 837, 853 (2007).
88. This has occurred between the EU and exporters in the leather footwear industry. Minh
Quang, EU duties severely cramp shoes industry, THANH NIEN NEWS, Aug. 31, 2008,
http://www.thanhniennews.com/business/?catid=2&newsid=41615 (visited Sept. 10, 2008).
89. See Press Release, Int'l Trade Admin., Commerce Completes Second Review of Vietnam
Import Data, (May 6, 2008) http://www.trade.gov/press/press-releases/2008/vietnam050608.asp. A
similar situation has taken place with respect to Vietnamese shoe exports and the European Union.
90. SURI & DINH, supra note 68, at 8 (discussing a complaint by the Vietnamese steel industry
about Chinese dumping).
91. See Shaffer, supra note 57, at 39.
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for effectively organizing affected industry members and challenging foreign trade
policies would have left firms and industry groups in Vietnam vulnerable,
particularly during the first year of Vietnam's WTO membership.
V. ARBITRATION AS A SOLUTION FOR NON-STATE ACTORS
The challenges faced by developing countries like Vietnam and private actors
in particular export industries are compounded by the vagaries of social, economic,
and political history that are unique to each WTO member state, as illustrated in
the case of Vietnam.
Instead of solely supporting the efforts of trade officials in developing
countries to create formal and informal methods of public-private collaboration
that would allow exporters to effectively petition the government to seek relief at
the WTO, an alternative method allowing non-state actors to directly challenge
policies that violate international trade law would provide several distinct
advantages. The advantages that would accrue to developing countries may be
considered within several conceptually distinct categories.
A. Equality
The most important set of advantages is based on the concept of equality.
Non-state actors in developing countries would be placed on an equal footing with
well-organized public-private networks utilized by private actors in developed
countries. Allowing non-state actors to independently resolve alleged violations
would enable them to organize support, consolidate resources, and obtain private
legal counsel as a way to challenge discriminatory policies and practices by WTO
member states. Arbitration would help non-state actors coordinate affected parties
seeking to challenge policies of WTO member states that violate international
trade law, especially when domestic authorities do not have the resources or
experience to manage a similar campaign. 92 Even if non-state actors struggled to
effectively organize opposition to trade policies enacted by developed countries
such as the United States, the opportunity for private actors to initiate dispute
settlement claims would nevertheless formally equalize their standing with private
actors from WTO members like the EU and the United States.
Adjudication of alleged violations would also prevent developed states from
disregarding their obligations as member states of the WTO. Powerful WTO
member states lengthen dispute settlement proceedings to frustrate the ability of
member states with fewer resources to sustain dispute settlement claims.93 For
instance, the United States pursued this strategy with respect to textile safeguard
disputes with Costa Rica and Pakistan in the late 1990s and early years of the
twenty-first century.94 Reforming the dispute settlement system may eliminate the
value that developed countries derive from foot-dragging tactics. With much
greater numbers of potential non-state complainants and a greater number of
92. See Schneider, supra note 58, at 629 (suggesting that private parties need not rely on states or
external oversight in deciding when it is appropriate to raise a complaint).
93. Shaffer, supra note 57, at 14-15, 19, 39.
94. Id. at 39-40.
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potential cases to manage, powerful WTO member states may find it more costly
and time-consuming to ward off disputes from a much larger and diverse range of
complainants. Foot-dragging would also become more costly because authorities
in developed states would be forced to grapple with an increased number of
complaints about alleged violations and an accumulation of unresolved cases.
B. Independent Decisions by Non-state Actors
Non-state actors in the developing world would gain an advantage by
exercising independent authority over the decision to initiate complaints over
alleged violations of international trade law. Instead of working to convince
domestic and ministerial authorities to initiate WTO complaints, non-state actors
could decide to independently act upon substantial trade infringements and would
exercise the initiative to decide whether formal arbitration best suited their needs
and interests.
Providing all non-state actors with the ability to participate in dispute
settlement would avoid the politically-charged task of distinguishing between
special rights granted to private actors in developing and least-developed WTO
member states.95  Although non-state actors in developed countries would be
afforded the same opportunity to challenge alleged violations in the WTO dispute
settlement system, many of those actors already exercise considerable influence
over trade dispute settlement. 96 As a result, private actors worldwide would have
similar opportunities to independently challenge policies that violate member
states' obligations under international trade agreements without being hindered by
historical circumstances particular to each WTO member state.
C. Credibility and Transparency in the WTO system
Adjudication before arbitration panels would also bolster the credibility and
transparency of the WTO dispute settlement system for a number of reasons. If
this proposal were adopted, the WTO dispute settlement system would involve a
far larger range of actors as potential complainants.97 This would likely increase
the total number of complaints, leading to an overall increase in the amount of
scrutiny directed at the trade practices of all WTO member states.98 This would
also result in an overall increase in available information on trade policies enacted
by WTO member states. An increase in the available information on international
trade policies would result in greater overall transparency in the WTO dispute
settlement system. WTO dispute settlement would also become more transparent
because affected parties would have the opportunity to gain first-hand knowledge
through involvement in adjudication. WTO dispute settlement would gain
credibility not only as a result of direct participation by non-state actors, but also
because the dispute settlement system would be more responsive to those who are
directly affected by final decisions under the DSU. As a result of greater
involvement by affected actors, along with greater visibility for international trade
95. See id. at 13, 40-41.
96. See supra text accompanying notes 20-56.
97. See Moremen--Costs and Benefits, supra note 58, at 189, 207-08.
98. See e.g. Shell, supra note 3, at 377-78.
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dispute settlement, the WTO would become more transparent and credible to those
who are most profoundly affected by trade policies and practices of WTO member
states. 99
D. Counterarguments
Although participation in trade dispute settlement would confer benefits for
private non-state actors in developing countries, arguments may be raised
suggesting that reforms would do little to remove the obstacles facing non-state
actors in developing countries.
1. Scarcity of Resources Available to Non-state Actors
Public finances, political capital, and sustained levels of expert attention must
be spent in significant quantities by ministerial authorities to commence dispute
settlement proceedings under the DSU. Still greater resources must be spent to
successfully conclude a full course of WTO dispute settlement. All member states
of the WTO struggle to allocate resources in the most efficient and effective
manner possible to preserve and assert interests in WTO dispute settlement
proceedings. Non-state actors, especially those in new WTO member states, are
unlikely to possess the same quantity of resources available to state ministries
responsible for WTO matters. The logic of allowing non-state actors to
independently litigate WTO complaints may seem weak, particularly if those
actors are materially, politically, and experientially unprepared to independently
challenge policies of WTO member states. 100 However, if non-state actors were
provided the opportunity to directly contemplate the merits of formal arbitration,
aided by affordable private counsel and unburdened by domestic political
considerations, the difficulty of challenging violations of international trade law
may be significantly reduced.
Resistance from ministerial authorities regarding dispute settlement by non-
state actors may be unavoidable, particularly in situations where state authorities
fear international political ramifications from actions taken by non-state actors
located in their countries. However, non-state actors may be able to afford private
legal counsel and allocate resources to preserve interests in the most important
trade dispute scenarios. Additionally, as evident in the case of Vietnam, many of
the commodities that firms export, such as garments, are relatively inelastic and
require exporters to engage in robust competition.l'l Therefore, exporting firms in
Vietnam and other developing WTO member states may be highly motivated to
preserve their presence in international markets and commercial interests through
active participation in dispute settlement and resolution.
Another variation of this argument approaches the same issue from a different
direction. If non-state actors from developing countries lack experience in
99. Ragosta, supra note 2, at 750-52.
100. Gregory Shaffer, The Challenges of WTO Law: Strategies for Developing Country Adoption, 5
WORLD TRADE REV. 177, 185 (2006).
101. HARVARD VIETNAM PROGRAM, CHOOSING SUCCESS: THE LESSONS OF EAST AND SOUTHEAST
ASIA AND VIETNAM'S FUTURE 34 (2008), available at
http://www.innovations.harvard.edu/cache/documents/982/98251 .pdf.
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weighing the merits of trade dispute claims, what would prevent the dispute
settlement system from becoming saturated with an overwhelming number of
meritless claims? Would some threshold be necessary to ensure that non-state
actors chose to pursue claims with unmistakable merit? Even if non-state actors
became sophisticated complainants over time, would the system be abused by
powerful private actors?1"2
Concerns about the ability of non-state actors to discern the merit between
potential trade dispute claims are worth considering, particularly in the early period
of implementing reforms to the DSU. However, even when non-state actors have
not accrued significant first-hand experience in the WTO dispute settlement
process, a number of factors would enable non-state actors in developing countries
to avoid anticipated difficulties. It is likely that non-state actors would seek
assistance from private counsel to determine the value of adjudication under the
DSU, and also to determine whether claims would be worth litigating at the onset
of representation. As a result of consultation with experienced legal experts,
private actors may identify and avoid disputes without merit. The pressure to
selectively direct resources towards adjudicating only the most promising claims
would ease concerns that the WTO dispute settlement process would become
encumbered with claims from non-state actors.'
03
2. Non-state Actors and the WTO
Non-state actors do not have standing to pursue complaints in the WTO
dispute settlement system. Some authors have stated that simply lacking standing
presents a formidable legal barrier against participation by non-state actors in
WTO dispute settlement, even if the DSU was formally amended.10 4 However, a
number of other multilateral conventions already allow non-state actors to take
action against state actors. Under the Convention on the Settlement of Investment
Disputes Between States and Operation of the International Centre for the
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), private actors that invest
internationally may challenge actions taken by countries that violate obligations
outlined in bilateral investment treaties between two states. 10 5 NAFTA's Chapter
11 provides the same opportunity to private actors in the United States, Canada,
and Mexico. 10 6 Just as states must abide by international obligations to private
actors under the ICSID Convention and multilateral free trade agreements like
NAFTA, WTO member states should be expected to abide by agreements
undertaken upon joining the WTO, regardless of the type of actor that challenges
policies and practices that violate international trade law.
102. Nichols, supra note 58, at 327.
103. See Schneider, supra note 58, at 629.
104. See Trachtman, supra note 18, at 538: see also Nichols, supra note 58, at 327-28.
105. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other
States, art. 36, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159.
106. See North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 605
(1993). "An investor of a Party may submit to arbitration under this Section a claim that another Party
has breached an obligation ... and that the investor has incurred loss or damage by reason of, or arising
out of, that breach." Id. art. 1116.
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Although the DSU would have to be reformed to allow for private rights of
action, Article 25 of the DSU sets forth the basic method for making adjudication
by non-state actors a feasible possibility. Although commentators have even
supported the ability of domestic courts to decide WTO trade disputes, °7 domestic
courts in developing countries may be subject to the same shortcomings that
hamper government authorities in developing countries from initiating trade
disputes under the DSU. To avoid oversaturation of dispute settlement panels and
overloading courts at the domestic level, international arbitration based on models
in other multilateral agreements and on Article 25 may be the best way to balance
the benefits that arise from modifying standing for private actors in the WTO
dispute settlement system.
3. Internal Conflicts in Developing Countries
Domestic authorities may be unwilling or politically unprepared to share
control with non-state actors over the types of complaints that may be initiated in
WTO dispute settlement proceedings. 10 8 The same political considerations that
hinder authorities in countries like Vietnam from asserting trade complaints and
organizing effective public-private collaboration may cause authorities to fear that
they will relinquish sovereignty and lose political significance if non-state actors
are free to participate in dispute settlement under the DSU. 10 9 For domestic
authorities in developing member states, non-state actors located in the same
country would likely pose the same level of political threat as non-state actors
based in developed countries.
It should be noted that governments in developing countries also stand to gain
from economic benefits achieved by non-state actors that open new or existing
foreign markets by successfully resolving trade disputes and successfully
challenging violations of international trade law. Although authorities in
developing countries may fear a decline in their own political credibility if non-
state actors are allowed to initiate formal adjudication of alleged violations, the
rewards of successfully completing dispute settlement and increased export trade
may ease their concerns, particularly if they lack experience in managing
complaints under standard WTO dispute settlement proceedings.
107. Trachtman, supra note 18, at 538.
108. For an indication of the political disruption that non-state actors have already created for
authorities in developing WTO member states with respect to the WTO dispute settlement process, see
James Smith, Inequality in International Trade? Developing Countries and Institutional Change in
WTO Dispute Settlement, I I REV. INT'L POL. ECON. 542, 564 (2004) ("[D]eveloping countries are by
far the most strident opponents of nonstate submissions, which they view as an instrument of political
influence for organizations based disproportionately in advanced industrial states.").
109. For an explanation of developing state authorities' objections to the involvement of non-state
actors in the WTO, see Patrizia Nanz & Jens Steffek, Global Governance, Participation and the Public
Sphere, 39 GOV'T & OPPOSITION 314, 332 (2004) ("As many critics have remarked, the danger of
'benevolent patronizing' is imminent whenever northern-based organizations speak on behalf of the
developing world. Not only but not least for this reason, official representatives of developing countries
have been [skeptical] about strengthening the role of nongovernmental organizations in world trade
governance.").
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Governments in developing countries may also fear that powerful business
interests will predominate over the rights and interests of democratically elected
governments and their constituents. For instance, government authorities may
argue that empowering non-state actors would reduce the authority of officials
otherwise responsible for litigating dispute settlement claims. The result would be
a diminution of the power exercised by elected representatives in favor of non-state
actors that are not accountable to the interests of all members of society. l° The
criticism would apply not only in countries where non-state actors initiate dispute
settlement claims, but also in countries where domestic authorities turn out to be
unsuccessful respondents that are forced to change trade policies as a result of
complaints made by non-state actors. The credence of such an argument would be
even more important in developing countries with cultural sensitivity to the
influence of multinational corporations and post-colonial legacies.'
Non-state actors may have a difficult time responding to negative public
opinion and attacks from governments in various WTO member states. However,
the rationale for allowing non-state actors to adjudicate complaints is based on the
ability to maximize the benefits of formalized dispute settlement. Concerns about
the broader influence of powerful multinational firms and private interests may be
diminished if private actors in developing countries experience the greatest
benefits of challenging trade law violations. Additionally, significant political
influence is already exercised by non-state actors in the United States and
European Union. The proposed reform would do little to expand the powers that
non-state actors based in developed countries already possess. However, the
proposal would make it possible for non-state actors in the developing world to
compete in global markets without allocating considerable resources toward
improving public-private networks or leveraging their own political influence.
4. Government Accountability in Developing Countries
The proposal may seem to place a disproportionate amount of responsibility
on the shoulders of non-state actors. This perception is supported by the argument
that governing authorities in developing countries are the most appropriate
recipients of aid and capacity-building programs with regard to managing dispute
settlement.'1 2 The argument that governments in developing countries should be
encouraged and supported in their activities in the WTO is compelling. This
proposal does not directly conflict with the argument because both methods
emphasize the need to improve the WTO dispute settlement system for developing
countries. Even if extremely rapid reform were achieved by governments in
110. See Nichols, supra note 58, at 310-12.
111. See Maki Tanaka, Bridging the Gap Between Northern NGOs and Southern Sovereigns in the
Trade-Environment Debate: The Pursuit of Democratic Dispute Settlements in the WTO under the Rio
Principles, 30 ECOLOGY L. Q. 113, 115-16, 128 (2003) (arguing that friction between developing states
and NGOs over environmental issues is intensified by historical legacies of colonial rule and
decolonization).
112. Cf Shaffer, supra note 57, at 40-44 (discussing ways to improve the capabilities of developing
country governments in the WTO dispute settlement process); Shaffer, supra note 56, at 649-51; Bown
& Hoekman, supra note 57, at 873, 875-77, 886, 888-89.
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developing countries as a result of aid and capacity-building measures, it is
uncertain whether governments in developing countries would directly meet the
needs of non-state actors in those countries. Enabling non-state actors to challenge
violations may counteract unaccountable policy-making in the area of global trade
by governments in developing countries. As a result, the proposal may help trade
authorities in developing countries become more responsive to the needs of private
actors. Governments would have an incentive to remain relevant by providing
significant amounts of assistance and by using their own resources to create public-
private networks to reduce the need for arbitration to be initiated by non-state
actors. The concept applies to new WTO member states like Vietnam, where
authorities at the national level have traditionally exercised unilateral control over
policy and have only begun to seek input from private actors. By improving their
competence and relevance following the advent of private rights of action,
governments in developing countries may ultimately benefit from this proposal by
proving that, in the end, non-state actors have more to gain by utilizing public-
private collaboration than by challenging violations independently.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although the WTO dispute settlement process created new opportunities for
developing countries to compete in global trade, non-state actors in developing
countries and especially new WTO member states are placed at a disadvantage
when defending their interests and exercising influence in the formal dispute
settlement process. Governments and non-state actors in developed countries are
already adept at using formal and informal methods to prevail in trade disputes. In
developing countries, such methods are underdeveloped or unavailable, and may
be unlikely to improve in time to help non-state actors fully preserve their interests.
Non-state actors in developing countries may be provided an opportunity to
initiate dispute settlement without having to spend the time and energy necessary
to build public-private networks that would otherwise increase the likelihood of
favorable outcomes in WTO dispute settlement. Empowering non-state actors to
independently raise trade dispute claims against WTO member states would
require modifications to the current WTO dispute settlement system but would
ultimately create benefits. As one of the newest states to join the WTO, Vietnam
is no exception to the disadvantages facing developing countries with respect to
dispute settlement. Vietnam faces additional challenges due to its unique political
development and rapid introduction to global trade since the mid-1980s. However,
as discussed earlier in this article, firms and affiliated groups in Vietnam's garment
export industry would benefit from modifications enabling them to assert influence
by challenging violations by WTO member states. In the event that a
discriminatory trade policy diminished the value of an important market for
Vietnamese garment exporters, exporting firms and industry groups would have
the opportunity to raise claims under the DSU, avoiding the time and effort
required to facilitate cooperation with government authorities that would otherwise
be necessary to effectively challenge the problematic trade measure.
As more developing countries seek to join the WTO, reforming the dispute
settlement process would provide a practical way to ensure that the WTO system
stays relevant for all member states. By freeing non-state actors to complain about
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violations of international trade law with the prospect of receiving timely
resolution, reformation of the DSU may achieve those goals and ultimately
reinforce the salience of the post-Bretton Woods international trading regime.
MULTILATERAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS:
FROM MONTREAL TO KYOTO - A THEORETICAL APPROACH TO AN
IMPROVED CLIMATE CHANGE REGIME
Sean Cumberlege*
"[T]here is no durable treaty which is not founded on reciprocal advantage,
and indeed a treaty which does not satisfy this condition is no treaty at all, and is
apt to contain the seeds of its own dissolution. Thus the great secret of negotiation
is to bring out prominently the common advantage to both parties of any proposal,
and so to link these advantages that they may appear equally balanced to both
parties. " Frangois de Calli~res, De la Maniere de Negocier Avec les Souverains
(1716).
I. INTRODUCTION
Stratospheric ozone depletion and climate change are the two most significant
environmental challenges facing the world today. There is no longer any doubt that
an ambitious global plan must be crafted to address and reverse catastrophic
environmental harm. However, the level of government cooperation that is needed
and the fundamental change that is required in human economic and social
behavior makes climate change and ozone depletion difficult to reverse.' The
causes of climate change and its adverse impacts are closely linked to
industrialization, economic development, poverty alleviation and energy security -
necessitating an approach to climate mitigation that is sensitive to these concerns.
Moreover, both climate change and ozone depletion cannot be reversed without a
global effort involving all countries, and hence mandate that multilateral
environmental agreements (MEAs) form the basis of any potential solution.2
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experiences. In addition, I would like to thank Professor Ved Nanda for all his support and guidance.
Most importantly, to my parents - Charmain and Peter - let me simply say that no son could ever ask
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1. Cass R. Sunstein, Of Montreal v. Kyoto: A Tale of Two Protocols, 31 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv.
1,2 (2007).
2. See id.
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While climate change and ozone depletion are manifestations of different
harmful processes, they share four fundamental similarities: (1) both present
serious issues of international equity in that developed countries are the primary
contributors to both environmental problems and, hence, need to assume
predominant roles in mitigation efforts; (2) both problems involve extremely
serious difficulties due to intergenerational equity, as future generations are likely
to face greater environmental risks than current generations; (3) both
environmental concerns involve the tragedy of commons problem, in that states are
encouraged to simply "free ride" on the efforts of other states by benefiting from
the significant costs borne by parties that comply with their obligations; and (4)
both problems need the active participation of the United States (U.S.) for any
solution to be lasting and effective.3
Despite these similarities, the two MEAs that currently address ozone
depletion and climate change, respectively, have enjoyed very different levels of
success. The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer
(Montreal Protocol) has been ratified by 193 countries around the world.4 In
addition, the parties to the Montreal Protocol are complying with their obligations,
and as a result, ozone-depleting substances (ODSs) have been drastically reduced,
and monitoring of the ozone layer indicates that the ozone is recovering.5 Due to
the enormously successful efforts of the parties to the Montreal Protocol, the treaty
is frequently hailed as the most successful environmental treaty ever devised.6
The global effort to mitigate climate change, however, presents an altogether
different story. Despite the fact that the Kyoto Protocol to the Convention on
Climate Change entered into force in 2005 and has been ratified by 174 countries 7,
it has been largely ineffective in mitigating climate change.8 Indeed, despite high
participation (with the notable exception of the United States), it is widely known
that many parties to the Kyoto Protocol may not be complying with their
obligations. 9 The marginal results achieved under the Kyoto Protocol have led to
3. See id. at 3; see also Laura Thomas, A Comparative Analysis of International Regimes on
Ozone and Climate Change with Implications for Regime Design, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 795,
797-99 (2003).
4. Ozone Secretariat, United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), Status of Ratification
(2008), http://ozone.unep.org/Ratification-status/.
5. The Scientific Assessment Panel of the Motreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the
Ozone Layer, Executive Summary of the Scientific Assessment of Ozone Depletion: 2006
(WMO/UNEP), 1-3 (Aug. 18, 2006), http://ozone.unep.org/AssessmentPanels/SAP/index.shtml
(suggesting that there is clear evidence of a decrease in the atmospheric burden of ozone-depleting
substances in the lower atmosphere and in the stratosphere, and that early signs of recovery are also
evident).
6. RICHARD E. BENEDICK, OZONE DIPLOMACY: NEW DIRECTIONS IN SAFEGUARDING THE
PLANET 1 (2nd ed. 1998); see also Thomas, supra note 3, at 797.
7. See Kyoto Protocol, Status of Ratification, http://unfccc.int/files/kyoto-protocol/background
/status-of ratification/application/pdf/kp ratification.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2008).
8. Laurie Goering, UN: Time is now to fix warming Ahead of bid to replace Kyoto pact, urgent
action urged, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 18, 2007.
9. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 1, at 21; see also Congressional Research Service, Greenhouse
Gas Emissions: Perspectives on the Top 20 Emitters and Developed Versus Developing Nations, at 12,
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significant academic criticism of the climate change regime and has increased
public demand for more effective international cooperation to reverse the
significant environmental degradation that has been allowed to continue
unchecked.10
This paper, therefore, attempts to develop a dynamic theory of multilateral
environmental treaty creation that builds on legal, economic and international
relations theory. Based on the theoretical framework developed, this paper also
seeks to outline why the Montreal Protocol has been extremely effective in
curtailing the production of ODSs, and why the Kyoto Protocol has been
ineffective in reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. This paper will also
recommend possible improvements and changes to the Kyoto Protocol to
transform it into a viable vehicle for lasting climate change alleviation. In doing so,
this paper makes the assumption that states act predominantly out of self-interest.
Thus, within the cooperation continuum, my analysis will be based somewhat on
political economic theory within the Realist school of thought.
Section II will propose a theoretical framework for lasting and effective
multilateral environmental agreements. In doing so, this paper goes beyond mere
formal treaty provisions by discussing, from a political economic perspective,
extra-legal strategies to encourage participation and compliance. It incorporates
basic game theory to illustrate the complexity of multilateral treaty creation.
Against this backdrop, section III will examine the Montreal Protocol and highlight
some of its unique mechanisms and approaches that make it an effective MEA.
Section IV will examine the Kyoto Protocol by describing the negotiations leading
up to its creation and highlighting the approaches and mechanisms that undermine
its effectiveness and efficacy. Section V will conclude with recommended changes
to the existing climate change regime, based not only on its obvious weaknesses,
but also on some of the theories and approaches developed in this paper.
II. MULTILATERAL ENVIRONMENTAL TREATIES: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
A. The Complex Nature of Environmental Protection
International environmental concerns, along with any resulting call for global
action, raise a unique problem within the field of international relations.
Specifically, each country does not want to pay to protect the environment, but
each country also recognizes that if every other country takes this stance, the
environmental implications would be catastrophic. To make matters worse, even if
nations feel obliged to act, unilateral action will not work where the solution to an
international environmental risk is dependent on what other countries do to
advance the problem, and what other countries will do to solve the same problem.1'
In other words, actions and choices of any given state frequently affect the welfare
of other states, whether positively or negatively. In this way, most environmental
RL32721 (2008) (prepared by Larry Parker & John Blodgett), available at
https://ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/08Feb/RL32721 .pdf.
10. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 1, at 4; Thomas, supra note 3, at 797.
11. SCOTT BARRETT, ENVIRONMENT AND STATECRAFT: THE STRATEGY OF ENVIRONMENTAL
TREATY-MAKING 50-52 (2003).
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problems involve multilateral externalities, namely environmental effects felt from
activity outside a country's border, and actions that need to be taken outside a
given country's realm of direct control. 12 While many externalities are bilateral,
and hence easier to overcome, in the case of climate change and ozone depletion,
the multilateral externalities are reciprocal in a sense that (to varying degrees) each
country imposes externalities on the other countries sharing the same resource.
13
Despite varying levels of emissions, every country emits ozone depleting
substances and GHGs, and, more importantly, every country is susceptible to
harmful effects caused by these emissions. But, to the extent that externalities exist
in ozone and climate change concerns, they can be characterized as asymmetric
because they affect nations differently. 14 Also, it is in the nature of global
environmental problems that the damage each country suffers is never proportional
to its share of global emissions.
Ultimately, solutions to transnational environmental problems are difficult to
create because they invariably involve (and mostly conflict with) the principle of
sovereignty. 1 Thus, the absence of a world government forces states to create a
system of rules and a system of incentives to change state behavior. Indeed, states
are forced to negotiate and cooperate to simultaneously minimize joint costs and
collectively maximize joint benefits. Reality, however, presents a difficult working
environment within which to come to lasting agreement. Specifically, transaction
costs are unequal, information is imperfect, bargaining power remains
asymmetrical and states remain wary of "opportunism through actual or threatened
intentional noncompliance."' 16 Despite these impediments to cooperation, states
nevertheless frequently recognize that cooperation is the only available option. The
key consideration, then, necessarily becomes the means with which to achieve
such cooperation. Ideally, participation in an environmental treaty must be
voluntary, targets must be accepted by consensus, and obligation must be
implemented and enforced by the parties to the treaty.' 7 History has shown,
however, that this is not easy to achieve.
12. Id. at 52.
13. Id.
14. Id. (citing as examples: island states, coastal states, and those countries near the poles because
all have more to lose than many other states).
15. See id. at xiii-xiv (assuming that states act primarily out of self-interest and, hence, approach
solutions to transnational problems with the view that any action needs to maximize this self interest);
VED P. NANDA & GEORGE PRING, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FOR THE 2 1sT CENTURY 17-
18 (2003); Michael Weisslitz, Rethinking the Equitable Principle of Common but Differentiated
Responsibility: Differential Versus Absolute Norms of Compliance and Contribution in the Global
Climate Change Context, 13 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 473, 484 (2002) (highlighting that
developing countries were reticent to assume even voluntary commitments at the negotiations leading
up to the signing of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change out of fear that such
commitments would infringe with their sovereign right to economic development).
16. Brett Frischmann, A Dynamic Institutional Theory ofInternational Law, 51 BUFF. L. REv.
679, 692 (2003).
17. Christoph Bohringer & Michael Finus, The Kyoto Protocol: Success of Failure?, in CLIMATE-
CHANGE POLICY 258 (Dieter Helm ed., 2005).
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B. Restructuring Incentives to Encourage Participation and Compliance
The object of any MEA is ultimately to change state behavior to mitigate
harmful environmental degradation. In doing so, however, MEAs cannot rely
exclusively on moral necessity to encourage cooperation. Instead, MEAs that seek
to fundamentally alter state behavior and encourage widespread participation have
to restructure incentives to overcome constraints imposed by sovereignty.1 8 Treaty
design becomes a key consideration, and ultimately plays a determining factor in
the lasting efficacy of any agreement. Despite similarities between various
environmental concerns, no two treaties can be alike. Indeed, an examination of
existing international legal institutions suggests that a one-size-fits-all approach is
doomed to fail. 19 The larger question therefore becomes: under what
circumstances, or under what treaty design, can lasting environmental mitigation
be encouraged? Scott Barrett, a prominent scholar within the Rationalist school of
thought, articulates three broad requirements:
First, a treaty must be individually rational. This means that no party to
the treaty can gain by withdrawing, given the choices made by every
other country, and that no non-party (if any) can gain by acceding .... It
also means that no party can gain by failing to comply, given the
treaty's design. And it means that no non-party (again, if any) can gain
by changing its behavior (by polluting more or less, say), given every
other country's behavior.... Second, a treaty must be collectively
rational. This assumption recognizes negotiation to be a collective
activity, and requires that it not be possible for parties to gain
collectively by changing their treaty.... Finally, a self-enforcing treaty
must be "fair.'" Put differently, it must be perceived by the parties as
being legitimate.
20
It is because of these three broad requirements that no two MEAs can be
alike, because each multilateral agreement needs to be both rational to individual
countries and to the collective group. For each environmental concern, an
agreement will therefore have to create a different incentive structure to ensure
both participation and compliance, and to minimize the problems associated with
the "tragedy of commons," or "free-riding. 2 1 Closely associated is the necessity of
creating favorable cost-benefit structures for each prospective party to a MEA.
Indeed, the treaties that effectively deter non-participation and non-compliance
enjoy the most success. 22
The process of creating, or at least restructuring, incentives, however, is not
easy. One variable is the nature of the good or the behavior that is being regulated
and the means by which the regulation is put into place. Regulating a public good
18. Barrett, supra note 11, at 18.
19. Frischmann, supra note 16, at 689.
20. Barrett, supra note 11, at xiii-xiv.
21. Frischmann, supra note 16, at 693-95.
22. An example is the North Pacific Fur Seal Treaty where both participation and compliance was
encouraged by creating a treaty that maximized joint payoffs and, hence, created incentive. For an in-
depth discussion on the success of this treaty see Barrett, supra note 11, at 19-39.
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such as pollution creates difficulty in that there is an increased incentive for states
to "free-ride" on the collective efforts of other states.23 Thus, a high degree of
participation becomes key. Once a treaty enjoys adequate participation, the
necessity of effective enforcement measures becomes self-evident: non-
compliance with a treaty undermines its ultimate purpose. Hence, where states
agree that collective action is required, any resulting MEA has to create a system
of incentives that would dissuade a state from non-compliance. George Downs
maintains that "the level of threatened punishment needed to dissuade a State from
violating an agreement depends on the benefits that the State would gain from
defection." 24 Specifically, he maintains:
The larger the amount [of benefits from defection], the greater the
incentive to defect and the greater the threatened punishment that is
necessary to deter it. For example, to prevent a State from violating an
environmental agreement where the violation would save the State
twenty million dollars in pollution abatement costs requires more
aggressive enforcement and a larger penalty than is necessary to prevent
a violation that would save it only two million dollars.25
C. Using Game Theoty as a Model to Understand Rational Choice
This section introduces a game theoretical approach to international
environmental treaty creation. Scholars frequently use game theory as a theoretical
model through which to examine and predict individual and group behavior.
Specifically, game theory attempts to analyze behavior in situations where the
utility of a state's available choices depends on the choices of other states, or at
least the perceived choices of other states.26 Game theory therefore provides a
useful framework for analysis of international treaty building and the primary
concerns that impede lasting and effective cooperation.27 In this context, game
theory assumes that states are unitary rational actors that seek to maximize their
"individual" welfare by making decisions based on an expected payoff structure
28
associated with each choice it could make. 29 A central tenet of game theory is that
the choice of one state can affect the welfare of the other state.30
23. Barrett, supra note 11, at 83, 219.
24. George W. Downs, Enforcement and the Evolution of Cooperation, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 319,
324 (1998).
25. Id.
26. For a more thorough explanation of Prisoner's Dilemma see EconPort, Beginner's Guide,
http://www.econport.org/econport/request?page=man-gametheory-exp.prisondil (last visited Nov. 26,
2008).
27. See, e.g., Frischmann, supra note 16, at 700.
28. Id. at 704 (maintaining that "payoffs associated with cooperation are generally diffuse,
widespread, long-term, and arguably more closely linked to perceptions of national welfare, while the
payoffs associated with defection are generally concentrated among particular industry groups, short-
term, and more closely linked to the welfare of politicians and special interests.").
29. For a successful application of game theory to the environmental treaty regime, states are
presumed to be the dominant actors in international relations.
30. Frischmann, supra note 16, at 706.
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In its most basic form, game theory is illustrated in a simple two-player game
called Prisoner's Dilemma.3 1 In the context of environmental treaty negotiation, we
can assume, therefore, that two states are presented with a situation where they
have the choice to abate (stop polluting) or to continue polluting. In essence, state
A and B each face a decision regarding whether to cooperate with each other,
without being certain as to what the other state will choose. To make matters less
certain, different outcomes lead to different payoff structures, illustrated in the
following example by simple monetary figures to represent overall economic
benefits associated with each choice. For example, in the classic Prisoner's
Dilemma, if both states choose to cooperate and abate, they will both enjoy a net
payoff of $5, for a total of $10. If, however, both players choose to continue
polluting, they each receive a payoff of only $3, for a total of $6. Last, if one state
chooses to cooperate by abating and the other state chooses to pollute, the
cooperating state receives a payoff of $2, while the polluter receives a payoff of
$7, for a total of $9. Thus, one can see that the best possible outcome is that both
states abate and receive a combined payoff of $10. However, when making their
choice, each state recognizes that if they cooperate and the other state defects, their
net payoffs will be less than it would be had they chosen to defect (compare a
payoff of $2 with a payoff of $3). In this way, uncertainty and the nature of the
problem force states to accept that polluting is their dominant strategy because the
individual payoffs are higher, whether the other state chooses to cooperate or
abate.
Based on the situation in a Prisoner's Dilemma, it therefore becomes
necessary for the parties to give each other mutual assurances before "the game,"
and for states to create a situation where the dominant strategy is to abate. In
reality, states are forced to try and manipulate the nature of the game by tying their
hands and committing to cooperate by creating mechanisms and institutions to
encourage, monitor and enforce participation and compliance.32 In this way, the
institution or regime can reward cooperators or punish defectors, and hence,
31. The classical Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) is as follows:
Two suspects, A and B, are arrested by the police. The police have insufficient evidence for a
conviction, and, having separated both prisoners, visit each of them to offer the same deal: if one
testifies for the prosecution against the other and the other remains silent, the betrayer goes free and the
silent accomplice receives the full 10-year sentence. If both stay silent, both prisoners are sentenced to
only six months in jail for a minor charge. If each betrays the other, each receives a five-year sentence.
Each prisoner must make the choice of whether to betray the other or to remain silent. However, neither
prisoner knows for sure what choice the other prisoner will make. So this dilemma poses the question:
How should the prisoners act? Keep in mind that the best option for both is to keep silent; however,
remaining silent puts the silent prisoner at risk of a ten-year sentence if the other prisoner decides to
cooperate. In this way, each would likely decide to betray each other because, at worst, they will only
receive a five-year sentence, compared to the worst case scenario of receiving a ten-year sentence for
remaining silent. Thus, the Prisoners Dilemma is used by scholars to rationalize the choices states make
in deciding whether to abate or continue polluting in light of the payoffs of each option. In the classic
Prisoners' Dilemma story, the payoffs refer to the expected length of jail sentences depending on each
outcome. Payoffs, in the context of this note, refer simply to the measure of utility of each choice faced
by countries engaged in treaty negotiation.
32. Frischmann, supra note 16, at 719.
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directly influence the payoff structure of present and future iterations (games).33
This, in turn, leads to different choices and outcomes. Take for example, the
radically different outcome in the counterpart to Prisoner's Dilemma, a game aptly
referred to as Harmony.
In Harmony, if both states choose to cooperate and abate, they both enjoy a
net payoff of $6, for a total of $12. If, however, both players choose to continue
polluting, they each receive a payoff of only $2, for a total of $4. Last, if one state
chooses to cooperate by abating and the other state chooses to pollute, the
cooperating state receives a payoff of $4, while the polluter receives a payoff of
$3, for a total of $7. Like Prisoner's Dilemma, the best possible outcome is created
when both states abate and receive a combined payoff of $12. However, when
making their choice, each state recognizes that the individual payoff associated
with abatement is higher regardless of what the other state does. In this way,
abatement becomes each state's dominant strategy.
While these games may be too simple to completely capture the complexities
inherent in treaty negotiation and creation, they nonetheless provide insightful
illustrations of the basic choices and outcomes that are important variables in the
MEA negotiation process. In addition, the illustrations above suggest that in order
to encourage participation and compliance, states can jointly restructure payoffs
and incentives by either punishing non-cooperation, or creating positive payoffs
for cooperation.
Frischmann identifies three stages of the game, as it relates to MEAs. The
first stage involves framing the game whereby states recognize an interdependent
problem and propose potential solutions.34 This stage may involve varying levels
of scientific, political and economic uncertainty.35 The second stage involves the
forming of the game, whereby states negotiate an agreement and create monitoring
and compliance procedures.36 Indeed, it is here that states change the payoff
structure of cooperation by creating commitments, making concessions, and
establishing compliance procedures.37 The third stage is where states play the
game.38 Here, states implement and enforce the agreement, and individual
participants choose to either cooperate or pollute. 39 At this stage, a well-crafted
agreement should include the flexibility to respond to exogenous influences that
change the nature of the game. For example, scientific uncertainty may slowly
dissolve, transaction costs may diminish, and technological advancements may be
revealed.40 In this way, parties to an agreement need not go back to the drawing
board to reform and reframe the game - a process that we shall see, is extremely
difficult.
33. Id. at 681,683.
34. Id. at 723.
35. Id. at 724
36. Id. at 724-25.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 727.
39. Id. at 728.
40. Id. at 729-30.
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Indeed, a close examination of the Montreal Protocol provides an example of
how states successfully framed the game; changed the formation of the game by
negotiating the implementation of effective treaty mechanisms; and continue to
play the game by changing payoffs through both positive incentive and
punishment, and jointly encouraging participation and compliance.
III. THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL: A MODEL OF SUCCESS?
A. Negotiations Leading up to the Montreal Protocol
In 1974, Marion Molina and Sherwood Rowland published a scientific paper
suggesting that the stratospheric ozone layer was being destroyed by
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), a man-made chemical substance. 41 Although the
causal link between the release of CFCs and the depletion of the ozone was largely
unproved in the late 1970s, many countries began to unilaterally reduce and restrict
CFC production and consumption.42 However, despite significant unilateral action
on the part of major contributors, such as the United States, CFC production and
consumption began to rise in the 1980s, necessitating the need for international
cooperation in protecting the ozone layer by phasing out the use of harmful ozone
depleting substances.43 In 1981, United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)
established a Working Group of legal and technical experts to agree on and draft a
global framework convention.44 The resulting Vienna Convention for the
Protection of the Ozone Layer (Vienna Convention) was adopted and signed by
twenty countries plus the European Union, and entered into force on September 22,
1988. 45 Although the convention included no binding controls on the production
and emission of ozone depleting substances, the Vienna Convention played a
pivotal role in creating a foundation on which significant progress has been made.
Indeed, at the Convention the parties agreed to: (1) conduct further scientific
research and assessments to overcome uncertainty, (2) to exchange information for
the benefit of all participants, and (3) to adopt "appropriate measures" to deal with
the problem.46
41. Mario J. Molina & F. S. Rowland, Stratospheric Sink for Chlorofluoromethanes. Chlorine
Atomcatalysed Destruction of Ozone, 249 NATURE 810 (1974); see also DAVID HUNTER, JAMES
SALZMAN & DURWOOD ZAELKE, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 567-69 (3rd ed.
2007) (discussing the basic science of ozone depletion). When released CFCs rise to the stratosphere,
long exposure to solar radiation causes the CFCs to break down and release chlorine, which is the
source of ozone depletion, not the CFCs themselves. The consequence of ozone destruction is both life-
threatening and massive in scale because it is the ozone layer that absorbs harmful ultraviolet radiation.
An excess of UV radiation would result in increased cases of skin cancer and eye cataracts, lower yields
in agriculture and fisheries, and an accelerated increase in ground level ozone (smog), among other
disastrous effects.
42. Barrett, supra note 11, at 223.
43. Id.
44. Edith Brown Weiss, The Five International Treaties: A Living History, in ENGAGING
COUNTRIES: STRENGTHENING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL ACCORDS 89, 136
(1998).
45. Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Mar. 22, 1985, T.I.A.S. No. 11,097,
1513 U.N.T.S. 293 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
46. See also id. arts 2-7, annex I-II; Frischmann, supra note 16, at 792.
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Frischmann maintains that this was an important first step "because it broadly
framed the relevant issues at a time where the underlying problem and potential
solutions were relatively uncertain and States were understandably hesitant to
undertake specific commitments. 47 Indeed, parties to the convention "fully
expected that their commitments would evolve over time, ' 48 and articulated that a
protocol with more specific obligations and targets would be negotiated in the
future.
B. The Montreal Protocol: An Assessment
On September 16, 1987, twenty-four states signed the Montreal Protocol,
which expanded the goals of the Vienna Convention by creating a treaty that
obligated parties to reduce their ozone depleting substance emissions in relation to
1986 base-levels. 49 From the outset, the negotiating parties to the Montreal
Protocol recognized the existence of scientific uncertainty and, hence, placed no
specific limit on any of these harmful substances. However, the negotiators did
create a separate limit for the total amount of ozone depletion caused by the parties
to the Protocol. 50 In this way, the negotiators built sufficient flexibility into the
functioning of the Montreal Protocol. Richard Benedick, the chief U.S. negotiator
to the Montreal Protocol, also maintains that the Montreal protocol was designed
to be flexible "to be reopened and adjusted as needed, on the basis of the
periodically scheduled scientific, economic, environmental, and technological
assessments., 51 Thus, as scientific data progressed, the parties began to implement
direct controls on specific substances through subsequent amendments.52
The Montreal Protocol also implemented two important provisions during the
framing of the agreement. The first was the ability to "adjust" reduction targets,
ideally by consensus, but if necessary, by two-thirds majority of the parties
representing at least half of the total consumption of all the parties.5 3 Such
adjustments are binding on all parties even on non-consenting parties.5 4 The
47. Frischmann, supra note 16, at 792 (emphasis added).
48. Id.
49. Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, art. 2, Sept. 16, 1987, reprinted in 52
Fed. Reg. 47515, 26 I.L.M. 1541 (1987) (entered into force Jan 1, 1989) [hereinafter Montreal
Protocol]; see also Nanda & Pring, supra note 15, at 259. Interestingly, 1986 was chosen as a base-level
to avoid strategic maneuvering by states to increase their production so as to change their bargaining
positions. Had a future year been chosen, this might have encouraged many countries to increase their
production levels immediately to establish a higher basis from which subsequent cuts would have to be
made. In subsequent amendments, the base-level year was changed for many controlled substances as a
response to scientific data.
50. Nanda & Pring, supra note 15, at 259-60.
51. Benedick, supra note 6, at 99. We can see that this has indeed happened and the assessments
still form a major part in process of decision-making.
52. To date, the Montreal Protocol has undergone many transformations: Adjusted in Vienna
(1995); amended in Beijing (1999); adjusted and amended in London (1990), Copenhagen (1992), and
Montreal (1997). Therefore, a country that joins the Montreal Protocol today is joining a very different
treaty from the one negotiated in 1987. See Weiss, supra note 44, at 140-44; Barrett, supra note 11, at
153.
53. Montreal Protocol, supra note 49, art. 2, 9.
54. See Barrett, supra note 11, at 226.
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second provision was that the ability to broaden the agreement to include new
substances would have to be included through treaty amendments and, hence,
would be legally binding on parties to any such amendment.5 5 In this way, the
parties created institutional mechanisms that would adjust commitment levels and
payoff structures in response to unforeseen developments without requiring
56
renegotiation of the underlying game.
From the beginning, the Montreal Protocol also created a weighted list of
chemicals with ozone depleting potentials.57 As a result, the Montreal Protocol
created incentives to reduce the more harmful ozone depleting substances at a
higher rate than those that were less damaging to the ozone. In creating emissions
-offsets," the weighted list effectively lowered the cost of compliance associated
with binding obligations. 58 Additionally, since 1987, as scientific knowledge has
improved, the parties to the Montreal Protocol have increased the number of
controlled substances from eight to ninety-six. 59
1. Trade Leakage Concerns
A major concern for the negotiators of Montreal was the potential for "trade
leakage," whereby the production of ozone depleting substances would merely
shift from the parties to the Protocol to non-parties, in other words, from the
industrialized countries to the developing countries.60 Under such a scenario, the
Montreal Protocol would only serve to redistribute, rather than reduce, the
production and consumption of ozone depleting substances. In this way, trade
leakage would merely serve to increase the payoffs for non-cooperation, and
hence, would undermine participation and compliance. From the outset of
negotiations, the parties therefore worked hard to include measures to stop trade
leakage.6 Negotiations, focused on two solutions: (1) to create incentives for
developing countries to also assume obligations for the public good, and (2) to
implement tough trade measures to encourage participation.6 2 However, this did
not prove to be easy. Specifically, developing countries felt that they were
responsible for only a small portion of the ozone problem, and therefore argued
55. See Montreal Protocol supra note 49, art. 2, 1 9(d). This is helpful in that if, at the time of
negotiation, parties are uncertain as to the future environmental implications, and if at the time parties
expect this uncertainty to diminish, then countries may wish to negotiate an initial agreement that keeps
the option ofrenegotiation open in the future.
56. Recall Frischmann's three stages of the treaty negotiation game, supra text section II(C).
57. Montreal Protocol, supra note 49, annex A.
58. Benedick, supra note 6, at 78.
59. Montreal Protocol, supra note 49, annex A C. The most common controlled substances
include: Halo carbons, notably chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and Halons; Carbon tetrachloride; Methyl
chloroform (1,1,1 trichloroethane); Hydrobromofluorocarbons (HBFCs); Hydrochlorofluorocarbons
(HCFCs); Methyl bromide (CH3Br); and Bromochloromethane (BCM), a new ozone-depleting
substance that some companies sought to introduce into the market in 1998, which has been targeted by
the 1999 Beijing Amendment for immediate phase-out to prevent its use.
60. Barrett, supra note 11, at 231; see also HUNTER, SALZMAN & ZAELKE, supra note 41, at 584-
85.
61. Benedick, supra note 6, at 91-92.
62. Barrett, supra note 11, at 231, 313, 321, 346-49 (discussing the specific mechanisms
introduced to address these concerns).
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that they should not be held to the same standards as the industrialized countries.
63
After lengthy negotiations, the parties settled on mechanisms such as "basic
domestic needs," under which developing counties (Article 5 countries) could
increase their ozone depleling substances production to specified levels for ten
years, after which they were subject to a fifty percent reduction for the next ten
years.64 In 1992, the parties to the Montreal Protocol also created a comprehensive
funding mechanism to support efforts to develop "cleaner" technology. 65 These
actions simultaneously strengthened control measures by creating incentive for
developing countries to ratify, and increased the number of parties to the Montreal
Protocol by improving the cost-benefit positions of most developing countries.
66
As a result, we can see that the parties to the Montreal Protocol ensured that
payoffs for participation and compliance increased, and payoffs for non-
cooperation diminished. Importantly, these incentives effectively countered the
Prisoner's Dilemma, and subtly helped to shift states' dominant strategy from one
of defection (continued pollution) to one of abatement.
2. Trade Restriction Mechanisms
The parties also managed to create robust trade restriction measures that
effectively created favorable cost-benefit structures for states that were considering
whether to join the Montreal Protocol.67 In this way, the trade restriction
mechanism made participation individually rational for countries. 68 Again, by
implementing these restriction mechanisms the parties to the Montreal Protocol
diminished the potential payoff structure of non-cooperation and reformulated the
environment (or game) within which countries had choose to cooperate or not.
Ultimately, trade restriction effectively deterred free-riding and restructured
63. Sunstein, supra note 1, at 16.
64. Id. at 17. The phase out schedules for developed countries are as follows: Phase out Halons
by 1994; phase out CFCs, carbon tetrachloride, methyl chloroform, and HBFCs by 1996; reduce methyl
bromide by 25% by 1999, 50% by 2001, 70% by 2003, and phase out by 2005; reduce HCFCs by 35%
by 2004, 65% by 2010, 90% by 2015, and 99.5% by 2020, with 0.5% permitted for maintenance
purposes only until 2030; phase out HBFCs by 1996 and phase out BCM immediately. See Multilateral
Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol, About the Multilateral Fund: History,
http://www.multilateralfund.org/history.htm.
65. Sunstein, supra note 1, at 17. Currently, the Multilateral Fund for the Montreal Protocol is
administered by an Executive Committee of seven developed and seven developing countries chosen by
the Parties on annual basis. The Fund has been replenished six times: $240 million (1991-1993), $455
million (1994-1996), $466 million (1997-1999), $440 million (2000-2002), $474 million (2003-2005)
and $400.4 (2006-2008). The total budget for the 2006-2008 triennium is $470 million. $59.6 million of
that budget is from the 2003-2005 triennium and $10 million will be provided from interest accruing to
the Multilateral Fund during the 2006-2008 triennium. As of March 2007, the contributions made to the
Multilateral Fund by some forty-nine industrialized countries (including Countries with Economies in
Transition or CEIT countries) totaled over U.S.$ 2.2 billion. See Multilateral Fund for the
Implementation of the Montreal Protocol, About the Multilateral Fund: History,
http://www.multilateralfund.org/history.htm.
66. Nanda & Pring, supra note 15, at 265-66.
67. Montreal Protocol, supra note 49, art. 4.
68. Recall Barrett's three requirements for a successful environmental treaty, supra text section 1.
Barret, supra note 11, at xiii-xiv.
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incentives to encourage broad and deep participation. 69 Specifically, the Montreal
Protocol prohibits parties from importing controlled substances and products
produced with controlled substances from non-parties.70 In addition, the Montreal
Protocol bans parties from exporting controlled substances unless the recipient
country can show full compliance with the Protocol's reduction schedules. 7 To
discourage countries from holding out for short-term competitive advantage, the
parties also agreed that the Protocol would only enter into force when eleven
countries, representing two-thirds of global ozone depleting substances
consumption, had ratified.72
3. Implementation and Non-compliance
In 1997, in the Copenhagen Amendments, focus shifted from target setting to
effective implementation.73 The parties focused on increasing participation,
limiting the growth of emissions by developing countries, promoting universal
compliance, and controlling the emerging black market trade in CFCs. 74 Indeed,
the Montreal Amendments created institutional mechanisms to determine, and
effectively deal with, non-compliance, thereby making it collectively rational for
the parties to comply with their obligation.75 Specifically, the parties created an
Implementation Committee that has both a dispute resolution element and an
implementation element to make compliance issues fair to all the parties.76
Measures that can be taken under the Montreal Protocol for non-compliance
include:
(1) assistance [in the form of financial and technological assistance];
(2) "issuing cautions"; and
(3) suspension... of specific rights and privileges under the Protocol...
including those concerned with industrial rationalization, production,
consumption, trade, transfer of technology, financial mechanisms and
institutional arrangements.
77
69. Also, because of such enforcement mechanisms, the Montreal Protocol suffers from virtually
no free-riding. Indeed, after the trade restrictions were put into place, the number of developing
countries that joined the Montreal Protocol increased rapidly.
70. HUNTER, SALZMAN & ZAELKE, supra note 41, at 584-85.
71. Id.
72 E.g., id. at 586. As it turned out, the initial participation far exceeded this number in that 30
parties representing 83 percent of global consumption were founding parties to the Montreal Protocol.
73. Barrett, supra note 11, at 237. Again, recall Barrett's three requirements for a successful
environmental treaty, supra text section I.
74. See Adjustments and Amendment to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the
Ozone Layer Adopted at Copenhagen, Nov. 25, 1992, S. TREATY Doc. No. 103-9, 32 I.L.M. 874
(1993) (entered into force June 14, 1994) [hereinafter Copenhagen Amendments].
75. HUNTER, SALZMAN & ZAELKE, supra note 41, at 603-06.
76. See Copenhagen Amendments, supra note 74.
77. Barrett, supra note 11, at 288; UNEP, Report of the Fourth Meeting of the Parties to the
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone LaYer, Annex V, UNEP/OzL.Pro.4/15
(November 25, 1992), available at http://www.unep.org/ozone/4mop-cph.shtml.
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Indeed, by approaching the Implementation Committee, a party can request
assistance from other parties to meet its obligations. 78 This approach, therefore,
recognizes the need for collective action and assistance in solving the ozone
problem. In addition, the Montreal Protoc6l requires that parties submit reports
with data on import, exports and production of controlled substances to the
Implementation Committee. 79  The Implementation Committee has worked
extremely hard to enforce this reporting requirement, frequently threatening to
withhold critical financial assistance to Article 5 countries (developing countries)
that do not comply with the reporting requirement.
8 0
Thus, we can see that the framers of the Vienna Convention and the
accompanying Montreal Protocolframed and formed the game to maximize payoff
structures of cooperation. In addition, the parties to the Montreal Protocol created
an agreement that allows each party to continue to play the game, with a high level
of certainty that other states will do the same. Indeed, despite what other countries
may chose to do, each country's dominant strategy under the Montreal Protocol
remains participation and full compliance. As a result, there is almost full
compliance and participation in the Montreal Protocol and its subsequent
amendments continue to increase.
81
IV. THE KYOTO PROTOCOL
A. Similarities with Montreal Protocol
This paper has already described the similarities between the nature of ozone
depletion and climate change. Despite these similarities, it should be noted that
climate change mitigation raises a much greater challenge than that presented by
ozone depletion. First, climate change is a much more difficult phenomenon to
regulate because it is more scientifically complex than ozone depletion and is still
characterized by high uncertainty and sharp asymmetrical vulnerabilities.8 2 Indeed,
this uncertainty still plagues global efforts to reach consensus on lasting climate
change alleviation. 3 Perhaps more important, is the fact that climate change
mitigation affects core global economic activity and inherently involves issues of
78. Montreal Protocol, supra note 49, art. 10.
79. Id., art. 7; see also Barret, supra note 11, at 149.
80. The Montreal Protocol has a discrete approach to non-compliance and monitoring. Suspected
instances of non-compliance must be brought to the Implementation Committee, which reviews the
evidence and considers the circumstances that may have precipitated the non-compliance. It then makes
recommendations regarding actions to be taken. In a sense, therefore, the process may encourage non-
compliance, but the careful exercise of discretion may also prevent the punishment of a country that has
a legitimate reason beyond its control for non-compliance. See generally Barrett, supra note 11, at 150-
51.
81. As of June 2008, 193 countries have ratified the Montreal Protocol. Ratifications of the
amendments are: 189 countries for the London Amendments, 184 for the Copenhagen Amendments,
167 for the Montreal Amendments, 144 for the Beijing Amendments. Ozone Secretariat, supra note 4.
82. Thomas, supra note 3, at 823; see also Sunstein, supra note 1, at 2-4, 45.
83. Thomas, supra note 3, at 824. It should be noted that while scientific uncertainty within the
climate change regime has diminished with time, a significant obstacle to a lasting agreement is still
presented by a high degree of uncertainty regarding the economic impacts associated with proposed
global responses.
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competition between nations . 4 Specifically, climate change alleviation implicates
multiple sectors of the global economy, particularly those that have, throughout
modem history, served as the backbone to industrial growth and development.
8 5
While it is conceptually accepted that mitigation of climate change calls for the
restructuring of our global energy-based society, this in itself is not enough.
Indeed, it is the necessity of cheap energy as a foundation to growth and
development in less-developed countries that illustrates a particularly acute
problem, at least in climate change negotiation.
8 6
Despite the differences between climate change and ozone depletion, the
response to the two environmental challenges nevertheless share many common
elements. First, the extent of scientific cooperation and involvement in climate
change negotiations has been just as great, if not greater, than that of the ozone
regime.8 7 Second, climate change negotiation also followed an incremental
approach through the use of a convention-protocol scheme, and the creation of
targets and timetables to create binding emissions reduction standards.88 Third, like
Montreal, the negotiators of the Kyoto Protocol advanced the "common but
differentiated responsibility" principle, and created multiple mechanisms to
encourage and aid developing countries to participate.8 9 As we shall see, however,
despite these similarities between the two Protocols, key differences have exposed
many fundamental problems with the current Kyoto regime. Specifically,
differences concerning treaty negotiations, structure, and institutional mechanisms
have led to a vastly different outcome that must be addressed and amended in order
to sustain lasting climate change mitigation.
B. The Early Response to Climate Change
Despite the remarkable response to the problems of ozone depletion, the
world has yet to adequately respond to climate change - the "defining ecological
issue of the 2 1st century." 90 Over the past two decades, scientific consensus has
established that increasing levels of man-made greenhouse gases being released
into the atmosphere are causing global warming and changing the earth's fragile
climate. 9 1 Even before such consensus was reached, many scientists called for
84. Id. at 823.
85. See id. at 812.
86. Id. at 824-25.
87. Id. at 817; see also JORGEN WETTESTAD, DESIGNING EFFECTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL REGIMES:
THE KEY CONDITIONS 221-23 (1999) (noting that the climate change has an "'extraordinarily well-
developed scientific-political complex, with several organizational entities and bodies fulfilling
advisory and communicatory functions.").
88. Nanda and Pring, supra note 15, at 293-94.
89. For a discussion on the common but differentiated responsibility approach, see Kyle Danish,
An Overview of the International Regime Addressing Climate Change, 7 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. POL'Y
10(2007).
90. HUNTER, SALZMAN & ZAELKE, supra note 41, at 631.
91. Climate change refers to the change in the earth's climate brought about by increased
concentrations of greenhouse gases, which at normal levels are actually indispensable to life on earth.
However, due to man-induced pollution problems, the delicate balance of greenhouse gases is being
affected, and is, in turn, causing the earth's temperature to rise. These gases earn their name because,
much like a greenhouse, they allow sunlight to pass through the atmosphere while trapping heat, or
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international action back in the 1970s and 1980S. 9 2 Indeed, after the danger of man-
made greenhouse gases became more apparent, many industrialized countries
committed to reducing emissions of greenhouse gases, but unlike the same
unilateral commitments for ODSs, many countries did not follow through with
concrete action.93 The first major effort to regulate climate change took place in
1992, with the creation of the Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC),
signed at the 1992 Rio Earth Summit.94 The FCCC did not include any binding
measures or obligations, but it did establish a general framework on which further
action was taken. 95 In 1997, in response to scientific evidence that emphasized the
need for binding targets and timetables, the parties to the FCCC negotiated the
Kyoto Protocol to the Convention on Climate Change.96 As we shall see, however,
the Kyoto Protocol has been the target of widespread criticism, and has had very
little success at mitigating climate change.
C. The Kyoto Protocol: An Assessment
In February 2005, the Kyoto Protocol entered into force without the
participation of the United States.97 Despite U.S. withdrawal, the parties hailed this
as a milestone in the global effort to mitigate climate change.9 8 This does not,
however, deter scholars from severely criticizing the Kyoto Protocol. Specifically,
scholars argue that under the current provisions of the Protocol, impacts on global
emissions will be negligible. For example, Olmstead and Stavins maintain:
"[b]ecause the Kyoto Protocol's ambitious targets apply only to the short term
(2008-2012) and only to industrialized nations, the agreement will impose
relatively high costs and generate only modest short-term benefits, while failing to
provide a real solution." 99 While this condemnation has enjoyed widespread
support among scholars, the most common criticism of the Kyoto Protocol can be
summarized in four propositions:
infra-red radiation, close to the earth's surface. Thus, an increase in the concentration of greenhouse
gases leads to increased warming, which in turn is adversely effecting the earth's fragile environment.
Harmful chemicals that have led to increased greenhouse gas concentrations include: carbon dioxide,
methane, nitrous oxide, halocarbons (regulated by Montreal), and other halogenated substances such as
CFCs and HCFCs.
92. HUNTER, SALZMAN & ZAELKE, supra note 41, at 632.
93. Barrett, supra note 11, at 367.
94. UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature May 29, 1992, 1771
U.N.T.S. 107 (entered into force Mar. 24, 1994), [hereinafter UNFCCC].
95. Nanda & Pring, supra note 15, at 290-94 (noting that the basis for international law to address
climate change is Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration).
96. HUNTER, SALZMAN & ZAELKE, supra note 41, at 632.
97. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, adopted
Dec. 11, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 (entered into force Feb. 16, 2005) [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]. As of
October 16, 2008, there were 182 Parties to the Kyoto Protocol. See Kyoto Protocol, Status of
Ratification, supra note 7.
98.
99. Robert N. Stavins & Sheila M. Olmstead, An International Policy Architecture for the Post-
Kyoto Era, 96 AM. EcON. REV. PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS 35, 35 (2006), available at
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/4014/international-policy-architecture for the-postkyot
o_era.html.
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1. Negotiations leading up to the Kyoto Protocol were politically
motivated and led to diluted targets that will have very little effect on
climate change.l°°
2. The non-inclusion of developing countries in binding targets
undermines the efficacy of the Kyoto Protocol."0
3. The cost-benefit structure of the Kyoto Protocol undermines its
effectiveness and encourages non-participation.10 2
4. Ineffective enforcement mechanisms help to encourage lackluster
results and encourage free-riding and trade leakage.10 3
1. Negotiations Leading up to The Kyoto Protocol
Right from the start of negotiations, the Kyoto Protocol presented a more
complex political problem than that experienced during the Montreal negotiations.
However, it wasn't until the U.S. made public its intention not to become a party to
the agreement that the real problems associated with the negotiations started to
surface. 104 In 2001, after several years of negotiations between the U.S. and the
other parties to the Kyoto Protocol, President George W. Bush withdrew the U.S.
from the Kyoto Protocol, invoking great dissatisfaction from the rest of the
world.10 5 The U.S. maintained that it would not sign the Kyoto Protocol (1) unless
developing countries were included, and (2) as long as the U.S. considered it to be
harmful to its economic interests. 106 The U.S. Senate concluded that any
"exemption for Developing Country Parties is inconsistent with the need for global
action on climate change and is environmentally flawed" and strongly believed
that proposals leading up the Kyoto Protocol "could result in serious harm to the
100. See, e.g., Barrett, supra note 11, at 371-74.
101. See generally Sunstein, supra note 1, at 4-7; Anita M. Halvorssen, Common, But
Differentiated Commitments in the Future Climate Regime: Amending the Kyoto Protocol to Include
Annex C and the Annex C Mitigation Fund, 18 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 247, 248-51 (2007).
102. See, e.g., Barrett, supra note 11, at 377-80.
103. See Bohringer & Finus, supra note 17, at 279, 284, 294 (highlighting that more realistic and
effective punishments can provide incentives for compliance, and that strategic links among countries
can counter trade leakage). Recall discussion, supra text section III(B)(1).
104. See generally Oh no, Kyoto, THE EcONOMIST, April 7, 2001. (discussing the reactions after
the U.S. withdrawal from Kyoto, and the difficulties that soon became apparent after the withdrawal).
105. Barrett, supra note 11, at 371; see also Sunstein supra note 1, at 28 (suggesting that leading up
to the creation of the final draft of the treaty, it was common knowledge that the U.S. could never join
the treaty as drafted).
106. S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. 1 (1998), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/D?c105:1:./temp/-clO5F6Lwz2::. It should be noted that, despite the frequent accusations of
partisan political approaches, the U.S.'s involvement was virtually doomed from the start, even before
President Bush came into office. In fact, even during the Clinton Administration the Senate voted 95-0
against joining the Kyoto Protocol. Despite this, however, it should be recognized that many scholars
argue that it was the way in which President Bush withdrew that increased the dissatisfaction felt by
other parties at the U.S. withdrawal. E.g., Barrett, supra note 11, at 371.
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United States economy, including significant job loss, trade disadvantages,
increased energy and consumer costs, or any combination thereof."
107
Despite the obvious problems associated with the non-participation of the
U.S. in a global action to mitigate climate change,108 several prominent scholars
also point to the resulting concessions made in an effort to save the Kyoto Protocol
from an early death.109 Specifically, in the wake of the U.S. withdrawal, many
Annex 1 countries enjoyed significantly more bargaining power and effectively
renegotiated the Kyoto Protocol, resulting in a vast downgrade of original
targets. 110 Such downgrading included large concessions concerning "sinks" and
"hot air" trading."ll With the addition of hot air trading, the Kyoto Protocol allows
countries to purchase credits from countries that have achieved surplus reductions.
While many defend this as an effective mechanism to encourage participation,
allowances have been subject to vast abuse and mismanagement. 112 For example,
after the U.S. withdrew, Russia was able to negotiate double the amount of sink
credits permitted toward calculations of its emissions.1 13 In this way, the hot air
trading scheme undermines the effectiveness of the Kyoto Protocol by merely
shifting excess surplus to countries that are not meeting target reductions, with the
end-result being that total emissions reduction is significantly diluted.'1 14 Ironically,
the determination of the remaining parties to make Kyoto work also led to
concessions on a number of issues that the U.S. had lobbied for prior to its
withdrawal. 1
5
Another example of how politics drove the negotiations leading up to Kyoto
is that choosing the year 1990 as the base level for reductions conferred significant
advantages for many of the negotiating parties. 1 6 Specifically, during the
107. S. Res. 98, supra note 106, paras. 10-1 1.
108. See Parker & Blodgett, supra note 9, at summary (showing that the U.S. emits roughly 20
percent of global GHGs); see also Oh no, Kyoto, supra note 104.
109. See, e.g., Barrett, supra note 11, at 371-74; see also Thomas, supra note 3, at 821.
110. See Scott Barrett, Kyoto Plus, in CLIMATE-CHANGE POLICY, supra note 16, at 295.
111. Barrett, supra note 11, at 371. Another example of the weakening of the Kyoto Protocol is that
countries like Canada, in acceding, have actually unilaterally claimed credits (in the case of Canada -
30 percent credit for exports of "clean" energy to the U.S.). Hot air refers to the surplus of emission
reduction for the former communist countries of Europe. For example, Russia is required to stabilize
(0% increase) its emissions under the Kyoto agreement, but. in actual fact its emissions in 2000 were
roughly 70 percent of the 1990 level. With the surplus emission reduction, other countries can trade
with Russia to comply with their obligation; in other words, not by reducing emissions, but by paying
Russia to transfer a portion of its surplus. Barrett, supra note 110, at 294.
112. See Barrett, supra note 11, at 371-74.
113. Thomas, supra note 3, at 821.
114. Id.
115. Barrett, supra note 11, at 371; see also Nanda & Pring, supra note 15, at 294-300 (discussing
the U.S.'s position during the Kyoto negotiations and its subsequent decision to withdraw from Kyoto).
116. Richard Benedick, Morals and Myths: A Commentary on Global Climate Policy, 109 WZB-
MITTEILUNGEN 15, 15 (2005). The UK's official target was 8 percent, but in 1997 its emissions were
actually 5 percent lower than 1990. In addition, Russia's target was 100 percent of 1990, but its actual
emissions were at least 30 percent below that level due to the collapse of communism. In contrast, the
United States, which was enjoying a period of huge economic boom, was by 1997 emitting greenhouse
gases at a 12 percent increase from 1990 levels. Interestingly, this created a desire by the United States
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negotiations of the Kyoto terms, a group of thirty industrialized nations agreed to
reduce their combined GHG emissions by five percent of 1990 levels by 2012.
However, in 1997, the combined emissions of these countries were already three
percent below 1990 levels.11 7 Indeed, many nations at the time knew they would
not have to undergo significant reductions to meet the target, with the exception of
the United States, which had enjoyed a period of economic boom in the 1990s. 118
Richard Benedick believes that the basic underlying problem with Kyoto was
a lack of genuine political will on all sides. After years of wrangling
over further weakening its provisions, the treaty finally became law in
2005, but the self-congratulations could not disguise that its impact on
global emissions is negligible and its short-term orientation makes it
impossible for industry to plan long-term investments.
1 9
In sum, because of the negotiation process, the parties to the Protocol
eventually signed and ratified a significantly diluted treaty. Moreover, unlike the
successful framing of the game which created a conducive environment during the
early days of the Montreal Protocol, the parties to the Kyoto Protocol have created
an environment where costs are significantly different for states, where the U.S.
has a dominant strategy to continue polluting, and where even participating
countries have incentive to ignore their obligations.
2. The Exclusion of Developing Countries from Binding Targets
The Kyoto Protocol currently imposes quantitative restrictions on
industrialized countries, but does not impose similar obligations on developing
countries. 120 Although the Montreal Protocol had to overcome the same difficulties
with regards to developing nation participation, the Montreal Protocol was
successful in adopting a more rational sequential approach to negotiations. First,
the parties to Montreal focused on creating binding targets for industrialized
nations and hence tackled the most pressing issue first.12' Only then did the parties
turn to the sensitive but secondary issue of developing world participation. The
negotiators therefore managed to solve the common but differentiated
responsibility dilemma by separating the two fundamental issues of industrial
commitments and developing world commitments. At the Kyoto negotiations,
however, the issue of developing world participation became entangled with
negotiations over binding targets in the industrial world. As Laura Thomas states,
"the climate change negotiations have taken an 'inclusive' approach in which both
to secure an emissions trading scheme, so that it could essentially make up for its projected inability to
comply with the targets by buying emissions credits from Russia. At the same time, the EU opposed
(and correctly so) such a scheme under the pretext that it would easily meet its emissions targets.
However, after U.S. withdrawal, the parties to the Kyoto Protocol nevertheless included an emissions
trading scheme. Then, when it became clear that the EU would not likely meet its obligatory targets, it
actively enticed Russia to ratify in order to gain access to its excess emissions credits. Id.
117. Id. at 15.
118. Id. at 16.
119. Id. at 17.
120. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 97, annex B; see also Barrett, supra note 11, at 370.
121. Thomas, supra note 3, at 837-39.
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industrialized and developing nations have been involved in the negotiating
process."' 122 Compounding the problem, many industrialized nations have been
reticent to agree to meaningful binding targets without the simultaneous
participation of developing countries. 123 In this way, misplaced focus on the
developing world undermined and significantly diluted negotiations that should
have been focused solely on binding targets for industrialized countries. Indeed,
involvement of developing countries in the initial negotiations undermined the
parties' ability to form and frame a clear and foreseeable series of iterations (or
games representing different stages of agreement), through which uncertainty
would not have undermined cooperation.
The inclusion of binding targets for the developing world, albeit at a later
stage, is necessary to the long run effectiveness of the Kyoto Protocol. The
argument for imposing mandatory obligations on developing countries is not that
their exclusion is unfair, but rather, that a partial agreement (one not including
developing countries) is environmentally ineffective and costly at the same time
because the Annex 1 industrial countries would presumably undertake significant
costs only to see emissions migrate to developing countries. 12 4 In addition to
concerns for production shifting, many critics point out that without the
participation of developing nations, particularly those with high growth rates, the
Kyoto Protocol will have a negligible effect on global greenhouse gas emissions. 
125
It is significant that eight of the top twenty emitter countries are rapidly
industrializing, highly competitive "developing" countries. 126 Moreover. India's
greenhouse gas emissions exceed Germany's, those of South Korea exceed France,
and China recently became the largest emitter of greenhouse gases in the world.
127
Yet, none of these countries is obligated to comply with the Kyoto Protocol. While
many development scholars argue that the industrialized countries need to lead by
example, Barrett counters that leading by example is fundamentally flawed
because, if the current parties obligated under Kyoto do succeed in reducing their
emissions substantially, the costs paid by their respective industries will rise and
the incentive for other countries (developing countries) will fall because of a shift
in comparative advantage, or leakage. 12 In addition, it is generally the case that
122. Id. at 839.
123. Id.
124. Barrett, supra note 11, at 305. The concept of trade leakage is discussed supra text section
III(B)(1).
125. See Thomas, supra note 3, at 821-22.
126. See Parker & Blodgett, supra note 9, app. A.
127. Id.; see China Tops U.S. in Greenhouse Gas, Group Finds, N.Y.TIMES, June 21, 2007, at A;
see also Michael P. Vandenbergh, Climate Change: The China Problem. 81 S. CAL. L. REv. 905 (2008)
(discussing how to create incentives for China and the United States to make prompt, large emissions
reductions in light of the fact that they are the two largest emitters of GHGs).
128. Barrett, supra note 110, at 283-84. It should be noted that the author does not mean to
undermine the reality that the industrialized countries are certainly responsible for the vast majority of
the increase in GHG emissions over the past few decades, and that they need to take on significant costs
as a result. This paper merely seeks to point out that developing nations collectively will soon overtake
the industrialized (Annex 1) countries in global GHG emissions, and hence, must become part of a
long-term solution.
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wider participation in environmental treaties significantly lowers the cost to each
individual country participant. 129 To put the exclusion of developing nations into
perspective, Scott Barrett highlights that:
[T]he Kyoto Protocol would only limit the emissions of about 30 of the
world's 200 or so countries by only about 5 per cent for a period of just
5 years. Even if Kyoto worked as intended, the emissions of the
countries unconstrained by the agreement would rise, making it very
unlikely that Kyoto would even stabilize global emissions, let alone
reduce them, even over such a short period. 3
3. Unfavorable Cost-benefit Structures of Participation
Undoubtedly, one of the largest factors undermining the Kyoto Protocol is
that, under the current terms, the treaty has an unfavorable cost-benefit structure.
Mitigating climate change will present the industrialized nations with
"unprecedented challenges, because it can only be achieved through extraordinary
changes in the production and consumption of energy, thus affecting virtually all
areas of economic activity... '131 This cost cannot be avoided, and must be
undertaken by the global community to begin to reverse the effects of global
warming. However, under the current climate change regime, incentives are not
structured to minimize non-cooperation payoff structures and do not coincide with
the optimum cost-benefit positions. 132 Bohringer and Finus argue that "decision-
making in climate policy requires balancing total costs of greenhouse-gas-emission
abatement and total benefits of avoided undesirable consequences of global
warming." 133 They also note that abatement costs are equalized across time.134 That
is, abatement should be undertaken when it is cheapest and most effective, taking
into account that such abatement costs can lower as technology progresses. Such
arguments suggest that the Kyoto should create targets and timetables that are
sensitive to the immediate high costs of such reductions, with the aim of increasing
target reductions as costs start to fall.
To add to this, Barrett and Sustein argue that the Kyoto Protocol needs to
restructure its payoffs to create incentives for wide participation and to encourage
compliance. 135 This is based on the premise that the current climate change regime
presents a Prisoner's Dilemma, where the dominant strategy is to pollute (or fail to
comply). Instead, the parties to the Kyoto Protocol need to create an environment
that is more reflective of that present in a game of Harmony, where the dominant
strategy is cooperation or abatement. Remember, in a choice between continuing to
129. Id. at 304.
130. Barrett, supra note 110, at 288.
131. See Rudiger Wolfrum & Jurgen Friedrich, The Framework Convention on Climate Change
and the Kyoto Protocol, in ENSURING COMPLIANCE WITH MULTILATERAL ENVIRONMENTAL
AGREEMENTS: A DIALOGUE BETWEEN PRACTITIONERS AND ACADEMIA 53, 53 (Ulrich Beyerlin, Peter-
Tobias Stoll & Rudiger Wolfrum eds., 2006).
132. Bohringer & Finus, supra note 17, at 254-55 (discussing optimum cost-benefit positions).
133. Id. at 254.
134. Id. at 255.
135. See Barrett, supra note 11, at 389.
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pollute and abating pollution, countries will choose to do that which presents a
higher payoff.136 It is, therefore, imperative that the climate change regime
improve incentives to cooperate or diminish payoffs associated with non-
cooperation.
One suggestion is the inclusion of trade restriction mechanisms similar to
those under the Montreal Protocol. 137 Article IV of the Montreal Protocol
successfully led to increased country participation by providing market incentives
to join and diminishing the payoff structure of non-cooperation by deterring trade
leakage. Indeed, because the industrialized countries did not have to worry about
trade leakage, they were far more willing to accept binding targets with the
knowledge that trade restrictions, coupled with financial incentives, would
encourage broader participation at a later stage. 138 The Kyoto protocol, however,
includes no such trade restrictions, and industrialized countries do not enjoy the
security of assured mutual participation. The inclusion of trade restriction
mechanisms would ultimately reform and reframe the game by assuring higher
expectations of compliance in others. In this way, the Prisoner's Dilemma faced by
most parties to the Kyoto Protocol, could be changed to represent a situation more
like the game of Harmony.
An examination of the underlying reasons for the U.S. withdrawal from the
Kyoto Protocol offers convincing proof of the need for renewed incentives to
encourage participation. Sustein argues that the cost-benefit of participating and
complying with the Kyoto Protocol suggest that the U.S. should not comply with
the Kyoto Protocol even if all other countries do. Sustein states:
To the United States, the monetized benefits of the Montreal Protocol
dwarfed the monetized costs, and hence the circumstances were
extremely promising for American support.... The Kyoto Protocol
presented a radically different picture... the monetized benefits of the
Kyoto Protocol would be dwarfed by the monetized costs.. .Hence the
circumstances were unpromising for a successful agreement - and they
were especially unpromising for American participation... '39
It is plausible to suggest that the U.S. will only participate in an agreement
that leads to at least a convergence of the perceived domestic costs of emission
reductions with that of the perceived domestic benefits from such reduction. 140 In
136. For a more complete discussion on the Prisoner's Dilemma and its application to multilateral
environmental treaties see generally Barrett, supra note 11, at 53-61, 196, 290.
137. It should be noted, however, that a trade restriction mechanism would be far more difficult to
create and manage than that created for ODSs; however, some scholars have proposed that it is certainly
possible. One thing is clear - the Kyoto Protocol could certainly benefit from "a better integration of the
two competing realms of international trade and environmental law." Thomas, supra note 3, at 850.
138. Id.
139. Sunstein, supra note 1, at 5-6. This cost-benefit analysis also helps to explain why there are
different levels of compliance between the Montreal Protocol (which enjoys near perfect compliance)
and the Kyoto Protocol (which is known to suffer from widespread non-compliance).
140. WILLIAM NORDHAUS & JOSEPH BOYER, WARMING THE WORLD 162-68 (2000). Norhaus and
Boyer tabulated the costs associated with the U.S. involvement in Kyoto. According to them, for the
U.S., under a treaty that involves a trading scheme, the cost of compliance would be roughly $325
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this regard, convergence will take place when the climate change regime creates
incentives that either increase the benefits of participation (mitigating the cost of
participation) or increase the cost of non-participation. It is in the latter notion of
increasing the costs of non-participation that the current regime can affect the most
change. Again, a good example is the inclusion of trade restriction measures like
those under the Montreal Protocol, which effectively create an incentive for
countries to participate, and impose significant costs on non-participation.
4. Unfavorable Cost-benefit Structures of Compliance
With the notable exception of the U.S., and the non-binding obligations
imposed on developing countries, the Kyoto Protocol enjoys a significant
participation with 174 parties. But is this enough? The majority of literature
devoted to answering this question maintains that it is not. Indeed, several critics
point to the fact that despite the broad participation in the Kyoto Protocol by
industrialized nations, compliance remains largely weak.141 The larger point is,
therefore, that despite significant participation, climate change issues are not being
adequately solved, bringing the efficacy of the Kyoto Protocol into question.
Thus, in addition to broad participation, an effective multilateral
environmental agreement necessarily needs to "deepen" cooperation.' 42 Indeed,
many scholars argue that broad participation can, in fact, be a product of mostly
shallow cooperation.143 To deepen cooperation, a treaty or MEA must necessarily
design an effective compliance system to enforce commitments. Compliance
systems therefore play an important role in framing the rules of the game. Scholars
devoted to the study of compliance and enforcement advance two general
approaches to maintaining compliance: (1) an "enforcement approach" where non-
compliance is deterred through the use of threats, sanctions and other methods of
punishment; and (2) a "management approach" where the parties clearly delineate
obligations and use positive incentives to encourage compliance with these
obligations. "'AWhile both approaches seek the same outcome, they use very
different means of ensuring such an outcome. Frischmann describes how the
enforcement approach uses a variety of "hard" sanctions (such as trade sanctions or
economic penalty), whereas the management approach uses a variety of "soft"
sanctions (such as noncompliance reports and privilege suspension). 45 A closer
look at the Montreal Protocol, however, illustrates that the two approaches are not
billion. In the same light, the benefits of complying with the Kyoto Protocol are estimated to be roughly
$12 billion. For the world as a whole, the costs are actually lower, standing at about $217 billion. On
the other hand, according to estimates, the cost of climate change globally stands to be around $4
trillion. As a result, it is difficult to doubt that any treaty that has the potential to mitigate such costs is
not a worthy goal; however, in the case of Kyoto, the net benefits are at best marginal because it will
only have a small effect on aggregate emissions worldwide.
141. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 1, at 4; see also Parker & Blodgett, supra note 9, at 12.
142. See George Downs et al., Is the good news about compliance good news about cooperation?,
50 INT'L ORG. 379, 383 (1996).
143. See, e.g., David G. Victor, Enforcing International Law: Implications for an Effective Global
Warming Regime, 10 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 147, 152 (1999).
144. See, e.g., Frischmann, supra note 16, at 737.
145. Id. at 738-39.
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necessarily mutually exclusive. In fact, the Montreal Protocol's use of both
enforcement approaches ultimately plays a large role in ensuring almost full
compliance. For example, the trade restriction mechanism (hard sanction) helps to
encourage participation, while reporting requirements and technical assistance
(soft sanctions) help to undermine uncertainty and encourage compliance. 146 Why
then, can the Kyoto Protocol not adopt the same approach?
Shallow cooperation, at least concerning the Kyoto Protocol, is encouraged
because of the fact that enforcement mechanisms are not legally binding and can
only become legally binding by an amendment.1 47 Since any party can decline to
ratify an amendment, it can avoid being punished for failing to comply.
1 48
Moreover, the current compliance mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol, agreed
on in Bonn in 2001, are fundamentally flawed. It is even suggested that they
merely encourage non-compliance and might actually encourage non-
participation.149 Currently, if a party does not meet its obligations it can be
"punished" in two ways: (1) by accepting additional reductions in its emissions
during the control period following the period in which the country failed to
comply, and (2) by being excluded from the emission trading scheme.1 5o Thus, the
enforcement mechanisms merely delay punishment and actually ignore the fact
that delayed penalties increase participation costs with each control period. In this
way, the non-compliance measures make non-participation more attractive. 151 This
does not mean that the Kyoto Protocol is incorrect for trying to encourage states to
comply with their obligations. On the contrary, "coercive enforcement measures
are sometimes needed, particularly when the cooperation is deep and incentives to
defect are high."' 5 2 This would suggest that there is a trade-off between
encouraging participation and deepening cooperation. The Montreal Protocol
provides a good example of a treaty that established a healthy balance between the
two: creating an optimum cost-benefit structure to encourage participation through
incentives, including adequate enforcement mechanisms to deepen cooperation.
Kyoto, on the other hand, has large participation, a sub-optimal cost-benefit
structure and inadequate enforcement mechanisms to encourage deeper
cooperation.
146. See id. at 797-804; Weiss, supra note 44, at 147, 152-53.
147. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 97, art. 20. Article 20 states that an amendment requires at least
three-fourths of the parties present and voting at the meeting.
148. Barrett, supra note 11, at 384.
149. Id. at 384, 386.
150. Id. at 386.
15 1. Id. Another flaw is that compliance relies on self-punishment, in that it is only legally binding
if a nation chooses to ratify any such amendment. Countries that are most likely to fall short of
compliance will be the very countries that are least likely to approve such an amendment.
152. Teall Crossen, Multilateral Environmental Agreements and the Compliance Continuum, 16
GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 473, 493; see also Victor, supra note 143, at 151.
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Scott Barrett sums up participation in the Kyoto Protocol as follows:
The USA failed to participate (at least in part) because the costs of
participation were high. Other countries agreed to participate (at least in
part) because the costs to them of participating were low (as is true for
some EU states), zero (as is true for all non-Annex I states) or even
negative (as is true for the states given 'hot air' allowances). The Annex
I countries likely to have the hardest time complying (Canada and
Japan) agreed to participate only on the condition that their initial
reduction obligations be diluted.
153
Thus, one can see that the negotiations leading up to the creation of the Kyoto
Protocol ultimately led to a diluted agreement that has done very little to curb
GHG emissions, and will continue to do very little unless significant changes are
made. On the contrary, the Montreal Protocol is a model of efficacy and
effectiveness in that it enjoys near perfect compliance and has done a great deal to
reverse damage to the ozone layer.154 While the two agreements were created to
address the two most significant environmental threats facing mankind, their
structure, provisions, and respective mechanisms have led to radically different
outcomes.
The goal of any MEA is to encourage both broad participation and deep
cooperation. However, the Kyoto Protocol exhibits mostly broad participation,
along with shallow cooperation and weak compliance. This was a result of the
failed negotiation process that created a settlement for the lowest common
denominator of the parties to the agreement.
However, to encourage deeper cooperation, the Kyoto Protocol needs to
restructure incentives to ensure participation and compliance. Such incentives
include encouraging participation and then discouraging "defection" by
implementing coercive compliance mechanisms that change the cost-benefit
structure of potential defection. Such a treaty would satisfy the following criteria
introduced at the start of this paper:
Individually rational: such individual rationalism comes about when the
cost-benefit assessment is favorable for a nation to gain (or at least not
lose significantly) from treaty participation, either through the costs of
non-participation or direct benefits of participation.
Collectively rational: such rationalism is created when countries are
encouraged to participate and comply with the obligations imposed by the
treaty by creating a system of incentives, constrained by the credibility of
threats or enforcement mechanisms to discourage defection.
153. Barrett, supra note 110, at 295.
154. Indeed the Montreal Protocol has even had a substantial effect on climate change mitigation
because ODSs also contribute to climate change and, hence, their phase-out has provided substantial
climate change mitigation. Donald Kaniaru et al., Strengthening the Montreal Protocol: Insurance
Against Abrupt Climate Change, 7 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL'Y 3, 3 (2007).
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Fair: in that it must be perceived by the parties as being legitimate,
reinforcing the individual and collective rationality of the agreement. 1
55
To date, there has been significant legal scholarship on proposed alternatives
to the Kyoto Protocol. However, some of the most common proposals can be listed
as follows:
(1) Broader participation by industrial and developed nations is needed to
address the global commons problem effectively and efficiently. Such
proposals include measures such as "growth targets"'' 56 or creating an
annex for fast-growing developing countries like China, India and
Brazil. 157 Moreover, industrialized countries can also create a similar fund
to that created under the Montreal Protocol in order to lower the cost to
developing countries through direct and in-kind transfers. In this way, the
offer of side payments can be a strategic choice in that the transfer of
money and technology can help ensure that countries that would have lost
by participating, can now reap the benefits of participation.
(2) Include a more comprehensive and fully integrated global emission
trading scheme that would allow businesses instead of governments to
decide for themselves how to spend money on cutting emissions by
setting a variable carbon price. 58 In the alternative to a trading scheme, a
viable carbon taxing system would likely provide the same amount of
flexibility. Any foreseeable agreement on this raging debate would likely
include both measures. 
159
(3) Include measures and mechanisms in the Kyoto Protocol to prevent
trade leakage. Indeed, it was the trade restrictions, along with the
155. See Barrett, supra note 11, at xii-xiv.
156. Olmstead & Stavins, supra note 99, at 35.
157. See generally Halvorssen, supra note 101, at 248.
158. See Fiona Harvey, UN carbon tax advocacy opens old wounds, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2007.
The targets and timetables approach of the Montreal Protocol served to put producers and the relevant
industries on notice that alternative technology was going to have to be developed in light of eventual
cuts, or even complete phase-outs. In this way, the parties gave private business the go-ahead to start
investing in alternatives to CFCs. The resulting incentive then became for producers to be the first to
produce and market CFC alternatives to be sold around the world. Indeed, once substitutes became
available, developing nations were more inclined to use such technology over obsolete CFC technology.
An example of how this process worked is illustrated by Dupont's announcement one year prior to the
Montreal Protocol that it believed it could produce an alternative within five years, but the regulatory
environment had not given them enough incentive to justify the required investment. By late 1988,
Dupont and several other companies had created alternative chemicals. Currently there are a growing
number of companies that view climate change regulation as inevitable, and some are even starting to
propose that the US ratify the Kyoto Protocol to create conditions of investment certainty. In addition,
many companies are now taking the position that the Kyoto Protocol could offer market opportunities
and are pressing the US to reconsider its position. See generally Thomas, supra note 3, at 810 (noting
that the targets and timetables approach adopted by the Montreal Protocol had the additional benefit of
sending signals to CFC producing businesses that investments in alternatives would be profitable).
159. See Editorial, Groundhog Day, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 278, 2007.
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compensation mechanisms to developing countries for incremental costs
that led to a much broader participation among the developing world in
the Montreal Protocol. While such a provision would undoubtedly be
harder to administer under Kyoto, a "hybrid" version could be created to
ensure adequate administration and enforcement. Trade restrictions do
two things: (1) punish those that do not cooperate, and (2) correct for
losses in "competitiveness" of the countries that do participate. Also,
trade restrictions encourage participation, and with higher participation,
the detrimental concerns of competitiveness are lower.
(4) Kyoto should facilitate more technology transfer and joint research
and development (R&D) on a global scale. 160 The Montreal Protocol
encourages the sharing of R&D between participants and even between
participants and non-participants. 16 In addition, improving the
technological capacity of all countries encourages participation because
the cost of participation is lowered if a country is given a leg-up in the
form of cleaner technology before joining an agreement that obliges it to
undertake significant emissions reductions.
(5) Improve compliance and enforcement mechanisms to encourage
compliance from the industrialized countries. Here, it might be proactive
to include the ability to adjust compliance mechanism without party
ratification, as is required for an amendment.
The Parties to the Kyoto Protocol met in Bali between December 3 to
December 14 of 2007 to discuss a successor to the Kyoto Protocol. 162 Politics did,
and will continue, to inevitably play a large role in the future of climate change
mitigation. However, to have a significant and lasting impact on GHG emissions,
the successor to the Kyoto Protocol must include adequate incentives to encourage
broad participation, deepen cooperation, and encourage widespread compliance.
The fate of the earth's fragile climate is at stake, and with the Kyoto Protocol's
relatively lackluster impact on mitigating climate change, politics needs to give
way to efficient, efficacious, and lasting solutions that can turn the comer in a
somewhat stalled climate change regime.
160. For a complete discussion of what type of research and development measures should be
incorporated into the Kyoto Protocol, and what role such measures could play, see Barrett, supra note
11, at 391-98.
161. Montreal Protocol, supra note 49, art. 9; see also Barrett, supra note 11, at 309-10, 393-94
(noting that an indication of the lack of effectiveness behind Kyoto is that in many of the most pro-
Kyoto countries, government funded energy R&D actually decreased). Indeed a reverse relationship
exists too: creating more of an incentive for Kyoto participation through effective compliance will
undoubtedly speed up R&D for alternative technology.
162. See Fiona Harvey and John Aglionby, Bali near deal to save forests, FIN. TIMEs, Dec. 12,
2009

